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CHAPTER 1 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis responds to a problem outlined by many scholars and 
professionals concerning the establishment of a compliance function within 
American, British, and German private sector companies.1 The challenge is to 
ensure, on the one hand, that this job description be tailored to a company’s 
unique characteristics and, on the other, that the compliance officer2 (CO) be 
provided with the requisite authority and tools.3 Next, it examines in detail the 
legal background, definition, the concept, the role and classification of the 
compliance position within companies in the US, the UK, and Germany. To better 
understand the role of the compliance function, this thesis provides a legal 
comparison of the common law system and the civil law system. The findings 
ought to reveal which aspects from the common law and practice could be 
transferred to the German compliance officer to strengthen the position. In some 
cases, limitations attributable to the cultural and legal background may also come 
to light.  
                                                     
1 The term private sector in this thesis refers to the segment of the economy that is not 
controlled or owned by the government. The private sector is run by individuals and 
companies. The entities that operate in the private sector are business enterprises, small 
and medium-sized companies, as well as national, international, multinational 
corporations listed on stock exchanges. Examples include firms, organizations, 
corporations and companies. Black's Law Dictionary defines a corporation as "an 
association of shareholders (or even a single shareholder) created under law and regarded 
as an artificial person by courts. See in: US Legal Inc., CORPORATE LAW AND LEGAL 
DEFINITION |, https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/corporate-law/ (last visited Jul 15, 2015). 
2 The use of the terms ‘compliance officer ’, ‘compliance manager ’, ‘compliance personnel’ 
and ‘compliance professional’ in this thesis shall also include a chief compliance officer 
(CCO) and the ethics officer in the US in particular. In the interest of readability, the male 
form is used throughout.  
3 Scott A. Roney & Patricia J. Harned, Leading Corporate Integrity: Defining the Role of the 
Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer (CECO), in ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER (ERC), 1 (2007). 
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The role and significance of the compliance position of a company have 
increased considerably in recent years. The present discussion4 focuses on how 
the role has evolved over the last 40 years. The evidence highlights the fact that 
during this period in particular, the position of the compliance officer has 
changed dramatically. The legislation and statutory regulations put into place 
during this time have had a significant and far-reaching impact on companies 
today. As a result, new requirements have arisen and the scope of tasks and 
responsibilities that the compliance officer is expected to fulfill to are set to 
increase. 
With regard to possible claims for compensation, regulatory penalties, and 
damage to the reputation of companies, the compliance function is designed to 
eliminate statutory violations on the part of the company by means of effective 
preventative measures and structures. The role of the compliance officer has 
gained a new importance in the corporate environment in order to conform to 
these requests5. For instance, one survey of chief compliane officers confirmed 
that, “…the compliance function has never been more critical to long-term corporate 
success.”6 Notably, a study by PwC evaluated the strengths, the weaknesses, and 
the scope of this function and found that “…the scope of the compliance officer’s 
                                                     
4 See, e.g., Rowan Bosworth-Davies, An Analysis of Compliance Officer: Attitudes towards 
insider dealing, 20 Crime Law Soc Change 339–357 (1993).; Deborah A. DeMott, The Crucial 
but (Potentially) Precarious Position of the Chief Compliance Officer, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
&COM. L. 56–79 (2013).; Nicole Dando et al., The Evolving Responsibilities & Liabilities of 
Ethics Representatives: A practical guide,  in EBEF Paper One (2013).; Christoph E. Hauschka, 
Zum Berufsbild des Compliance Officers, 2014 CCZ 2014, 165 - beck-online 165–170 (2014).; 
Christian Heuking, Der Compliance Officer – Aufgaben und Anforderungen, 65 Information - 
Wissenschaft & Praxis 327–330 (2014).; Geoffrey P Miller, The Compliance Function: An 
Overview (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2527621 (last visited Dec 12, 2014).; James 
Weber & Dana Fortun, Ethics and Compliance Officer Profile: Survey, Comparison, and 
Recommendations, 110 Business and Society Review 97–115 (2005). 
5 S. WEINSTEIN & C. WILD, LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT, GOVERNANCE AND COMPLIANCE: A 
GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICE FROM LEADING EXPERTS 357 (2013), 
https://books.google.de/books?id=ba6aMQEACAAJ.  
6 Chief Compliance Officer Data Survey - Consero Group, 2 (2012), 
https://consero.com/2012-chief-compliance-officer-data-survey/ (last visited Dec 5, 2014). 
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purview is expanding....”7 A further study by PWC with 1,056 responses from 
compliance executives concluded that  
Compliance officers have been tasked with an increasing number of responsibilities, 
have been asked to manage a complex variety of compliance risks and have exceeded 
expectations in many areas. … The business and regulatory landscape is becoming more 
complex, and management and boards are pressuring CCOs to deliver better information 
to help them identify and manage a growing list of organizational risks. 8 
High-profile corporate scandals involving compliance failures, such as 
those at Enron, WorldCom9 or Siemens AG, indicate that loss of reputation can 
have a significant and, in some instances, fatal effect on a company. International 
companies recognize this and invest intensively in effective systems to detect and 
prevent compliance breaches. Today, compliance guidelines are a must-have desk 
reference for in-house corporate counsel and compliance officers involved in the 
compliance, audit, or legal functions within companies.10 For this reason, the 
compliance officer is an essential and significant function within companies.11 
Therefore, the academic debate focuses on the challenges facing the role of 
                                                     
7 MATT KELLY, SALLY BERNSTEIN & BARBARA KIPP, PWC-2012-COMPLIANCE-STUDY.PDF 7 
(2012), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/risk-management/assets/pwc-2012-compliance-
study.pdf (last visited Dec 5, 2014). 
8 SALLY BERNSTEIN & ANDREA FALCIONE, PWC-2014 COMPLIANCE SURVEY 2 (2014), 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/risk-management/state-of-compliance-survey/2014-
compliance-survey-resources.html (last visited Dec 5, 2014). 
9 Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WORLDCOM’S COLLAPSE: THE OVERVIEW; 
WORLDCOM FILES FOR BANKRUPTCY; LARGEST US CASE, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 
22, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overview-
worldcom-files-for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html (last visited Feb 3, 2014).The 
WORLDCOM (today MCI) scandal in 2002 was the largest accounting fraud in American 
history. This accounting scandal was the deciding factor behind the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act into United States federal law (enacted July 30, 2002) to protect 
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. See also Mark 
Tran, WorldCom accounting scandal, THE GUARDIAN, August 9, 2002, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2002/aug/09/corporatefraud.worldcom2 (last 
visited Feb 3, 2014). 
10 Id. WEINSTEIN AND WILD, supra note 5. 
11 Patrick J. Gnazzo, The Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer: A Test of Endurance, 116 
BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW 533–553, 533 (2011). 
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compliance officers.12 The main issue is that the compliance officer and other 
compliance staff are relatively new positions.13 It is clear that with the emergence 
of a new corporate position, one of the first – and most important - tasks is to 
define and classify precisely what this new and modern role entails. 
B. RELEVANCE OF PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The current academic debate14 also focuses on future developments, on a 
repositioning and structural reorganization of the compliance function and the 
expertise of compliance officers. Another issue encountered in daily business is 
the discussion concerning the effectiveness of the compliance officer and the 
establishment of practical, flexible standards for this position within companies.15 
Furthermore, there has been greater emphasis on the independence and 
impartiality of the compliance officer.16 In the US, it has been proposed that the 
compliance function should be independent from the general counsel, due to its 
supervisory tasks on behalf of the board of directors. Gnazzo takes the stance that 
the compliance position should not be subject to the authority of the legal 
department, because the tasks of this function are clearly beyond the duties of the 
general counsel.17 In addition, it has been proposed that reporting directly to the 
management would greatly enhance the compliance officer’s independence, 
                                                     
12 Michael D. Greenberg, Perspectives of chief ethics and compliance officers on the detection and 
prevention of corporate misdeeds: what the policy community should know, , Preface (2009). 
13 JAN CHRISTIAN HELLER, JOSEPH E. MURPHY & MARK E. MEANEY, GUIDE TO PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN COMPLIANCE Preface (2001). 
14 See e.g. Michael D. Greenberg, Transforming compliance: emerging paradigms for boards, 
management, compliance officers, and government,  (Rand Corporation ed., 2014); Chris 
Taylor, The Evolution of Compliance, 6 JOURNAL OF INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 54–58 (2005); 
Michael R. Rosella & Domenick Pugliese, The Investment Company Chief Compliance Officer: 
Three years later – an Assessment of the Evolution of the Role of the CCO, 7 JOURNAL OF 
INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 16–22 (2006). 
15 See e.g. Greenberg, supra note 12; HELLER, MURPHY, AND MEANEY, supra note 13; Gordon 
McMurray, Standards and Qualities expected of Compliance Staff, 5 JOURNAL OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 59–61 (1997). 
16 See e.g. Gnazzo, supra note 11; Greenberg, supra note 12; W. Michael Hoffman, John D. 
Neill & O. Scott Stovall, An Investigation of Ethics Officer Independence, 78 JOURNAL OF 
BUSINESS ETHICS 87–95 (2008). 
17 Id. Gnazzo, supra note 11 at 548. 
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thereby reducing conflicts of interest.18 Majewski’s conclusion that the compliance 
officer should seek independent outside sources could provide a solution to 
managing compliance conflicts.19 
Another aspect identified by DeStefano is that compliance officers are often 
involved in administrative proceedings before the courts on account of their role 
in ensuring compliance with the law and applicable rules within firms.20 On the 
one hand, companies are able to exercise the increased responsibility of the 
compliance function, while, on the other hand, a compliance officer needs a 
certain degree of political power, a defined framework within which to work, and 
standards to work to within the role.21 
The foregoing considerations in terms of compliance have resulted in a 
number of court decisions concerning corporate directors’ and officer’s duties 
under common law. For instance, in a much-debated judgment, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery discussed the potential liability for directorial decisions and 
the board's responsibility to monitor and oversee.22 In the most important opinion 
by Chancellor Allen,23 he pointed out that the members of Caremark's ‘board of 
directors’24 breached their ‘fiduciary duty’25 of care by failing to supervise the 
                                                     
18 See e.g. Gnazzo, supra note 11; Hoffman, Neill, and Stovall, supra note 16; Thomas M. 
Majewski, Conflicts of Interest Chief Compliance Officers face in implementing 
Compliance Programs for Investment Funds and Investment Advisers, 7 Journal of 
Investment Compliance 23–27 (2006). 
19 Id. Majewski, supra note 18 at 26. 
20 Michele Beardslee DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization 
May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 71–182, 82 (2013). 
21 Id. at 82. 
22 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), 698 
A.2d 959 (1996). 
23 CHANCELLOR ALLEN, MEMORANDUM OPINION, IN RE CAREMARK 
INTERNATIONAL INC. DERIVATIVE LITIGATION (1996), http://www.wlrk.com/docs/ 
INRECAREMARKINTERNATIONALINCDERIVATIVELITIGATION.pdf (last visited 
Dec 6, 2015). 
24 In the US, the ‘board of directors’ is responsible for governing the company. In 
accordance with the Delaware General Corporation Law the ‘board of directors’ means: 
“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors. See Title 8 DELAWARE CODE, 
DEL. CODE ANN. Ch. 1, § 141 (a). 
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conduct of Caremark’s employees. This decision was the starting point for the 
definition of internal monitoring requirements and standards of the board under 
US State Corporation Law. Caremark laid the groundwork for other cases in the 
US.26 In addition, in 2009, the Delaware Supreme Court determined in Gantler v. 
Stephens27 “Who is an officer?” and “What is an officer’s duty?” In conclusion, the 
court held that officers of Delaware companies owe the same duties of care and 
loyalty as directors.28 
In the same year, 2009, a decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH)29 in 
Germany outlined an obiter dictum regarding an compliance officer's 
responsibility within a company. Although this case dealt with the head of the 
legal department’s monitoring obligation within a company, it integrated the still 
relatively novel company function ‘compliance’ into the German legal system.30 In 
other words, the decision provides the reasoning behind summarizing the legal 
requirements for ‘compliance’ within the company, as well as the tasks, authorities 
and legal obligations pertaining to the employees concerned. 
In contrast, the main issues surrounding this function in terms of corporate 
law and employment law in Germany have highlighted a number of unclear facts 
and uncertain legal situations. Following the decision of the Federal Supreme 
Court (BGH),31 an academic discussion32 about the duties and responsibilities 
                                                                                                                                                  
25 The term ‘fiduciary’ means “a person charged under the law with making decisions 
fundamental to the welfare of someone else.” A ‘fiduciary duty’ is the legal duty that a 
fiduciary owes to the person on whose behalf he is acting.” See G.P. MILLER, THE LAW OF 
GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 49 (1. ed. 2014). 
26 Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE 
LAW 719–755, 724, 755 (2007). 
27 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009), 965 A.2d 695, 709 (2009). 
28 MARC J. LANE, REPRESENTING CORPORATE OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, MANAGERS, AND 
TRUSTEES 67 (2nd ed. 2010). 
29 BGH, 17.7.2009 - 5 StR 394/08 - Überhöhte Straßenreinigungsentgelte, 2009 NJW 3173–
3177 (2009). Responsibility under criminal law on account of professional position. 
30 Id. footnote 23 (1). 
31 Id. footnote 6, 19. 
32 See e.g. Jürgen Bürkle, Grenzen der strafrechtlichen Garantenstellung des Compliance-Officers, 
2010 CCZ 4–12 (2010); Tim Wybitul, Strafbarkeitsrisiken für Compliance-Verantwortliche, 2009 
BB 2590–2593 (2009); See, e.g., Gernot Zimmermann, Die straf- und zivilrechtliche 
Verantwortlichkeit des Compliance Officers, 2011 BB 634–637 (2011). 
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relating to the compliance function has begun in Germany. The key issue is that 
the legal scope of action in which a German compliance officer works is currently 
largely unspecified in legal terms. Its implementation within the company is not 
consistently standardized. Germany has no legal provisions concerning 
compliance outside of the banking and insurance industry. In conclusion, in 
Germany, a complete legal character of the compliance officer does not yet exist 
and a “standardized legal profile” is still lacking.33 Therefore, it might be useful to 
examine the legal environment of the compliance function outside of Germany 
and to explore the professional status and role of the corporate compliance officer 
in other countries. 
As previously mentioned, in Germany, the legal character of the compliance 
officer has existed only within organizations that operate in heavily regulated 
industries, such as the financial services. According to Section 33 of the German 
Securities Trading Act (WpHG) there is an obligation to establish a compliance 
position in securities - related services enterprises.34 Furthermore, in its 
MAComp,35 the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bafin) outlines 
the minimum requirements for this position. 36 In this newsletter, it is advised that 
the compliance officer’s independence and a guaranteed prohibition against 
discrimination could be promoted by appointment for a 24-month period, with a 
12-month notice period for termination of the employment contract.37  
                                                     
33 Daniel Geiger, Nemo ultra posse obligatur - Zur strafrechtlichen Haftung von Compliance-
Beauftragten ohne Disziplinargewalt,  CCZ 170–174, 170 (2011). 
34 WPHG, WpHG SECURITIES TRADING ACT Federal Law Gazette I, 2708 33 (1998). 
35 Richtlinie des Bundesaufsichtsamtes für den Wertpapierhandel zur Konkretisierung der 
Organisationspflichten von Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen gemäß § 33 Abs. 1 
WpHG vom 25. October 1999, See http://www.uni-leipzig.de/bankinstitut/files/ 
dokumente/1999-10-25-01_0.pdf, (last visit Dec 6, 2014) 
36 The Bafin supervises banks, financial services providers, insurance undertakings and 
securities trading. The objective of financial supervision is to ensure the proper 
functioning, stability and integrity of the German financial market. See, 
http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Broschuere/dl_b_bafin_about_us.pdf?_
_blob=publicationFile, (last visited Dec 6, 2014) 
37 Bafin (2010) Newsletter 4/2010 (WA) – MaComp B.T. 1.3.3.4 Measures of Ensurance the 
independence of the Compliance-function, See: http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/ 
Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Rundschreiben/rs_1004_wa_macomp.html?nn=2818068# 
doc2676654bodyText24, (last visit Dec 6, 2014) 
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More recently, both the case law and the legislature have begun to set out 
the first concrete explanation of this function. The legal practice of the Criminal 
Senate of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) has gained influence on compliance 
practice in companies that actually has civil origin.38 In this context, it is 
interesting to note that the draft for the introduction of a new corporate criminal 
law submitted by the conference of justice ministers deals with compliance 
issues.39 This draft includes extensive legal consequences ranging from (1) fines, 
(2) the public announcement of the conviction, (3) the exclusion from entitlement 
to subsidies, and (4) the dissolution of the association.40 Other critical voices41 do 
not deem new legislation necessary because these penalties could be adopted into 
exting law.42 At this time, the German legislatior is examining the enhancement of 
sanctions against companies in cases of legal violations. Two options are probably 
appear on the one side an extension of the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG) or 
on the other side the creation of a new corporate criminal law.43 In the view of the 
German federal government, a compliance system could be a preventative 
protection system in order to prevent violations.44 In sum, in Germany an altered 
legal environment could enhance compliance structures and the compliance 
function within companies. Ultimately, it remains to be seen whether this draft 
will be upheld as legally binding and will, in fact, enter into force.45 
The current German academic debate about the compliance function 
contains the following important topics: What are the scope and the area of 
responsibility? Should the compliance officer be liable for failure to detect 
misconduct by employees? Is the compliance officer able to limit his or her 
                                                     
38 BGH, supra note 26. 
39 GESETZESENTWURF ZUM UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT - VERBANDSSTRAFGESETZBUCH 
(VERBSTRG-E) | DRAFT OF A CRIMINAL CODE OF ORGANIZATIONS, (2013), 
https://www.justiz.nrw.de/WebPortal/JM/justizpolitik/jumiko/beschluesse/2013/herbstkon
ferenz13/zw3/TOP_II_5_Gesetzentwurf.pdf (last visited Dec 6, 2014). 
40 Hauschka, supra note 3, at 165. 
41 Oliver Hein, Verbandsstrafgesetzbuch (VerbStrG-E) – Bietet der Entwurf Anreize zur 
Vermeidung von Wirtschaftskriminalität in Unternehmen?,  CCZ 75–81, 75 (2014). 
42 GESETZ ÜBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN (OWIG) | ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCES ACT, Federal 
Law Gazette I, p. 481 (1968). 
43 BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACHE - BT 18/2187, 2 (2014). 
44 Id. at 3. 
45 See further in Ch. 6, A., III., 5.c., p. 521 
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liability? Is there any form of protection against dismissal for compliance officers? 
How may design the employment contract for a compliance officer?46 The 
German legal environment that affects this function has been the subject of 
controversial debate. On the one hand, there is little uniformity and 
standardization of the compliance function. As previously discussed, a generally 
applicable definition of the compliance function is absent as yet.47 These attitudes 
are inconsistent with the view taken by Groß. She countered on the other hand, 
that a separate job description has developed in the meantime.48 Additionally, the 
relevant practical debate on the compliance function within the German 
associations represents efforts to create a unique job description.49 Overall, there 
are many questions regarding the position that have not yet been resolved. 
Creating a generally applicable definition and a modern and dynamic role of the 
German compliance officer might be one possible response. Therefore, the next 
section will outline the scientific objective of this thesis. 
                                                     
46 Georg Gößwein & Olaf Hohmann, Modelle der Compliance-Organisation in Unternehmen - 
Wider den Chief Compliance Officer als “Überoberverantwortungsnehmer,” 2011 BETRIEBS-
BERATER 963–967 (2011); Marcus Kirsch, Im Blickpunkt: Die Tätigkeitsschwerpunkte des 
Compliance-Officer, 2011 BB V (2011); Martin Schulz & Hartmut Renz, Der erfolgreiche 
Compliance-Beauftragte - Leitlinien eines branchenübergreifenden Berufsbildes, 2012 BETRIEBS-
BERATER 2511–2517 (2012); Martin Wolf, Der Compliance-Officer - Garant, hoheitlich 
Beauftragter oder Berater im Unternehmensinteresse zwischen Zivil-, Straf- und Aufsichtsrecht?, 
2011 BB 1353–1360 (2011); Wybitul, supra note 29. 
47 Bürkle, supra note 32; Matthias Dann & Anja Mengel, Tanz auf einem Pulverfass – oder: 
Wie gefährlich leben Compliance-Beauftragte?, 2010 NJW 3265–3269 (2010); Geiger, supra note 
33; Steffen Krieger & Jens Günther, Die arbeitsrechtliche Stellung des Compliance Officers 
Gestaltung einer Compliance-Organisation unter Berücksichtigung der Vorgaben im BGH-Urteil 
vom 17. 7. 2009, 2010 NZA 367–373 (2010); Hans-Georg Meier, Der Arbeitsvertrag des 
Compliance-Beauftragten – Rechtliche Notwendigkeiten und Möglichkeiten, 2011 NZA 779–782 
(2011); Zimmermann, supra note 32. 
48 NADJA FEE VIOLA GROß, CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER: COMPLIANCE-FUNKTIONSTRÄGER IM 
SPANNUNGSVERHÄLTNIS ZWISCHEN WIRKSAMER COMPLIANCE UND ARBEITSRECHTLICHER / 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTLICHER KOMPETENZORDNUNG 29 (1. ed. 2012). 
49 See e.g. Professional Association of Compliance Manager | Berufsverband der 
Compliance Manager (BCM), http://www.bvdcm.de/ (last visited Dec 7, 2014).; German 
Federal Association of Compliance Officers | Bundesverband deutscher Compliance 
Officer (BDCO), http://bdco.de/ (last visited Dec 7, 2014). 
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C. SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVES AND SCIENTIFIC INTEREST OF THE TOPIC 
The aim of this section is to describe the scientific objectives and interests 
behind this thesis. First, the main target of my doctoral thesis is to establish a 
modern and dynamic role of the German corporate compliance officer. As 
discussed above, the compliance officer will play a major role in the ongoing 
regulated world.50 The assumption is, therefore, that the role, function, and duties 
of this position need to be clearly defined and organized, but such definitions do 
not exist beyond the regulated financial sector and market in Germany. This 
thesis will attempt to outline a standardized but dynamic model of the German 
corporate compliance officer with a concise description and definition of the 
function. 
This objective will entail, secondly, the description and evaluation of the 
responsibilities of the compliance officer, as well as an examination of their 
activities, and the scope of the legal risks inherent thereto. The analysis will also 
cover the specific legal and organizational environment in which a compliance 
officer works. In order to try and to resolve the recent debate, one step will be to 
identify the presence of the responsibilities and liabilities of this position. For 
instance, in the US it has been suggested that the responsibilities should been 
distinguished clearly from business line duties.51 Nevertheless, recent studies and 
surveys have shown that the integration of this function within business units can 
support the effectiveness of this position through the assessment of business 
risks.52 In addition, compliance officers are advised to consider the legal 
environment and take appropriate steps to establish a compliance culture within 
the company in order to minimize their liability risk.53 In brief, the organizational 
                                                     
50 See supra A., pp. 23 et seq. 
51 Scott A. Roney & Patricia J. Harned, Leading Corporate Integrity: Defining the Role of the 
Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer (CECO), in ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER (ERC) , 17 (2007). 
52 See e.g. DELOITTE & COMPLIANCE WEEK, 2015 COMPLIANCE TRENDS SURVEY (2015); PWC 
Study 2015 SALLY BERNSTEIN & ANDREA FALCIONE, PWC-2015 COMPLIANCE SURVEY | 
MOVING BEYOND THE BASELINE LEVERAGING THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION TO GAIN A 
COMPETITIVE EDGE (2015), www.pwc.com/us/stateofcompliance. 
53 DeStefano, supra note 20 at 136. 
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and functional structure of the compliance function may generate consequences 
that could influence the liability and effectiveness of this position.54 
Thirdly, a study by Adobor shows that, due to the legal requirements, 
companies focus on managing their compliance programs by developing 
organizational structures.55 For example, the SOX of 200256 and the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines (FSG),57 both in the US, provide the standard for seven 
minimum requirements for an effective compliance and ethics program.58 The US 
Sentencing Commission (USSC), an administrative agency in the judicial branch, 
promulgated guidelines, policy statements, and commentary pursuant to Section 
994 (a) of Title 28, Chapter 58 of the United States Code (USC).59 In its Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (FSGO), chapter eight, the USSC 
provides organizations60 methods to reduce and eliminate criminal conduct by 
providing a structural foundation through an effective compliance and ethics 
program.61 "Compliance and ethics program" means a program designed to prevent 
and detect criminal conduct.62 These guidelines include, for example, “High-level 
personnel of the organization” that are intended to ensure that the organization has 
an effective compliance and ethics program.63 "High-level personnel of the 
organization" means an individual who has substantial control over the 
organization or who has an essential role in the making of policy within the 
organization.64 Since the launch of the guidelines, hundreds of new compliance 
programs have been implemented, and thousands of new positions for 
                                                     
54 Id. at 71. 
55 Henry Adobor, Exploring the Role Performance of Corporate Ethics Officers, 69 JOURNAL OF 
BUSINESS ETHICS 57–75, 57 (2006). 
56 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, H.R. 3763 PUBLIC LAW 107-204, 15 USC, 18 USC. 116 Stat. 
745 (2002). 
57 SENTENCING REFORM ACT (1984), PUB. L. NO. 98-473, 18 USC § 3551 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). 
58 § 8 B2.1 USSC, US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1991) (2013), 
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2013/2013-1a1 (last visited Dec 7, 2014). 
59 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, USSC, §§ 991-998 (1991). 
60 Id. § 8 A1.1. See Commentary "Organization" means "a person other than an individual." 
61 Id. § 8. 
62 Id. § 8 B2.1. See Commentary 
63 Id. § 8 B2.1b (2) B.  
64 Id. § 8 A1.2. See Commentary 
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compliance personnel have been established in the US. Other countries, such as 
Australia, the UK, and Canada have followed suit.65  
Nevertheless, the US is not alone in establishing legal requirements for 
firms. In the UK, the Cadbury Report66 and the United Kingdom Bribery Act 
201067 provide similar guidelines. The Act deals with both domestic and foreign 
bribery of persons and companies.68 Accordingly, this thesis focuses on the 
position of the compliance officer within American, UK, and German companies 
due to the legal environment. All these developments lead to the first assumption 
about an emergence of this position as a result of the enforcement of new law. 
Fourth, to achieve the goal of this thesis, the professional standards, the 
concept and future development of the compliance function within firms will all 
be explored. According to Demott,69 the role and standards of compliance 
personnel have remained relatively unexamined by scholars although there is a 
wide range of American70 and German71 literature, and articles dealing with the 
compliance function. There is a gap in knowledge in applicable legal standards 
                                                     
65 HELLER, MURPHY, AND MEANEY, supra note 13 Preface. 
66 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. [...]: 
THE CODE OF BEST PRACTICE, (Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance ed., 1996), http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf (last visited 
Dec 7, 2014). 
67 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, 2010 CHAPTER 23 BRIBERY ACT 2010 (2010). 
68 Samuel Richard, To Bribe a Prince: Clarifying the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Through 
Comparisons to the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act of 2010, 37 BOSTON COLLEGE 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 419–450, 426–427 (2014). 
69 DeMott, supra note 4 at 56. 
70 See e.g. DeStefano, supra note 19; James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A 
Reorientation in Compliance for Financial Firms,  BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL 1–65 (2013); 
Edward H. Freeman, Regulatory Compliance and the Chief Compliance Officer, 16 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY 357–361 (2007); Gnazzo, supra note 10; Greenberg, supra 
note 11; etc. 
71 See e.g. Bürkle, supra note 29; Dann and Mengel, supra note 39; Geiger, supra note 30; 
Christoph E. Hauschka, Compliance, Compliance-Manager, Compliance-Programme: Eine 
geeignete Reaktion auf gestiegene Haftungsrisiken für Unternehmen und Management?, 2004 
NJW 257–261 (2004); Heuking, supra note 3; Kirsch, supra note 38; Meier, supra note 39; 
Eckart Sünner, Das Berufsbild des Compliance Officers, 2014 CCZ 2014, 91 - BECK-ONLINE 91–
96 (2014); Wybitul, supra note 29; …etc. 
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for effectiveness of this position. Therefore, this study examines the compliance 
officer’s function based on law in the business environment.  
In order to bridge the aforementioned gap, the following questions need to 
be addressed: What is the scope of responsibility of the compliance function? 
Should the compliance officer be liable for failing to detect misconduct by 
employees? Is the compliance officer able to limit his or her liability? Is there any 
form of protection against dismissal for compliance officers? How should the 
employment contract for a compliance officer be drafted? Thus, the trigger for the 
problem statement discussed in this thesis is the legal framework and 
environment surrounding the emergence and functioning of this position in the 
US, the UK, and Germany.  
The final key aim of my analysis is to establish a modern and dynamic 
profile applicable to all sizes, business lines and legal forms of companies of the 
German compliance officer with a concise description and definition of this 
function. This objective includes the description and evaluation of the 
responsibilities of the compliance officer, as well as an examination of their 
activities and the scope of the legal risks involved. For this purpose, the thesis will 
examine the following topics: (1) the legal and organizational framework within 
which a compliance officer works, (2) the implications thereof in practice within 
companies in the common law and civil law systems, (3) the relevant case law in 
terms of compliance (4) the enforcement of duties with respect to directors and 
officers, and (5) the scope of responsibilities of compliance officers. Therefore, the 
second goal of this research is to compile approaches for a legal concept of the 
German compliance officer from a comparative legal perspective. Under pressure 
of increasing globalization, it appears necessary to consider solutions from other 
legal systems, in order to optimize and to take account of solutions employed 
elsewhere in competitive legal and economic conditions in the home legal system. 
For example, Hopt argues that this procedure is the main goal of comparative 
company law.72  
Therefore, my research questions are framed as follows: 
(1) How are the modern role and legal position of the Compliance Officer defined under  
                 common law and practice? 
                                                     
72 KLAUS J. HOPT, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW 37 1168 (2006). 
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(2) Which aspects are transferable to the German Compliance Officer?  
(3) How can the role of the German Compliance Officer be more effectively enhanced in  
                practice? 
The answers to these questions will be important for the German academic 
discussion about civil and criminal liability relating to this function in private-
sector firms, both in theory and in practice. The results of this thesis could 
contribute to the transformation of the German compliance function in the next 
few years. Furthermore, the findings of my thesis could be expanded upon to 
boost the understanding of the legal framework and environment of the 
compliance function in the business context. Moreover, the results could provide 
feasible solutions for legal interpretation and help contribute to shape the further 
development of this role. However, the aim of this thesis cannot be a detailed 
analysis of the American, British, and German law, but relevant statutory 
provisions and landmark cases. Hence, the objectives will be achieved through an 
abstract and general presentation of the most important general provisions in 
terms of this function. Finally, consideration will also be given to the ways in 
which potential solutions and approaches from the common law could be 
transferred into civil law. The conclusion should be helpful in providing non-
binding recommendations for this position. 
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
First, this part will provide the scope of the content-related framework of 
the investigation in this thesis. As has been mentioned already, the focus lies on 
the employed compliance officer within private sector companies. The analysis 
does not extend to internal auditors, ombudsmen, or legal advisors. The public 
enterprise sector and Non-Government Organisation(s) (NGOs) are categorically 
excluded. The special circumstances and particularities of the compliance 
function in the financial services sector will not be explicitly examined, but as an 
amendment in the case of absence of comparable statutory provisions or case law 
regarding this function.  
Secondly, it is also necessary to define the role of the US ethics officer (EO), 
an additional and specific post works in American companies. There are extensive 
discussions about the distinctive role of ethics and compliance officers. Izraeli & 
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BarNir presenting an ideal profile of an ethics officer.73 They argue that, “…the 
main responsibility of the EO is to improve the organization’s ethical performance.”74 
This is different to the view held by Demott, who argues that the compliance 
officer is responsible for the compliance systems and deals with compliance 
issues.75  
In contrast, some authors have argued that the two functions should not be 
split because the combined function has the power to help an organization.76 Morf, 
et al. stated that duties for full-time ethics officers in corporations include 
coordinating the ethics and compliance program with senior management.77 In 
sum, the compliance function is intended to ensure that the employees and the 
firm comply with applicable laws, while the ethics function serves to ensure that 
the employees act correctly, beyond the formal dictates of law. However, the 
current practice of many companies in America is to combine these two 
functions.78 Hence, these two American corporate functions will also briefly be 
touched on in this thesis. 
Another aspect is that ethics issues have a longstanding tradition in North 
America. For instance, Vogel examined the historical roots of ethics and found that 
the subject of business ethics is not a new one.79 Furthermore, in his comparison of 
business ethics, Enderle discovered dissimilarities80 and “ethics gaps”81 between the 
United States and Germany. In his view, the "ethics gaps" would be a semantic 
one and could be a result of corporate initiatives.82 In contrast, Vogel saw the 
reason for these dissimilarities in the American model. Four issues characterize 
                                                     
73 Dove Izraeli & Anat BarNir, Promoting Ethics Through Ethics Officers: A Proposed Profile 
and an Application, 17 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 1189–1196 (1998). 
74 Id. at 1189. 
75 DeMott, supra note 4 at 56. 
76 Gnazzo, supra note 11 at 534. 
77 Duffy A. Morf, Michael G. Schumacher & ScottJ. Vitell, A Survey of Ethics Officers in 
Large Organizations, 20 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 265–271 (1999). 
78 Greenberg, supra note 12 at 12. 
79 David Vogel, The Ethical Roots of Business Ethics, 1 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY 101, 101 
(1991). 
80 Georges Enderle, FOCUS: A Comparison of Business Ethics in North America and 
Continental Europe, 5 BUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW 33–46, 37 (1996). 
81 Id. at 35. 
82 Id. at 37. 
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this model: (1) American culture, (2) American history and religion, (3) the legal 
roots and (4) the individual character.83 Nevertheless, an intercultural comparison 
of American and German business ethics by Palazzo shows that American 
business ethics programs cannot be directly transferred to German companies 
without considerations and adjustments.84 
However, there are only a small number of ethics officers in German 
companies, for example at Daimler AG.85 In contrast, the US companies 
responded to organizational scandals by creating both the ethics and compliance 
officer positions.86 For this reason, this thesis will consider the American ethics 
and compliance function together in terms of the British and German compliance 
officer position. A large number of American studies and surveys87 have 
simultaneously focused on the two functions. In the view put forward by Treviño, 
et al. both the ethics and compliance officers play the most critical role of 
overseeing the ethics and compliance program, the compliance infrastructure, 
and the management of the organization’s ethical context.88. The conclusion 
emerging from this analysis is that the American ethics and compliance officer 
function cannot always be clearly held separate. 
Lastly, this section describes the selection of the methodological approach of 
comparative law. The choice of the legal systems covered was made not based on 
legal policy objectives, but from a broader perspective on the wide range of 
solutions and experience. The majority of the world’s legal systems could be 
classified into two main groups: civil law, and the common law system. The 
United States and the UK both have a common law system while Germany has a 
                                                     
83 Vogel, supra note 79 at 104. 
84 Bettina Palazzo, US-American and German Business Ethics: An Intercultural Comparison, 41 
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 195–216 (2002). 
85 See Hier spricht Ihr Chief Ethics Officer « Philosophie & Wirtschaft | Blog, PHILOSOPHIE 
& WIRTSCHAFT (2010), http://www.philosophieundwirtschaft.de/blog/2010/10/05/hier-
spricht-ihr-central-ethics-officer/ (last visited Dec 8, 2014). 
86 Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Legitimating the legitimate: A grounded theory study of legitimacy 
work among Ethics and Compliance Officers, 123 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN 
DECISION PROCESSES 186–205, 186 (2014). 
87 Joshua Joseph, Integrating Business Ethics and Compliance Programs: A Study of Ethics 
Officers in Leading Organizations, 107 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW 309–347 (2003); Treviño 
et al., supra note 86; Weber and Fortun, supra note 4. 
88 Treviño et al., supra note 86 at 186. 
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civil law system.89 Byrd stated that the English common law system was exported 
to the US in 1607.90 In addition, the American legal encyclopedia, the Corpus Juris 
Secundum (CJS),91 “…refers to the general system of law derived from England as 
opposed to the Roman or civil law.”92 The core difference lies in the source of law. 
The primary source in a civil law system is a code93, while the primary source of 
law in a common law system is judicial opinion.94 Nevertheless, the American 
company law and securities law also included codified law. The historical legal 
development with the enforcement of the 1930s US securities regulation and the 
growing corporate governance movement in the 1990s also influenced legal 
developments in Europe. This initial impetus developed in the United States 
came across to the United Kingdom and to Continental Europe.95 For these 
reasons, it seems that a legal comparison between the American, the UK, and 
German legal systems could be prove insightful. This approach is outlined in the 
next part below. 
E. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND EXAMINATION DESIGN 
This part will first address the methodical approach and then focus on the 
structure of this study. Two different types of method were used to examine the 
research questions. The first is an analysis of the legal framework and the second 
a legal comparison. Additionally, the historical legal background and roots, views 
of legal scholars, findings of studies and surveys, available data in terms of the 
compliance function will also be presented. 
                                                     
89 B. SHARON BYRD ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW & LANGUAGE: 
EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHE RECHTSSPRACHE. BD. 1: [...] (3. ed. 2011). 
90 Id. at 4. 
91 The CJS is an encyclopedia of the US law and contains an alphabetical arrangement of 
legal issues developed by US cases. In the US a legal encyclopedia is regarded as a 
secondary authority in legal research.  
92 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM (C.J.S.), I. § 1.b. 
93 See e.g. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH BGB, CIVIL CODE (1900) Aug. 18. 1896; last amended 
by Article 4 para. 5 of the Act of 1 October 2013, Federal Law Gazette I, page 3719. 
94 BYRD ET AL., supra note 89 at 3–4. 
95 HOPT, supra note 72 at 1163. 
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The objective and the research questions were outlined at the beginning of 
my dissertation.96 In order to achieve the aim, this study will provide a 
comparison of the legal position and the role of the compliance officer in the US, 
the UK, and Germany, based on the academic debate in Germany. The 
investigation will focus on five aspects of the American, UK, and German 
compliance officer’s role: (1) the legal framework in the respective jurisdiction 
pertaining to the function of compliance officers, (2) the compliance officer’s wide 
range of purview, (3) the legal definition of this position, (4) a classification of this 
function in the structure of the American, British and German companies, and (5) 
aspects, which could be adopted for the German compliance officer. Hence, this 
study will comprise a legal analysis and secondly will conduct a comparative 
legal examination. The findings of this thesis can be seen as the starting point for 
further research in order to develop a standardized model of the corporate 
compliance officer. 
Building on the legal comparison, this thesis will provide a summary of the 
regulatory status of the compliance function in the common law and civil law 
system. To understand the outcomes of the legal research, it will be necessary first 
to obtain an overview of the historical development and the sources of law in the 
common and civil law systems. Next, the recent law, which includes cases, court 
rules, codes, statutes, and administrative regulations pertaining to compliance 
issues and the compliance officer’s function, will be examined. Based on the main 
source of law in the common law system it should be possible to identify 
precedents published in lengthy case decisions. Secondary sources of law, which 
explain legal concepts or doctrines, will also be explored. These sources are 
contained e.g. in commentaries on the law, law review articles, legal 
encyclopedias, and the American Law Reports. This approach will result in 
categorized abstract of the legal framework of compliance and of the compliance 
function within companies in the common law and civil law systems. To 
summarize, this means on the one hand that it would be useful to perform an 
analysis of the differences and similarities in the legal framework with the 
primary sources of the two legal systems, while on the other hand, the secondary 
                                                     
96 See supra C., pp. 31 et seq. 
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sources of law will help to identify primary sources and to understand the 
substance of the law. 
Understanding the legal framework in relation to the compliance function 
in the organizational context and analyzing the academic debate in law review 
articles could also yield findings that provide some much-needed clarity in regard 
to the compliance situation. Based on these findings, the study will then go on to 
describe and define the role of the compliance officer within US, UK and German 
companies. The approach of legal comparison will be explained in more detail in 
the following section. 
I. Methodological Principles of Comparative Law 
The practice of comparing laws and legal procedures is simultaneously 
“very old” and “very modern.”97 Hopt argues that the method of comparative law is 
“old” because business has never stopped at the frontiers of countries and states. 
In this context, ‘modern’ means comparative law has always been considered to be 
an enrichment of legal solutions.98 Djilani adds that comparative law allows 
attorneys, legislators, and scholars to understand and learn from legal systems in 
foreign jurisdictions.99 In the view of Zweigert & Kötz, the origin of comparative 
law lies in the analysis of legal problems.100 They found that the primary objective 
of comparative law is recognition.101 Their approach at first is to identify the 
essential elements of the foreign law as described in national reports. Then it 
follows a consideration of the legal comparison and a critical discussion. In 
conclusion, the findings facilitate and provide interpretations of the national 
law.102 In so doing, they postulate a fundamental methodological principle: “The 
basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality.”103 They 
                                                     
97 HOPT, supra note 72 at 1162. 
98 Id. at 1162, 1167. 
99 Jessica Naima Djilani, The British Importation of American Corporate Compliance, 76 
BROOKLYN LAW REV. 303–341, 303 (2011). 
100 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM 
GEBIETE DES PRIVATRECHTS (3. ed. 1996). 
101 Id. at 14. 
102 Id. at 6. 
103 Id. at 33. 
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take the stance that an issue is legally comparable only, if it contains the same task 
and the same function.104 In sum, the general research question should be asked 
on a clearly functional level without legal terms from the own national law. 
Other - more critical - voices concluded that the functional method in 
comparative law is an under-theorized approach with an undefined disciplinary 
position.105 Michaels argues that, “…the functional method is strong as a tool for 
understanding, comparing, and critiquing different laws, but a weak tool for evaluating 
and unifying laws.”106 Thus, it appears that functionalist comparative law is not 
suitable for unifying or standardizing laws. However, it can be seen that this is 
not the aim of comparative law. We should look at an interpretive approach that 
integrates historical and cultural considerations. This would allow us to pick the 
best aspects from the common law system and could help to improve the legal 
framework in other legal jurisdictions. Moreover, Michaels reflects that the 
difficulty is how to differentiate between “true” (“good”) […] and “false” 
(“bad”).107 He argues that the nature of the problem is that we cannot say that a 
foreign law is better than our own.108 In conclusion, we instead need to recognize 
different solutions in order to allow us to develop alternatives.109 
To summarize, the legal research has to identify some features and 
characteristics of the American, UK, and German compliance officers in order to 
establish the basis for a legal comparison. The comparison will begin with 
definitions and explanations of legal terms, before proceeding to describe the 
regulatory framework in the US, UK, and Germany. Then, lastly, it will illustrate 
key legal topics in terms of pertinent court cases. In other words, this means the 
legal comparison will define the differences and similarities between, and analyze 
the common law system with the civil law system in terms of the legal practice 
applicable to compliance officers. Based on this comparison of laws, it ought to 
possible to establish recommendations for terms in the employment agreements. 
                                                     
104 Id. at 34. 
105 RALF MICHAELS, THE FUNCTIONAL METHOD OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1–47 25 (2005), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=839826 (last visited Dec 8, 2014). 
106 Id. at 45. 
107 Id. at 43. 
108 Id. at 43. 
109 Id. at 43. 
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Understanding the respective roles and functions of the American, British, and 
German compliance officers within companies will enable us in general to 
improve the recognition of this function and its position in private sector 
companies. Finally, this legal comparative overview will help to establish a 
modern and dynamic organizational profile of the German compliance officer. 
II. The Design of the Study 
The first step of the legal comparison will reflect the roots and the legal 
background in the common law and civil law systems. In this context, the 
historical cultural background and legal roots will also be taken into 
consideration. The next step will be to explore the relevant primary and 
secondary sources of law in terms of the CO in the US, UK, and Germany. 
Furthermore, it will analyze the American, British, and German legal framework 
pertaining to the position of compliance officer. The examination will contain 
legal research in the literature and law review articles concerning the key duties 
and features of this position, e.g. the range of purview, liabilities, reporting, 
independence, and special skills of the compliance officers. Hence, the answers 
will present an overview of the variety of professional roles and skills involved. 
Beyond the review of the legal parameters and views of the post, the next step 
will be the research to establish the existing roles applicable to this profession. In 
addition, the thesis will examine available data from databases to obtain 
compliance officers insights into their day-to-day business. This approach can be 
helpful in the last step when it comes to defining in detail the position of 
compliance officer. In conclusion, the examination will establish the basis for 
creating a modern and dynamic role and concept of the German compliance 
officer. Figure 1, below, will summarize all of these points and facts. 
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Figure 1 - The Design of the Study 
 
(4) Presentation of a modern and dynamic 
model the German compliance officer's role 
(3) Comparison between the American, English,  
and German duties, responsibilities and roles of 
this position 
(2) Overview of the legal environment for the 
      compliance function in the US, UK and 
      Germany  
(1) Analysis of the legal framework, case law 
      and contractual agreements available in the 
      respective jurisdiction  
(1) Comparison of the roots and 
the legal background in the 
common law and civil law systems 
(2) Legal Analysis of the primary 
and secondary sources of law in 
relevance to the CO in the US, UK, 
and Germany 
(3) Research of available data in 
terms of the corporate 
compliance officers' position  
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One important purpose of this thesis is to reveal a model of compliance 
officer’s legitimacy in the common law and civil law systems and an approach for 
a better understanding of the legal role and status of the corporate German 
compliance officer. Thus, the focus of this study is to bring together the 
knowledge of issues concerning compliance officers from other countries and 
other legal systems. Finally, the next part will provide a brief overview of the 
structure of the thesis. 
F. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS – AN OVERVIEW 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter one outlined the academic 
interest and background of the compliance function within companies in the 
private sector. Furthermore, this chapter introduced to the scientific objectives of 
the topic, which lead to the key questions. Lastly, this chapter explained the 
methodical approach and presented the design of this study.  
The next chapter explores the legal comparison of the sources of law in the 
common law and civil law systems. First, this chapter gives an overview of the 
fundamental characteristics of the main sources, the general structure of the court 
systems, the differences and similarities, and a summary of developments of both 
the common law and civil law systems stated as between 2014 and April 2017. 
Then, the second chapter will outline a discussion of relevant English and 
German literature in relation to the problem of the topic of this thesis. Concerning 
relevant literature, research will conduct in legal, business ethics, management 
and governance databases. Finally, the findings are essential for identifying the 
gap in knowledge and developing of the hypotheses of this thesis.  
Chapter three will analyze the terms ‘compliance’ and ‘compliance officer’ in a 
historical legal comparative view. This methodical approach of acquiring 
knowledge by analyzing the relevant literature, which is most applicable to the 
legal roots and the cultural background of compliance in the US, UK and 
Germany, will lead to a general definition of the term ‘compliance’ and ‘compliance 
officer’ for this thesis. Based on the results of this legal comparison, it will establish 
a comparative legal matrix of the historical legal roots of the compliance officer.  
Chapters four to six provide the main subject, the corporate compliance 
officer under common law and civil law within the private sector, of this thesis. 
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These chapters at first, highlight the relevant primary law and then, secondary 
law in relation to the problem. They analyze, examine and compare the legal 
framework of compliance in the areas of company, bribery, criminal law, and 
employment law, as well as landmark cases with respect to compliance and 
compliance officers, additional guidelines and principles to outline the role and 
position of the compliance officer under common and civil law. The chapters will 
also discuss on the meaning of relevant terms and how they relate to the research 
questions. In addition, online databases in the US, UK and Germany will search in 
order to obtain case law and relevant information, materials and documents on 
the relevant issues. The findings of this legal comparison could be used at first to 
establish an American and English role model of the corporate compliance officer 
under common law and then, a modern and dynamic role of the German 
compliance officer. Overall, the issues discussed in chapters four to six enable a 
cleare understanding of the role and position of the corporate compliance officer. 
Based on the findings of chapters four to six, chapter seven compares and 
summarizes the key aspects of the American and English compliance officers’ 
models in response to the research questions and hypotheses of this thesis. 
Finally, based on these key aspects of the US and UK models of the corporate 
compliance officer as a frame, a proposed example of the German compliance 
officer, which will applicable to all size of companies, will draw up and present. 
In addition, a definition of the German corporate compliance officer will provide. 
The results of this thesis, the German compliance officer’s model and its 
definition, aim to contribute to a better understanding of the status and role of 
this relatively new position within German companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
A. BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 
In 1900, the first international congress on comparative law took place in 
Paris, marking the starting point of systematic legal comparison as a scientific 
discipline. Since then, legal scholars110 and lawyers in Europe and America began 
studying and categorizing the differences in the various features of the common 
law and civil law systems.111 As discussed above,112 the major purpose of 
comparing law is to facilitate the further development of the law. In the view of 
some authors,113 domestic courts acknowledge that experience gained in other 
jurisdictions may be helpful in explaining the nature of a legal problem or finding 
guidance concerning a specific legal position. Freda had a similar viewpoint; her 
findings stated that the decisions of the great tribunal’s [La corte suprema a 
Roma] 114 on the European continent could be considered the equivalent of “case-
law.”115 A study by Stanton found that while the English courts make considerable 
use of comparative common law, in contrast, materials from civil law jurisdictions 
were used less in recent years.116 In addition, Stanton argued that in the UK, 
                                                     
110 See generally, Dolores Freda, “Law Reporting” in Europe in the Early-Modern Period: Two 
Experiences in Comparison, 30 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY 263–278 (2009); Raluca Lupu, 
Sources of Law - Judicial Precedent, 5 CONTEMPORARY READINGS IN LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
375–381 (2013); Keith Stanton, Comparative Law in the House of Lords and Supreme Court, 42 
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW 269–296 (2013); RAOUL C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, 
LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS: CHAPTERS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY (1. ed. 1993).Raoul 
C. Van Caenegem (1987). This author illustrated the distinction between the two legal 
systems in terms of ten main differences. 
111 ANTOINETTE DOP, INTRODUCTION INTO LEGAL ENGLISH FOR DUTCH LAW STUDENTS 1 (1. 
ed. 2009). 
112 See supra  Ch. 1, E., 1. p. 41 
113 See e.g. Stanton, supra note 110 at 276. 
114 Freda, supra note 110. The article refers to the Italian and French great tribunals, for 
instance Tribunali Supremi degli Stati Italiani (La corte suprema a Roma). 
115 Id. at 263. 
116 Stanton, supra note 110 at 269. 
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judges sometimes cited overseas cases to support the existence of a general 
principle of law117 and to reinforce their arguments.118 Overall, the judges use 
foreign cases to show the tendency in the matter of law in the common law 
countries.119  
Thus, the evidence shows that the courts use comparative materials to 
identify emerging trends in the common law. At times, a foreign case could even 
be used to overrule an existing domestic decision.120 In a similar approach, 
through comparative law, the values of other legal systems could be drawn on to 
help resolve problematic legal issues despite fundamental differences between the 
common law and civil law systems.121 
I. Introduction of Legal History of the Common Law and Civil Law 
Systems 
Everything is the sum of the past. Nothing is comprehensible except through its 
history.122 
To understand modern law, we must understand its history. For example, 
in Freda’s view, legal historians recently recognized that the history of law and 
legal comparison are strictly tied to one another.123 Therefore, the first part of this 
chapter discusses the common law and civil law history by firstly, defining 
relevant terms, and then comparing and contrasting the legal history in brief. In 
sum, this part provides a brief historical comparison focusing on the common law 
and civil law system.  
                                                     
117 See e.g. Lord Hutton in: Darker and Others and Chief Constable of The West Midlands Police, 
[2001] 1 AC 435; [2000] 4 All ER 193[2000] 3 WLR 747 (2000). He uses both Australian and 
English authority as support for a general principle. 
118 Stanton, supra note 110 at 279. 
119 Id. at 279. 
120 Id. at 280. 
121 Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 THE 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 419–435, 419 (1966). 
122 PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, THE FUTURE OF MAN 1 (1. ed. Image Books, 2004). 
123 Freda, supra note 110 at 264. 
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The term ‘civil law’ is derived from the Latin words ‘jus civile’, which 
applied exclusively to Romans citizens.124 In contrast, the common law is the body 
of law and jurisprudence originating from, developed, and formulated in 
England. It applies to most of the states and peoples of the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, and has developed case-by-case, through judicial decisions.125 The 
common law is opposed to statutory law.126 In conclusion, in a wider sense, the 
common law includes all original and judge-made case law.127 
A theory of legal origin by La Porta et al. terms England and France as the 
“mother countries” for the common law system and the civil law system, 
respectively.128 Legal and financial scholars have traced the origins of the different 
legal families to England and France in the 12th and 13th century.129 However, 
other scholars of comparative law argue that the classification of countries by 
reference to legal origins is not always clear.130 Besides the French model, two 
other civil law traditions developed: the German and the Scandinavian.131 
Furthermore, they pointed out that the majority of legal systems are, in fact, 
hybrid.132 For instance, due to the influence of the EU legislation, the common law 
system in the UK has become more continental. Indeed, Scotland has its own, 
separate legal system, which has its roots in both the common law and civil law 
traditions.133 The conclusion here is thus that the theory and discussion not 
explain in full why a country belongs to a certain legal family.134 
                                                     
124 Dainow, supra note 121 at 420. , GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, ROMAN LAW AND THE ORIGINS 
OF THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 27 (2015). 
125 What is COMMON LAW? Definition of COMMON LAW (Black’s Law Dictionary), , 
http://thelawdictionary.org/common-law/ (last visited Dec 11, 2014). 
126 PETER HAY, US-AMERIKANISCHES RECHT: EIN STUDIENBUCH 5 (5. ed. 2011) note 16. 
127 Id. at 5. note 16. 
128 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 285–332, 318 (2008). 
129 Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law, 52 
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL 55–81, 58 (2007). 
130 Prabirjit Sarkar, Common Law vs. Civil Law: Which System Provides More Protection to 
Shareholders and Creditors and Promotes Financial Development, 2 JOURNAL OF ADVANCED 
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 143–161, 144 (2011). 
131 Siems, supra note 129 at 59. 
132 Sarkar, supra note 130 at 144. 
133 Stanton, supra note 110 at 273. 
134 Siems, supra note 129 at 59. 
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In spite of the academic discussion of the legal origin theory, this thesis will 
follow a pragmatic approach to analyzing the legal roots of the common law and 
civil law systems. To generalize, there are two main, contrasting legal systems: the 
common law system in the majority of English-speaking countries as well in the 
US and the UK on the one hand and on the other hand the civil law system, based 
on Roman law in the majority of countries in continental Europe, for example in 
France and Germany. Up until the 11th century, English and continental law both 
belonged to the oldest legal family - Roman law.135 It was at that time that the 
Roman law and procedure began to be transformed.136 From the 11th to the 20th 
centuries, the source of Roman law developed with a particularly methodological 
approach formalized through codification from the Codex Iustinianus.137 The 
Roman law times of prosperity at the universities took place by means of its 
reception in Germany, France, and Scotland in the 16th century.138 Hence, the 
Roman law developed as a scholarly activity by professors. As a result, on the 
European continent the Corpus Juris and the Code Civil became the lawyer’s 
bibles.139 Additionally, in the 19th century, the majority of continental countries 
codified their law in statutes such as the French Civil Code140 or German Civil 
Code.141 In doing so, these countries summarized their law in a systematic 
manner.142 As a result, the rules of law were rather abstract in continental Europe. 
In contrast, England evolved its own particular legal procedure. Therefore, 
England remained unaffected by legal scholarship because its universities had no 
law faculties at that time. Instead, lawyers, judges, and law students read and 
studied the cases at the inns of courts, leading European legal scholars began to 
                                                     
135 VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 110 at 114. 
136 Id. at 114. 
137 GEOFFREY SAMUEL, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMON LAW (1. ed. 2013). The 
Codex Iustinianus (Latin) is a part of the Corpus iuris civilis, the codification of the 
Roman law. The earliest statute preserved in the code was enacted by Emperor Hadrian; 
the latest come from Justinian himself. See CODEX IUSTINIANUS, II , 
http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/Corpus/codjust.htm (last visited Dec 9, 2014). 
138 VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 110 at 121. 
139 Id. at 125. 
140 CODE NAPOLÉON, CODE CIVIL (FRANCE) CODE CIVIL DES FRANÇAIS (1804). 
141 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB) | GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 93. 
142 Dainow, supra note 121 at 424. 
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emphasize the “insularity” of the common law, with its “atypical, native, and 
eccentric character.”143 
It was not until the 19th century that the universities in England and Wales 
began with legal scholarship and legal research.144 The first English legal scholar 
was William Blackstone145 in the 18th century. He brought together all of the 
common law of England systematizing, over a period of many years, the common 
law decisions by judges146 through his Commentaries on the laws of England.147 
Blackstone also identified the sources of the English common law: 
That ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs, which is called the common 
law, however compounded or from whatever fountains derived had subsisted immorality 
in this kingdom…etc.148 
But, with us at present, the monuments and evidences of our legal customs are 
contained in the records of the several courts of justice in books of reports and judicial 
decisions, and in the treatises of learned sages of the profession, preserved and handed 
down to us from the times of highest antiquity.149 
It could be argued that, over the centuries, the origins of the common law 
have developed from judicial opinion, its nascence traced back to the 12th 
century. Another decisive factor was that King Henry II150 reduced the power of 
the courts by himself executing jurisdiction by opening the King’s Court, Curia 
Regis. In doing so, he established a central court - royal courts, which were held at 
Westminster Hall. At the same time, the royal justices rode circuit around 
England to hear cases from the local people. For this reason, the law that 
                                                     
143 Freda, supra note 110 at 264. 
144 SAMUEL, supra note 137. 
145 (July 10, 1723 – February 24, 1780) Blackstone was an English jurist and judge. He gave 
lectures at Oxford University. These lectures were published as the Commentaries on the 
Laws of England. See The Editors of The Encyclopædia Britannica, SIR WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE | ENGLISH JURIST ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Blackstone (last visited Dec 9, 2014). 
146 Id. 
147 See e.g. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, VOLUME 1: A 
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769 (New ed. 1979). 
148 Id. at I. 
149 Id. at III b. 
150 (March 5, 1133 – July 6, 1189) 
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developed from the decisions at the King’s Court became ‘common’ to all of 
England.151 Since, the law was ‘common’ to all free people in England, the term of 
‘common law’ historically emerged.152  
Moreover, the court’s activities were determined and limited through the 
‘writ system’.153 Writs were issued by the Chancellor154 and included the order to 
opening a trial. These procedures were called forms of action. This meant there 
was no claim if a case could not be fitted into an existing writ.155 Therefore, the 
common law system gradually became more and more specific and rigid. Thus, 
the King’s Chancellor began asking the King for relief from this injustice. The 
second statute of Westminster II (1258) granted the Chancellor the authority to 
issue new writs in similar cases. The writ of “trespass upon the case”156 enabled a 
broader scope.157 Furthermore the writs, the ‘equity’158 of the King (later of the 
Chancellor) emerged to bring a degree of justice in the individual case. This led to 
the development of a separate legal principle and pillar of the law: the principle 
                                                     
151 BYRD ET AL., supra note 89 at 4. 
152 VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 110 at 44. 
153 The writ was an order issued by a court in the name of a sovereign authority requiring 
the performance of a specific act. Writs began to be used in judicial matters by the Kings, 
who developed set formulas for them. The most important were original writs, for 
beginning actions. See writ | law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/writ (last visited Dec 10, 2014). 
154 The Lord Chancellor traditionally served as head of the judiciary and speaker of the 
House of Lords. See Lord Chancellor | British Official, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/lord-chancellor (last visited Dec 10, 2014). 
155 HAY, supra note 126 at 1 note 4. 
156 Initially, trespass in law means unauthorized entry upon land. Once a trespass is 
proved, the trespasser is usually held liable for any damages. See trespass | law, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/trespass-law (last visited 
Dec 17, 2014). “TRESPASS ON THE CASE” - It is the technical name of an action, 
instituted for the recovery of damages caused by an injury unaccompanied with force, or 
where the damages sustained are only consequential. See Trespass on the case, 
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Trespass+on+the+case (last visited Dec 17, 2014). 
157 HAY, supra note 126 at 1 note 4. 
158 Equity, in Anglo-American law, is the custom of courts outside the common law or 
coded law. Equity provided remedies in situations in which precedent or statutory law 
might not apply or be equitable. equity | law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/equity (last visited Dec 18, 2014). 
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of ‘equity’.159 These two systems- the common law and equity- worked together 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as separate and complementary 
jurisdictions until 1873160 in England and until as recently as 1938 in the US.161 Due 
to inconvenience this separation entailed. One and the same judge could apply 
both the principle of law and the principle of equity. Nowadays, the distinction 
between the two systems has disappeared entirely.162 
To summarize the legal origins of the common law and civil law systems, it 
can be noted that the major distinction lies in the structure and collection of law. 
For instance, there are formal legal collection such ”law on the books,” as opposed 
to the “law in action”163 or, in other words, between “codified law“ and “case law.”164  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
159 Id. at 2 note 6. 
160 Judicature Act (1873) was an act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom in 1873. It 
reorganized the English court system so that both systems should be used regularly by all 
courts. The Judicature Act of 1873 created the Supreme Court of Judicature. See SUPREME 
COURT OF JUDICATURE ACT 1891 (REPEALED), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/54-
55/53/introduction (last visited Dec 10, 2014). 
161 HAY, supra note 126 at 2 note 9. The Rules Enabling Act, See RULES ENABLING ACT 
(REA), 28 USC § 2071-2077 466 (1938)., authorizes the Supreme Court to prescribe general 
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for the federal courts. See FRCP § 2 
“There is one form of action—the civil action”. 
162 BYRD ET AL., supra note 89 at 34. 
163 Sarkar, supra note 130 at 145. 
164 Freda, supra note 110 at 267. 
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Figure 2 - Development of the Common Law and Civil Law Systems 
 
Before it is possible to outline the legal framework in terms of the 
compliance function in the common law and the civil law, the next section will 
present a general overview of both legal systems. Firstly, it will examine the 
fundamental differences between these two legal systems. This section will then 
compare the main legal sources and courts systems in the common law system 
with those in the civil law system. Finally, it will then provide an outlook for the 
future developments of the law. 
II. The Fundamental Differences between the Two Legal Systems  
Historically, the Anglo-American legal system belongs to the common law. 
As discussed in the section above, the common law developed in England before 
being transferred to the US in 1607. As shown, its roots can be traced back to the 
English law, developed on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the US common 
law has been adapted to fit the specific conditions there. When the American 
Codification Judicial opinion 
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colonies declared their independence from the British government in 1776 and 
passed into states, the common law became the main jurisprudence in the US.165 
Evidently, the term ‘common law’ and its development in the US have also been 
taken into consideration in the CJS: 
The term of common law of England refers to the general system of law derived from 
England as opposed to the Roman law or civil law.166 
The greater part of the common law in the US is derived from the common or 
unwritten law of England.167 
Furthermore, James Kent168 and Joseph Story169, the authors of the 
Commentaries on American Law170 and Commentaries on the constitution of the 
United States171, consolidated the influence of the English law.172 However, there 
are some exceptions. Louisiana, for instance, follows the French legal tradition 
and applies a civil code.173 In addition, the Franco-Spanish law, particularly its 
matrimonial law, has influenced some western federal states in the US.174 In sum, 
despite these exceptions, the legal theory, legal language, and legal principles in 
the US are common law.175 
Considering both the US and the UK common law, it has been 
acknowledged that, due to the historical development, there are some significant 
differences between the common law and civil law systems. Legal historians 
assumed that these differences are based on the following factors e.g. the history, 
the organization of the law, the legal sources, the legal education system, the 
                                                     
165 BYRD ET AL., supra note 89 at 4–5. 
166 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM (C.J.S.), supra note 92 at I. § 1.b. 
167 Id. at II. § 3. 
168 An American jurist and legal scholar, (July 31, 1763 – December 12, 1847) 
169 An American lawyer and jurist, (September 18, 1779 – September 10, 1845) 
170 J. KENT & G.F. COMSTOCK, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (3. ed. 1867). 
171 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A 
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, 
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1833). 
172 HAY, supra note 126 at 4 note 13. 
173 Dainow, supra note 121 at 420.; HAY, supra note 126 at 4 note 14. 
174 HAY, supra note 5 at 14. 
175 Id. at 5. note 14. 
56 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
modes of research, the styles of argumentation and the judicial process.176 
Mousourakis, for instance, explains the factor ‘sources of law’ as “the ways in which 
law is created or comes into being.”177 Other authors argue that the 
Sources of law are accepted as binding by the officials of a legal system and this 
collective social practice of officials provides the foundations for a legal system.178  
Thus, it can conclude that the ‘sources of law’ include a variety of aspects (1) 
the historical development, (2) a set of rule of conduct, and (3) the relationship 
between people within a society. 
Based on these aspects, it can be assumed that the common law and civil 
law systems are built on different legal sources.179 As a result, it is important to 
recognize the many distinctions between the two legal systems.180 However, the 
differences in the two systems are attributable to certain factors, which the next 
sections will analyze as the basis for a general comparison. This comparison will 
be carried out by means of the legal sources, court systems, and the further 
development of the common law and civil law system. 
1. Comparison of the Sources of Law 
All legal systems have sources of law that are fundamental.181 Primary 
sources contain the law itself, the positive law, while secondary sources include 
the interpretation of the law, for example commentaries or guidelines on the 
law.182 The oldest primary source of law is customary law.183 Other major legal 
sources are judicial decisions and legislation. In the civil law countries, secondary 
                                                     
176 See e.g. Dainow, supra note 121 at 427. Freda, supra note 110 at 267 note 17.; Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, supra note 128 at 287.; ZWEIGERT AND KÖTZ, supra note 100 
at 68.  
177 MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 124 at 27. 
178 G. Lamond, Legal Sources, the Rule of Recognition, and Customary Law, 59 THE AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE 25–48, 25 (2014). 
179 CAROL M. BAST & MARGIE HAWKINS, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING / 
CAROL M. BAST, MARGIE HAWKINS 1 (5th ed. 2013). 
180 Dainow, supra note 121 at 419. 
181 Lamond, supra note 178 at 25. 
182 BAST AND HAWKINS, supra note 179 at 10. 
183 Raluca Lupu, Sources of Law - Judicial Precedent, 5 CONTEMPORARY READINGS IN LAW AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 375, 376 (2013). 
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sources like the treatises and commentaries of legal scholars had a great influence 
on the evolution of the legal system.184 These writings analyze and classify 
decided cases and then evaluate the essence of those cases.185 In contrast, the 
common law countries have a lesser extent of doctrinal materials, but a variety of 
guidelines and principles. The legal sources of the common law and the civil law 
system will be examined in more detail in the next sections. 
a.  The main source of  the Common Law System 
In general, it has been recognized that the essence of the common law is that 
it is created, developed, articulated, and applied by judges sitting in courts and 
deciding on disputes in individual cases. In other words, 
The common law is judicially created law that is developed on a case by case basis.186  
According to this development, the decisions of the higher courts187 played 
an important role as the main sources of the common law.188 Judges developed 
and applied specific principles of law to resolve disputes referred to subsequently 
as ‘binding precedent’.189 Hence, the judges were bound by their previous decisions 
and were required to follow the decision of other judges who decided other 
similar cases previously. Thus, they follow the reasoning of the doctrine of 
precedent and the principle of law and thereby, lawyers cited past decisions as 
                                                     
184 Dainow, supra note 121 at 428. 
185 Id. at 428. 
186 Chief Justice Hannah of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Mason v United States, 136 
US 581 (1890). 
187 E.g. The High Court and the Court of Appeal in England, United State Supreme Court 
188 Freda, supra note 110 at 275. 
189 Perell, Paul M. (1987); Also called the doctrine of precedent or of “stare decisis” literally 
translates as “to stand by decided matters.” Is itself an abbreviation of the Latin phrase “stare 
decisis et non quieta movere” which translates as “to stand by decisions and not to disturb settled 
matters.” See Paul M. Perell, STARE DECISIS AND TECHNIQUES OF LEGAL REASONING AND 
LEGAL ARGUMENT – BEST GUIDE TO CANADIAN LEGAL RESEARCH CANADIAN LEGAL 
RESEARCH BLOG (1987), http://legalresearch.org/writing-analysis/stare-decisis-techniques/ 
(last visited Dec 17, 2014). (Latin: “let the decision stand”), in Anglo-American law, 
principle that a question once considered by a court and answered must elicit the same 
response each time the same issue is brought before the courts. The principle is observed 
more strictly in England than in the United States. See stare decisis | law, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/stare-decisis (last visited Dec 17, 2014). 
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arguments.190 Hence, the first major source in a common law system lies in 
judicial decisions.  
However, it is not the whole judicial decision that forms the precedent for 
the future. Obviously, a decision contains (1) the fact of the case, (2) the legal 
history of the case, (3), the issue raised on appeal and lastly (4) the holding as the 
resolution.191 The precedent is the principle of law or more precisely known as 
‘stare decisis’ used to reach the judgment in a case.192 These judicial decisions are 
documented in collections of case law known as the English year books and 
reports.193 
Finally, some rules of decisions recognized as a part of the common law 
originated from one or more court cases. For many authors194 this feature is one of 
the main strengths of the common law. Even the judges explain new external 
sources with these words:  
Now,. . . in most cases where a court is asked to state or formulate a common law 
principle in a new context, there is a general understanding that the law is not so much 
found or discovered as it is either made or created.195  
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain the court stated: 
Whatever may be said for his [plaintiff] broad principle advances, in the present, 
imperfect world, it expresses an aspiration exceeding any binding customary rule with the 
specificity this Court requires.196 
Creating a private cause of action to further that aspiration would go beyond any 
residual common law discretion we think it appropriate to exercise.197 
                                                     
190 BYRD ET AL., supra note 89 at 7–8. 
191 Id. at 15. 
192 Id. at 15. Referred to as the 'ratio decidendi'.  
193 Law report, in common law, published record of a judicial decision that is cited by 
lawyers and judges for their use as precedent in subsequent cases. The earliest English 
court reports were the year books produced from the late 13th to the 16th century. See law 
report | common law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/law-
report (last visited Dec 17, 2014). 
194 See e.g. BYRD ET AL., supra note 89; HAY, supra note 126; Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of 
(Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 2–64 (2014). 
195 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain et al., 542 US 692, 725 (2004). 
196 Id. at 731. 
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In consideration of the unbroken continuity of the law, it is the fact that 
every case is an individual case. Nevertheless, the common law system appears at 
times rather inflexible. In contrast, American and English scholars198 evaluate 
judicial decisions with the ability to shape the law on a case–by–case basis as less 
formalistic. In their view, this approach helps to make the law more flexible. They 
argue that this regulation is more adaptable to changing circumstances.199 
Additionally, Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo explain the difficulty of codification.200 In 
their view, legislation cannot possibly foresee all potential future circumstances 
around a case201 and allowing judges only to interpret and apply such legislation 
in a restrictive way.202  
A study by Aron Balas et al.203 measures the formalism index of legal 
procedure for twenty common law and twenty civil law countries during the 
period from 1950 to 2000.204 They found that ‘formalism’205 is higher in civil law 
than in common law countries.206 However, the formalism should in fact be 
considered with the impact of globalization, but the globalization is most likely to 
affect the areas of law than the legal procedure.207 In conclusion, the evidence 
suggests that one important difference between the legal systems might be how 
quickly they are able to react to problems.208 Therefore, the next section will 
examine the historical development of flexibility in the common law system.  
                                                                                                                                                  
197 Id. at 738. note 70. 
198 See e.g. Sarkar, supra note 130; Siems, supra note 129.  
199 See e.g. Sarkar, supra note 130 at 144. 
200 J.H. MERRYMAN & R. PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 30 (3. ed. 2007). 
201 Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, supra note 128 at 304. 
202 MERRYMAN AND PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 200 at 30. 
203 Aron Balas et al., The Divergence of Legal Procedures,  NATIONAL BUREAU OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 33 (2008) table 1. 
204 This index measures how stringently the law regulates the legal procedure itself. See Id. 
at 28. 
205 The study defines ‘formalism’ as the sum of seven sub-indices:(1) professionals vs. 
laymen; (2) written vs. oral elements; (3) legal justification; (4) statutory regulation of 
evidence; (5) control of superior review; (6) engagement formalities; and (7) independent 
procedural actions. See Id. at Appendix. table 1B. 
206 Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, supra note 128 at 307. 
207 Balas et al., supra note 203 at 28. 
208 Id. at 28. 
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b.  Development of Equity  in the English Common Law System 
In the 15th century, due to the developed case law with the writ system,209 
the law in England became rigid, inflexible, and complicated. The rigid form of 
actions required exceptions. These were offered in the form of ‘equity’210 with 
fairness in individual cases.211 In a way, equity developed in a way in competition 
with common law. In the wide sense, the term equity means ‘fair’ or ‘just’, but in 
its legal meaning the rule developed to mitigate the severity or strengths of the 
common law. Over time, the English King, through his Chancellor, set up a 
special court known as the Court of Chancery.212 This was originally the royal 
secretariat. The idea was to deal with the ‘petitions of right’,213 i.e. claims, against 
the Crown that were addressed directly to the King. The Chancellor and the court 
clerks acted according to the facts of the case before them. Gradually, law and 
equity developed as separate systems in the 15th century. On the one hand, the 
judges at the King’s Court decided cases on the common law principles and on 
the other hand, the Chancellor understood the need for certainty and developed 
his own body of principles in the jurisprudence of the English legal system, i.e. 
equity.214 The English distinction in trial at law and equity was also adopted in the 
American colonies. Today, however, the equity- courts no longer exist in the US 
As mentioned previously, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP),215 
established in 1938, determined one uniform form of action, whereas in England, 
                                                     
209 Writ | law, supra note 153. 
210 Equity | law, supra note 158. 
211 HAY, supra note 126 at 2 note 6. 
212 Court of Chancery, in England, the court of equity under the lord high chancellor that 
began to develop in the 15th century to provide remedies not obtainable in the courts of 
common law. See Court of Chancery | court, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Court-of-Chancery (last visited Dec 18, 2014). 
213 Petition of right, legal petition asserting a right against the English crown, the most 
notable example being the Petition of Right of 1628, which Parliament sent to Charles I 
complaining of a series of breaches of law. See petition of right | English law, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/petition-of-right-English-
law (last visited Dec 18, 2014). 
214 BYRD ET AL., supra note 89 at 33–34. 
215 See supra footnote 161, p. 53 
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the Judicature Act 1873216 required that both systems should apply in all courts.217 
In the 19th century, this separation was seen as inconvenient and the courts were 
merged. Nowadays, one judge applies both principles of law in the common 
law.218  
In spite of the conjunction of these two legal sources in the common law 
system, the distinction between the two sources remains essential. On the one 
hand, the equity system is a source of independent claims and legal remedy while 
on the other, this system pervades virtually the entire common law system. In the 
US, the law promotes itself equity, for example the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) of 1990.219  
In conclusion, both the law and equity developed from judicial decisions.220 
Hence, it has been shown that common law can deal flexible with both the 
common law principles and the equity system as major sources.221 
c.  Legal Concepts in the Common Law   
To reiterate, the common law generally uses judicial decisions and equity as 
its primary sources of law. Other primary sources include court rules, 
constitutions, statutes, and administrative regulations.222 However, there are other 
additional sources. Another source is called the concept of the common law. 
Balganesh & Parchomovsky define the legal concept as: 
The operational legal devices that the common law uses in doctrine to understand and 
compartmentalize aspects of a legal issue or dispute.223 
                                                     
216 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 passed by Parliament in 1873 and reorganized 
the English court system to establish the High Court and the Court of Appeal. See 
SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACT 1891 (REPEALED), supra note 160. 
217 HAY, supra note 126 at 2 note 9. 
218 BYRD ET AL., supra note 89 at 34. 
219 Adobor, supra note 55 at 66. See AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA), 42 USC § 
12101 PUB. L. 114-38 (1990). 
220 Dainow, supra note 121 at 423. 
221 Id. at 423. 
222 BAST AND HAWKINS, supra note 179 at 10. 
223 Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the Common 
Law, 163 U. OF PENN. LAW. REV. 1241–1310, 1243 (2015). 
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If a legal principle comes to be directly embedded into a legal rule and is 
applied in the analysis, the principle becomes ‘a legal concept’.224 In the United 
States, this concept is held in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),225 which 
provides that 
Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its 
performance or enforcement. 
Similar provisions are found in the codes of most civil law jurisdictions226 
such as in the German Civil Code (BGB).227 In contrast, the English courts did not 
recognize an implied duty of good faith between contracting parties.228 
However, the purpose of legal concepts is to build a balance between 
stability and change.229 As opposed to rules, common law concepts take the form 
of legal standards.230 Legal concepts are usually interpretive and contain a 
descriptive element. Hence, the legal concepts established the basis for 
interpretation and application of the codified law. That means that the concept 
could be “modified or qualified” depending on the relevant purpose. Today, an 
                                                     
224 Id. at 1254. 
225 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC), (1952)§ 1-203., See also Restatement (Second) of the 
Law of Contracts § 205 (1979), It is a legal treatise to inform judges and lawyers about 
general principles of contract common law. § 205 Duty of good faith and fair dealing - 
Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement. See http://www.lexinter.net/LOTWVers4/ 
duty_of_good_faith_and_fair_dealing.htm, (last visit Dec 27, 2014) 
226 Christopher Braithwaite, Stephen Brown & Lee Coffey, JONES DAY | TOWARDS AN 
IMPLIED DUTY OF GOOD FAITH UNDER ENGLISH LAW JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS (2013), 
http://www.jonesday.com/towards-an-implied-duty-of-good-faith-under-english-law/ 
(last visited Dec 19, 2014). 
227 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB) | GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 91 § 242 Treu und 
Glauben. 
228 Braithwaite, Brown, and Coffey, supra note 226. See also JOSEPH CHITTY & H. G. BEALE, 
CHITTY ON CONTRACTS. VOL. 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 1-039 (31. ed. 2012)....in keeping with 
the principles of freedom of contract and the binding force of contract, in English contract 
law there is no legal principle of good faith of general application, although some authors 
have argued that there should be. 
229 Balganesh and Parchomovsky, supra note 223 at 1243. 
230 Id. at 1244. 
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examination of the common law reveals legal concepts in a variety of areas e.g. the 
concepts of ‘duty of good faith’ and ‘duty of care’.231 
For instance, the requirement of good faith is based on numerous judicial 
opinions, statutory developments, and is published in writings by professors.232 
Summers, for instance, found several reasons for the benefits of recognition and 
conceptualization of the duty of good faith in contract law.233 First, this concept is 
a commitment of justice according to law. Second, in his view, such a doctrine or 
an equitable principle is a requirement of “contractual morality”. Third, although it 
is only a minimum requirement, its relevance is far-reaching and plays a 
significant role in the common law.234 Finally, it is a tool that judges can use to 
bridge gaps.235  
Today, legal concepts such as good faith form part of both corporate law 
and contract law.236 Given its relevance to the topic of this thesis, the legal concept 
of ‘duty of good faith’ in corporate law will be explained in brief. Generally, the 
duty of good faith means the corporate directors' duties, which are determined 
primarily by members of the board of directors. In a number of recent Delaware 
cases,237 it was recognized that corporate managers owe a fiduciary duty of good 
faith in addition to their traditional duties of care. The duty of good faith was not 
created by cases, but the duty has long been governed by statutory provisions e.g. 
the ‘business judgment rule’,238 which requires directors to act in good faith.239 
                                                     
231 Id. at 1255. 
232 Robert Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 
67 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 810–840, 812 (1982). 
233 Id. at 811. 
234 Id. at 811. 
235 Id. at 812. 
236 See e.g. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC), supra note 225. § 2-103 (2003) Good faith 
means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing.  
237 See supra in detail Ch. 4, A., II. pp. 277 et seq.; See e.g. In re Caremark International Inc. 
Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra note 22., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 
362 (Del. 2006), 911 A.2d 362 (2006)., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra 
note 27., In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., WL 4826104 (2011). 
238 The ‘business judgment rule’ is a judicially created doctrine that protects directors from 
personal civil liability for the decisions they make on behalf of a corporation. See Lori A. 
McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV . 
64 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
Eisenberg argued that the concept of duty of good faith is instantiate of a general 
baseline conception comprising four elements: (1) subjective honesty, (2) non-
violation of generally accepted standards of decency applicable to the conduct of 
business, (3) non-violation of generally accepted basic corporate norms, and (4) 
fidelity to office.240 He pointed out that the duty of good faith provides a 
principled basis upon which the judges in the courts can articulate new, more 
specific, obligations in response to changes in the social and business 
environment.241 
Finally, the significance of those principles lies in the further development 
of the law by judges.242 If a legal concept has been accepted in the form of 
appropriate practices and duties, then it will also be embodied in law. In 
conclusion, it seems that the legal concepts used by the courts constitute a 
primary source of law in the common law system.243 
d.   The major sources in the European Civil  Law System 
As has been noted, the term ‘civil law system’ describes of laws derived from 
Roman law.244 Legal scholars and authors245 have insisted that the accepted theory 
of sources of civil law recognizes only (1) statutes, (2) regulations, and (3) custom. 
They pointed out that this list is exclusive and appears very technical. The civil 
law system tends to use more abstract terms and to employ a conceptual 
approach to legal matters.246 Mousourakis argued that the aim of the study of cases 
                                                                                                                                                  
521–574, 521 (2013). The role of the business judgment rule has been defined as follows: 
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental 
principle, codified in tit. 8 Del. C. § 141(a). See Id. at 528. 
239 Melvin Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, DELAWARE JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE LAW 1–75, 1 (2006). 
240 Eisenberg, supra note 239. 
241 Id. 
242 M. AUER, MATERIALISIERUNG, FLEXIBILISIERUNG, RICHTERFREIHEIT: GENERALKLAUSELN IM 
SPIEGEL DER ANTINOMIEN DES PRIVATRECHTSDENKENS 198 (2005). 
243 Braithwaite, Brown, and Coffey, supra note 226. 
244 MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 124 at 296. 
245 See e.g. J. GORDLEY & A.T. VON MEHREN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY 
OF PRIVATE LAW: READINGS, CASES, MATERIALS (1. ed. 2009). MERRYMAN AND PÉREZ-
PERDOMO, supra note 200 at 24. 
246 MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 124 at 296. 
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is only to show how the law works in practice. However, this theory appears too 
biased because there is no awareness that the sources of law could in fact vary.247 
In addition, the civil law sources contain both written and unwritten law, 
providing a considerable degree of legal certainty.  
The history of the primary sources of law will be now presented. Firstly, it 
has been recognized that the European civil law system has its ancient origins in 
the Roman Republic before the beginning of the Empire, in the second century. 
Unlike the common law, the Roman law was based on a procedural system, not 
on judges.248 Despite this, there were two types of civil judges: the praetor249 and 
the trial judge.250 In general, the proceedings began with a hearing before a 
praetor, followed by a trial before an iudex.251 The praetor252 and the judges did 
not have much by way of legal training. Therefore, Roman justice was not 
professional. In contrast to the common law system, the proceedings before the 
iudex were free of formal controls and there was no review of the findings of the 
iudex. The judgments were given orally, without reasons.253 Hence, some 
authors254 concluded that judicial decisions in the civil law system were not 
recognized as an important source of innovation.255  
                                                     
247 Id. at 304. 
248 GORDLEY AND VON MEHREN, supra note 245 at 19. 
249 The praetor was one of a group of magistrates’ who were elected annually. See Id. at 19.  
250 James G. Apple & Robert P. Deyling, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM 4 (1995), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf (last visited 
Dec 20, 2014). 
251 GORDLEY AND VON MEHREN, supra note 245 at 19. The judges were men from the upper 
classes of Roman society who had an interest in the law. See also Apple and Deyling, supra 
note 250 at 4. 
252 The praetor was appointed for one year only and played a limited role in the resolution 
of cases. See Apple and Deyling, supra note 250 at 4. 
253 GORDLEY AND VON MEHREN, supra note 245 at 20. 
254 Apple and Deyling, supra note 250; GORDLEY AND VON MEHREN, supra note 245. 
255 The Roman jurist Gaius did not recognize judicial decisions as a basis of Roman law in 
his Institutes of Gaius, a legal textbook, written in the 2nd century AD. “The Civil Law of 
the Roman people consists of statutes, plebiscites, Decrees of the Senate, Constitutions of the 
Emperors, the Edicts of those who have the right to promulgate them, and the opinions of jurists.” 
See The Institutes of Gaius, , http://thelatinlibrary.com/law/gaius1.html (last visited Dec 
20, 2014). 
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In addition, as the praetorian system developed, the jurists256 assisted the 
praetor in drawing up formulae with highly generalized standards. The Edict was 
created annually, to declare the principles of the praetor. Furthermore, the jurists 
provided written technical advices to judges concerning the state of the law and 
interpretation of textual material such as the Edict.257 The Roman jurist Papinian258 
concluded that the law was developed by the Praetors’ Edict because it was an 
instrument that supplemented, explained, and improved the ‘ius civile’.259  
Secondly, in the sixth century - the next important historical epoch for the 
development of European law - the Emperor Justinian ordered the creation of a 
comprehensive manuscript covering all aspects of Roman law. Justinian’s 
Institutes, the Corpus Juris Civilis,260 included not only a refinement and adoption 
of Gaius’ Institutes, but also the Digest,261 the Code [early imperial legislation], and 
the Novels [Justinian’s legislation].262 In this legal textbook, the sources of law were 
divided into written263 and unwritten law.264 In Justinian’s view, the unwritten 
                                                     
256 Jurists in Rome had no official government powers. See Apple and Deyling, supra note 
250 at 4.  
257 Id. at 4. 
258 Aemilius Papinianu, (148–211) 
259 The Romans called their law ius civile. This law was applied by Roman citizens to 
Roman citizens. See MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 124 at 27.  
260 Called the Body of Civil Law, was issued in three parts, in Latin in (529) AD. See, 
Justinian, [CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS] ... COMMENTARIIS  SUMPTIBUS HORATIUS CARDON, SCHOLIIS 
CONTII, PARATITLIS CUIACII ... NOVAE ACCESSERUNT AD IPSUM ACCURSIUM DIONYSII 
GOTHOFREDI, I. C. NOTAE, ... LUGDUNI: SUMPTIBUS HORATIUS CARDON, (1604), 
http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/14856910?n=1&imagesize=1200&jp2Res=.25&printTh
umbnails=no (last visited Dec 20, 2014).) 
261 Writings of classical jurists or Pandects, issued in (533) AD. It compiled the writings of 
the great Roman jurists such as Ulpian, along with current edicts. See, 
http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/Corpus/digest.htm, (last visited Dec 20, 2014) 
262 Apple and Deyling, supra note 250 at 6. 
263 The Institutes (535) AD, Book I, 2.3. “The written part consists of leges (lex), plebiscita, 
senatusconsulta, constitutiones of emperors, edicta of magistrates, and responsa of 
jurisprudents [i.e., jurists].” See http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/Corpus/digest.htm, 
(last visited Dec 20, 2014) 
264 The Institutes (535) AD, Book I, 2.9. “The unwritten law is that which usage has 
established; for ancient customs, being sanctioned by the consent of those who adopt 
them, are like laws.” See http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/Corpus/digest.htm, (last 
visited Dec 20, 2014) 
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law or local custom was a source of law, although other Roman jurists e.g. 
Papinian and Gaius, did not see the unwritten law as a legal source. For this 
reason, its merit was supplementing the sources of law.265 By surveying the recent 
literature,266 it has been recognized that custom - as one of the oldest sources of 
law,267 is also among the primary legal sources in the civil law system. In 
Germany, for example, the judge has to fill gaps in the written law by applying 
principles of customary law. 
The third important step in civil law history began as the civil law came to 
be practiced throughout Europe.268 At this point, the role of local custom as a 
source of law became increasingly significant. Therefore, the European legal 
scholars attempted to systematize scattered and disparate written laws and local 
customary law and brought them together into harmony with rational principles 
of civil law.269 In the 16th century, the European states unified and organized their 
individual legal systems through codification. This process affected all European 
states, with the exception of England.270 Furthermore, during the era of 
Humanism and Enlightenment in the 18th century, the European jurists 
rationalized and systematized the law in order to provide a systematic legal 
order. As a result of these efforts, the Codes e.g. Prussia’s Complete Territorial 
Code of 1794, France’s Civil Code of 1804, and the German Civil Code of 1900 
were created.271 This process is known as codification. Legal scholars272 explain the 
term codification as a process of compiling and systematizing laws into a 
complete written body of law.273 It can be noted that the primary written source in 
                                                     
265 MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 124 at 28. 
266 See e.g. Dainow, supra note 121; Lupu, supra note 183; MERRYMAN AND PÉREZ-PERDOMO, 
supra note 200. 
267 Lupu, supra note 183 at 376. 
268 The Regents of the University of California, THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 
TRADITIONS 2, 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html 
(last visited Dec 20, 2014). 
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270 Apple and Deyling, supra note 250 at 14. 
271 The Regents of the University of California, supra note 268 at 2. 
272 See e.g. Apple and Deyling, supra note 250; Dainow, supra note 121; MOUSOURAKIS, supra 
note 124; The Regents of the University of California, supra note 268. 
273 Law code | law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA. 
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the civil law system is a code passed by legislation.274 These national codes 
contain a highly organized collection of the entire body of law275 and are 
continuously revised by the government.  
Nevertheless, other authors argue that codification is not a form, but rather 
an attempt to understand an ideology; they base this argument on the fact that, in 
some civil law countries e.g. in Greece and Hungary, the law remained uncodified 
until the Second World War.276 In spite of the codes, they argued that the 
influence of the source of Roman Law dominates over the ius commune in the 
European Codes.277 Another aspect that they pointed out is that e.g. California has 
more codes than some civil law countries.278 It can therefore be argued that 
codification can also be seen as a method. Furthermore, we find codes both in the 
common law and the civil law system. In contrast to the common law countries, 
the comprehensive and organized codes are of great significance to the 
interpretation and application of the law in the civil law countries. Here, judges 
generally interpret codes and laws very strictly.279 Additionally, it can be noted 
that codes are generally published with commentaries by legal scholars.280  
In conclusion, the codification process and the codes have characterized and 
shaped the civil law system. As a result, these legislative codes became one of the 
major sources of law in most European countries. 
e . Legislation in the European Civil Law Countries 
Having explained the historical codification process and codes in the civil 
law countries, this section will now examine others sources of law. As previously 
discussed, the codes are continuously revised trough new legislation. This process 
began after codification. Since then, legislation has become a separate power281 
and legislative activities have grown to modernize and adjust the legal 
                                                     
274 BYRD ET AL., supra note 89 at 3. 
275 Id. at 3. 
276 MERRYMAN AND PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 200 at 27. 
277 See e.g. BYRD ET AL., supra note 89; MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 124. 
278 MERRYMAN AND PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 200 at 27. 
279 Vivienne O’Connor, Common Law and Civil Law Traditions,  in PRACTITIONER’S 
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280 BYRD ET AL., supra note 89 at 3. 
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CHAPTER 2 | 69 
 
provisions.282 Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo state that, as a result, the law became 
synonymous with legislation in the 19th century.283  
Additionally, legislation could delegate legal power to the executive. In the 
majority of civil law countries, there is a hierarchy of law. The Constitution stands 
at the head of the hierarchy, followed by federal codes and other statutes.284 
O’Connor takes the view that legislation and codification ensure a rational, logical, 
and systematic approach to law. Many authors285 claim that judges generally 
interpret codes very strictly and consistently in compliance with the established 
legal order. However, the codes are updated based on research relating to socio-
economic conditions and public attitutes as voiced by legal scholars.286 Hence, in 
their view, the creation of new interpretations and new law is very limited.287 
Thus, the legislator needs to draft codes clearly and without gaps.288 One could 
say that the civil law system appears rigid and inflexible; indeed, this could be the 
overriding assumption since recent years have seen a spate of legal reforms289 in 
the European Union, and thus, in European civil law countries. As a result, 
national laws have adapted290 and new laws have been passed.291 The evidence 
suggets that, in light of this fact, there is also a great deal of diversity in terms of 
concrete responses to legal problems in the civil law.  
Despite the academic debate, legislation can be seen as a major source of 
law. It is responsible for the constantly updated and adjusted systematization of 
legal normative acts in terms of codes. Dainow emphasized the importance of the 
                                                     
282 MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 124 at 301. 
283 MERRYMAN AND PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 200. 
284 O’Connor, supra note 279 at 11. 
285 See e.g. Apple and Deyling, supra note 250; MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 124; O’Connor, 
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Shleifer, supra note 128 at 304. 
289 See e.g. DIRECTIVE 2000/31/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL- E-COMMERCE - STANDARD EU RULES, 32000L0031 (2000). 
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law-making function of legislation in the civil law system. Even he saw legislation 
as the main source or basis of the law in civil law jurisdictions.292 In addition, he 
pointed out that the comments of legal scholars and professors represent another 
significant feature.293 Other authors argued that legal analysis, studies, and 
interpretations of legal scholars also constitute sources of law.294 These materials 
were referred to as doctrine. A Romanian researcher defined this source as 
followed 
Doctrine is law, as conceived by theory, its scientific explanation, generalization and 
systematization.295 
Prior to codification, the doctrines played an important role for judges 
seeking solutions in the comments of academic works. Nowadays the aim of 
doctrine is to facilitate the legislator in the process of creating, or law 
enforcement.296 In conclusion, legal scholars view doctrine as an indirect and 
supporting source of law in the civil law system.  
f .  Customary Law in the Civil Law System 
Since Justinian,297 it has been recognized that unwritten law, or custom 
belongs to the sources of law. Modern authors recognized law as a social practice. 
Moreover, in their view customary standards also comprise part of the system.298 
This original source of law also has its origins in Roman law299 and could be 
considered the oldest source of law.300 In accordance with Lupu,301 two conditions 
                                                     
292 Dainow, supra note 121 at 424. 
293 Id. at 424. 
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are required for a custom to become a source of law: firstly, there is a material, 
objective condition, namely an old and applied custom, and secondly, there is a 
psychological, subjective condition, according to which the specific rule is 
binding. 
Customary law matters both in theory and in practice.302 One important 
example is the development of Bona Fides303 in Roman contract law. It required the 
contracting parties to give due consideration to the legitimate interests of the 
other party and to behave honestly. This custom contributed to the flexibility, 
informality and justice required by the community of merchants.304 
Later, this principle found its way into the German Civil Code (BGB)305 in 
the notion of ‘Treu und Glauben’ as set forth in Section 157306 and 242.307 These 
paragraphs state 
Contracts shall be interpreted according to the requirement of good faith, ordinary 
usage being taken into consideration.308  
At the beginning of the 19th century, the methodical academic debate on 
Section 242 of the German Civil Code (BGB) on the one side referred to a “baneful 
plaque” while the other side, praised it as the “queen of rules.”309 Nevertheless, 
through this principle, legislation provides an opportunity for courts to regulate a 
huge number of different cases. Hence, the legislation concedes that the judges 
can decide what is equitable given the circumstances of the specific case 
concerned. It has been shown that this legal principle could be seen as an 
adjustment of the rigid formalistic application of legal norms if these results in an 
abuse of rights.  
                                                     
302 Lamond, supra note 178 at 27. 
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Nonetheless, since the enactment of the German Civil Code (BGB), the 
courts have ruled on numerous cases concerning Section 242 of the (BGB). These 
cases on the general clause Section 242 of the German Civil Code (BGB) are 
recorded in well-known commentaries.310 In the meantime, legal scholars and 
German lawyers have attempted to categorize these countless applications into 
‘groups of cases’.311 Through these, it has been recognized that Section 242 of the 
German Civil Code (BGB) serves as a supplement to German civil law.312 Finally, 
while custom remained a major source of law throughout the era of Roman law 
and the Middle Ages, its significance is preserved in the civil law system. 
g.  Final Comparison of  the Sources of Law   
To conclude, the analysis shows that the primary sources in the common 
law are judicial decisions and equity. The common law developed historically on 
a case-by-case basis, resulting in the creation of precedents, which are binding in 
order to ensure certainty and fairness.313 In contrast, the primary source of law in 
the civil law systems is a code in the form of legislation. In addition to the 
primary sources, there are other sources like customary law, legal concepts, and 
doctrine. Overall, it can be argued that both the common law and the civil law 
systems contain all sources of law, as established in the comparison, but there is a 
different weighting and application. Thus, the essence of the comparison of the 
legal sources is that the main difference between the two legal systems lies in the 
contrast between the procedural and the theoretical origins of legal norms. A 
German legal historian, Engelmann, summarized that, due to the absence of 
                                                     
310 See e.g. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH: MIT NEBENGESETZEN | COMMENTARY ON THE 
GERMAN CIVIL CODE, (Otto Palandt & Peter Bassenge eds., 75. ed. 2016); MÜNCHENER 
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scientific legal theory in the common law, legal practice evolved through teaching 
legal practice.314 
By focusing on further legal development, many scholars have overlooked 
the fact that the distinctions are gradually blurring in the modern globalized 
world. Seemingly, the differences between the two legal systems are actually 
overemphasized. Ultimately, legal scholars concluded that each legal system 
possesses strong characteristic features that established its own identity.315 
Furthermore, the shared element is that all legal systems have the purpose of 
regulating and harmonizing social and business activities.316 For instance, due to 
their parallel economic and social development, the EU Member States are 
required to satisfy the same social standards. Hence, they also have to harmonize 
their legal development. In some cases, it seems that real differences between the 
civil law and the common law system have ceased to exist.317 Legal scholars have 
argued that the matter of "mixed jurisdictions” should also be considered. For 
example, Merryman stated that 
The two systems… are converging from different directions toward roughly 
equivalent mixed systems.318 
Currently, through globalization and the trend of harmonization of law it 
appears this tendency is on the rise.  
2. Comparison of the Courts Systems 
This section will examine the different organization and practice of the 
courts in the common law and the civil law systems in order to substantiate the 
comparative analysis of law. The focus on the courts in these two legal systems 
can be helpful firstly in order to obtain a better insight into the use of the law in 
judicial decisions and secondly to show the importance of judicial decisions for 
the legal framework of the compliance functions. For these reasons, this section 
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315 Dainow, supra note 121 at 435. 
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will briefly analyze and compare the organization and practice of the court 
systems in the UK, in the US and in Germany. 
a.  The Court System in England 
This section presents the competences and the organizational structure of 
the courts in the UK. The UK has a unified hierarchical structure, referred to as a 
four-tier system.319 At first, the highest court and the top level is the UK Supreme 
Court.320 The highest courts play an important role as the final interpreters of the 
law in the common law system.321 However, few cases ever reach this court.322 For 
example, the annual report323 of the Supreme Court’s full financial year shows a 
record number of hearings and judgments. The Court received 231 applications 
between 2014 and 2015, heard 89 appeals, with 37 appeals ultimately allowed.324 
Therefore, while the volume of cases in the Supreme Court is limited, this 
Court is extremely important. The Supreme Court is the final appellate court and 
has twelve judges.325 As a general rule, decisions can be appealed if the lower 
court has granted leave to appeal.326 The following diagram provides a brief 
overview of the English court system. 
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Figure 3 - The English Court System327 
It has been shown that the first instance includes the Magistrates’ Courts 
and the County Courts with limited jurisdiction. The Magistrates are trial courts 
with jurisdiction for petty criminal, family, and private law disputes, such as 
traffic offenses up to the value of £ 5,000.328 The majority of judges are lay persons, 
but the Magistrates do have a court clerk, a lawyer who trains and advises them 
on the law.329 The County Courts are geographically limited in their jurisdiction. 
Conversely, the Crown Court has no geographical limitation. The County Courts 
deal with minor civil, contract, tort, and land law cases with a value of less than 
£25,000.330 These Courts alleviate the burden of the High Court of Justice.  
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The second instance comprises two courts. The first is the Crown Court, the 
trial court for criminal cases, and the second the High Court of Justice for private 
law. The High Courts have three divisions: (1) the Queen’s Bench Division 
(QBD),331 (2) the Family Division, and (3) the Chancery Division. The QDB 
primarily handles contract and tort cases with a value over £ 25,000; the Family 
Division deals with matters concerning children or families, as well as divorce 
cases; and the Chancery Divisions handles e.g. equity matters, insolvency cases, or 
company law cases.332 Appeals from decisions of the County Courts proceed 
directly to the third instance, the Court of Appeal, whereas appeals from 
decisions of the Magistrates are referred to the Crown Court if the appeal was 
allowed.333  
Lastly, the Court of Appeal has two divisions: (1) the criminal division, 
headed by the Lord Chief Justice, and (2) the civil division, headed by the Master 
of the Rolls. This Court is an exclusively appellate court similar to the Supreme 
Court. The final and highest court, the Supreme Court (SC), is located at the top of 
the pyramid. It was established in 2009.334 It replaced the Law Lords as the highest 
Court in the UK. Today, the SC is located in the former Middlesex Guildhall in 
Parliament Square, Westminster.335 The SC hears appeals on arguable points of 
law in civil and criminal cases.336 Based on this structure, the justice system was 
cumbersome, slow and inefficient.337 Pressure has led to the introduction various 
reforms.338 In the course of the reforms, the creation of the UK SC separated the 
most senior level of the judiciary from the legislature.339 The importance of this 
Court lies in the hearing of appeals on points of law.340 In other words, the SC 
reviews the application of the law. The scope of judicial review has grown in 
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334 See SUPREME COURT RULES 2009, 1–2 (2009). These Rules apply to civil and criminal 
appeals to the Court.  
335 STEPHEN R. WILSON ET AL., ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 47 (1. ed. 2014). 
336 M. MORAN, POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE UK 405 (2011). 
337 Id. at 406. 
338 SUPREME COURT RULES 2009, supra note 334. 
339 MORAN, supra note 336 at 404. 
340 Id. at 404. 
CHAPTER 2 | 77 
 
recent years due to three influences (1) membership in the EU, (2) the expansion 
of the volume and scope of administrative law, and (3) as a result of 
parliamentary activism.341 Overall, the common law continues to exert binding 
power in the form of precedents, provides a framework for legal solutions, and 
influences the interpretation of existing statutes.342 
h.The Federal Court System in the United States  
The justice system in the US comprises two parallel systems: the federal and 
the state system. Each of these systems is responsible for civil and criminal 
cases.343 Both the federal and state courts interpret the law, which is enacted by 
the legislature. The judiciary has the authority to review legislative and executive 
actions.344 Thus, it has the capacity to tackle new social, political, or economic 
requirements.345 Federal law has its origins in the US Constitution.346 Due to its 
importance for criminal and corporate law, this section presents a brief overview 
of the federal court system in the US. 
Although the common law was transferred to the American colonies, the 
federal court system in the US is often described as a three-tiered system.347 
Similar to the UK court system, it includes trial courts, intermediate appellate 
courts and a supreme court.348 It has evolved over more than 200 years and is built 
around a hierarchical structure.349 The judicial system of the United States is set 
up in accordance with Article III of the US Constitution.350 Thus, Article III 
provides for one Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court consists of one Chief 
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Justice of the US and eight associate justices.351 In a year, one justice can handle 
and considers around 100 cases, but the court receives approximately 10,000 
petitions per year.352 The US Supreme Court is the highest Court in the US and 
has both original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction according to the United 
States Code.353 It has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases from the other courts.354 
In addition, it revises the decisions of the US courts of appeal.355 To this end, the 
Supreme Court orders the complete record of the case from the lower courts.356 
Often, the Supreme Court decides unsettled constitutional cases or has the final 
say if two courts of appeal have interpreted the law differently in similar cases.357  
The intermediate Courts of Appeal are called Circuit Courts because the 
country is divided into eleven geographical regions, called circuits. The circuits 
are named by numbers: The First Circuit, the Second Circuit ... through the 
Eleventh Circuit, plus a Circuit for the District of Columbia (Washington D.C.) 
and a Federal Circuit.358 According to the USC359 the United States has a total of 
thirteen judicial circuits. These Courts hear and review the decisions of the lower 
courts, the US District Courts. However, in contrast to the US Supreme Court, the 
Appellate Courts only decide in legal matters, not on the facts of the cases.360 In 
general, the Courts of Appeals consist of three-judge panels,361 which reach a 
decision by a simple majority.362 The districts are within the circuits. Each judicial 
district has a district court.363 Today, all districts have more than one judge who 
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presides over the cases.364 The US District Courts are primary trial courts, which 
deal with civil and criminal cases. The decisions of these courts bind the lower 
courts within the same circuit. The precedents remain unless the US Supreme 
Court overrules the decision.365 
In addition, according to the Constitution, the Congress is authorized to 
enact e.g. “…uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.”366 The bankruptcy judge is 
a designated judicial officer of the District Court, who deals with the matter of 
bankruptcy proceedings.367  
In conclusion, Figure 4 shows the general structure of the Federal United 
State Court system in brief, which comprises trial courts, appellate courts and a 
supreme court.  
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            … 
 
 
 
 
Trial Courts 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - The Federal US Court System 
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To summarize, in terms of the unified hierarchical structure, the appellate 
system, and the name of the highest Court, the US court system is similar to the 
UK court system. The unique characteristic of the US judiciary is that it is more 
locally oriented. Furthermore, the structure of the US court system is very 
different from the court systems of the European nations, because each state in 
the US has its own court system, as well as a self-contained legal system.368 As 
previously described, the federal government e.g. the Congress, possesses 
considerable authority over the Federal US Court System.369 Nevertheless, only a 
limited number of cases actually progresses to the federal legal system, for 
example crimes in violation of federal law or any cases arising under US law.370  
Additionally, the federal legislature can establish administrative agencies371 
in order to delegate the power to promulgate administrative rules and regulations 
that have the force of law.372 Therefore, the agency has the quasi-judicial power 
for administrative law judges. They decide disputes concerning the 
administrative rules and regulations.373 Furthermore, in the US, the Judicial 
Conference studies caseloads, reviews staff needs, and establishes administrative 
guidelines for the federal judiciary.374 In addition, the Judicial Conference reviews 
rules, unlike the Supreme Court and the district courts, in terms of their 
consistency with federal law.375 The Administrative Office, meanwhile, oversees 
the bureaucratic aspects of the federal judicial system.376  
In conclusion, the American system of justice enforces and interprets the 
law not only through its judges but also through legislative and executive bodies 
and administrative agencies.377 Over time, this characteristic of the judiciary 
                                                     
368 BYRD ET AL., supra note 89 at 149; HAY, supra note 126 at 48. 
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system has developed differently to the UK judicial system and America’s 
multifaceted judicial system is the result of its unique historical development and 
historic events such as the creation of the Constitution and the Declaration of the 
Independence from the UK.378 
i .  The German Court System 
As has been shown in the previous sections, the court systems in the typical 
common law countries are unified and organized in form of a pyramid, with the 
high Supreme Court at the top.379 Thus, the Supreme Court could, in theory, 
review every civil and criminal case.380 It appears that the ultimate power to 
review the legality of administrative action and the constitutionality of legislative 
action lies with the Supreme Court.381 
Generally, the court system in civil law countries differs markedly to the 
unified court system of the common law countries.382 The civil law court system is 
organized as a set of two or more distinct structures.383 For example, there is a 
theoretical and practical distinction between public law and private law. For this 
reason, the court structure is more complex, more specialized and more 
decentralized than in the common law countries and is divided according to 
public law and private law cases.384 Legal scholars speak to this system as an 
ordinary or regular jurisdiction, because the ordinary courts evidently influence 
the life of ordinary citizens.385 The ordinary judges interpret and apply the codes. 
In contrast to the common law system, only the legislator has the power to make 
law.386 
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The German Court system evolved through the codification of the German 
law.387 The Court system in Germany is a complex specialized system, which also 
includes trial courts and appellate courts. The German courts are, however, 
specialized according to subjects matter. There are five different hierarchies of 
courts, each with their own specific jurisdiction.388 The German court system is 
structured into five independent specialized jurisdictions: (1) ordinary 
jurisdiction, (2) labor jurisdiction, (3) general administrative jurisdiction, (4) fiscal 
jurisdiction and (5) social jurisdiction.389 Each set of courts has its own 
jurisdiction, hierarchy, judiciary, and procedure.390 According to the Basic Law of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (GG),391 the highest Courts of Justice of the 
Federal Government392 are located at the head of each jurisdiction as the last 
instance. These courts handle the final appeals and review the decisions of the 
lower regional specialized courts. They have appellate jurisdiction and rule only 
on issues of law, not facts. 
The courts of first instance can also be found in smaller towns within each 
of the Länder.393 Generally, the trial courts have original jurisdiction to deal with 
cases with a value at dispute of up to €5,000. These cases are heard by a single 
judge who holds a law degree, in accordance with the Courts Constitution Act 
(GVG).394 The large number of courts facilitates simple and prompt decisions. The 
intermediate higher regional courts have appellate and original jurisdiction. For 
instance, pursuant to the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO),395 the appeal 
will be allowed if the appeal value of €600 is reached. According to the Courts 
                                                     
387 FOSTER AND SULE, supra note 385 at 80. 
388 Id. at 81. 
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Constitution Act (GVG),396 the higher regional courts comprise both civil and 
criminal divisions. They handle civil cases with a value of more than € 5,000 and 
more serious criminal matters.397 Despite this seemingly complex and highly 
specialized court structure, the German system is more accessible and provides 
fast judicial decisions.398  
It has been noted that legislative power could not be exercised by the 
ordinary judiciary.399 After 1945, Germany established a rigid constitution, which 
includes some methods of reviewing legislative action.400 The Federal 
Constitutional Court was created to review the legality of administrative action. 
Therefore, the separation of the legislative, judicative, and executive power works 
as a principle.401 
Nowadays, the highest and most important court is the Federal 
Constitutional Court (BVerfG) in Karlsruhe. The Federal Constitutional Court was 
established by the constitution.402 This Court represents the final court of appeal 
for all cases originating in the regional and appellate courts and holds no original 
jurisdiction. The Federal Constitutional Court (BVerG) consists of two senates 
with eight judges each.403 The judges are selected to serve for twelve-years and 
decide on the interpretation of the constitution.404 The first senate deals with 
issues concerning the basic constitutional rights, as set forth in the Basic Law for 
the Federal Republic of Germany (GG).405 The second senate handles cases 
involving political actions, electoral and international law.406 The Court’s most 
important function is to interpret the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (GG). It decides the question of law to ensure consistency for all other 
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courts.407 Generally, judges in courts follow the rule of non-binding precedents, 
but judges in lower courts are also aware of the decisions in the higher courts.408 
However, the rule of non-binding precedents include one formal exception 
pursuant to Section 31 (I) of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (BVerGG).409 
The decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court are binding on all courts, 
legislative and executive authorities.410  
To summarize, Figure 5, below, presents the ordinary and specialized 
structure of the German court system in brief. 
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Figure 5 - The German Court System 
                                                     
407 Id. at 91. 
408 Id. at 54. 
409 GESETZ ÜBER DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (BVERGG) | FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT ACT, Federal Law Gazette I, 243 (1951), § 31 (I). 
410 FOSTER AND SULE, supra note 385 at 54. 
CHAPTER 2 | 85 
 
j .  Final Overview of the Courts Systems  
It has been mentioned that there are key differences in the court systems in 
the common law and civil law countries. Generally, the common law countries 
have a unified hierarchical court system. The court systems are comprised of 
three or four tiers.411 The common law court system makes a general distinction 
between civil and criminal cases. In contrast, the civil law countries generally 
have a more complex and specialized court system. The civil law court systems 
are comprised of e.g. public, administrative, labor law, and other areas of the law. 
The highest court is an appellate court on point of law, but holds no original 
jurisdiction.  
Secondly, the Supreme Courts in the common law countries play a greater 
role than in the civil law countries. They have original and appellate jurisdiction 
and have the authority to review legislative and executive actions. Regardless of 
the number and various kinds of courts, every case could be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the highest court, the Supreme Court.  
Thirdly, judges in the common law countries follow the doctrine of stare 
decisis.412 Judges are bound on similar cases in the past. The court should follow 
the legal principle, which has decided by that court or a higher court in a prior 
similar case.413 In contrast, in the civil law system judges follow the rule of non-
binding precedents. 
To conclude, in the common law system, the courts and judges play a 
greater role in the creation and development of the law. However, the civil court 
system with its ordinary courts seems more accessible to the citizen and the 
judicial process swifter than in the common law countries.  
3. Development of the Law in the two Systems 
This section compares the various aspects of the development of the law 
between the common law and civil law systems. It considers in brief the 
differences and similarities and provides perspectives on the sources and 
dynamism of the two systems. 
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k.  Development in the Common Law 
As outlined in the previous sections, the basis of common law is the 
establishment of judicial decisions. However, before the 20th century, there was 
no organized system of cases and law reports. The cases had to be analyzed orally 
by the lawyers and judges. Today, all major decisions are published online.414 
Thus, it is also important to note that the common law is constantly evolving. 
Furthermore, legal scholars assert that the focus on the development of law 
in the common law has been the judge.415 As such, he or she is a much more 
powerful figure than in the civil law. Judges were traditionally vested with the 
ability to create law.416 The historical development shows that judges interpret the 
law on a case–by–case basis in order to shape that same law. Thus, it has been 
recognized that the common law was originally created and grown through 
judges’ decisions.417 As a result, Sakar asserts that this approach may help to make 
legal regulation more adaptable to changing circumstances and, thus, it also helps 
fit with the generally accepted theory.418 
In addition, the courts also exercise judicial review over federal statutes and 
the actions of official bodies, and determine the constitutionality of federal and 
national laws.419 Through the concept of stare decisis,420 judicial decisions in the 
common law can act as binding precedent for subsequent decisions. This means 
that, in the interest of legal certainty, the principles of law set forth in cases upon 
which individuals have relied should not be overruled.421 A precedent thus helps 
ensure consistency and reliability in the common law.422  
However, in some cases it has been recognized that the common law courts 
overruled rules established previously.423 For example, the Federal Supreme 
Court and the state counterparts overruled their precedent and interpreted a new 
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understanding of the law, which they could apply to future cases presenting the 
same case and legal issue.424 The technique of overruling has made room for 
flexibility and permitted adjustment to these new conditions. In addition, since 
joining the European Union, the UK common law system has had to contend with 
a new source of law in the form of acquis communautaire.425  
Moreover, despite this method of further development of the law by judges, 
the legislature regularly intervenes by enacting new acts,426 for instance those 
passed by the Congress of the United States.427 Some areas of the law are 
governed exclusively by statutes.428 One example is commercial law, which in the 
US is codified in the Uniform Commercial Code429 adopted in all 50 US states.430  
Furthermore, the interpretation and application of the acts is again a matter 
for the courts. Judicial review was an issue in a well-known case, Marbury v. 
Madison, in which the Chief Justice John Marshall stated that the Supreme Court 
has the authority to review acts of US Congress and determine whether they are 
unconstitutional and, therefore, void.431 In this case, the rule must be repealed.432 
In contrast, the influence of the development of the law in the common law 
system by law professors, legal scholarship, and academic writings is less than in 
the civil law system. While legal scholars contend that the importance and use of 
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this material by courts will grow in the future.433 Merryman states that even today 
the common law is still the law of the judges.434 
In conclusion, we see that over time the common law has evolved with a 
systematically organized case system, by overruling precedents and judge-made 
reinterpretations to give a new understanding of the law, supplemented by 
legislative statutes in special areas of law, and through the review of those 
statutes by the judiciary. 
l .  Development in the Civil Law 
In the past, the legal development of the civil law system was subject to two 
main influences. The first is the function of the legislator to make law. 
Historically, this authority developed through the codification process and a strict 
separation of powers between the legislative, judiciary, and executive.435 For this 
reason, in the civil law countries the law is created and adopted by the legislator. 
Consequently, the judges merely apply and interpret the law. Judicial powers and 
scope are less than in the common law countries.436 
A second aspect of legal development is that, contrary to the consistency of 
the common law system, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the civil law system was 
modified and reinterpreted due to the increased input from European legal 
experts and academics.437 A characteristic feature of the civil law tradition is the 
method of legal thinking. Legal scholars and academics use abstract terms, 
scientific legal theory, and methodologies to solve legal problems.438 Moreover, 
legal scholars have a highly prestigious standing and their opinions exert great 
influence.439 Scholars could influence the judges in two ways: Firstly, the theories 
and methods of the scholars are used by the courts to help them interpret the law 
in a specific matter and, secondly, after the decision, the academics publish their 
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critical legal opinions of the decision.440 Furthermore, the legal tradition of writing 
legal textbooks facilitated the transfer of legal knowledge at the European 
universities.441 Hence, in the civil law system, the legal scholars and their legal 
writings are a dominant factor and have a great impact both on the judges and on 
the legislator,442 who use the legal theory put forward by legal scholars when 
making and applying the law.443 Thus, legal scholars can also influence the 
development of the law in the civil law systems. 
In conclusion, on the one hand the role of legal science and academia with 
its theoretical explanatory, scientific interpretations of the normative material 
support the legislator or judge in the process of creating or interpreting and 
applying the law.444 On the other hand, legislation responds to changing social 
circumstances by means of legal theories. Finally, the civil law system evolved 
exclusively through legislation and legal science through the application of the 
law by the judiciary. 
m.  Summary of the  Development of both Legal Systems 
The three previous sections highlight the specific differences and 
similarities between the civil law and common law systems. At the beginning of 
the 19th century, a professor of law at Harvard University succinctly summarized 
the basic distinction between the common and civil law with these words: 
Sec. 570 The most striking difference between the civil and the common law lies in the 
greater relative importance, which, in the former system, is attributed to the opinions of 
jurists as compared with prior decisions of the courts.445  
Firstly, the Anglo-American legal system and the English legal system are 
built on case law. In other words, the common law is the totality of principles, 
concepts, and binding decisions set down by the judiciary. Although typically 
affected by statutory authority, broad areas of the law, most notably relating to 
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property, contracts, and tort, are traditionally part of the common law.446 Overall, 
these facts confirm that the judiciary’s common law authority is established by 
the decisions made by past generations of judges.447 Legal scholars described this 
approach as ‘prior model of judging’. 
Secondly, the legislation is subjected to the binding interpretations of the 
courts. What this means, in practice, is that the legislation is ‘overlaid’ by the case 
law.448 For this reason, the common law system has no statutory basis; because the 
judges establish common law by applying previous decisions to present cases. 
However, in some cases, the legislator regulated the scope of jurisdiction through 
the creation of new statutes.449 
Thirdly, in the common law system there has therefore been no need for 
legal scholars in order to devise and develop a comprehensive system of law.450 In 
other words, analyses by legal scholars and legal science do not play any 
significant role in the development of the law in the common law world. In 
contrast, the decisive central pillar of the civil law is legislative codification, an 
approach that has determined the very nature of this legal system.451 It follows 
that, in contrast to the year-books and reports in the common law, the codes and 
legal textbooks possess the highest level of systematics and generalization, based 
upon a scientific structure and classification of the law. In addition, both the 
legislative and the judges refer to the codes, statutes, and legal commentaries of 
legal scholars and afford these a great deal of respect and consideration.452 Thus, it 
has been recognized that the sources of law in the civil law system comprise a 
hierarchy including the constitution, legislation, statutes, and customs.453 
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While, it might seem that the common law system is slow and unwieldy, 
because the judges rigidly follow established precedents,454 other authors455 see 
the same weakness in the civil law system, since, there, the judges are bound by 
the codes. However, as has been demonstrated,456 both the common law and civil 
law systems are capable of developing and evolving. Moreover, recent years have 
shown that altered social and political circumstances can result in modifications 
and adjustments to government regulations e.g. through the transposition of EU 
directives in the UK and Germany457 or by the enactment of new acts in both 
systems.458 
In conclusion, the common law and civil law system have seen a variety of 
sources e.g. the customary law, judicial precedents, the codes, legislative acts, and 
legal science.459 It can be argued that all legal sources of law have revealed their 
feasibility of development. This ability has evolved through and as a direct 
response to the multitude and variety of social issues and historical 
developments. However, there are also similarities in the two systems in terms of 
the form taken by such adjustments to social and political influences. Lastly, 
while formative elements of the law remain tied up in history and tradition, 
globalization is leading to a steady process of convergence of the two ostensibly 
opposing systems. Therefore, the next section examines the further development 
of the law in both the common law and civil law systems. 
                                                     
454 Nelson, supra note 194 at 15. 
455 See e.g. Sarkar, supra note 130; MERRYMAN AND PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 200. 
456 See supra II., 3., p. 85 
457 See e.g. DIRECTIVE 2004/39/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON 
MARKETS IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AMENDING COUNCIL  DIRECTIVES 85/611/EEC AND 
93/6/EEC AND DIRECTIVE 2000/12/EC (MIFID 2004), 32004L0039 L 241/1 (2006). GESETZ ZUR 
UMSETZUNG DER RICHTLINIE ÜBER MÄRKTE FÜR FINANZINSTRUMENTE UND DER 
DURCHFÜHRUNGSRICHTLINIE DER KOMMISSION  (FINANZMARKT-RICHTLINIE-
UMSETZUNGSGESETZ - FRUG), Federal Law Gazette I p. 1330 (2007). 
458 See e.g. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56. UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 
2010, supra note 67. 
459 Dainow, supra note 121; Lupu, supra note 183 at 375; MERRYMAN AND PÉREZ-PERDOMO, 
supra note 200; MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 124; Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, supra 
note 128; Sarkar, supra note 130. 
92 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
B. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT – CONVERGENCE OF THE TWO SYSTEMS 
The two systems… are converging from different directions toward roughly 
equivalent mixed systems.460  
It has been shown that both legal systems have evolved and adapted over 
the course of time and that there have also been similarities between the two legal 
systems.461 First, the common law world has moved gradually towards greater 
legislative power. The period since the end of the 19th century has seen a great 
many more federal statutes due inter alia to increased government intervention 
e.g. the US Code,462 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)463, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002,464 and the UK Bribery Act 2010.465 Under pressure to respond to a 
number of high-profile corporate scandals, a number of Western countries, 
including the US and the UK, established governmental regulatory and standards 
in the field as diverse as occupational health and safety, the environment, 
consumer protection, securities, money laundering and foreign corrupt practices 
in the field of compliance.466 This has resulted, accordingly, in a more statutory 
regime that could lead to a ‘box-ticking’ approach with the legislature also 
fostering and enforcing various recommendations. In addition, standards such as 
the UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance,467 the Code, flexibly offers a 
“comply or explain model” for the companies.468 These examples show an increasing 
influence of government intervention in the common law. 
                                                     
460 MERRYMAN AND PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 200 at 126. 
461 O’Connor, supra note 279 at 34. 
462 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC), supra note 228. 
463 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), PUB. LAW 95-213, 15 USC § 78DD-1 91 
Stat. 1494 (1977). 
464 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56. 
465 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67. 
466 Christine Parker, The Ethics of Advising on Regulatory Compliance: Autonomy or 
Interdependence?, 28 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 339–351, 339 (2000). 
467 Cadbury Committee, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2014) (1992), 
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx (last visited Dec 27, 2014). 
468 Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Corporate governance in the 
UK: Is the comply or explain approach working?, 30 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 193–201, 2 (2010). 
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Secondly, on the other side, there is an also a growing reliance on case law 
in the civil law system.469 For instance, in Germany, the judicial decisions of the 
Federal Labor Court (BAG) are of major significance for the interpretation and 
practical application of the highly fragmented system of employment law, and, as 
such, for the lower labor courts. The reason for this is that, to date, there has been 
no comprehensive codification of all areas of labor. The great variety of 
provisions with employment law makes it all more difficult to handle. Hence, in 
practice, employment law has often been determined largely by judicial decisions. 
This authority to further develop employment law is set forth in the Labor Court 
Act (ArbGG).470 The Federal Labor Court (BAG) has embodied this further 
development of law in cases concerning the termination of contracts.471 
Thirdly, the structure of the court systems differs considerably between the 
two systems. In the civil law countries, there is a distinction between public law 
and private law.472 Thus, the civil law system, on the one hand, followed the 
tradition of the separate codes and built a specialized organization of courts.473 In 
contrast, the common law system favored integrated court systems with courts of 
general jurisdiction. Typically, in the common law countries there is a 
constitutional review of legislation, which is historical not common in civil law 
countries due to the primacy of legislation there. However, Merryman refers to a 
‘constitutionalization’ of the development of civil law.474 He argues that the 
codification process has been completed. Thus, legislative supremacy is bound to 
decline.475 As mentioned previously, the civil law countries have also established 
constitutional courts to review legislation.  
                                                     
469 O’Connor, supra note 279 at 34. 
470 ARBEITSGERICHTSGESETZ (ARBGG) | LABOR COURT ACT, Federal Law Gazette I, 1267 
(1953) § 45 IV. “Der erkennende Senat kann eine Frage von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung 
dem Großen Senat zur Entscheidung vorlegen, wenn das nach seiner Auffassung zur 
Fortbildung des Rechts oder zur Sicherung einer einheitlichen Rechtsprechung 
erforderlich ist.“ 
471 See e.g. BAG v. 20.11.2014 - 2 AZR 664/13, 2015 NZA 931; BAG, 20.03.2014 - 2 AZR 
565/12, 2014 NJW 2219. 
472 O’Connor, supra note 279 at 15. 
473 Apple and Deyling, supra note 250 at 37. 
474 MERRYMAN AND PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 200 at 152. 
475 Id. at 155. 
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Fourthly, particularly in the European countries, another major factor has 
been the emergence of supranational legal norms, such as the European Union 
regulations and directives. The development of the European Union and its 
judicial body has had a significant effect in terms of shaping the national law.476 
European law at times overlaps with national laws. In recent years, the adoption 
of a number of regulatory acts within the EU has resulted in a degree of 
harmonization of the law. The two families of legal system represented in the EU 
member states are converging, causing a blurring of the distinction between the 
civil and common law systems. Legal authors477 call this phenomenon ‘mixed’ or 
‘hybrid’ legal systems.  
Nevertheless, a number of fundamental differences and divergent 
approaches to the law remain to the present day between the two legal systems, 
with the US and the UK common law system on the one side, and the German 
civil law system on the other side. Despite the tendencies outlined above (1) 
increasing legislation in the common law system, (2) the application of case law in 
specific areas of law within the civil law system, and (3) the convergence of the 
common law and civil law systems the two distinct legal systems will 
nevertheless be preserved for the future.  
Table 1 summarizes the findings of my comparison of the common law and 
civil law systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
476 Id. at 155. 
477 See e.g. Apple and Deyling, supra note 250; O’Connor, supra note 279. 
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Table 1 - Comparison between the Common Law and Civil Law Systems 
Factors Common Law Civil Law 
 US UK Germany 
Legal Sources Judicial Decisions, 
(Equity) 
Judicial Decisions, 
(Equity) 
Legislation 
 Precedents Precedents Statutes  
 Binding cases Binding cases Hierarchical Order 
 Customary Law Customary Law Legal Science 
Law Collections 
Yearbooks and 
Reports 
Yearbooks and 
Reports 
Comprehensive, 
Systemized Codes 
Doctrine of Good 
Faith 
Corporate and 
Contract Law, The 
USC 
Not recognized, is 
owed under a Fidu-
ciary Relationship 
Enshrined in law 
(BGB) as bona fides 
Court System 
Federal and State 
System, Three-
Tiered Unified, 
Hierarchical System 
Four-tier System, 
Unified, 
Hierarchical System  
Complex, 
Specialized System 
Supreme Court 
Original and 
Appellate 
Jurisdiction 
Original and 
Appellate 
Jurisdiction 
Appellate 
Jurisdiction 
Formalism High High Very High 
Development By Judges By Judges By Legislator 
Future 
Development 
Foreign Cases 
Foreign Cases, EU 
Legislation 
EU Legislation 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE TOPIC 
I. Introduction 
This part provides an overview of the literature on the German, US, and UK 
compliance officer as per December 2014. The purpose of this literature review is 
to summarize the already existing key issues relating to this function by 
surveying the academic literature on the subject. In recent years, the academic 
legal literature has yielded a variety issues and discussions, which have emerged 
around the role of the compliance officer. The debate has shown that the 
requirements for the implementation and developing of this function have been 
subject to fundamental changes under the revised legal regulatory framework. 
Seemingly, the debate indicates that regulatory changes could have a profound 
impact on the organizational role of the compliance officer. 
Firstly, the following section surveys the relevant German literature on the 
role of the compliance officer and introduces the key issues relating to the 
compliance officer’s position within companies. Specifically, it will analyze in 
detail the German literature and articles as regards the German compliance officer 
role. Therefore, it presents the current state of the function and the key issues 
concerning this position. The aim of this analysis is to identify gaps in the 
research. Then, the analysis of the American and English literature of the US and 
UK will continue in the second and third sections with the examination of the 
present state of research and debate on the compliance officer. Lastly, this part 
will provide the hypotheses relating to the compliance officer function within 
companies. 
1. The Key Issues relating to the German Compliance Officer 
Prior to 2009, the German literature focused on compliance was not 
particularly substantial. The academic debate considered the need for compliance 
within German companies, the implementation of a corporate compliance 
program as well as the selection of a compliance officer.478 Following the decision 
                                                     
478 Nicola Buffo & Bina Brünjes, Gesucht wird ein Compliance-Officer – Ein 200.000 Euro-
Beispiel aus der Praxis, CCZ 108–112 (2008); Hauschka, supra note 71. 
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of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) in 2009,479 we began to see a broad academic 
interest and discussion480 about the legal duties and responsibilities of the 
compliance officer function. In this judicial decision, the Federal Supreme Court 
stated that an employee in an executive position has a responsibility under 
criminal law on account of his or her professional position.481 Since then, the 
academic assumption has been that the compliance function justifies a 
supervisory duty and an obligation to avoid punitive damages.482 From Bürkle, 
Moosmayer, Hauschka to Zimmermann, there is among academic and legal 
practitioner a far-reaching explanation of the tasks and requirements of this 
position. An examination of the German literature shows the following key topics 
concerning the compliance function: (1) What is the scope of responsibility of the 
compliance function? (2) Should the compliance officer be liable for failing to 
detect misconduct by employees? (3) Is the compliance officer able to limit his or 
her liability? Is there any form of protection against dismissal for compliance 
officers? How should the employment contract for a compliance officer be 
drafted?483 
However, having surveyed the German literature, it has been noted that 
legal authors are not agreed as to the requirements and liability relating to the 
compliance function. The current debate centers mainly around the scope of 
                                                     
479 BGH v. 17.7.2009 - 5 StR 394/08, NJW 2009, 3173, BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, 
supra note 29. 
480 See e.g. Bürkle, supra note 32; Dann and Mengel, supra note 47; Jörg Fecker & Ulrich-
Peter Kinzl, Ausgestaltung der arbeitsrechtlichen Stellung des Compliance-Officers 
Schlussfolgerungen aus der BSR-Entscheidung des BGH, CCZ 13–20 (2010); Gößwein and 
Hohmann, supra note 46; Hauschka, supra note 4; Heuking, supra note 4; Meier, supra note 
47; Sünner, supra note 71; Wolf, supra note 46; Wybitul, supra note 32; Zimmermann, supra 
note 32. 
481 BGH v. 17.7.2009 - 5 StR 394/08, BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 note 
22. 
482 See e.g. José A. Campos Nave, Strafbarkeit des Compliance Officer aufgrund einer aus dem 
Aufgabenbereich abgeleiteten Garantenstellung, BETRIEBS-BERATER 2059, 2059 (2009). 
483 See supra Ch. 1, B., p. 26; See e.g. Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480; Gößwein and 
Hohmann, supra note 46; Kirsch, supra note 46; Klaus Lackhoff & Martin Schulz, Das 
Unternehmen als Gefahrenquelle? Compliance-Risiken für Unternehmensleiter und Mitarbeiter, 
CCZ 81–88 (2010); Krieger and Günther, supra note 47; Volker Rieble, Zivilrechtliche 
Haftung der Compliance-Agenten, CCZ 1–4 (2010); Schulz and Renz, supra note 46; Wybitul, 
supra note 32. 
98 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
responsibilities attempts to identify the compliance officer’s liability. For this 
purpose, German legal scholars analyzed the increased criminal and civil liability 
of the compliance function and its limitation.484 Other legal authors explored the 
scope of responsibilities,485 the legal employment status of the compliance 
officer,486 and models of compliance structures within companies, including the 
implementation of the compliance function.487 Since 2012, some authors have 
discussed the development of the compliance job description.488 They point out 
the necessity for further professionalization of this function. In the financial 
services sector, for instance, in the view of Klebeck & Zollinger489, the purpose 
behind the AIFM-Directive490 is to create a European legal framework and to 
establish an independent and effective compliance function into the post of 
Alternative Investment Funds Manager (AIFM). According to Art. 37 sec. 7 (b), 
(c)491 the AIFM should appoint a legal representative who is “sufficiently equipped 
to perform the compliance function pursuant to this Directive.”492 The implementation 
                                                     
484 See e.g. Bürkle, supra note 32; Tom Giesen, Die Haftung des Compliance-Officers gegenüber 
seinem Arbeitgeber – Haftungsprivilegierung bei innerbetrieblichem Schadensausgleich?,  CCZ 
102–106 (2009); Wolf, supra note 46; Zimmermann, supra note 32. 
485 See e.g Kirsch, supra note 46; Nadja Raus & Martin Lützeler, Berichtspflicht des Compliance 
Officers – zwischen interner Eskalation und externer Anzeige, 2012 CCZ 96–101 (2012). 
486 See e.g. Diana Illing & Karsten Umnuß, Die arbeitsrechtliche Stellung des Compliance 
Managers – insbesondere Weisungsunterworfenheit und Reportingpflichten,  CCZ 1–8 (2009); 
Daniel Meier-Greve, Zur Unabhängigkeit des sog. Compliance Officers, 2010 CCZ 216–221 
(2010). 
487 See e.g. Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46. 
488 See e.g. Christoph E. Hauschka, Wirnt Galster & Annette Marschlich, Leitlinien für die 
Tätigkeit in der Compliance-Funktion im Unternehmen (für Compliance Officer außerhalb 
regulierter Sektoren), 2014 CCZ 242–248 (2014); Hauschka, supra note 4; Daniel Sandmann, 
Die Compliance-Funktion unter Solvency II – Ein Überblick, CCZ 70–77 (2015); Sünner, supra 
note 71. 
489 Ulf Klebeck & Peter Felix Zollinger, Compliance-Funktion nach der AIFM-Richtlinie, 
BETRIEBS-BERATER 459–464 (2013). 
490 DIRECTIVE 2011/61/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON 
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS AND AMENDING DIRECTIVES 2003/41/EC AND 
2009/65/EC  AND REGULATIONS (EC) NO 1060/2009 AND (EU) NO 1095/201, OJ L 174 p. 1 
(2011). 
491 Id. 
492 Id. 
CHAPTER 2 | 99 
 
of this Directive could be a further step towards increasing legal requirements 
relating to this position in the financial services sector. 
The actual discussion493 specifies the tasks and requirements of the 
corporate German compliance officer and attempts to establish guidelines for this 
position. In 2014, the German Federal Association of Compliance Officers 
(BDCO)494 published a position paper “A job description of the compliance officer–
minimum requirements of the content, education and development.”495 In Hauschka’s 
evaluation, these requirements are too far-reaching since they were transferred 
unaltered from the regulated finance and banking sector into the private sector.496 
In sum, since 2009, the German compliance officer has been the subject of 
controversial debate.  
Furthermore, there is a broad academic debate on the nature and 
classification of this function. Some authors have argued that this position should 
be an economic function because the effective compliance officer must 
understand the business and structure within the company. As such, the 
appointment of judges and prosecutors as compliance officers, for instance, 
appears questionable.497 Other authors identify the significance of legal education 
and knowledge in being able to properly fulfill this position.498 They point out 
that the increasing importance of the legal profession for this function has been 
recognized in recent years. Mention has also been made to the fact that the 
                                                     
493 Hauschka, supra note 4; Heuking, supra note 4; Sandmann, supra note 488. 
494 German Federal Association of Compliance Officers | Bundesverband deutscher 
Compliance Officer (BDCO), supra note 49. 
495 BDCO, BDCO-POSITIONSPAPIER - BERUFSBILD DES COMPLIANCE OFFICERS – 
MINDESTANFORDERUNGEN ZU INHALT, ENTWICKLUNG UND AUSBILDUNG (2013), 
hhttp://bdco.de/positionspapier-compliance-officer (last visited Dec 12, 2014). 
496 Hauschka, supra note 4 at 170. 
497 See e.g. Jürgen Bürkle, Compliance-Beauftragte, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: HANDBUCH 
DER HAFTUNGSVERMEIDUNG IM UNTERNEHMEN § 8 (Christoph E. Hauschka & Christoph 
Besch eds., 2. ed. 2010) note 38; Jörg Thierfelder, Anforderungsprofil für Compliance Officer, 
in DER COMPLIANCE OFFICER: EIN HANDBUCH IN EIGENER SACHE § 2, 15-24, 18 (Jürgen 
Bürkle & Christoph E. Hauschka eds., 1. ed. 2015) note 8; Heuking, supra note 4 at 329. 
498 See e.g. Bürkle, supra note 32 at 12; Klaus Moosmayer, Modethema oder Pflichtprogramm 
guter Unternehmensführung? – Zehn Thesen zu Compliance, 2012 NJW 3013–3017, 3014 
(2012). 
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compliance officer ought to have both economic and legal expertise.499 The 
conclusions drawn from this analysis is the reference to this function as a “legal 
manager.”500 
In 2013, an empirical German study501 within companies with a random 
sample of 486 responding compliance mangers revealed the academic education 
of compliance officers in large firms, active on a global scale. The study found that 
over 70 percent of compliance officers held an academic degree.502 Of these, 
approximately 40 percent have a law degree and approximately 30 percent a 
degree in economics.503 In spite of these academic debates, empirical legal 
research on the function of the compliance officer is largely absent in the German 
literature and journals. However, it has been noted that there is a lack of focus on 
a precise explanation and definition of the compliance function.  
Another aspect that the legal authors contributed to the debate, is the lack of 
uniformity and standardization of the compliance function. There is no 
established job description for the compliance officer.504 The scope of 
responsibilities of this function is not enshrined in legislation, neither in 
accordance with the Vocational Training Act,505 nor in terms of generally accepted 
guidelines. In addition, an applicable definition of the compliance function is still 
lacking.506 These attitudes are inconsistent with the view taken by Groß, who 
counters that an entirely new and separate job description has developed in the 
meantime, but she does not actually present this description.507 However, there is 
no definition of the compliance function outside the banking sector. This gap in 
the knowledge is relevant because, in recent years and due to international 
                                                     
499 See e.g. Hauschka, supra note 71 at 261. 
500 See e.g. Moosmayer, supra note 498 at 3015. 
501 HENNING HERZOG & GREGOR STEPHAN, BERUFSFELDSTUDIE COMPLIANCE MANAGER 2013: 
VERMESSUNG EINES BERUFSSTANDES (Professional Association of Compliance Manager | 
Berufsverband der Compliance Manager (BCM), 1. ed. 2013). 
502 Id. at 55. fig. 3.01. 
503 Id. at 56. fig. 3.02. 
504 See e.g. Bürkle, supra note 497 at 11; Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480 at 15. 
505 BERUFSBILDUNGSGESETZ (BBIG) | VOCATIONAL TRAINING ACT, Federal Law Gazette I, 
1112 last amended August 2015 p. 1474, 1538 (1969)§§ 4-5. 
506 See e.g. Hauschka, supra note 4; Meier, supra note 47; Meier-Greve, supra note 486; Raus 
and Lützeler, supra note 485. 
507 GROß, supra note 48 at 29. 
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influences, German firms have faced increasingly stringent requirements 
concerning legally and ethically responsible behavior.508  
In conclusion, the current German debate among academics and 
practitioners509 represents efforts to create a specific job description. In sum, it is 
acknowledged that there are still many unanswered questions concerning this. 510 
There is a need for a generally applicable definition and a modern understanding 
of the role of the German compliance officer. 
2. The Key Issues relating to the American Compliance Officer 
By surveying the peer-reviewed American Journals and literature dealing 
with the corporate ethics and compliance officer from 1990 to the present date, it 
can be noted that a very wide variety of books and articles have been published.511 
American researchers have afforded this position a great deal of interest and 
attention.  
One aspect, which illustrates the key issues relating to this position, is the 
implementation of an ethical and compliance culture and program within 
American companies. Such programs comprise the designation and the 
appointment of a high-level officer responsible for ethics and compliance. In 
addition, ethics researchers have studied the features of compliance professionals, 
which intended to prevent unethical conduct on the part of the employees. An 
empirical study by Weaver et al.,512 summarized the current state of corporate 
ethics practice in the mid-1990’s and found that major American corporations 
                                                     
508 Moosmayer, supra note 498. 
509 See e.g.  Professional Association of Compliance Manager | Berufsverband der 
Compliance Manager (BCM), supra note 49; BDCO | Bundesverband deutscher 
Compliance Officer, supra note 49. 
510 See supra I., p. 96 
511 See e.g. Freeman, supra note 70; Gnazzo, supra note 11; Hoffman, Neill, and Stovall, 
supra note 16; Anthony Pirraglia, A Tangled Web: Compliance Director Liability Under the 
Securities Laws, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 245–272 (2003); Rosella and Pugliese, supra 
note 14; Heather Traeger, Kris Easter Guidroz & McAllister Jimbo, Supervisory Liability: 
The SEC’s Scrutiny and Support of Chief Compliance Officers: Part 1 of 2, 21 THE INVESTMENT 
LAWYER 25–33 (2014); Treviño et al., supra note 86; Weber and Fortun, supra note 4. 
512 Gary R. Weaver, Linda Klebe Treviño & Philip L. Cochran, Corporate Ethics Practices in 
the Mid-1990’s: An Empirical Study of the Fortune 1000, 18 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 283–
294 (1999). 
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have generally adopted ethical policies and have developed ethics programs 
within companies in the United States. 513 
Another key issue that has to be considered is that companies have 
responded to legal requirements by creating an ethics and compliance program 
and through the appointment of an ethics and compliance officer.514 More recent 
research has shown that this development is part of the significant efforts on the 
part of the federal government to regulate ethical activities.515 A study by Weber & 
Wasieleski compares the results from previous studies and found that the major 
pressure to develop and maintain an ethics and compliance program within 
companies is “to comply with government laws.”516 In addition to these findings, a 
number of American legal scholars and legal practitioners acknowledged the 
increasingly dominant role of federal law in employing the criminal law to assure 
corporate compliance with external legal requirements517 and in regulating 
directors' duties as “monitors” to the compliance issues.518  
The features of the ethics and compliance function have also been subject to 
research and have been discussed by a number of different authors. There were 
two studies519 relating to the ethics officer’s position published before 1990. After 
that time, a broad debate on the American compliance function, on the role and 
profile of the ethics and compliance officers also began to take shape.520 For 
                                                     
513 Id. at 293. 
514 See e.g. Joseph, supra note 87; Parker, supra note 466; Weaver, Treviño, and Cochran, 
supra note 512. 
515 James Weber & David M. Wasieleski, Corporate Ethics and Compliance Programs: A 
Report, Analysis and Critique, 112 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 609–626 (2013). 
516 Id. at 614. 
517 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 note 969. 
518 See e.g. H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight Responsibility in 
the Post Caremark Era, 26 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW 1–145 (2001); Aaron D. 
Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers under 
Delaware Law, 44 AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 475–520 (2007); Paul E. McGreal, 
Corporate Compliance Survey, 67 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 227–253 (2011); Sale, supra note 26. 
519 Center for Business Ethics, Are Corporations Institutionalizing Ethics?, JOURNAL OF 
BUSINESS ETHICS 85–91 (1986); Center for Business Ethics, Instilling Ethical Values in Large 
Corporations, 11 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 863–867 (1992). 
520 Gnazzo, supra note 11; Izraeli and BarNir, supra note 73; Weber and Fortun, supra note 
4. 
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example, Izraeli & BarNir521 present an “ideal profile” of an effective ethics officer. 
For this purpose, they pointed out five necessary requirements for this position 
(1) an insider status, (2) independence, (3) professionalism, (4) knowledge of 
organizational issues, and (5) knowledge of ethical theory.522 A survey by Weber & 
Fortun523 supported the requirement for the ethics and compliance function to 
have an insider status and provided the following profile 
…an ECO is typically a male who is 48 years old. He has been with his company for 
nearly 14 years and has held the ECO position for about three years.524 
An earlier survey525 by Morf et al. provided reliable evidence and data: 45 
percent of the thirty ethics officers surveyed held this position for one to two 
years and 77 percent were already employed within in the same company before 
assuming this position.526 However, the insider status could be a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, the majority of insiders have a profound knowledge of 
the business and structure of the organization; on the other hand, though, they 
could be entangled in corporate misconduct or professionally blinkered. In 
addition, there appears to be a lack of influencing factors. In sum, the “ideal 
profile” of an ethics officer presented by Izraeli & BarNir appears too simple. Their 
profile does not adequately reflect the relevance of links between external and 
internal factors. In conclusion, there is a lack of social and legal impact factors. 
Generally, with a few exceptions, there is very little empirical research 
available dealing with the positions of the corporate ethics officer and compliance 
officer.527 For example, Smith argues that the development of the general 
                                                     
521 Izraeli and BarNir, supra note 73. 
522 Id. at 1192. 
523 See Weber and Fortun, supra note 4. This survey of ethics and compliance officers was 
carried out under the auspices of to a professional association, the Pittsburgh Ethics 
Network, located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and represents a variety of business 
industries. The survey was conducted in the summer of 2004. 
524 Id. at 110. 
525 See Morf, Schumacher, and Vitell, supra note 77. This survey included interviews with 
thirty ethics officers from Fortune 500 firms in order to develop a database of their duties.  
526 Id. at 267. 
527 See e.g. Robert W. Smith, Corporate Ethics Officers And Government Ethics Administrators: 
Comparing Apples With Oranges or a Lesson to Be Learned?, 34 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY 
632–652 (2003). 
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characteristics of this position could be generated from the de facto or de jure 
working duties and responsibilities.528 In sum, he characterized an effective role of 
the ethic officer with five arguments: 
 Reports to the highest levels of the organization, 
 Has adequate resources and funding, 
 Serves more in a mediation role for employees, 
 Communicates employee concerns, and 
 Serves as the point person for reaffirming the importance of ethics in the 
corporation.529  
To further understand the role of the ethics and compliance officer, a study 
by Joseph530 identified that the major task and responsibility of this position was 
the implementation of the ethics and compliance programs within companies. He 
demonstrated that the more recent focus on the role of the ethics officer could be 
the participation in ethics investigations into misconduct. Apparently, nearly a 
quarter of the interviewed ethics officers viewed investigative responsibilities as a 
threat to their programs. In response, Joseph suggested that the EO should provide 
suggestions and insights to make the investigative processes fairer and more 
transparent to employees.531 The study by Joseph also evaluated the pros and cons 
of alternative staffing approaches involving employing full-time versus part-time 
ethics staff members.532 In conclusion, the study found that a successful ethics and 
compliance program depends on an awareness of best practices.533 
Furthermore, an empirical study by Canary & Jennings,534 examines the 
similarities and differences between corporate ethics codes and codes of conduct 
in the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley era. Their results indicate that the enactment 
                                                     
528 Id. at 638. 
529 Id. at 639. 
530 See Joseph, supra note 87 at 309. This study includes 26 structured, in-depth interviews 
with ethics officers at Fortune 500 companies between September 1998 and March 1999. 
531 Id. at 326. 
532 Id. at 332–333. 
533 Id. at 343. 
534 Heather E. Canary & Marianne M. Jennings, Principles and Influence in Codes of Ethics: A 
Centering Resonance Analysis Comparing Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Codes of Ethics, 80 
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of the SOX535 would affect the content and structure of codes for public 
companies.536 For instance, they found that the terms ’ethics’,’ ‘ethical’,’ and 
’compliance’ converge and the importance of compliance and law is emphasized 
more in the codes issued in the post-SOX era.537 Thus, the status of ethics and 
compliance programs with the adopted component of a compliance officer in the 
US seems to be warranted. In contrast to this view, other authors538 have argued 
that this examination revealed a number of sobering impacts on the effectiveness 
of ethics and compliance programs. For instance, the content of the codes is 
considered too generic.539 The proponents of this line of argument emphasize that 
all organizations need to be aware that ethics and compliance are at the core of 
their organizations’ values and culture and in the interest of all stakeholders. 
Furthermore, by analyzing past studies, they found that corporate ethics and 
compliance programs are significantly influenced by the external environment.540 
Evidently, the American academic debate identifies the influence of new 
regulations on the new importance of the role of CECO in the corporate 
environment.541 New research by Adobor, DeStefano, Fanto, Majewski, Miller, 
Kaptein, Panebianco, Rosella & Pugliese, Sobol, Traeger & Jimbo, Treviño, et al. 
investigates the performance, effectiveness, independence, and the potential 
liability of the ethics and compliance function. Their findings show that the role of 
the CECO is unique because this position deals with multiple (sometimes 
competing) expectations from different groups or units in the organization.542 
                                                     
535 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56. 
536 Canary and Jennings, supra note 534 at 275. 
537 Id. at 275. 
538 See e.g. Muel Kaptein, The Effectiveness of Ethics Programs: The Role of Scope, Composition, 
and Sequence, 132 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 415–431 (2015); Weber and Wasieleski, 
supra note 515. 
539 Weber and Wasieleski, supra note 515 at 624. 
540 Id. at 622–623. 
541 Freeman, supra note 70. 
542 Adobor, supra note 55; DeStefano, supra note 20; Fanto, supra note 70; Kaptein, supra 
note 538; Majewski, supra note 18; Geoffrey P. Miller, The Compliance Function: An 
Overview, No. 14-36 NYU LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER (2014); Colette 
Panebianco, The after‐effect of Rule 203(b)(3)‐2: what it means to take on the role of CCO to 
comply with the controversial measure, 6 JOURNAL OF INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 59–62 (2005); 
Rosella and Pugliese, supra note 14; Rob Sobol, Conversations at the top: the tone of the 
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In addition, the actual debate also focuses on the prospects and 
repositioning of the ethics and compliance officer.543 The current academic debate 
highlights a new importance, a repositioning and further development of this 
position. This line of argument follows an ongoing debate on the independence of 
the CECO and on the reporting structure of this function. 544 Another important 
key issue is the proposal to establish this function as an agent of the board of 
directors or providing the CECO direct access to the management board.545 
Discussions have held that this proposal could eliminate the conflict-of-interest 
and increase the authority and status of the position of the CECO in the company. 
In conclusion, in America, the key issues relating to the ethics and 
compliance function are more far-reaching than those in Germany. It has been 
mentioned that the American debate centers around four key topics (1) the 
implementation of an ethics and compliance program through the ethics and 
compliance function within companies, (2) the creation of an ideal job profile, (3) 
the influence of external factors like business and regulatory environment and (4) 
the independence and repositioning of the ethics and compliance officer. 
3. The Key Issues relating to the UK Compliance Officer 
Having surveyed the English literature, it can be noted that there is a 
distinct lack of material relating to the corporate compliance officer. The analysis 
of the peer-reviewed journals indicates that the majority of the articles published 
relating to the UK compliance functions examine the position in context of the 
regulated financial sector. For example, Edwards & Wolfe and Taylor explore the 
origins of the function of the compliance officer, how it has evolved over the past 
20 years, how the responsibilities are defined for the compliance function, and 
                                                                                                                                                  
independent chief compliance officer, 10 JOURNAL OF INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 10–15 (2009); 
Heather Traeger & McAllister Jimbo, Supervisory Liability: The SEC’s Scrutiny and Support of 
Chief Compliance Officers: Part 1 of 2, 21 THE INVESTMENT LAWYER 12–21 (2014); Treviño et 
al., supra note 86. 
543 Greenberg, supra note 12. 
544 Gnazzo, supra note 11; Hoffman, Neill, and Stovall, supra note 16; Majewski, supra note 
18. 
545 Michael D. Greenberg, Culture, compliance, and the C-suite: how executives, boards, and 
policymakers can better safeguard against misconduct at the top, (2013); W. Michael Hoffman & 
Mark Rowe, The Ethics Officer as Agent of the Board: Leveraging Ethical Governance Capability 
in the Post-Enron Corporation, 112 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW 553–572 (2007). 
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how the compliance function is expected to change over the coming years.546 In 
1993, Bosworth-David547 analyzed and evaluated the attitudes of the compliance 
officer in the English financial service industry in the wake of the Financial 
Services Act 1986.548 This study, which was conducted with the members of the 
United Kingdom Association of Compliance Officers, attempted to explore the 
attitudes of the compliance officer in the financial institutions. The findings 
indicated that the compliance officers appear to have a weak position within their 
organizations and that the former system of financial regulation fails to employ 
compliance officers sufficiently qualified to ensure efficient performance.549  
In contrast to the findings above, Edwards & Wolfe concluded that  
The compliance function provides a focal point for compliance in the organisation. Its 
role is multifunctional. There should be a greater recognition of the complex issues 
involved in making compliance work in a practical and meaningful way for the benefit of 
all concerned. 550 
They offered a compliance competence partnership approach within banks. 
This partnership approach consists of three main elements, which are linked 
together: (1) good compliance practice, (2) positive regulator relationship and (3) 
good ethical practice.551 The authors believed that this approach facilitates a 
compliance function capable of enhancing a compliant culture within the 
organization, as well as boosting the benefits of reputation and integrity in the 
financial market.  
As previously noted, in the UK there is little academic research on the topic 
of the function of the compliance officer. Several studies have analyzed the 
                                                     
546 Jonathan Edwards & Simon Wolfe, The compliance function in banks, 12 JOURNAL OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 216–224 (2004); Jonathan Edwards & Simon 
Wolfe, Compliance: A review, 13 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 48–
59 (2005); Jonathan Edwards & Simon Wolfe, A compliance competence partnership approach 
model, 14 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 140–150 (2006); Taylor, 
supra note 14. 
547 Bosworth-Davies, supra note 4. 
548 See FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986, FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986 c. 60 (1986).(It was 
repealed 2001 and superseded by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000) 
549 Bosworth-Davies, supra note 4 at 356. 
550 Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 223. 
551 Id. at 221. 
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influence of the legal environment on small and-medium sized enterprises (SME) 
in the UK. For example, an empirical study by Weir & Laing552 examined the 
effects of Cadbury553 compliance on UK listed companies.554 In addition, they 
found that complete compliance with the model of governance proposed by the 
Cadbury Committee555 does not appear be associated with company performance. 
Furthermore, in recent years several studies by Arcot et al. and Wilson et al. have 
examined the influence and effectiveness of environmental legislation on UK 
SME.556 Apparently, these studies evaluated only the influence on English 
legislation of the corporate compliance issue, but not on the compliance function. 
For example, the analysis by Arcot et al.557 found an increasing trend for 
compliance with the Combined Code,558 but frequent use of standard explanations 
                                                     
552 Charlie Weir & David Laing, The Performance-Governance Relationship: The Effects of 
Cadbury Compliance on UK Quoted Companies, 4 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT AND 
GOVERNANCE 265–281 (2000). 
553 FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - CADBURY REPORT 1992, (1992). 
554 See COMPANIES ACT 2006, COMPANIES ACT 2006 c. 46 (2006)., Part 15, Ch. 1 (2) A “quoted 
company” means a company whose equity share capital - (a) has been included in the 
official list in accordance with the provisions of Part 6 of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (c. 8), or (b) is officially listed in an EEA State, or (c) is admitted to 
dealing on either the New York Stock Exchange or the exchange known as Nasdaq. See, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/part/15/chapter/1/crossheading/ quoted-
and-unquoted-companies, (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) 
555 The Committee recommended that certain internal monitoring mechanisms should be 
adopted by quoted firms. The Report was published in December 1992 and contained a 
number of recommendations to raise standards in corporate governance. See FINANCIAL 
ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - CADBURY REPORT 1992, supra note 553.. 
556 Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468; Christopher Wilson, Ian David 
Williams & Simon Kemp, Compliance with Producer Responsibility Legislation: Experiences 
from UK Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, 20 BUSINESS STRATEGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
310–330 (2011); Christopher D. H. Wilson, Ian David Williams & Simon Kemp, An 
Evaluation of the Impact and Effectiveness of Environmental Legislation in Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises: Experiences from the UK: Evaluation of Impact + Effectiveness of Environ 
Legislation in SMEs, 21 BUSINESS STRATEGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 141–156 (2012). 
557 See Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468. They analyzed 245 annual 
reports of UK non-financial companies. 
558 CADBURY COMMITTEE, supra note 467. Today the UK Corporate Governance Code, 
(formerly the Combined Code) sets out standards of good practice in relation to board 
leadership and effectiveness, remuneration, accountability and relations with 
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in the event of non-compliance. In contrast to evidence presented by Arcot et al., a 
study by Wilson et al.559 found that the influence of environmental legislation and 
surveillance of SME compliance is generally low. They argued that compliance 
issues were recognized and acknowledged only if identified by a regulator and 
were regarded as serious only if prosecuted.560  
There has also been some debate surrounding the modernization and 
strengthening of corporate criminal laws in the UK. Djilani concludes that these 
developments could create a stronger corporate compliance regime.561 It can be 
argued that companies are likely to establish some internal monitoring processes 
of corporate compliance.562 This process also includes the establishment of 
voluntary compliance programs with the assistance of compliance officers.563 She 
considers compliance officers reporting duties vis-à-vis external regulators. 
Similarly, as in the US, UK-based companies could be given credit for reporting 
wrongdoing if they have created a compliance program.564 A recent book by 
Ward565 explores the relationship between regulation and compliance in the UK. 
She points out the influence of the legal framework and law of the changing face 
of compliance.566 In addition, Stephan argued that in the event that individual 
employees are prosecuted, the compliance officer has to weigh up the relationship 
balance between criminalization and leniency.567 Furthermore, Richard argues that 
the compliance officers are employees and not directors, even though they are at 
                                                                                                                                                  
shareholders. See, https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-
governance/UK- Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx, (last visit  Dec 22, 2014)  
559 Wilson, Williams, and Kemp, supra note 556; Wilson, Williams, and Kemp, supra note 
556.They conducted detailed semi-structured interviews with SME management and site 
staff. In total, 44 businesses were audited in the north-west of England between April and 
September 2008. 
560 Wilson, Williams, and Kemp, supra note 556 at 141. 
561 Djilani, supra note 99 at 341. 
562 Id. at 341. 
563 Id. at 329. 
564 Id. at 330. 
565 SHARON WARD, THE CHANGING FACE OF COMPLIANCE: MANAGING REGULATORY RISK (1. 
ed. 2015). 
566 Id. 
567 A. Stephan, Four key challenges to the successful criminalization of cartel laws, 2 JOURNAL OF 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 333–362, 360 (2014). 
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the front line within their companies.568 In summary, strong corporate criminal 
law sanctions and an increasingly stringent legal environment may also help to 
achieve corporate reform and foster compliance in UK companies.569 
To conclude, there has been barely any discussion or examination of the role 
of the corporate compliance officer in the UK-based academic and practitioner 
literature. Thus, it appears that the role and profile of the corporate compliance 
officer in the UK is significantly underresearched. This gap in the research 
knowledge might be attributable to the absence of cases that directly involve non-
financial companies. Another reason could be the non-regulatory environment in 
the private sector. It is also possible that this is due to the absence or lack of 
formalization of the corporate compliance role. Nevertheless, the role of the 
compliance officer is often linked with reporting duties to external regulators and 
the handling of regulatory sanctions. 
4. Conclusion 
The examination of the key issues in the US, UK, and Germany showed that 
recent years have seen an increasing visibility of the compliance function. One 
could argue that there is a broad agreement that a strengthened regulatory and 
legal framework in the corporate environment encourage compliance programs 
and, thus, the emergence of the compliance officer. In spite of the significance of 
this function, which is emphasized in the American and German literature, the 
role of the compliance officer within companies is still undefined. Despite the 
great importance of the ethics and compliance officer in the US, only 30 percent of 
surveyed ethics and compliance officers had an employment contract in 2009.570 
Moreover, a European Business Ethics Forum (EBEF) paper shows that most of 
                                                     
568 Alexander Richards, Criminal liability of employees of financial intermediaries for money 
laundering: a British perspective, 318–339, 318 (1. ed. 2003). 
569 See e.g. COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 554; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra 
note 67. 
570 See Rebecca Walker, COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS OFFICER POSITIONING: A BENCHMARKING 
SURVEY 50 (2009), http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Resources/View/ 
ArticleId/262/Compliance-and-ethics-officer-positioning-A-benchmarking-survey.aspx 
(last visited Dec 22, 2014). 
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them are in in voluntary roles if they work outside of the regulated industries, 
like healthcare or securities.571  
The findings relating to the key issues in terms of the American, English, 
and German compliance function reveal that there are a number of differences in 
the development and importance of this position in the US, UK, and Germany. 
Furthermore, gaps in the knowledge of this function remain. For instance, 
DeStefano argues that there is little qualitative research on compliance officers in 
the United States.572 In addition, Demott argues that the role and status of 
compliance personnel within private-sector firms have been the subject of 
relatively little examination by scholars although there is a wide-range of 
academic literature, reviews, and articles referring to the compliance function.573 
Apparently, in Germany only one study focuses on the position of the corporate 
compliance officer.574  
As mentioned previously, in the course of the last few years, the key issue 
in Germany as far as the compliance officer is concerned has been the broad 
academic discussion concerning the criminal duties and responsibilities of the 
post of compliance officer in the wake of a decision of the Federal Supreme Court 
on the matter.575 There is a gap in knowledge between the wide-ranging scope 
and limitation of the responsibilities of the compliance function. It is precisely the 
legal position that is the most problematic aspect of the compliance officer’s 
function. Hence, the current role of the compliance officer has been characterized 
by a number of unclear factors. Evidently, the legal scope of action within 
companies in which a German compliance officer works is sometimes 
undefined.576 Overall, it can be argued that the nature and classification of the 
German compliance officer are in need of further examination.  
In the US, the role of the compliance officer within companies appears more 
established, more broadly recognized and well integrated. Thus, the academic 
                                                     
571 Nicole Dando et al., The Evolving Responsibilities & Liabilities of Ethics Representatives: A 
practical guide, in EBEF PAPER ONE , 13 (2013). 
572 DeStefano, supra note 20 at 77. 
573 DeMott, supra note 4 at 56. 
574 HERZOG AND STEPHAN, supra note 501. 
575 BGH v. 17.7.2009 - 5 StR 394/08- BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29.  
576 Hauschka, Galster, and Marschlich, supra note 488 at 243. 
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debate appears to be oriented more towards the repositioning and further 
development of this function. In contrast, the UK corporate compliance officer has 
been subject to less attention in the academic debate. However, in general, the 
consensus is that the compliance officer’s role is multifunctional. In recent years, a 
number of American and English studies have evaluated the influence of legal 
legislation and compliance issues within companies.577 The conclusion drawn 
from the literature review is that, it is the unclear picture and definition 
governing the corporate compliance officer’s position in the US, the UK, and 
Germany that is the trigger behind the problem statement discussed in this thesis. 
II. Hypotheses 
This section establishes the hypotheses relating to the compliance officer 
function within companies, which will be examined in the course of this thesis. 
First, based on the findings of the literature review above, particularly 
contributions found in Law Reviews and studies,578 the general tendency evident 
in the US and the UK is that an increasingly stringent legal framework and 
regulatory requirements in the common law system have influenced the 
evolution of the compliance officer’s role in recent years. In other words, the legal 
pressure on firms to act in compliance with the regulations is growing. As a 
result, the first two assumptions are that the compliance officer will be afforded a 
more precise profile and a more important role at the high-corporate level within 
firms. 
H1 Due to the legal framework the function of the compliance officer is better defined and 
standardized in the common law than in the civil law system on account of the specific historical 
and legal development. 
H2 It can be anticipated that the compliance officer has emerged with enhanced legal 
requirements because the legal framework could establish a formal position of authority for the 
compliance officer at a high corporate level within companies. 
                                                     
577 See e.g. Center for Business Ethics, supra note 519; Djilani, supra note 99; Panebianco, 
supra note 542; Richard, supra note 68; Weir and Laing, supra note 552; Wilson, Williams, 
and Kemp, supra note 556. 
578 See e.g. Brooklyn Law Review, California Law Review, Cornell Law Review, 
International Review of Law and Economics, Virginia Law Review,…etc. 
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Second, in addition to the literature review, it might be helpful to examine 
cases in order to explore the concrete responsibility and duties of the compliance 
officer’s role in practice. For example, in the view of Jones, in the US, board 
decisions are the only legal tool available for regulating officer’s conduct and the 
only means of dismissing the officer in the event of misconduct.579 Nevertheless, 
over the last two decades, the corporate governance community and the courts 
have begun to pay greater attention to the legal obligations pertaining to 
corporate officers. One example of this development is the case580 in which Disney 
paid $130 million to its President Michael Ovitz who was removed for inefficient 
management a little over a year after he was hired.581 The court investigated 
claims that he had wasted money. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware 
decided on June 8, 2006 that such a claim could arise only in the rare event of 
directors irrationally squandering or giving away corporate assets.582 For this 
reason, Jones concluded that state corporate law, such as Delaware corporate law 
remains silent on the relevant legal duties in the context of corporate officers’ 
misconduct.583 Additionally, in the view of Murphy,584 the case law does not 
feature any helpful cases concerning the role of compliance officers, since most 
major companies prefer to agree to a settlement rather than go to trial.585 
However, the Delaware courts have focused on the role of the board members 
and on the effectiveness of the compliance programs within companies.586 It 
appears that cases involving the personal liability of compliance officers remain 
relatively rare.  
H3 It can be assumed that, due to the limited number of judicial decisions on the 
compliance officer’s role in the common law system, it would be useful to analyze the legal 
framework pertaining to the corporate compliance officer. 
                                                     
579 Jones, supra note 518 at 477. 
580 In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
581 Jones, supra note 518 at 475 note 2. 
582 Id. at 475. 
583 Id. at 476. 
584 Joseph E. Murphy, The Compliance Officer: Delimiting the Domain, in GUIDE TO 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN COMPLIANCE 19–36, 21 (2001). 
585 See e.g. In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), 
supra note 22.; Kennedy, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 US 742, 97–569 (1998). 
586 Murphy, supra note 584 at 21. 
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Third, another important aspect in the context of the compliance officer that 
this thesis will examine is the nature of the role within a company. As previously 
shown, new research has explored the legal environment, reporting duties, 
independence, the resources available to the compliance departments, the role of 
supervision, the scope of the responsibilities and tasks incumbent upon the 
position, but there is still a lack of knowledge about classification of this position. 
In the US, legal scholars have attempted to create a profile of this function.587 In 
addition, in 1995, Richard Y. Roberts, a Commissioner of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, held a speech on the "The Role of Compliance Personnel”.588 
He saw the compliance personnel in “…the first line of defense against fraud….”589 
The compliance officer supports the board in monitoring and overseeing the 
compliance program. Therefore, it is essential for a compliance officer to have 
authority within the firm to issue sanctions, or even to dismiss rogue employees 
and that the compliance officer obtain appropriate resources to be effective.590 
However, this approach and authority could yield a conflict of interest for the 
role. 
H4 It can be assumed that the compliance officers’ post is categorized as a control function 
in order to implement legal requirements. For this reason, this function is viewed as “corporate 
cop”591 or “watchdog” and does not obtain effective and relevant information of the business, 
because employees are wary of them. 
Fourth, legal authors have argued that a compliance officer should be able 
to operate independently of the general counsel or the management. He should be 
able to perform duties free from any conflicts of interest.592 The authors concerned 
pointed out two major potential conflicts: On the one hand, the reporting 
relationship - to whom does the CO report misconduct, and on the other hand, 
the degree of authority that the management has assigned to the compliance 
                                                     
587 See e.g. Gnazzo, supra note 11; Weber and Fortun, supra note 4. 
588 See Richard Y. Roberts, THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL. (2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1995/spch030.txt (last visited Dec 16, 
2014). 
589 Id. 
590 Id. 
591 See Joseph Weber, The New Ethics Enforcers - These corporate cops have unprecedented power 
to throw their weight around, 4 BUSINESS WEEK 40–41 (2007). 
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officer.593 They consider that an independent compliance officer can support the 
board in its compliance-monitoring role. The authors also make a historical 
comparison between the CO and the auditor independence of the audited 
companies. They argue that the case of Enron594 clearly illustrated the weakness of 
the close relationship between audit firms and clients.595 However, increasing 
independence of the compliance officer could give rise to another risk. 
H5 It can be assumed that the compliance officer is independent, he or she may not be 
sufficiently familiar with the risks of the business, because he or she is not involved enough in day-
to-day business. 
If the compliance officer seeks closer ties to the business units and functions, 
another conflict may arise. If the compensation of the compliance officer is tied to 
the financial performance of the business, their independence might be 
undermined. Furthermore, a 2009 study revealed that two- thirds of the surveyed 
ethics and compliance officers simultaneously held other positions in their 
company, such as Head of Human Resources, General Counsel, Chief Operating 
Officer, etc.596 Therefore, there is a wide-range of job titles for the compliance 
position.597 It appears that the compliance function is an add-on responsibility for 
another function and a multifunctional role. 
H6 It can be suggested that due to this multifunctional role, the function of the corporate 
compliance officer is unable to develop an independent standalone position, because the 
responsibilities are not clearly delimited and defined. 
Fifth, it has been recognized that the compliance officer should report to the 
highest levels within an organization.598 Gnazzo also presents suitable tools such 
                                                     
593 Id. at 90. 
594 The Enron scandal, revealed in October 2001, led to the bankruptcy of the Enron 
Corporation, an American energy company based in Houston, Texas. See The Enron 
scandal, http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijbm/article/viewFile/7627/5855 (last 
visited Dec 16, 2014). 
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596 Walker, supra note 570 at 48. 
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as audits, surveys, and interviews for reporting on the state of compliance.599 He 
recommends that the CECO ought to report directly to the board of directors 
because he or she protects the stakeholders within companies.600 This approach 
protects the CECO from undue influence by senior executives and management 
and supports them in obtaining senior authority within the company.601 
Moreover, based on this, legal scholars and legal practitioners argue that the 
compliance officer should be made an integral part of the corporate management 
structure.602 However, a recent study by PWC found that, at present, only around 
one- third of the companies report that the compliance officer is involved in 
helping develop or implement corporate strategy.603 
H7 It can be assumed that legislative regulation and a regulatory framework will be 
necessary to appoint an independent standalone compliance officer at a high-corporate level.  
In conclusion, the review of the academic literature reveals a gap in 
knowledge concerning the clearly definition of the role of the corporate 
compliance officer. There is a need to evaluate the role and status of the 
compliance function within companies by examining how this position can help 
manage risks and contribute to comply with law.604 To further define the role of 
the compliance function, this thesis will examine in detail the legal and cultural 
background of this function, the legal framework around this position as well as 
the repositioning of the traditional identity of the compliance officer from legal 
and regulatory supervisors to effective strategic business partners.605 
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CHAPTER 3 
A. COMPLIANCE AND THE COMPLIANCE OFFICER: A HISTORICAL VIEW 
This chapter provides an overview of the legal and cultural background of 
compliance606 and the compliance function607 in the American, British, and 
German private sector. The first step of the legal research is to establish a general 
understanding of the history of compliance, in order, based thereon, to define the 
term ‘compliance’ in the US, UK and in Germany. The subject of compliance is not 
a new one; as noted previously, there is a rich field of secondary literature on this 
topic.608 This chapter will explore the origins of corporate compliance. 
The second step will be to examine the historical evolution of the 
compliance function in the US, UK, and Germany. Thus, the following three parts 
will provide an overview of the legal history, the development and legal reasons 
for the emergence of the compliance function. Based on the assumption that the 
compliance function did not simply appear and disappear again, the next sections 
will also examine the changes in the regulatory framework in terms of the 
compliance function. It has been noted that the spread of regulators and rules 
around the world has been a predominant feature of the last few years in 
particular.609 To understand the role and nature of the compliance function within 
companies, it is thus essential that we examine the legal and cultural background. 
Ultimately, this approach may help to facilitate a better understanding, definition, 
and classification of the role of the compliance officer.  
                                                     
606 In the US, the term ‘compliance’ will examine related to ethics because the two areas 
penetrate each other. This will be discussed in detail later. See Chapter 3, p. 131 
607 In the US, the corporate compliance and ethics officer function are often combined as a 
chief ethics and compliance officer (CECO) in practice. See supra note 11, Gnazzo at 534. 
608 See e.g. Vogel, supra note 79 at 102. 
609 Gareth Adams, What is Compliance?, 2 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL REGULATION AND 
COMPLIANCE 278–285, 278 (1994). 
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I. Legal Roots and cultural background of compliance in the US 
Focusing on the origins of American compliance, it becomes clear that this 
issue is the subject of some controversy among legal scholars.610 In short, they 
identified several business sectors and areas of law from which compliance seems 
to have originated. It appears that in the US, the origins of compliance can be 
traced back to the healthcare sector, securities law, US export regulations, the 
criminal corporate law of the individual states, and antitrust law.611  
However, based on a review of the American literature, it can be argued 
that corporate compliance emerged in the private sector at the beginning of the 
19th century as a substantial element of self-regulation within firms. The 
motivation behind the implementation of self-regulatory company structures has 
many root causes.612 For example, a study by Palazzo compares the US and 
German cultural background of business ethics.613 The study explores the fact that 
one source seems to have its origins in the basic American religious principle of 
Protestantism.614 Palazzo states that there is a positive relationship between 
business and ethics in America attributable to the puritan work ethic, which 
emphasizes that industriousness and frugality can lead to salvation.615 Another 
source that she points out is that Americans appear to have less of a personal 
private sphere than the Europeans.616 Therefore, it is easier for Americans to 
accept the declaration of moral norms e.g. a code of ethics, or a code of conduct 
issued by an employer.617 In fact, as a result of these cultural developments, 
American business ethics often appear to be rather legalistic. In conclusion, the 
Americans tend to understand ethics in terms of compliance as a certain set of 
universal rules. The popularity of checklists, guidelines, and principles in the US 
                                                     
610 See e.g. Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B. C. L. REV. 949–975 (2009); 
Alexander Eufinger, Zu den historischen Ursprüngen der Compliance,  CCZ 21–22 (2012); 
Fanto, supra note 70; Miller, supra note 542; Taylor, supra note 14. 
611 Eufinger, supra note 610 at 21. 
612 Palazzo, supra note 84 at 196. 
613 Palazzo, supra note 84. 
614 Id. at 210. fig. 3. 
615 Id. at 200. 
616 Id. at 201. 
617 Id. at 201. 
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is inherent to this understanding.618 Thus, it is clear that the cultural background 
of corporate compliance could potentially be traced back to the beginning of the 
19th century due on account of the American religious denomination.  
Although history has no beginning, Miller619 identifies that the initial legal 
starting point of corporate compliance might be the Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887.620 In 1890, the drive for industrial expansion, the completion of the railway 
network, the corporations’ need for self-financing, and the need for investment 
bankers to be financially independent were the first cornerstones of the demands 
for professionalism in corporate capitalism in the United States. Hence, this 
historical development reflected self-regulatory efforts designed to eliminate 
corporate corruption and enhance compliance issues within companies.621 
A further step in the evolution of compliance can be seen in the federal 
securities laws passed in the wake of the collapse of the financial markets in the 
US, in 1929. After the Depression of 1930, government regulation had a huge 
influence on the development of corporate business and investment banking.622 
Apparently, important legislative origins of compliance were set down in the 
Banking Act of 1933623 and the Securities Acts of 1933.624 Overall, in response to 
the financial crisis, the collapse of the financial markets and the Depression in the 
1930s, US legislative passed statutes exclusively in the area of securities law.625 It 
can be argued that these developments indicate the first origins of compliance 
                                                     
618 Id. at 203. 
619 MILLER, supra note 25 at 138; Miller, supra note 542 at 2. 
620 INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT (ICA), 24 Stat. 379 (1887). This Act was created by a federal 
administrative agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate the 
railroad. In 1887, the Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, making the railroads 
the first industry subject to federal regulation. The Act addressed the problem of railroad 
monopolies by setting guidelines for how the railroads could conduct business. This Act 
was the first federal law to regulate private industry in the United States. See 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=49, (last visit March 28, 2015) 
621 Miller, supra note 542 at 3. 
622 MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 138–
139 (1. ed. 1977). 
623 BANKING ACT OF 1933, PUB.L. 73–66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
624 SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, PUB. L. 73-22, 15 USC § 77A, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
625 Miller, supra note 542 at 3. 
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regulation in the financial services sector. Fanto626 and Taylor627 also emphasized 
these aspects in their discussion on the evolution of compliance. Finally, they 
concluded that the term compliance refers to the need to adhere to the 1930s 
securities laws.628 
In detail, the Exchange Act of 1934629 empowered the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)630 with broad authority over all aspects of the 
securities industry.631 One clear point emphasizing the importance of compliance 
was that a broker-dealer and its employees must conduct their business in 
accordance with their legal, regulatory, and professional obligations.632 
Nevertheless, Section 15 (b) (4) (D) allowed the SEC to discipline only the firm, 
not the violating employee. This problem was resolved with the addition of 
Sections 15 (b) (4) (E) and 15 (b) (6)633 in the amendments to the Acts of 1964. 
Under Section 15 (b) (4) (E), a broker-dealer or an associated person634 can also be 
a subject to sanctions.635 Since the additional provisions came into force, the need 
                                                     
626 Fanto, supra note 70 at 11. 
627 Taylor, supra note 14 at 54. 
628 Fanto, supra note 70 at 11; Taylor, supra note 14 at 54. 
629 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, PUB.L. 73–291, 15 USC § 78A 48 Stat. 881 (1934). 
630 “The SEC is an administrative agency of the federal government and promulgates 
detailed administrative rules and regulations, which have the force of law. The SEC has 
five Commissioners who are appointed by the President of the United States with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. The mission of the SEC is to protect investors, to 
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” See SEC, SEC 
| THE INVESTOR’S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS, MAINTAINS MARKET 
INTEGRITY. SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar 28, 2015). 
The term Commission also means the Securities and Exchange Commission as well. 
631 See SEC, SEC | FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml 
(last visited Mar 28, 2015). 
632 Fanto, supra note 70 at 11. 
633 See SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 630 at Pub. L. 88–467,15 USC §§ 78o 
(b)(4)(E) & (6) (1964). 
634 See Id. at Pub. L. 88–467. 15 USC. § 78o (b) (6) (1964). An “associated person” is defined 
as “who, among other things, willfully aids and abets a violation of the federal securities 
laws or who commits a supervisory violation.” See also Sec. 3 (a) (18) “any partner, officer, 
director, or branch manager of such broker or dealer (or any person occupying a similar 
status or performing similar functions) …etc.” 
635 Fanto, supra note 70 at 12. 
CHAPTER 3 | 121 
 
for a firm function, i.e. compliance, has been reinforced.636 In addition, the SEC 
required a financial service firm to have a compliance department and a 
compliance officer. Over the course of time, this approach has become a model for 
other companies as well.637 In conclusion, the main legislative source of 
compliance was established in the securities laws governing the financial services 
sector.  
The third step in the development of corporate compliance can be traced 
back to the antitrust law. The best-known price-fixing cases in the 1960s were the 
“Electrical Equipment Cases,” which resulted in large fines for the companies 
concerned.638 In these cases, the federal grand jury and the government 
prosecuted a group of heavy electric equipment companies for antitrust 
violations.639 It has been suggested that the “Electrical Cases”640 were the landmark 
cases for the implementation of compliance programs in the private sector in the 
1960s.641 In addition, the Supreme Court stated in previous cases642 that price-
fixing is per se illegal under the Sherman Act.643 However, in a recent case, the 
court held that Microsoft Corp.644 had monopoly power in the market for PC 
operating systems and had violated the Sherman Act.645 In a broad sense, 
                                                     
636 Id. at 13. 
637 Id. at 15. 
638 WILBUR L. FUGATE & LEE H. SIMOWITZ, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
342 (5th ed. 1996). 
639 DeStefano, supra note 20 at 88. 
640 Eufinger, supra note 610 at 21. 
641 Id. at 21. 
642 See e.g. United States v. Trenton Potteries Company 273 US 392 (1927), No. 27 392 (1927).; 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company 310 US 150 (1940), No. 346 150 (1940). – 
“Agreements to fix prices in interstate commerce are unlawful per se under the Sherman 
Act, and no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which the agreements were 
designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense.” See United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. 310 US 150 (1940). 
643 SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT, 15 USC §§ 1–7 26 Stat. 209 (1890); FUGATE AND SIMOWITZ, 
supra note 639 at 342. 
644 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
645 SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT, 15 USC. §§ 1–7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). See William H. Page & 
Seldon J. Childers, Measuring Compliance with Compulsory Licensing Remedies in the 
American Microsoft Case, 76 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 239–269, 241 (2009). 
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Microsoft had failed to comply with the required technical standards.646 
Apparently, one reason for the development of compliance is the corporate 
violation of laws or rules in particular those pertaining to antitrust law. For this 
reason, US companies have attempted to prevent such violations before they 
occur by implementing effective compliance structures.647 Besides the 
enforcement of antitrust law, the environmental awareness increased in the US.648 
The government set forth a series of important federal statutes, including the 
Clean Air Act649 and the Clear Water Act.650 In response, a new federal 
administrative agency was born, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to 
monitor, standard-setting and enforcement activities to ensure environmental 
regulations.651 
Thus, the third factor in the enhancement of corporate compliance issues 
were economic reasons linked to corporate scandals and environmental concerns. 
One reason behind companies’ self-regulation lies in the possibility of them being 
exposed to dramatic and serious losses as a result fraudulent acts by officers and 
employees in a lower level of the corporate structure.652 Hence, the evolution of 
compliance in the US was further influenced by efforts by the companies 
themselves to comply with antitrust and environmental law. Thus, self-regulation 
could be seen as an attempt on the part of the companies to ensure that 
employees do not violate applicable rules, regulations, or norms.653 After all, in 
the US fraud and misconduct of employees could pose an existential threat for the 
company due to the separate legal personality654 of the corporation.655 In addition, 
                                                     
646 Page and Childers, supra note 645 at 250. 
647 THEODORE L. BANKS & FREDERICK Z. BANKS, CORPORATE LEGAL COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 
(2nd ed. 2011)§ 4.01. 
648 MILLER, supra note 25 at 139. 
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an effective compliance structure could avoid any loss of reputation and may 
reduce costs of insurance and workers’ compensation. Furthermore, compliance 
might help to avoid prosecution or reduce criminal penalties and could provide a 
significant defense in the event that the board fails to exercise its obligations to 
supervise compliance risks.656 In conclusion, it can be noted that self-regulation 
was the preferred option because it minimized the costs and maximized the 
independence of companies. 
The fourth step in the emergence of corporate compliance originated from a 
larger number of court decisions in corporate law in the 1960s. At that time, there 
were two different legal perceptions in the US concerning the duties of a company 
director. In 1963, in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.657 the Delaware 
Supreme Court rejected the concept that company directors were responsible for 
implementing a structure that ensured compliance with the law.658 This court 
approach also seems consistent with the ‘business judgment rule’.659 While the 
Delaware courts did not interfere with the internal structure of companies, the 
legislator enforced the criminal law.660 From 1996, the Delaware courts re-entered 
the compliance arena with the landmark case In re Caremark Derivative Litigation.661 
In this case, the court concluded that it could not foreclose the director’s 
                                                     
656 BANKS AND BANKS, supra note 647 § 1.01. See also In re Dow Chemical Company Derivative 
Litigation, No. 4349-CC (Del. Ch. 2010), (2010). The plaintiffs, stockholders of Dow, 
brought this action against current directors and officers of the Company, alleging that the 
defendants had breached their fiduciary duties to the company by point (3) …to failing to 
detect and prevent a variety of alleged wrongs, including bribery, misrepresentation, 
insider trading, and wasteful compensation.” See Chandler, MEMORANDUM OPINION 
IN RE THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY IN CIVIL ACTION NO. 4349-CC (2009).  
657 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), 188 A.2d 125, 
130 (1963). 
658 Baer, supra note 610 at 961. 
659 The business judgment rule is a presumption that a rational business decision of the 
officers or directors of a corporation is proper unless there exist facts which remove the 
decision from the protection of the rule, such as self-dealing, conflict of interest, etc. See 
Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952 (Del. Ch. 1980), 756 (1980). See supra footnote 238. 
660 Baer, supra note 610 at 961. 
661 Id. at 961.; In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 
1996), supra note 22. 
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obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation.662 Hence, 
lawyers and legal scholars evaluated the Caremark decision as a basis for directors 
to ensure that monitoring systems were in place to prevent and detect criminal 
violations.663  
A further step towards in the enforcement of federal law was that Congress 
fostered the corporate compliance movement by enacting the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA), in 1977.664 Therefore, the legislator responded to growing 
concern about corporate bribery in the mid-1970s.665 In addition, in 1991, the US 
government enacted the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations 
(FSGO).666 Under these recommendations, organizations can minimize fines if 
they have in place an effective compliance program to prevent and detect 
violations of the law.667 However, this legislation could not prevent corporate 
scandals of the early 2000s such as Enron, WorldCom or Adelphia.668 Afterwards 
one of the most important governance and compliance statutes came into force, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.669 The content, relevance, and effects of the FCPA, FSGO, 
and the SOX with regard to compliance and the compliance function will be 
discussed in detail later.670 
These and many other developments point out the legal roots and the 
cultural background of compliance in America. In short, the cultural background 
of compliance in the US can be traced back to Protestantism. The industrial 
revolution and the financial crisis at the beginning of the 19th century led to the 
enactment of the first legal statutes and administrative regulations governing the 
                                                     
662 Baer, supra note 610 at 967; In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 
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corporate and financial services sector. It has been mentioned that, more recently, 
on the one hand court decisions have enhanced the development of compliance 
systems within companies while, on the other legislation has encouraged the 
emergence of compliance issues, for instance in the area of antitrust and anti-
corruption laws. Miller concluded that this was a fundamental development in 
American law.671 He termed this development as “a rise of the administrative state 
and a judicial model of regulation.”672 In response, the American companies have 
increased their efforts to protect themselves by implementing compliance 
structures. To further understand the role of compliance and the compliance 
officer function the next three sections will examine more precise the definition of 
compliance and the emergence of the compliance function in the US. 
1. Definitions of Compliance in the US 
In order to understand the role of compliance in the US, the term 
compliance will be outlined. The first explanations of compliance originated in 
the healthcare sector. In this area, the word compliance explains the patients’ 
cooperative behavior in the context of a therapy; in this context, it means 
adherence to the course of treatment. The healthcare literature has revealed three 
aspects of compliance: (1) evaluative, (2) rationalization, and (3) acceptance.673 
Today in the US, the healthcare sector is subject to extensive regulation. The 
relationship of trust between the patient and the physician establishes a special 
responsibility. Therefore, developments in this area required the development of 
a professional ethical culture with an ethical structure.674 
Secondly, as discussed previously,675 corporate compliance is a creature of 
federal criminal and antitrust law. When legal scholars explain the matter of 
compliance, what they actually explore and highlight is the legislation and the 
                                                     
671 MILLER, supra note 25 at 140. 
672 Id. at 140. Under the judicial model of regulation, the government and the regulated 
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673 Nancy Murphy & Mary Canales, A critical analysis of compliance, 8 NURSING INQUIRY 
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implementation of ethics and compliance programs within companies.676 One 
study by Pérezts and Picard found that researchers have long assumed and 
described the gap between the adoption of formal regulations and the actual 
implementation thereof in daily practice.677 For instance, socio-legal scholars 
believed that compliance was established within companies and sometimes 
linked with the external regulators.678 Meanwhile, other scholars679 argued that 
compliance is a complex, political, creative, collective, conflicting, and evolving 
process between the formal compliance systems and management structure and 
the perceptions and motivations of individuals in organizations. While, at first 
glance, these findings might explain the notion of the word compliance, on closer 
consideration, what they described is the process or procedure of compliance.  
Thirdly, in order to describe the US term ‘compliance’ more precisely it could 
be helpful to differentiate the meaning of the term ‘ethics’. According to Joyner and 
Payne ethics is defined as a core “set of beliefs and principles”680 The term 
compliance can be characterized by observance; conformity; obedience.681 In this 
context, it appears that ethics entails more than compliance. The purpose of 
business ethics is "to improve the ethical quality of decision making and acting at all 
levels of business.”682 However, ethics and compliance together require that the 
employees act in accordance with their legal, regulatory and professional 
                                                     
676 See e.g. Canary and Jennings, supra note 534; Joseph, supra note 87; Kaptein, supra note 
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677 Mar Pérezts & Sébastien Picard, Compliance or Comfort Zone? The Work of Embedded 
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obligations.683 These explanations show that compliance is a concept of what 
constitutes correct conduct or behavior or, in other words: “the state or fact of 
according with or meeting rules or standards”.684 Thus, compliance is adherence to 
regulations as an essential part of doing business in today’s corporate 
environment. 
Building on these explanations, the business ethics literature often describes 
compliance as “adherence with all the laws, regulations, rules, and policies governing an 
organization.”685 In other words, the objective of compliance focuses on obeying 
and monitoring the existing provisions, rules, and guidelines. Furthermore, 
Gnazzo argued that compliance is an “oversight” function.686 This conclusion has 
significant importance for the compliance function since it means that the 
compliance officer ought to be responsible for ensuring that all aspects of 
compliance are properly managed within organizations.687  
In addition, legal business scholars have pointed out that compliance 
programs within companies address the overall conduct of business activities in 
accordance with legal and increasingly, ethical and cultural, norms.688 
Additionally, in recent years, American companies have established compliance 
departments, which monitor and discipline employees who breach law or internal 
corporate policies.689 Furthermore, compliance departments assist in the 
investigation of wrongdoing. Accordingly, American legal business scholars have 
provided their definition of the term compliance. They identify compliance as 
                                                     
683 Fanto, supra note 70 at 11. 
684 Compliance Facts, information, pictures | THE OXFORD POCKET DICTIONARY OF CURRENT 
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…a system of policies and controls that organizations adopt to deter violations of law 
and to assure external authorities that they are taking steps to deter violations of law.690 
Finally, it has been mentioned that compliance has existed as long as people 
have done business.691 As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, compliance 
is characterized by its supervisory nature, may reduce violation of the law, and 
could help to ensure adherence to internal policies within companies. 
2. The historical evolution of the compliance function in the US 
To reiterate and to understand the nature of the compliance function within 
US firms, it is necessary first to explore the ways in which the American 
compliance function has evolved over the years. The American compliance 
departments and the independent compliance function were first established in 
the securities industry in the early 1960s.692 Before that time, responsibility for 
compliance was incumbent upon legal departments and the person in charge of 
compliance often reported to the General Counsel.693 
In order to assess the role of the corporate compliance function a shift in 
academic focus to look deeper within private sector firms and the legal 
environment is necessary. As discussed previously, various federal statutes were 
enacted in the 1960s and 1970s e.g. the Clean Air Act694 and the Clean Water Act.695 
In addition, a new federal administrative body, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA),696 was established. Furthermore, Chandler recognized that the roots 
of the modern-day ethics and compliance position can be traced back to the 
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Watergate scandal.697 The aftermath of the scandal, with the Congressional 
hearings and investigations into illegal payments, focused public attention on the 
unethical actions of individual employees. Based on this investigation, more than 
400 corporations have admitted to making illegal payments.698 These 
developments ultimately encouraged the US federal government to improve the 
ethical behavior of US corporations by means of legislation.699 To this end, in 1977, 
the legislature passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.700  
A survey of ethics officers at Fortune 500701 firms by Morf et al. found that 
corporations in the US have established ethics programs for a variety of 
reasons.702 For example, they found that General Dynamics was the first 
corporation to create a new generation of corporate ethics offices in 1985. At the 
time, General Dynamics was under government investigation for billing 
irregularities. General Dynamics has in the meantime established an ethics office 
and an ethics hotline for employees to report ethical problems anonymously.703 
Furthermore, in 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act,704 which 
established a set of mandatory federal sentencing guidelines. In 1991, the 
                                                     
697 David Brian Chandler, Organizations and Ethics: Antecedents and Consequences of the 
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establishment of the Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (FSGO)705 created 
the first basis for laws relating to corporate compliance programs. This was a 
significant milestone in advancing corporate compliance. The 2004 amendments 
of the FSGO706 imposed responsibility for the compliance program on an 
organization ”governing authority“ or “high-level personnel.”707 Thus, the 
compliance function is a key component of an effective compliance program. The 
FSGO outlined seven elements of effectiveness.708 These standards serve as a 
guide for directors to ensure that compliance is effectively established within 
firms.709 Hence, the FSGO developed the first criminal justice framework for an 
effective corporate compliance program. This was the legal starting point for 
companies to develop such programs.710 Finally, under this legislation711 the 
companies could impose fines and penalties in cases involving corporate crime.712 
As a result, the guidelines encouraged companies to set up internal structures to 
help prevent, detect, and report criminal behavior.713 They also offer incentives for 
corporations to hire ethics and compliance officers who are in charge of controls 
to prevent, investigate, and punish wrongdoing and misconduct by employees.714  
                                                     
705 USSC, supra note 56. On November 1, 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission 
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Furthermore, the corporate scandals of the early 2000s led to the enactment 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).715 The SOX was proposed to establish 
“significantly higher standards for corporate responsibility and governance”716 to protect 
investors. The SOX requires firms to apply best practice with e.g. the enforcement 
of compliance with professional standards717 and the establishment of a code of 
ethics for senior financial officers.718 Hence, this Act tackled issues concerning the 
role of corporate officers and imposed new legal duties upon those officers.719 For 
example, their main tasks are to supervise the day-to-day conduct of business 
unit activities and to ensure that employees adhere with applicable laws and 
regulations.720 It has been mentioned that the focus lies on ensuring legal and 
ethical norms from the inside out. Hence, the compliance personnel, structure, 
and processes can be characterized as internal governance mechanisms.721  
All of these federal statutes were a response to the disclosure of corporate 
bribery. In addition, following the collapse of insurance and loan institutions and 
the loss of confidence in the integrity of the American financial system, new 
banking regulations were enacted. Finally, the financial crisis of 2007 until 2009 
saw the introduction of some new statutes, for instance the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010.722 Miller held that the government today possesses greater power of 
                                                     
715 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is Federal 
Law and mandatory. All listed organizations must comply. The legislation was enacted in 
2002 and introduced major changes to the regulation of financial practice and corporate 
governance, See Addison-Hewitt Associates, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 2002 A GUIDE TO 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, http://www.soxlaw.com/ (last visited Sep 9, 2015). 
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720 Securities Industry Association, Compliance & Legal Division, supra note 692 at 5. 
721 DeMott, supra note 4 at 57. 
722 DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), PUB. L. 
111–203, § 929-Z, 15 USC § 78O 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010); Miller, supra note 543 at 3., This 
was an act “To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system…” See Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
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enforcement and authority.723 He concluded that these developments resulted in a 
“tectonic” change in the American common law system.724 
Overall, it has been recognized that, nowadays, companies undoubtedly 
face more compliance issues than they did a century ago.725 In response, many 
companies have built strong instituting procedures to internalize law 
enforcement.726 The compliance function has evolved over time on the one hand 
as one component of firms’ self-regulatory initiatives in order to avoid corporate 
scandals and high penalty payments, and on the other hand, on account of the 
increasingly stringent legal framework.727 Due to the financial crises, more and 
more government legislation has been passed over time. In the wake of a number 
of high-profile corporate scandals, separate compliance departments have also 
developed within companies outside the financial services sector.728 Finally, the 
compliance officer position was established as a result of efforts by organizations 
to ensure that employees do not violate the applicable laws and the enforcement 
of legislation.729 Having examined the evolution of this position, the next section 
will provide a definition of the compliance function in the US. 
3. Definition of the Compliance Function in the US 
By reviewing the academic literature this section attempts to outline a 
definition of the US compliance function in the private sector. In the US, the 
compliance officer function attracts a great deal of public and academic 
attention.730 It can be noted that in the US, the compliance officer is recognized as 
a member of a profession. As a rule, members of a profession establish their own 
                                                     
723 Miller, supra note 542 at 3. 
724 Id. at 3. 
725 See supra Chapter 3, A., I., 2., p. 128 
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standards for performing an important function and serving a public social 
goal.731  
As the foregoing section demonstrates, compliance officers emerged on the 
corporate scene in the early 1960s within legal departments. Since then, the US 
has seen a significant increase in the attention afforded this position and the 
number of compliance officers.732 As discussed previously, over time the 
compliance function has further developed in response to corporate scandals and 
to changes in the enforcement of law, and a new regulatory environment. Hence, 
the role of the compliance officer has moved to center stage.733 For instance, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics734 points out that in 2014 a total of 260,300 compliance 
officers were employed in the US. Additionally, it is expected that this occupation 
will grow by a further 3.3 percent by 2024. Furthermore, the compliance officer’s 
median annual wage was $ 62,020 and the typical entry-level education of 
compliance officers is a Bachelor's degree. Surprisingly, a survey735 by the Health 
Care Compliance Association (HCCA) found that 72 percent of respondent 
organizations in the healthcare sector have a female compliance officer. In 
contrast, 72 percent of the surveyed German compliance officers in the corporate 
environment are male.736  
As discussed above,737 three key reasons for the establishment of the 
function of ethics and compliance officers in the US have been recognized, (1) as a 
response to a series of scandals and crises in corporate companies, (2) since then, 
the FSGO (1991) and the SOX (2002) have provided a criminal justice framework 
to deter and penalize organizational misconduct, and (3) a growing trend in 
                                                     
731 Meaney, supra note 674 at 3–4. 
732 Weber and Fortun, supra note 4 at 98. 
733 SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION SIFMA, THE EVOLVING 
ROLE OF COMPLIANCE | 2013 | WHITE PAPERS | CORRESPONDENCE 36 1 (2013), 
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589942363 (last visited Sep 9, 2015). 
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PROJECTIONS (2014), http://data.bls.gov/projections/occupationProj (last visited Sep 9, 
2015). 
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businesses that promote, enforce, and encourage an ethical climate is needed for 
effective and profitable companies.738  
In conclusion, the appointment of a compliance officer position within 
companies has made a significant contribution of these developments.739 Since the 
release of the FSGO740 in 1991, 54 % of the Fortune 1000741 has established an ethics 
or compliance officer function assigned to deal with ethics and conduct measures 
designed to fulfil the standards.742 A 2010 survey of more than 1,200 members of 
the Ethics and Compliance Officers Association (ECOA) by Weber & Wasieleski 
found that 100 percent of the responding organizations743 have an ethics or 
compliance officer.744 They concluded that despite the fact that there is a definite 
trend towards more ethics and compliance programs within companies, it should 
be assumed that ethical and compliance efforts still need to be increased.745 
Having traced the importance of the compliance function, this section will 
provide the definition of this position proposed by professionals and legal 
scholars. Gnazzo, an early chief compliance officer at United Technologies 
Corporation’s describes the compliance function in his own words as follows: 
It should be responsible for ensuring that all aspects of those organizational 
requirements are being managed properly. Clearly, compliance is an oversight function.746  
The responsibility of the compliance officer and the compliance function should be one 
of oversight on behalf of the board of directors.747 
In addition, practitioners explain the daily nature of the function as follows: 
The role has evolved from more of a technical [discipline] to that of a decision science. 
I think the big shift is in how chief compliance officers interact with and relate to people.748 
                                                     
738 Smith, supra note 527 at 636. 
739 Adobor, supra note 55 at 57; Fanto, supra note 70 at 1. 
740 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 58. 
741 See Date.com, FORTUNE 1000 FORTUNE 1000 COMPANY LIST (2015), 
https://connect.data.com/directory/company/fortune/1000 (last visited Sep 10, 2015). 
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Legal scholars such as Rostain and Freeman have examined in turn that the 
compliance function should include 
…the promulgation of codes of behavior, the institution of training programs, the 
identification of internal compliance personnel and the creation of procedures and 
controls to insure company-wide compliance with legal mandates.749 
The responsibilities of the position [compliance function] often include leading 
enterprise compliance efforts; ensuring compliance with internal standards and state and 
federal laws; managing audits and investigations into regulatory compliance issues; and 
responding to requests for information from regulatory bodies.750  
In other words, a successful compliance officer will also act as an educator 
and advisor. Freeman concluded that the comprehensive task of the compliance 
officer is dealing with all levels of management, corporate employees, 
government regulators and the public with respect, diplomacy, and discretion.751 
Although Smith complained that the precise role of compliance officers 
often goes undefined in companies, he also argued that it would be helpful to 
develop a more meaningful definition within corporations.752 Hence, he believed 
that it is possible to develop a definition from the de facto and sometimes de jure 
job duties and responsibilities.753 A 2005 survey of ethics and compliance officers 
conducted by Weber and Fortun helpfully provides the following profile of a 
compliance officer: 
An ECO is typically a male who is 48 years old. He has been with his company for 
nearly 14 years and has held the ECO position for about three years. His title varies 
greatly from other ECOs but probably includes the term “compliance” and is likely a 
director or officer in the company. His educational background consists of either a JD or 
MBA or both. His primary job responsibilities most likely include ensuring compliance 
                                                                                                                                                  
748 Scott Mitchell, CEO of the open compliance and ethics group. See Caron Carlson, HOW 
THE MODERN CCO CAME TO BE | COMPLIANCE WEEK COMPLIANCE WEEK (2008), 
https://www.complianceweek.com/news/news-article/how-the-modern-cco-came-to-be 
(last visited Sep 10, 2015). 
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750 Freeman, supra note 70 at 360. 
751 Id. at 360. 
752 Smith, supra note 527 at 635. 
753 Id. at 638. 
136 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
program oversight, conducting investigations of alleged employee misconduct, and 
carrying out the organization’s employee ethics and compliance training program.754 
These findings suggest that the average US compliance officer has more of 
an insider status, and is a middle-aged man. In most instances, he has a legal or 
business background. His main duties comprise the creation of codes of conduct, 
monitoring of compliance program, conducting compliance trainings program 
and ensuring that employees operate the business in adherence with the law. The 
compliance officer sometime also participates in internal investigations of alleged 
breaches by employees. According to these findings, ethics and compliance 
officers in the corporate world are concerned primarily with overseeing the 
ethical conduct of all employees.755 He should ensure that the firms and its 
employees comply with all applicable laws and regulations.756 Similarly, Miller 
argued that the compliance function tasks embody the duty and the obligations to 
prevent illegal activities on the part of the employees.757 In the view of DeStefano 
and Parker, this position should be a combination of compliance detection, 
prevention, and response policies.758 In addition, a study759 by Rosen et al. found 
that the compliance function should analyze and influence the company’s 
compliance structures and, practices and on the other hand, the costs, benefits 
and risks of non-compliance.760 Hence, it has been recognized that a compliance 
officer is an individual responsible for the detailed revision and monitoring of 
compliance procedures and policies. 
In addition, it has also been noted that the compliance officer occupies a 
difficult position between business and regulation. On the one hand, he does not 
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engage in the firm’s business but nevertheless has to understand the business.761 
On the other hand, he is responsible for revising and monitoring compliance 
procedures, policies, law, and regulation.762 These are management tasks.763 
Similarly, Jones considers the dualistic standard applicable to the role of officers 
due first to their duties of care and second the standard of liability.764 A theoretical 
study by Treviño et al. pointed out the inherent duality in the compliance officer’s 
approach.765 They have to balance sensitivity to business needs while having, an 
occasion to say “no” to potentially profitable new ideas if they would result in the 
business not complying with the law. On this basis, it has been said that the role 
of compliance officer is a ‘dual-hatted’ position because of their simultaneous 
business oversight role and supervisory duties.766  
In conclusion, in the US, the compliance officer can be defined as a high-
level employee, in charge of managing an effective internal compliance structure 
in close collaboration with all employees and the management. He diplomatically 
handles business needs and ensures adherence with the applicable law. The role 
of the compliance officer needs to be effective, and may at times restrict the 
business creativity and profitability through its rules, procedures and 
monitoring.767 Finally, the nature and role of the US compliance function has been 
defined as a ‘dual-hatted’ role768 and an oversight and control function.769 
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II. Legal roots and cultural background of compliance in the UK 
This part examines the legal roots of compliance in the UK and the cultural 
background of the compliance function within English companies. A review of 
the English literature shows that there has been little academic and empirical 
research by legal scholars on the topic of compliance770 and the function of the 
corporate compliance officer771. 
In the UK, the term ‘compliance’ is explained as a concept of obedience, 
observance, deference, governability, amenability, passiveness, non-resistance 
and submission. Compliance has existed in some form for a long time.772 The first 
Act relating to compliance issues was put on the statute books in the UK in 1697. 
This Act expired in 1704. Its purpose was to limit the unfair practices of brokers 
and stock-jobbers.773 Today, compliance is far more complex and has a 
professional nature.774 
However, other authors identified the first step of the development of 
compliance in the 19th century. During this time, the industrial revolution 
significantly changed the English economy. There was also a huge growth in the 
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establishment of companies, and in fraudulent actions. Therefore, preventive 
measures were developed in the form of legal liability.775 The Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1844776 and the Limited Liability Act 1855777 were enacted at this 
time. The main purpose behind these Acts was to regulate the registration of 
companies and the mandatory accounting and auditing requirements. Regulation 
was based on the principle of publicity.778 The legislation manifested a policy both 
in terms of the companies and the transactions taking place within that 
company.779  
In addition, it has also been acknowledged that another origin of 
compliance was the development of a system of self-regulation within companies. 
The term ‘self-regulation’ can be characterized, explained, and identified from 
various different perspectives. At first, the prefix ‘self’ should be identified. It is 
possible to argue that ‘self’-regulation may consider a system of voluntary ‘self’-
control. This system was created by companies in order to control risks.780 In other 
words, firms implement their own internal rules and procedures to monitor and 
adjust themselves for non-compliance.781 Clarke identified a risk in self-regulation, 
namely ‘regulatory capture’.782 Secondly, at this level of analysis of self-regulation it 
is important to note that regulation in this context relates to organizational 
behavior.783 Seemingly, there is a lack of emphasis on the fact that self-regulation 
also has a goal. Therefore, self-regulation could be a preventive and evaluative 
measure to avoid misbehavior of employees. In conclusion, self-regulation 
explains forward-looking organizational measures of a corporation designed to 
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avoid illegal activities of its employees. It can be said that self-regulation is a 
model of rules by which a specific organization regulates itself.784 
The second stage in the modern development of corporate compliance was 
the division of function at the beginning of the 20th century. The more complex 
corporations were divided into the owners and the management. Because of this, 
legislation was introduced in an attempt to ensure that directors are 
accountable.785 In addition, a broad interest of public and political concerning the 
integrity of market participant to carry out financial business has begun in the 
UK.786 This led to the introduction and implementation of regulatory techniques 
and measures in the financial services industry similar to those in the US.787 Thus, 
the UK responded by providing legislation governing corporate governance788 
failures in the 1980s.789 In 1986, this regulation began with the introduction of the 
Financial Services Bill in 1986.790 Subsequently, a number of Acts of Parliament 
were introduced within the financial services industry e.g. the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986791, the Insolvency Act 1986792, the Banking Act 1987793, 
the Companies Act 1989,794 and the Criminal Justice Act 1993.795 Hagland noted 
that such a network of regulations is unprecedented.796 He argued that this could 
result in an enforcement of new criminal and civil liabilities.797 
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Before 1986, compliance was considered somewhat of a “dirty word”.798 Since 
the introduction of the Financial Services Bill,799 however, compliance has 
undergone a process of continual evolution in the United Kingdom. Since the 
enactment of this Act, compliance has been recognized as an essential prerequisite 
in business dealings.800 With this new legislation, the financial services firms 
began to realize that the term compliance had gained a new significance and 
would have an important impact upon their operations.801 This marked the 
beginning of the transformation from a self-regulated system to a system of 
control and the evolution of this concept within the United Kingdom. 802 
In addition, in 2000, the Financial Services Authority (FSA),803 was 
established as a central regulatory body for the financial services sector.804 The 
FSA was granted its statutory powers by the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (FSMA).805 This Act sets forth compliance requirements for misleading 
statements and practices of a person in the financial services sector.806 For 
example, in 2011 the FSA has fined a compliance officer at a hedge fund 
management company with £14,000 because she failed to act with due skill and 
care.807 In addition to this Act, the FSA has a number of functions, such as making 
rules governing admission of securities to the official listing at the London Stock 
                                                     
798 Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 52. 
799 FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986, supra note 548. 
800 Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 52. 
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Exchange (LSE), providing guidance, and determining the policies and principles 
under the FSMA.808 Cruickshanks argued that the compliance officers derive their 
authority from the FSA.809 In 2003, the FSA moved to a principles-based regime810 
and regulated the majority of financial services markets, exchanges, and firms. 
For example, it framed requirements and could take action against firms that 
failed to meet the required standards. This marked the definitive end of self-
regulation, and the advent of statutory regulations within the financial services 
sector in the UK.811  
Furthermore, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision812 established 
ten principles for the compliance functions in banks.813 Since 2007, the Basel 
Capital Accord (Basel II) has required banks to manage all of their risks through 
effective internal risk management procedures.814 However, another aspect of this 
approach suggests that there is a lack of analysis of how the compliance function 
actually works within banks in practice.815 Nonetheless, the increasing importance 
and significance of compliance came to the fore in the financial service industry in 
the UK. 
However, it was not only in the UK financial services sector that the 
significance of compliance was on the rise. In 1992, the Cadbury Report816, the UK 
                                                     
808 JONATHAN FISHER, THE LAW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 18 (2nd ed. 2003). A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY LISTING REGIME, 2012/2013, 
4 (25. ed. 2012). 
809 Cruickshanks, supra note 771 at 379. 
810 Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 
AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 1–60, 1 (2008). 
811 Taylor, supra note 14 at 55. 
812 The Basel Committee is the primary global standard-setter for the prudential regulation 
of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its 
mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and practices of banks worldwide 
with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. See (BIS) Bank for International 
Settlements, ABOUT THE BASEL COMMITTEE (2011), 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm?m=3%7C14%7C573 (last visited Sep 10, 2015). 
813 Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 217; The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, COMPLIANCE AND THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION IN BANKS (2005). 
814 Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 217. 
815 Id. at 223. 
816 COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE, THE CADBURY REPORT (1992) 
(1992). 
CHAPTER 3 | 143 
 
response to the corporate scandals e.g. Maxwell Communications,817 introduced 
the ‘comply or explain’ approach. This approach is characterized by voluntary 
compliance with the recommended provisions, and mandatory disclosure.818 This 
new approach became the cornerstone of UK corporate governance practice.819 It 
explained that: 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors.[.] The 
board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting.820 
This Report made a number of important recommendations relating to 
internal monitoring mechanisms in UK public limited companies.821 Some central 
components of this voluntary code include a clear division of responsibilities at 
the top, primarily that the position of chairman of the board should be separated 
from that of chief executive, and the appointment of a company audit committee 
comprising at least three non-executive directors.822 The objective was to improve 
the quality of monitoring by means of a code of practice. The Cadbury Report 
(1992) was the first version of the Code. Since then this Report has been modified, 
for example as the Greenbury Report (1995). In 1998, the two Codes were 
combined in the Combined Code,823 which was in force from 1998 to 2004.824 
Today the Code is called the UK Corporate Governance Code and aims to:825  
                                                     
817 Maxwell Communication Corp. plc. was a leading British media business. It was listed 
on the London Stock Exchange (FTSE 100). It filed for bankruptcy on December 18, 1991. 
See Prokesch, supra note 786. 
818 Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468 at 194. 
819 COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE, supra note 816. The UK and the 
US corporate governance systems are outsider-dominated systems. In these systems, the 
role of board of directors is important and these systems will tend to inhibit shareholder 
engagement. See Andrew Tylecote & Paulina Ramirez, Corporate governance and innovation: 
The UK compared with the US and “insider” economies, 35 RESEARCH POLICY 160–180, 165 
(2006). 
820 THE CADBURY REPORT (1992), supra note 807 no. 2.5. 
821 THE CADBURY REPORT (1992), supra note 807 no. 3.1.The Code of Best Practice is directed 
to the boards of directors of all listed companies registered in the UK. 
822 THE CADBURY REPORT (1992) Id. no. 4.35 (a) (b). 
823 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE supra note 468. See Id. 
824 Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468 at 194–195. 
825 See supra in detail later Ch. 5, B., I., p. 451 
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The Code sets out standards of good practice in relation to board leadership and 
effectiveness, remuneration, accountability and relations with shareholders.826 
A study by Arcot et al. analyzed a database of 245 non-financial services 
companies during the period 1998 to 2004. They found that the Combined Code 
fostered compliance in the private sector.827 Seemingly, companies make a 
fundamental choice between compliance or non-compliance.828 Furthermore, a 
study by Weir and Laing found that only some of the governance mechanisms 
recommended by Cadbury had an effect on accounting performance.829 Finally, 
they concluded that the public justiﬁcation “comply or explain” could partially 
account for the increase in compliance.830 Additionally, a 2009 report carried out 
by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC)831 held that the Code promotes high 
standards of corporate governance and should contribute to better long-term 
performance by helping a board to discharge its duties.832 
Overall, in recent years, UK compliance has developed through the 
enactment of the Financial Service Act,833 Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000834, and the release of the Cadbury Report835 as a response to corporate 
scandals. In contrast to the mandatory system of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act836 in the 
US, the UK Corporate Governance Code 837 flexibly allows companies to choose 
whether to comply with its principles or to explain why they do not.838 Similar to 
                                                     
826 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 468. 
827 Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468 at 194. 
828 Id. at 193. 
829 Weir and Laing, supra note 549 at 274, Table III. 
830 Id. at 279. 
831 FRC is an important and independent UK regulator responsible for promoting 
conﬁdence in corporate reporting and governance. See FRC, FINANCIAL REPORTING 
COUNCIL | FRC, https://www.frc.org.uk/About-the-FRC.aspx (last visited Sep 10, 2015). 
832 FRC, 2009 REVIEW OF THE COMBINED CODE FINAL REPORT 6 (2009), 
https://frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/2009-Review-of-the-
Combined-Code-Final-Report.aspx (last visited Sep 10, 2015). 
833 FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986, supra note 548. 
834 FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 805. 
835 THE CADBURY REPORT (1992), supra note 796, supra note 465. 
836 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56. 
837 CADBURY COMMITTEE, supra note 467. 
838 Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468 at 194. 
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the US agencies, the FSA839 supported the legislation in the financial services 
sector. Summing up, the UK has successfully implemented a new and flexible 
approach known as ‘comply or explain’ and tried to enhance corporate compliance. 
1. Definition of Compliance in the United Kingdom 
This section will outline the definition of compliance in the UK. At first, the 
academic interest of the word compliance in the UK began in the early nineties by 
noting that the French use a Greek term for compliance, ‘déontologie.’840 This term 
means moral in character841 or deontological ethics. The term also could be seen as 
an expression of a normative ethical position. Examining the term ‘compliance’, 
Adams found the following definitions in the British dictionary: 
(1) Acquiescence, 
(2) A disposition to yield to others, 
(3) A measure of the ability of a mechanical system to respond to an applied vibrating 
force.842 
Additionally, Adams defined compliance as a middle or front office function 
due to its purpose of regulatory risk management.843 He concluded that 
compliance is something carried out by a firm, not for a firm.844 Moreover, Adams 
pointed out that by characterizing compliance as the management of regulatory 
risk, there is a better chance of striking a chord and avoiding risks.845 Hagland 
interpreted the word compliance as a key concept and the observance of the 
requirements of the general law.846 That is why he argued that there is a 
requirement for a company to establish an internal structure and procedures, 
specifically focused on compliance.847 However, he did not actually explain the 
                                                     
839 The Financial Services Authority, supra note 803. 
840 Adams, supra note 609 at 279; Clarke, supra note 770 at 123. 
841 Adams, supra note 609 at 279; Clarke, supra note 770 at 123. 
842 Adams, supra note 609 at 279. 
843 Id. at 284. 
844 Id. at 284. 
845 Id. at 284. 
846 Hagland, supra note 770 at 12. 
847 Id. at 12. 
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key concept. In 1996, Lange simply defined compliance as “fulfilling legal 
requirements.”848 She noted that this understanding refers to an abstract level of 
understanding compliance.849 Furthermore, Clarke categorized the term 
compliance having either negative or positive connotations - on the one side 
defensive and hostile, and on the other cooperative and constructive.850 In 
addition, Clarke suggested that the risk analysis undertaken by many companies 
and banks are aimed at gaining acceptance of the practical importance of 
compliance.851 He concluded that positive compliance is aimed at best practice.852  
Secondly, a review of the business literature shows that the most important 
view sees compliance predominantly as a financial corporate decision or relating 
to concerns of loss of reputation or status.853 Alternative views see compliance as 
the consequence of the acceptance or internalization of rules; as the outcome of 
the learning process or as a result of organizational management.854 Finally, in 
2012, Miles suggested from a philosophical point of view that compliance should 
be characterized “…as a scale, rather than a binary choice.”855 
Thirdly, Taylor found that in the UK the term compliance first appeared in 
the Financial Service Act in 1986.856 Until this time, the senior management 
identiﬁed executives who should review this legislation. However, only later 
were these executives referred to as compliance ofﬁcers.857 In conclusion, Taylor 
argued that UK compliance refers to financial services legislation and regulation, 
                                                     
848 Bettina Lange, Empirical compliance: A study of waste management regulation in the UK and 
German, December, 1996. 
849 Id. at 1. 
850 Clarke, supra note 770 at 124. 
851 Id. at 123. 
852 Id. at 124. 
853 Fairman and Yapp, supra note 780 at 494. 
854 Ton van Snellenberg & Rob van de Peppel, Perspectives on compliance: non-compliance 
with environmental licences in the Netherlands, 12 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT 131–148, 133 
(2002). 
855 Roger Miles, From compliance to coping: Experiences of Chief Risk Officers in UK banks 2007-
2009, July 4, 2012. 
856 Taylor, supra note 14 at 54. See supra note 545 FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986, Ch. 3, 12 
compliance orders. 
857 Taylor, supra note 14 at 54. 
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but there is no official legal definition in the UK.858 In spite of this legal vacuum, 
he concluded that in the UK compliance has gradually evolved as a concept over 
the last years. 859 
Furthermore, the English legal scholars have adopted the American 
terminology of compliance. According to the American definition, the English 
literature also describes the term compliance as “…the adherence by the regulated to 
rules and regulations laid down by those in authority…”860 However, in a broader 
sense, the English scholars supplemented the argument that compliance also links 
to other aspects of duties. Compliance links both to business and the consumer 
and was first established in the financial services sector. For example, the 
investment businesses (e.g. banks, insurance companies, building societies and 
others) are required to comply with the conduct and business requirements set 
out by the FSA.861 Hence, the term also includes concepts of e.g. obedience, 
observance, deference, governability… etc.862  
As has been noted, the financial services sector has been significantly 
influenced by the enforcement of regulation and, as a result, the emergence of 
compliance in the UK. Simultaneously, recent studies863 shed new light on an 
increasing trend in compliance relating to the Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance, also referred to simply as ‘the Code’.864 As discussed previously,865 
these studies found that the Code fostered compliance by implementing internal 
monitoring mechanisms in listed firms.866 For example, in 2004, more than half of 
                                                     
858 Id. at 57. 
859 Id. at 58. 
860 See e.g. Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 48; Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 
141. 
861 Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 141. See FSA The Financial Services Authority, 
supra note 803. The FSA is renamed the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). See FCA, 
HANDBOOK | FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (FCA), http://www.fca.org.uk/handbook 
(last visited Sep 10, 2015). 
862 Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 141. 
863 See e.g. Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468; Weir and Laing, supra note 
552. 
864 The Cadbury Report 1982, supra note 796; The UK Corporate Governance, supra note 
465. 
865 See supra p. 138. 
866 Weir and Laing, supra note 552 at 265. 
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the FTSE 350867 companies were fully compliant with all provisions of the Code.868 
In addition, Weir and Laing examined869 the relationship between governance 
structures and performance in 1992 and in 1995. Their conclusion was that the 
number of firms adopting the governance structures recommended by Cadbury 
has increased.870 The authors saw the reason in the public justification of 
explaining companies’ governance policies.871  
Furthermore, the evidence highlights that the composition of the board with 
non-executive directors is seemingly associated with better performance.872 
However, in contrast an American meta-analytic review of board composition873 
found that there is no consistent link between the board structures and the 
company’s financial performance because outside directors lacked the requisite 
information and did not appear to fully understand the business.874 In sum, it can 
be noted that the adopted governance structure could lead to improved 
compliance with the law, but there does not appear to be any reliable evidence of 
a higher financial performance of a company as a result. The reason for this might 
be the high costs of implementation and maintenance of this structure. 
Fourthly, compliance in the English private sector developed in response to 
corporate scandals without prescriptive and legislative regulation – a different 
                                                     
867 FTSE is a London Stock Exchange Index of the largest 350 companies by capitalization. 
See London Stock Exchange, FTSE 350 CONSTITUENTS SHARES PRICES - LONDON STOCK 
EXCHANGE, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-
markets/stocks/indices/summary/summary-indices-constituents.html?index=NMX (last 
visited Sep 10, 2015). 
868 Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468 at 193. 
869 They used a sample of 200 firms. Company names were taken from the Times 1000 for 
1992 and 1995. The Times 1000 lists are the firms with the largest sales in the UK. For each 
year, 200 nonfinancial, fully quoted UK companies were randomly selected. See Weir and 
Laing, supra note 552 at 269. 
870 Id. at 265. 
871 Id. at 279. 
872 So-called outside directors, See Id. at 279. 
873 Dan R. Dalton et al., Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and 
financial performance, 19 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 269–290, 269 (1998). This meta-
analysis provided 54 relevant empirical studies of board composition and ﬁnancial 
performance. 
874 Weir and Laing, supra note 552 at 267. 
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approach to that implemented in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US.875 In 2010, the 
United Kingdom’s Bribery Act was passed.876 Richard compared the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)877 structure and key provisions with the United 
Kingdom Bribery Act.878 In his view, the UKBA anti-bribery provisions are more 
extensive than the FCPA provisions in the US. For instance, this Act holds 
corporations strictly liable for preventing persons from committing bribery.879 The 
Act establishes potential criminal liability for corporations, their officers, 
employees, and shareholders. Thus, since 2010, a strict bribery legislation has also 
been enacted in the private sector in the UK. Therefore, English and foreign 
companies that are active in the UK have to secure conformity with the law by 
means of internal control systems or compliance structures to prevent potential 
violations of the law. In addition, the UKBA 2010 Guidance provides 
recommendations for companies on forms of external verification of the 
effectiveness of anti-bribery procedures in instances where an offence could be 
prosecuted.880 Thus, Ernst & Young recommend that companies should undertake 
a proper risk assessment and build an effective anti-corruption compliance 
program.881  
In conclusion, it has been demonstrated that the first steps in corporate 
compliance were the development of a model of corporate ‘self-regulation’ and the 
introduction of the “comply or explain” approach with the Code. Additionally, in 
recent years, the UK legislator enhanced corporate compliance by introducing a 
formal statute to combat foreign bribery. To summarize, the development of 
compliance began with the enactment of the Financial Service Act in 1986 and a 
number of other financial regulations, with the establishment of regulators, then 
with the creation of the UK Corporate Governance Code and reached its 
                                                     
875 Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468 at 194. 
876 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67. See Richard, supra note 68 at 437. 
877 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463. 
878 Richard, supra note 68. 
879 Id. at 439. 
880 Ministry of Justice, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010 - GUIDANCE 31, 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf (last 
visited Sep 11, 2015). 
881 ERNST & YOUNG, THE UK BRIBERY ACT: DEVELOPING AN ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE 
FRAMEWORK 16 3 (2011). 
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highpoint with the UKBA in 2010. From 1985 until today, a number of pieces of 
far-reaching legislation have been passed in the UK, creating a legal framework 
for the development of compliance. One reason for this strong legislation might 
be the English importation of American corporate compliance by strengthening 
corporate criminal laws in recent years.882  
Based on the above, answering the question of how English corporate 
compliance is defined continues to pose a challenge. In addition to the two 
studies883 evaluating the impact of the Code on corporate compliance, there is 
very little research on the topic of compliance. As mentioned previously, there is 
no legal definition of the term compliance in the UK and the general definition of 
UK compliance is more abstract than the American description. Similar to US 
compliance, UK compliance has evolved through self-regulation by a firm. 
Nevertheless, today, the majority of English legal scholars view compliance as a 
compulsory exercise or scale necessary to fulfil legal requirements.  
2. The historical evolution of the compliance function in the UK 
As explained previously, over the last thirty years English compliance has 
evolved through legislation within the financial services sector and subsequently 
also in the private sector. As we have seen, in the UK the compliance function 
originated from the Financial Services Act.884 However, some concerns concerning 
compliance have remained. Despite the introduction of the Financial Service Act 
1986 in the UK, there are still many different perceptions of the compliance 
officer’s role.885 For instance, initially, the description of the job profile was not 
clear - neither to the public nor to the compliance officers themselves.886 However, 
Cruickshanks identified that the role and authority of compliance officer derives 
from the legislation.887 For example, the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) such 
as the LAUTRO888 required that its members “shall appoint one of its officers”889 to be 
                                                     
882 Djilani, supra note 99 at 303. 
883 Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468; Weir and Laing, supra note 552. 
884 FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986, supra note 548; Taylor, supra note 14 at 54. See supra III.,1. 
885 Cruickshanks, supra note 771 at 376. 
886 Id. at 376. 
887 Id. at 377. 
888 See e.g. Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organization (LAUTRO) See John 
Black, LIFE ASSURANCE AND UNIT TRUST REGULATORY ORGANIZATION | LAUTRO, A 
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a compliance officer with general responsibility for overseeing the member's 
compliance procedures. Initially, these executives were not called compliance 
officers.890 Generally, members of the board who were close to retirement age 
were selected to perform this new compliance function.891 There was little 
knowledge or staff expertise. In the UK, the first wave of compliance officers had 
to understand the new legislation, the new regulations of the self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs) and to obtain authorization for their ﬁrms.892 However, 
Taylor pointed out that in recent years the compliance function has radically 
changed, with widening responsibilities set forth in new legislation. For example, 
in 2007, the EU Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) required that 
the compliance function be independent from internal audit and risk 
management functions. 893 Based on this, Taylor concluded that the compliance 
function should be more adaptable in the future.894 
Another milestone in the development of the compliance function in the 
financial services sector was further supported by a consultative document by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.895 In April 2005, it published ten 
principles for the compliance function in banks.896 The paper defined this function 
as:  
                                                                                                                                                  
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (3. ed. 2009), http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/ 
10.1093/acref/9780199237043.001.0001/acref-9780199237043-e-1804 (last visited Sep 10, 
2015). A UK self-regulating organization responsible for regulating organizations offering 
life assurance and unit trusts as principals. See also supra footnote 940, p. 168 
889 Id. Rule Book, Rule 2.12(3). In: Cruickshanks, supra note 771 at 377. 
890 Taylor, supra note 14 at 55. 
891 Id. at 55. 
892 Id. at 55. 
893 COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2006/73/EC, ABI. 2006 L 241/26 (2006) Article 6 2., which 
implemented DIRECTIVE 2004/39/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
ON MARKETS IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AMENDING COUNCIL  DIRECTIVES 85/611/EEC AND 
93/6/EEC AND DIRECTIVE 2000/12/EC (MIFID 2004), supra note 457. 
894 Taylor, supra note 14 at 58. 
895 Bank for International Settlements, supra note 812. 
896 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 813. 
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An independent function that identifies, assesses, advises on, monitors, and reports on 
the bank’s compliance risk, […] to comply with all applicable laws, regulations, and codes 
of conduct and standards of good practice.897  
The paper highlighted two principles of the compliance function: First, the 
role and responsibilities should be clearly identified, and secondly, the function 
should be independent from the business activities of the bank.898 Therefore, 
Edwards and Wolfe concluded that this consultation paper provides a high-level 
approach to business in banks and can enhance a compliant competent culture 
within an organization.899 At the same time, they criticized the fact that the 
complex compliance issues need to taken into consideration in day-to-day 
business.900  
By contrast with the apparently mandatory nature of the compliance 
officer's function within the financial services sector, the emergence of the 
compliance function in the English private sector has no legal origins. One aspect 
of the evolution of this function identified by Cruickshanks is commercial and 
competitive pressure on a company.901 The next aspect that can be identified is the 
increasing influence of the investors. The author demonstrated this aspect, citing 
the increase in investor’s complaints,902 for instance, the bankruptcy of Maxwell 
fueled skepticism regarding the self-regulatory system.903 Hence, at the same time 
investors have made greater use of complaints.904 In sum, he argued that the 
standards of service are likely to have a significant influence on the commercial 
success of companies in the future. The complaints should initially be addressed 
directly to the compliance officer. As a result, contributions by compliance officers 
are likely to be afforded greater importance.905 However, there are still many 
                                                     
897 Id. at 3. para. 10. 
898 Id. at 9–10.; Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546. 
899 Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 223. 
900 Id. at 223. 
901 Cruickshanks, supra note 771 at 377. 
902 Id. at 378. 
903 See Prokesch, supra note 786. Robert Maxwell diverted millions of pounds of the firm 
employees’ pension funds for his own purpose. In: ANNIE MILLS & PETER HAINES, 
ESSENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPLIANCE (2nd ed. 2015). 
904 Cruickshanks, supra note 771 at 378. 
905 Id. at 379. 
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challenges facing this function. For example, Cruickshanks noted that there are 
various different perceptions of the compliance officer's role.906 He concluded that 
due to the lack of concrete specification of this role, it is difficult to clearly define 
and describe precisely what it entails.907 
In addition to these considerations, Miles pointed out that if self-regulation 
were purely voluntary, internal compliance officers could be “more capable [but] 
not necessarily more willing to regulate effectively” than the regulator’s own agents.908 
For example, in the absence of any formal authority like in the financial services 
sector, companies have to establish some form of internal control. The role has 
evolved through the legitimate self-interest of the private sector and lastly the 
market seems to have chosen compliance as a standard.909  
Furthermore, the emergence of corporate compliance and the compliance 
function in the UK was also influenced by the UK takeover regime.910 The 
Takeover Code regulates takeovers and mergers911 and while it does not have 
statutory force, the Companies Act of 2006 affords it considerable clout.912 The 
purpose of the company law reform was to codify the principles underpinning 
directors’ duties under common law.913 In addition, under section 9A of the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986,914 the Office of Fair Trading 
                                                     
906 Id. at 376. 
907 Id. at 376–377. 
908 Miles, supra note 855 at 63. 
909 Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468 at 200. 
910 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the “Panel”) is an independent body, established 
in 1968, whose main functions are to issue and administer the City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers (the “Code”) and to supervise and regulate takeovers and other matters to 
which the Code applies. Its central objective is to ensure fair treatment for all shareholders 
in takeover bids. See The Takeover Panel, THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (THE 
“PANEL”), http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/ (last visited Sep 12, 2015). 
911 MILLS AND HAINES, supra note 903 at 13. 
912 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 554. This Act is the primary source of UK company 
law and codifies certain existing common law principles, such as those relating to general 
duties of directors (Ch.2) and to the disqualification of directors’. 
913 Id. Ch. 2. 
914 COMPANY DIRECTORS’ DISQUALIFICATION ACT 1986, supra note 791 sec. 9A. 
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(OFT)915 and the regulators have the power to apply to the court for an order 
disqualifying a director from being involved in the management of a company, if 
there has been a breach of UK or EU competition law through the company.916 In 
addition, the OFT Guidance 1341917 encouraged all companies to comply with 
competition law using a risk-based, four- step process for achieving a compliance 
culture.918 This process includes step one: risk identification, step two: risk 
assessment, step three: risk mitigation; and step four: review.919 Moreover, the 
guidance recommended that the company should reinforce a compliance culture 
by appointing compliance champions within business units.920  
However, as mentioned previously,921 before the enactment of the UK 
Bribery Act 2010,922 the English law system consisted of a collection of legislation 
and voluntary Codes.923 Fortunately, the UKBA includes a defense from criminal 
liability for corporations.924 A commercial organization is not liable for failing to 
prevent bribery if it “had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons 
associated with [the corporation] from undertaking such conduct.”925 Furthermore, the 
UKBA pointed out that  
The Secretary of State must publish guidance about procedures that relevant 
commercial organizations can put in place to prevent persons associated with them from 
bribing.926  
Nevertheless, this guidance gives no recommendations concerning the 
implementation of the compliance function.927 
                                                     
915 OFT, COMPANY DIRECTORS AND COMPETITION LAW - DIRECTORS’ GUIDANCE (2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284410/of
t1340.pdf (last visited Sep 12, 2015). 
916 BANKS AND BANKS, supra note 647 at 24. 
917 OFT, supra note 915. 
918 Id. at 4. 
919 Id. at 9. 
920 Id. at 13. 
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923 Richard, supra note 68 at 438. 
924 Id. at 439. 
925 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67 § 7(2). 
926 Id.§ 9 (1). See Ministry of Justice, supra note 880. 
927 Ministry of Justice, supra note 880. 
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In conclusion, the new UK legislation and the growing responsibilities of 
the corporate management have combined the practice of business with legal 
requirements and have strongly supported the transformation of the compliance 
manager into a self-regulatory function within UK companies.928 The purpose 
behind the UK compliance function is to be involved in the interests of 
developing the most conducive compliance culture within companies.929 Similar 
to the US, the UK compliance function originated from the financial services 
legislation. In contrast to the US, however, it has been recognized that the UK 
compliance officer is a new phenomenon. 
3. The definition of the compliance function in the United Kingdom 
Linked to the findings above, an examination of the historical evolution of 
the compliance officer in the UK shows that the UK compliance function is still a 
young position and there is no generally accepted or legal definition of the 
corporate compliance officer.930 This section will now explore the characteristics 
and features of the position within companies in the UK. Edwards and Wolfe 
already identified the objectives, targets and techniques of the compliance 
function within banks.931 The objectives and techniques of the corporate 
compliance function can be examined analogous to those findings. Edwards and 
Wolfe found that there are some difficulties in terms of defining this function. At 
first, internally, within a company the objectives of the compliance function might 
be determined by its compliance policy.932 In the UK, regulators933 additionally 
have defined responsibility for businesses.934 Often, the senior management 
                                                     
928 CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND 
DEMOCRACY 168 (1. ed. 2002). 
929 See e.g. Bosworth‐Davies, supra note 771; Cruickshanks, supra note 771; Edwards and 
Wolfe, supra note 546; McMurray, supra note 771. 
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delegates daily responsibility for compliance to the compliance department.935 
Secondly, the size of companies, their scope of business and their corporate 
objectives diﬀer and the scope of responsibilies of the compliance officer differ 
accordingly.936 However, they agree with the key principle put forward by the 
Committee,937 which was that the compliance function should be independent 
from business activities of the company units.938 In other words, compliance staff 
should not be directly involved in the activities they have to monitor. 
In addition, Hagland argued that the compliance officer should have the 
power, status, authority, and personality to challenge anyone about any action 
within the company to effectively control and monitor the firm.939 In the UK, one 
important aspect of the compliance function is contact to the self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs)940 in order to obtain pertinent informal guidance.941 The 
compliance officer should be familiar with the rulebooks and guidance of the 
SROs.942 Ward suggests a balancing role of compliance between the objectives, 
purposes, and needs of the regulators on the one side, and of the board of 
directors on the other.943 Lastly, the compliance officer has to establish a 
regulatory infrastructure within the firm.944  
Another key aspect is the handling of his or her actions following the 
establishment of wrongdoing by employees within the company.945 The 
                                                     
935 MILLS AND HAINES, supra note 903. See e.g. FCA, supra note 934. 5. A firm’s senior 
management is responsible for the firm’s activities and for ensuring that its business 
complies with regulatory requirements.  
936 Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 218. 
937 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 813. 
938 Edwards and Wolfe, supra note 546 at 218. See also Hagland, supra note 770 at 13. 
939 Hagland, supra note 770 at 12–13. 
940 A non-governmental organization that has the power to create and enforce industry 
regulations and standards. The priority is to protect investors through the establishment 
of rules that promote ethics and equality. See Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) 
Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (2004), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sro.asp (last 
visited Sep 22, 2015).  
941 Hagland, supra note 770 at 13. 
942 See e.g. Ministry of Justice, supra note 880; OFT, supra note 915. 
943 WARD, supra note 565 at 60. 
944 MILLS AND HAINES, supra note 903 at 21. 
945 Hagland, supra note 770 at 18. 
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compliance officer’s conduct will have a major impact upon the nature, quality, 
and credibility of his or her evidence if called upon to testify at a tribunal.946 
Hence, Hagland concluded that taking compliance issues seriously requires that 
the compliance officers have the necessary skills and adopts the power and 
authority to apply the complex tasks and duties inherent to their function.947 To 
further strengthen this function, the compliance officer should deal with the 
establishment of a compliance culture within the firm.948 Generally, the 
compliance culture could arise through announcement imposed top-down and 
training of employees and compliance staff.949 Mills and Haines drew up a list 
summarizing the key responsibilities of the compliance officer.950 They pointed 
out that regardless of which firm the compliance officer works for, his activities 
encompass an understanding of that company.951 The compliance officer should 
identify and determine best practice standards applicable with respect to 
compliance with law, regulations, and the corporate goals in order to document 
and keep records of the compliance steps; he must monitor and measure 
compliance risks and should advise the employees and the management 
accordingly.952 Based on these multiple tasks, Taylor identified the compliance 
function as a “multifunctional” role.953 
Finally, the UK definition of the corporate compliance officer can be 
summarized with a flexible description by Mills and Haines, which could apply 
for each company in the UK: 
Compliance officers are there to help stop things going wrong from a regulatory 
perspective, and to help to deal with them if they do.954 
                                                     
946 Id. at 18. 
947 Id. at 18. 
948 McMurray, supra note 771 at 142. 
949 Id. at 143. 
950 MILLS AND HAINES, supra note 903 at 23. 
951 Id. at 23. 
952 Id. at 23. 
953 Taylor, supra note 14 at 223. 
954 MILLS AND HAINES, supra note 903 at 19. 
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III. Legal Roots and cultural background of compliance in Germany 
The two previous sections explored the emergence and definition of 
compliance and the compliance function in the US and UK respectively. This part 
will introduce the legal roots of compliance and examine whether there is a 
definition of compliance and the compliance function in Germany. 
A review of the German literature shows that there is little explanation on 
the cultural background and legal origins of compliance in Germany. Apparently, 
the emergence of compliance is attributable predominantly to external factors. 
One reason for this could be that the term compliance is relatively new outside 
the financial services sector in Germany and has been subject of extended debate 
and discussion for only around ten years.955 The German academic debate has 
recognized that the term compliance is derived from the Anglo-American 
terminology.956 For more than a century, the management boards of American 
companies have been dealing with the issues of to prevent and detect corporate 
crime and misconduct.957 Hence, even before legislation was introduced to 
regulate compliance issues, American companies had implemented voluntary 
codes of conduct, policies, and a corporate compliance culture. This self-regulated 
system developed mainly in the US and in the UK.958 Compared to companies in 
continental Europe, the American firms have by preference tended towards 
formal rules controlling employees in line with Taylor’s principles.959 In contrast, 
Taylor’s theory of management960 was never as popular in German companies as 
                                                     
955 Eberhard Vetter, Compliance im Unternehmen, in COMPLIANCE IN DER 
UNTERNEHMERPRAXIS: GRUNDLAGEN, ORGANISATION UND UMSETZUNG 1–18, 1 (G. Wecker 
& B. Ohl eds., 3. ed. 2013). 
956 See e.g. Eufinger, supra note 610 at 1; Hauschka, supra note 71 at 257; Thomas Rotsch, 
Compliance,  in HANDBUCH WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHT 45–78, 50 (Hans Achenbach, Andreas 
Ransiek, & Katharina Beckemper eds., 3. ed. 2012); Vetter, supra note 955 at 1. 
957 See supra A., I., p. 118 
958 See supra A., I., p. 118, II., p. 138 
959 Palazzo, supra note 84 at 204. 
960 Taylorism is a system of scientific management advocated by Fred W. Taylor. In 
Taylor’s view, the task of factory management was to determine the best way for the 
worker to do the job, to provide the proper tools and training, and to provide incentives 
for good performance. He broke each job down into its individual motions, analyzed 
these to determine which were essential, and timed the workers with a stopwatch. With 
unnecessary motion eliminated, the worker, following a machinelike routine, became far 
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in America.961 Therefore, ethical behavior and rules are usually introduced 
informally in German companies.962 As a result, Palazzo argued that Americans 
think and work towards achieving unity between ethics and profit. Ethics and 
compliance issues are connected to formal codes, and are equated to good 
business practice.963 By contrast, European companies are more community-
oriented. Palazzo argued that European companies prefer more moral orientations 
in the field of relationships than US firms. Moral principles and behavior depend 
more on the concrete situation, and less on absolute and universalistic norms.964 
Thus, Palazzo concluded that German companies rely more on informal 
mechanisms of social control.965  
As previously discussed, the legal origins of American corporate 
compliance can be traced back to American antitrust compliance at the beginning 
of the 1960s.966 In contrast to the development of compliance in the US, the initial 
starting point for the German compliance debate centered around the keyword 
‘corporate governance’967 in the 1990s.968 In Germany, the first legal objective of 
compliance related to the financial services sector within securities services 
companies.969 At first, there were voluntary guidelines to support self-regulation 
                                                                                                                                                  
more productive. See Taylorism | scientific management system, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA (2015), http://www.britannica.com/topic/Taylorism (last visited Sep 24, 2015). 
961 Palazzo, supra note 84 at 205. 
962 Id. at 205. 
963 Id. at 210. 
964 Id. at 204. 
965 Id. at 204. 
966 Eufinger, supra note 610 at 22; Rotsch, supra note 958 at 50 margin note 10. 
967In Germany, ‘corporate governance’ means ‘corporate constitution’ and explains the 
regulatory framework for the management and supervision of German listed companies. 
See THE GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (DCGK), (2002) Foreword. The German 
corporate governance system is seen as an “insider-dominated” system in which the 
stakeholders are included and more engaged in governing the company. See Tylecote and 
Ramirez, supra note 819 at 163. 
968 Jürgen Bürkle, § 1 Einleitung, in DER COMPLIANCE OFFICER: EIN HANDBUCH IN EIGENER 
SACHE 1–13, 3 (Jürgen Bürkle & Christoph E. Hauschka eds., 1. ed. 2015) margin note 6; 
Christoph E. Hauschka, Corporate Governance und Compliance, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: 
HANDBUCH DER HAFTUNGSVERMEIDUNG IM UNTERNEHMEN § 1, § 1 (Christoph E. Hauschka 
& Christoph Besch eds., 2. ed. 2010) Rn. 1; Rotsch, supra note 958 at 50 margin note 10. 
969 Rotsch, supra note 958 at 53 margin note 17. 
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within securities services companies.970 In 1994, the transposition of the European 
Investment Services Directive enshrined the term compliance in German law.971 
However, Eufinger concluded that the transfer of compliance within various areas 
is fluent.972 He argued that the compliance organizational structures of the 
securities services organizations are also applicable to various other areas.973 
Based on the above, it has been suggested that compliance will pervade other 
sectors as well.974 Meanwhile, the evidence suggests that compliance influences 
not only the banks and investment services companies within the financial 
services sector, but also companies in the private sector.975 Nevertheless, not all of 
research shows that this transfer runs smoothly without adjustments.976 
In Germany, corporate scandals also focused attention on corporate 
compliance. In 2008, a German company listed in the US, Siemens AG and several 
of its subsidiaries were accused of bribery. Siemens AG and its subsidiaries were 
involved in offering bribes totaling more than $1.4 billion to foreign officials in 
various countries all over the world.977 Siemens ultimately agreed to pay $800 
million in fines and penalties.978 Since then, Siemens has undergone a 
fundamental compliance transformation and the term compliance entered the 
                                                     
970 Id. at 53. margin note 17. 
971 Id. at 53. margin note 17; DIRECTIVE ON INVESTMENT SERVICES 93/22/EEC, OJ 141 of 
11.6.1993 (1993), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Al24036c 
(last visited Sep 22, 2015); WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | SECURITIES TRADING ACT, 
WPHG Federal Law Gazette I, 1749 (1994) § 33. 
972 Eufinger, supra note 610 at 23. 
973 Id. at 23. 
974 Rotsch, supra note 958 at 54 margin note 17. 
975 Bürkle, supra note 970 at 4 margin note 8. 
976 Hauschka, supra note 4; Sünner, supra note 71. 
977 Press Release DOJ, SIEMENS AG AND THREE SUBSIDIARIES PLEAD GUILTY TO FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT VIOLATIONS AND AGREE TO PAY $450 MILLION IN COMBINED 
CRIMINAL FINES (2008), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-
1105.html (last visited Sep 12, 2015). 
978 Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, WISCONSIN 
LAW REVIEW 609–659, 612 (2012); B. SIEBLER, CRIMINAL-COMPLIANCE IM 
INTERDISZIPLINÄREN KONTEXT: DIE LEGITIMIERUNG VON COMPLIANCE-TÄTIGKEITEN UND 
MASSNAHMEN SOWIE DEREN VERWERTBARKEIT IM DEUTSCHEN STRAFVERFAHREN 3 (1. ed. 
2014); See also BGH, 29. 8.2008 - 2 StR 587/07 - Siemens Case, Bildung verdeckter Kassen 
als Untreue, 2009 NStZ 95–100 (2008). 
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public arena in Germany.979 The enforcement of compliance through the 
globalization of economic transactions, growing economic pressure, and 
increasingly complex international legal norms and regulations also led to the 
need for the implementation of appropriate values and patterns of behavior 
within German companies.980 In contrast, Parker argued that German companies 
are still reluctant to address normative questions publicly.981 
Following the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) in criminal matters decision of 
July 17, 2009 a comprehensive and far-reaching academic and practical debate has 
begun to develop around the issues of corporate compliance and the compliance 
officer function.982 The head of the internal audit and legal department at a public 
cleaning service company was found guilty of failure to take appropriate 
measures on evidence of customer overcharging.983 However, he was not a 
compliance officer. Nevertheless, this decision by the German Federal Court 
could establish compliance officers’ criminal liability for violation of their duties, 
and creating a challenge for compliance measures within companies.984 The Court 
classified the compliance officer as a guarantor pursuant to criminal law.985 The 
court decided that the head of the internal audit and legal department was 
responsible under law to ensure that a specific outcome does not occur.986 He thus 
bears a special responsibility.987 As a result, the Court tends to transfer of criminal 
prevention within the companies.988 Over the past five years, legal scholars have 
                                                     
979 Koehler, supra note 978 at 613. 
980 PARKER, supra note 928 at 195. 
981 Id. at 195. 
982 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29. Responsibility under criminal law on 
account of professional position. 
983 Dando et al., supra note 571 at 6. 
984 Ralf-Friedrich Fahrenbach et al., THE COMPLIANCE OFFICER’S FUNCTION WITHIN A 
COMPANY MAYER BROWN (2009), http://www.mondaq.com/x/91716/ (last visited Sep 22, 
2015). 
985 STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, Federal Law Gazette I, 3322 (1998) 
§ 13 (1). See also supra Ch. 6, A., III., 4., p. 510 
986 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 note 31. 
987 Id. note 23. 
988 Bürkle, supra note 970 at 5 margin note 11; Bürkle, supra note 32 at 4; Meier, supra note 
47 at 779. 
162 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
criticized this attempted shift.989 However, in the German academic legal 
literature, this decision had a broad impact990 on the advisory and supervisory 
tasks of the compliance function within companies.991 An EBEF paper surmised 
that although such legal cases are rare, they suggest a trend relating to 
compliance and the compliance function, and demonstrate a need for clarity in 
terms of the scope and limitation of the responsibilities and liabilities of this 
function.992  
Moreover, in 2013, the Regional Court Munich I decided another case 
Siemens AG v. Neubürger.993 In that case, the court initially decided in a civil 
judgement on the compliance duties of the management board.994 Bürkle argued 
that this decision will have a considerable impact on day-to-day compliance. It 
can be recognized as a landmark decision in terms of internal liability of the 
management board in instances of non-compliance.995 The court argued that the 
management board is responsible for monitoring and supervising in order that no 
legal violations can arise from the employees.996 In its decision, the court 
explained that compliance issues were not new.997 In addition, Bürkle pointed out 
                                                     
989 See e.g. contra Campos Nave, supra note 482 at 2548; Wolf, supra note 46 at 1358; pro 
Dann and Mengel, supra note 47 at 3267. 
990 Bürkle, supra note 32; Campos Nave, supra note 482; Dann and Mengel, supra note 47; 
Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480; Giesen, supra note 484; Hauschka, Galster, and 
Marschlich, supra note 488; Hauschka, supra note 71; Heuking, supra note 4; Illing and 
Umnuß, supra note 486; Kirsch, supra note 46; Klebeck and Zollinger, supra note 489; 
Krieger and Günther, supra note 47; Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 483; Meier-Greve, 
supra note 486; Raus and Lützeler, supra note 485; Rieble, supra note 483; Wolf, supra note 
46; Wybitul, supra note 32; Zimmermann, supra note 32. 
991 Bürkle, supra note 32 at 8. 
992 Dando et al., supra note 571 at 7. 
993 LG München I, 10.12.2013 - 5 HK O 1387/10 - Pflichten des Vorstands einer AG, 2014 
NZG 345–349 (2013); Handelsblatt, Heinz-Joachim Neubürger: Ex-Siemens-Finanzchef soll 
Millionen zahlen, HANDELSBLATT, October 12, 2013, 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/management/heinz-joachim-neubuerger-ex-
siemens-finanzchef-soll-millionen-zahlen/9200546.html (last visited Sep 22, 2015). 
994 Jürgen Bürkle, Compliance als Aufgabe des Vorstands der AG – Die Sicht des LG München I,  
CCZ 52–55, 52 (2015); Bürkle, supra note 968 at 5 note 13. 
995 Bürkle, supra note 994 at 52. 
996 LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 995 at 346; AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN 
STOCK CORPORATION ACT, Federal Law Gazette I, 1089 (1965) § 91 (II). 
997 LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 993 at 346. 
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that the court had to failed to take account of the organizational approach of 
compliance.998 He concluded that the responsibility includes the application of 
this approach in daily practice.999 The risk of such judgement1000 is that hysterical 
compliance activities will begin.1001  
Finally, like many other trends, compliance issues were introduced from the 
US to Europe and Germany.1002 It has been recognized that the concept of 
compliance was historically transferred from the US to Germany.1003 As 
previously discussed, in accordance with the strict legislation in force there, 
American companies have developed a very specific way of dealing with the 
norms and have introduced so-called compliance programs as a self-regulatory 
system. 1004 In spite of the different cultural backgrounds in the US and Germany, 
the US transportation of compliance has implemented formal business 
compliance programs in German listed companies. On the assumption that 
German firms need to remain competitive, they will increasingly be required to 
comply with more and more requirements in terms of adherence to legal 
provisions. For example, over time and as a result of pressure from of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 20021005 on German companies listed in the US and the 
detailed rules and regulations of the SEC,1006 compliance also infiltrated German 
companies.1007 In conclusion, it would appear that corporate compliance has no 
German cultural and legal origin, but, it appears that compliance was an 
“Importation of American corporate compliance.”1008  
                                                     
998 Bürkle, supra note 968 at 6 note 15. 
999 Id. at 6. note 15. 
1000 LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 993. 
1001 Bürkle, supra note 968 at 5 note 13. 
1002 Palazzo, supra note 84 at 196. 
1003 See e.g. SIEBLER, supra note 978 at 4. 
1004 Rotsch, supra note 956 at 60 note 10. 
1005 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56. 
1006 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, USSC, supra note 57. 
1007 Meier, supra note 47 at 779. 
1008 Djilani, supra note 99. 
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1. The Definition of Compliance in Germany 
As discussed above, according to many German authors1009 the term 
‘compliance’ originated from the Anglo-American legal terminology. That is why 
in Germany compliance means “…the adherence, observance, accordance, and 
fulfilment of determined bids.“1010 However, the word compliance has simply been 
adopted into the German legal terminology without translation. As such, it 
constitutes a so-called “legal transplant.”1011 The word represents a generic term, 
originating from the English verb “to comply with.”1012 Hence, in a strict sense, 
compliance means “to be in compliance with the law.“1013 In practice, compliance 
requires that corporations and companies should act in accordance with the 
applicable laws.1014 In Hauschka’s view, this is an obvious principle under the rule 
of law in all states.1015 As such, it describes an implicit understanding: The 
corporation and every employee should always act in compliance with the 
applicable laws.1016  
However, standing by this narrow definition would render compliance a 
mere platitude.1017 For this reason, the term compliance will be considered in a 
broader sense. Rotsch argued that compliance is a tool for monitoring and 
supervising a system.1018 The term is therefore clarified as comprising a set of 
measures in order to ensure the legal conduct of the employees.1019 Bürkle defines 
compliance as a package of organizational activities, which guarantee that the 
                                                     
1009 See e.g. Eufinger, supra note 610; Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46; GROß, supra 
note 48; Hauschka, Galster, and Marschlich, supra note 488; SIEBLER, supra note 978. 
1010 Hauschka, supra note 970 §1 note 2. 
1011 GROß, supra note 48 at 34. 
1012 SIEBLER, supra note 978 at 3. 
1013 Rotsch, supra note 956 at 47 note 1. 
1014 Hauschka, supra note 968§ 1 note 2. 
1015 Id.§ 1 note 2. 
1016 Rotsch, supra note 956 at 47 note 1. 
1017 Hauschka, supra note 71 at 257; Rotsch, supra note 956 at 47 note 2; Uwe H. Schneider, 
Compliance als Aufgabe der Unternehmensleitung,  ZIP 645–650, 646 (2003). 
1018 Rotsch, supra note 956 at 47 note 3. 
1019 See e.g. Frank Maschmann, Haftungsvermeidung durch Gesetzetreue - Compliance und 
Arbeitsrecht, 15 in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE UND ARBEITSRECHT | MANNHEIMER 
ARBEITSRECHTSTAG 2009 7–10, 7 (Frank Maschmann ed., 1. ed. 2009); Rotsch, supra note 958 
at 48 note 4; Schneider, supra note 1019 at 646. 
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employees adhere to internal and external requirements.1020 In short, he defines 
compliance as “organized legal conformity.”1021 In addition, Gößwein and Hohmann 
point out that compliance requires an organizational model with procedures and 
structures, which facilitate adherence to corporate policies.1022 Moreover, Benz and 
Klindt conclude that, today, the general term compliance includes all aspects of 
risk management, auditing, and various areas of law e.g. antitrust law, criminal 
law and product liability law.1023 In short, compliance pervades a number of areas 
of law. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that compliance measures must always 
themselves be compliant.1024 For example, the recent corporate emissions scandal 
involving VW illustrates a spectacular failure on the part of the compliance 
department and measures.1025 Following the first scandal in 2005, the CCO 
reported directly to the chairman of the executive board under the renewed VW-
compliance structure.1026 However, the current structure revealed a common 
weakness in the compliance system within corporations. Seemingly, the sets of 
measures are biased toward corruption and compliance staff are too far removed 
from the day-to-day business.1027 These assumptions ought to be taken into 
                                                     
1020 Bürkle, supra note 968 at 2 note 3. 
1021 Id. at 3. note 3. See also supra in detail Ch. 6, A., p. 471 
1022 Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46 at 963. 
1023 Jochen Benz & Thomas Klindt, Compliance 2020 – ein Blick in die Zukunft, 49 BB 
2977–2980, 2977 (2010). 
1024 Maschmann, supra note 1019 at 9. 
1025 Christopher Grundler, director of the EPA said that VW manufactured and installed 
soft-ware in the electronic control module of these vehicles that sensed when the vehicle 
was being tested for compliance with EPA emissions standards. See, Jana Kasperkevic, 
Head of VW in US will tell Congress he knew of emissions rigging in early 2014, THE GUARDIAN, 
October 8, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/07/vw-president-ceo-
congress-knew-emissions-rigging-early-2014-michael-horn (last visited Sep 22, 2015). 
1026 See Geertje Oldermann, COMPLIANCE: VOLKSWAGEN ÜBERARBEITET STRUKTUR UND 
BERUFT LEITER ARBEITSRECHT ALS CCO JUVE (2011), 
http://juve.de/nachrichten/namenundnachrichten/2011/02/compliance-volkswagen-
uberarbeitet-struktur-und-beruft-leiter-arbeitsrecht-als-cco (last visited Sep 22, 2015). 
1027 See Newsdesk, Zwei Gründe, warum die interne Kontrolle bei VW erneut versagt hat, 
MANAGER MAGAZIN, September 28, 2015, http://www.manager-
magazin.de/unternehmen/autoindustrie/zwei-gruende-warum-die-interne-kontrolle-bei-
vw-erneut-versagt-hat-a-1054967.html (last visited Sep 22, 2015). 
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consideration in any review of the existing compliance structures in German 
companies. This most recent scandal shows that the structure of the compliance 
organization must be established effectively.1028 
Despite the definition of compliance in the academic literature and the 
landmark case1029 establishing responsibility under criminal law on account of a 
professional position, it is difficult to find legal norms relating to corporate 
compliance in Germany. However, the academic debate often refers to the 
Administrative Offences Act,1030 the Stock Corporation Act,1031 the Federal 
Immission Control Act,1032 the German Banking Act1033, the Securities Trading 
Act,1034 and the implementing provision.1035 In line with the American and English 
origins of the legal definition of compliance and the appointment of a compliance 
function in the securities laws, it is not surprising that the German codification 
was enacted in the Banking Act1036 and Securities Trading Act.1037 Thus, financial 
services and investment services organizations must appoint a compliance 
function are required to have in place a properly established internal business 
organization, which guarantees adherence to the legal provisions. 
                                                     
1028 See e.g. Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46 at 966; Hauschka, Galster, and 
Marschlich, supra note 488 at 245; Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 483 at 88; Moosmayer, 
supra note 498 at 3016. 
1029 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29. 
1030 GESETZ ÜBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN (OWIG) | Act on Regulatory Offences, supra note 
42 §§ 9, 30, 130. 
1031 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 998 § 91 (II). 
1032 BUNDES-IMMISSIONSSCHUTZGESETZ (BIMSCHG) | FEDERAL IMMISSION CONTROL ACT, 
Federal Law Gazette I, 721 (1974) § 52 (II). 
1033 GESETZ ÜBER DAS KREDITWESEN (KWG) | GERMAN BANKING ACT, RGBl I, 1203 (1935) § 
25a. 
1034 WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | SECURITIES TRADING ACT, supra note 973 § 33 I 2 
No. 5. 
1035 WERTPAPIERDIENSTLEISTUNGS-VERHALTENS- UND ORGANISATIONSVERORDNUNG 
(WPDVEROV) | SECURITIES TRADING IMPLEMENTING PROVISION, Federal Law Gazette I, 
1432 (2007) § 12. 
1036 GESETZ ÜBER DAS KREDITWESEN (KWG) | GERMAN BANKING ACT, supra note 1036 § 25a. 
1037 WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | SECURITIES TRADING ACT, supra note 973 § 33 (I) 
No. 5; WERTPAPIERDIENSTLEISTUNGS-VERHALTENS- UND ORGANISATIONSVERORDNUNG 
(WPDVEROV) | SECURITIES TRADING IMPLEMENTING PROVISION, supra note 1038 § 12. 
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However, it is uncertain whether this legislation1038 includes organizational 
requirements of the implementation of corporate compliance structures and the 
compliance function within companies in the private sector.1039 Nevertheless, 
there is also an academic debate1040 on the legal obligation to implement a 
compliance structure within companies according to para 9, 30, 130 of the Act on 
Regulatory Offences (OWiG).1041 Hauschka pointed out that there appears to be a 
legal obligation. For example, the compliance officer is responsible for avoiding 
offences by employees. This could be described as the supervisory duty of the 
compliance officer.1042  
Furthermore, in Germany the term compliance is explained in the German 
Code 2015.1043 Hence, the DCGK term compliance describes a requirement of or a 
task performed by the management board.1044 The DCGK primarily refers to listed 
corporations.1045 The legislative commission claimed that through the declaration 
of conformity pursuant to Section 161 German Stock Corporation Act (AktG),1046 
the code has a legal basis.1047 In contrast, legal scholars have argued that the legal 
                                                     
1038 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 998 § 91 (II); 
GESETZ ÜBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN (OWIG) | Act on Regulatory Offences, supra note 42 
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1039 See e.g. Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46 at 963; Hauschka, supra note 970§ 1 note 
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1041 GESETZ ÜBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN (OWIG) | Act on Regulatory Offences, supra note 
42. 
1042 Hauschka, supra note 4 at 168. 
1043 THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 967 at 6 Number 4.1.3. “The Management Board 
ensures that all provisions of law and the enterprise’s internal policies are abided by and works to 
achieve their compliance by group companies (Compliance).” 
1044 Hauschka, Galster, and Marschlich, supra note 488 at 243; Peter Hemeling, Compliance 
im Erst- und Rückversicherungsunternehmen, CCZ 21–25, 21 (2010). 
1045 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 998 § 161. 
1046 Id.§ 161 inserted on July 25, 2002, BT 2682. 
1047 The German Government Commission, DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX 
(DCGK) | THE GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE DCGK, 
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nature of the DCGK is not entirely clear.1048 At the beginning of the 1990s, due to 
the international “Corporate Governance development“ and the resultant emergence 
of codes, guidelines, principles, reports, statements, and standards of good 
practice, as well as due to a number of German corporate scandals,1049 the German 
legislator recommended the draft of a Corporate Governance Code.1050 On 
February 26, 2002, the DCGK was published on the website of the Commission.1051 
Similar to the UK Corporate Governance Code, the DCGK1052 and Section 161 
German Stock Corporation Act include a ‘comply or explain’ approach. Although 
the Code is voluntary, German listed companies must explain their governance 
policies and give reasons for not complying with the recommendations of the 
DCGK. However, this international framework of corporate governance is not a 
primary source of law, but so-called ‘soft law’.1053 Simarly, the German Code is not 
a primary source of law.1054  
In short, Germany has no formal legal definition of the term compliance. 
The Code provides an explanation of the term compliance, but even the case-law 
does not provide any definitive answer as to what compliance entails or requires 
the implementation of compliance tools such as risk analysis, or a code of 
conduct.1055 Due to this legal gap, the academic literature has attempted to define 
the term. To summarize all the definitions mentioned in this section, compliance 
is more than simply adherence to the law. The term also encompasses rules of 
conduct, the avoidance of violations, and an organizational concept with 
                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.dcgk.de/en/code.html (last visited Sep 21, 2015). See also supra in detail, Ch. 6, 
B., p. 548. 
1048 Henrik-Michael Ringleb, Vorbemerkung, in KOMMENTAR ZUM DEUTSCHEN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE KODEX: KODEX-KOMMENTAR (Thomas Kremer, Marcus Lutter, & Axel von 
Werder eds., 5. ed. 2014) note 54; Rotsch, supra note 951 at 55 note 20. 
1049 E.g. PHILIPP HOLZMANN AG was a German construction group and a global player. It 
was located in Frankfurt am Main. In 2002, it declared its bankruptcy. 
1050 Introduction of the DCGK | Commentary on the DCGK, in KOMMENTAR ZUM 
DEUTSCHEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX: KODEX-KOMMENTAR (Thomas Kremer et al. 
eds., 6. ed. 2016) note 1-8. 
1051 See THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 967. 
1052 Id. at 2. Foreword. 
1053 Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1050 note 5. 
1054 Ringleb, supra note 1048 note 54. 
1055 Bürkle, supra note 497 at 6 note 15. 
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appropriate measures. Ultimately, all of these organizational measures serve to 
ensure lawful conduct by the company and its employees. 
2. The historical evolution of the German compliance function 
A in the US and the UK, the compliance function did not simply appear. 
Firstly, it was a result of legal enforcement and changes in the European 
regulatory environment in the financial services sector and securities sector. In 
recent years, specific requirements of compliance and the compliance function 
have been put into place. For example, the EU Directives1056 have to be 
implemented into national law. In contrast, the EU regulations have direct effect 
and are binding on all EU member states.1057 Based on the MiFID-Directive1058 for 
instance, the German legislator inserted the European requirements of 
compliance and the compliance function into the German Securities Trading Act 
(WpHG)1059 and the Securities Trading Implementing Provision,1060 which 
established binding compliance requirements in the securities sector.1061 These 
provisions require the appointment of a compliance officer as a permanent, 
effective, and independent compliance function1062 within financial services 
companies.1063 In addition, in 1999 the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority 
(Bafin)1064 provided a Directive specifying the organizational duties.1065 For 
                                                     
1056 CONSOLIDATED VERSIONS OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND THE TREATY ON THE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, OJ EC No. C 115 (2009) Article 288. 
1057 Jürgen Bürkle, Der Compliance Officer in regulierten Finanzsektoren, in DER COMPLIANCE 
OFFICER: EIN HANDBUCH IN EIGENER SACHE 315–342, 325 (Jürgen Bürkle & Christoph E. 
Hauschka eds., 1. ed. 2015) note 28. 
1058 COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2006/73/EC, supra note 893. 
1059 WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | GERMAN SECURITIES TRADING ACT, supra note 
973 § 33 (I) 2 No. 1. 
1060 WERTPAPIERDIENSTLEISTUNGS-VERHALTENS- UND ORGANISATIONSVERORDNUNG 
(WPDVEROV) | SECURITIES TRADING IMPLEMENTING PROVISION, supra note 1038 § 12 (4). 
1061 Bürkle, supra note 1057 at 325 note 30. 
1062 WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | GERMAN SECURITIES TRADING ACT, supra note 
973 § 33 (I) 2 No. 1. 
1063 The definition of the financial services companies is enshrined in the Id. § 2 (4); GESETZ 
ÜBER DAS KREDITWESEN (KWG) | GERMAN BANKING ACT, supra note 1036 § 53 (1) 1. 
1064 This is an autonomous public-law institution and is subject to the legal and technical 
supervision of the Federal Ministry of Finance. See BaFin | Federal Banking Supervisory 
Authority, http://www.bafin.de/EN/BaFin/bafin_node.html (last visited Sep 22, 2015). 
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example, no. 4.1 determined that the executive board must establish a compliance 
position to monitor organizational duties.1066 This function should operate 
independently from the other business units and report directly to the executive 
management.1067  
Just like in the UK, since 2005, the Basel Capital Accord (Basel II)1068 has 
provided non-binding recommendations on the establishment of a compliance 
function in the financial services sector.1069 In accordance with these 
recommendations, the German banks must manage all of their risks through an 
effective internal risk management procedure. As a result, the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (Bafin) published its minimum requirements of the 
compliance function in a newsletter (MAComp)1070 in June 2010. However, these 
recommendations merely include guidelines and administrative rules for the 
compliance position, but these are not legally binding on courts.1071 For example, 
these proposals suggest that the compliance officer should be independent and 
discrimination should be prevented by the appointment being for a 24-month 
period and with a 12-month notice period for termination of the employment 
contract.1072 
                                                                                                                                                  
1065 Directives of the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority in order to specify the 
organizational obligations of investment services companies according to the German 
Securities Trading Act (WpHG), § 33 Abs. 1 of October 25, 1999. See BaFin, RICHTLINIE DES 
BUNDESAUFSICHTSAMTES FÜR DEN WERTPAPIERHANDEL ZUR KONKRETISIERUNG DER 
ORGANISATIONSPFLICHTEN VON WERTPAPIERDIENSTLEISTUNGSUNTERNEHMEN GEMÄß § 33 
ABS. 1 WPHG (1999), https://www.uni-leipzig.de/bankinstitut/files/dokumente/1999-10-25-
01_0.pdf (last visited May 22, 2015). 
1066 Id. at 4. no. 4.1. 
1067 Id. at 4. no. 4.2. 
1068 Bank for International Settlements, supra note 812. 
1069 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 813. 
1070 Minimal Requirements for Compliance (MACOMP), See BaFin, BAFIN | 4/2010 (WA) | 
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION AND ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
GOVERNING RULES OF CONDUCT, ORGANISATION AND TRANSPARENCY PURSUANT TO 
SECTIONS 31 ET SEQ. OF THE SECURITIES TRADING ACT (2010), 
https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Rundschreiben/rs_1004_maco
mp_en_wa.html (last visited Sep 23, 2015). 
1071 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2511. 
1072 BaFin, supra note 1070 MaComp B.T. 1.3.3.4 Measures of Ensurance the independence 
of the Compliance function. 
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In January 2014, a huge European regulatory package implementing Basel 
III entered into effect, the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV)1073 and the 
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR).1074 The provisions set out in the CRR and 
the technical standards are thus binding throughout the EU.1075 Although there 
are no explicit requirements of compliance and the compliance function, the 
German legislator enshrined these provisions in law.1076 Thus, the German 
Banking Act1077 includes a mandatory compliance function within credit 
institutions.1078 Lastly, today it is evident that due to the European legal 
framework there are now legal provisions in the German financial services and 
investment service sectors, which require all securities firms to appoint a 
compliance officer within credit institutions and financial services companies. 
In contrast, outside the financial services sector there are no legal provisions 
on the implementation and establishing of a compliance function within 
companies.1079 However, the legal obligation of the establishment of the 
compliance function has been the subject of much discussion in the academic 
debate in recent years.1080 For example, for large companies Hauschka 
recommended the implementation of the compliance function,1081 while 
Moosmayer1082 argued that compliance is a primary task of the management board 
                                                     
1073 DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL (CRD IV 
DIRECTIVE), ABI. 2013 L 176/338 (2013). 
1074 REGULATION (EU) NO 575/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, OJ 
L 176, 2013, 1, L 321/6 (2013). 
1075 Birgit Höpfner, CRD IV: New regulatory package for banks in force, January 15, 2014, 
https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Fachartikel/2014/ (last visited 
Sep 22, 2015). 
1076 Bürkle, supra note 1057 at 329 note 47-48. 
1077 GESETZ ÜBER DAS KREDITWESEN (KWG) | GERMAN BANKING ACT, supra note 1036 § 25a 
(I) s. 3 No. 3 (c). 
1078 The definition of the credit institutions provides Section 1 of the German Banking Act. 
See Id.§ 1. 
1079 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2512. 
1080 See e.g. Pro Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 483; Moosmayer, supra note 498 at 3013; 
Contra Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480 at 15; Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46 at 
964; Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486 at 2. 
1081 Hauschka, supra note 970 § 8 note 7. 
1082 KLAUS MOOSMAYER, COMPLIANCE: PRAXISLEITFADEN FÜR UNTERNEHMEN (3. ed. 2015) 
note 10. 
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to conduct a risk analysis and to implement appropriate compliance measures 
according to the Stock Corporation Act (AktG)1083 or the Act on Regulatory 
Offences (OWiG).1084 In addition, he pointed out that the case-law has provide 
minimum standards for appropriate compliance measures such as (1) the 
organizational duty, (2) the supervisory duty and (3) the examination duty.1085 A 
number of authors suggest that every company should have an appropriate 
compliance structure with a compliance function to protect against the risk of loss 
of reputation and assets.1086  
Lastly, nowadays German companies are confronted with international 
competition and an increasing legal framework in the European environment, 
resulting in greater pressure to implement compliance measures to meet 
legislative regulations and internal guidelines. The compliance officer should be 
responsible for fulfilling these requirements.1087 Since 2000, the emergence of the 
German compliance officer has been attributable to the binding regulatory 
requirements in the financial services sector. In the private sector, the compliance 
officer function has been implemented voluntarily for several reasons.1088 
Seemingly, the increasing influence of international regulations and the court 
decisions concerning organizational duties have influenced German companies. 
Similarly, to the US, the emergence of this function also appears to have been a 
response to public pressure due to corporate scandals.  
3. The Definition of the compliance function in Germany 
As previously discussed, the development of compliance and the 
compliance function occurred in stages. The academic literature has focused on 
the current trend in compliance. Since the well-known court decision1089 on the 
                                                     
1083 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 998 §§ 93 (I) (1) 
and 91 (II) – Duty of Care. 
1084 GESETZ ÜBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN (OWIG) | Act on Regulatory Offences, supra note 
42 §§ 9, 30, 130 – Organizational Duties. 
1085 MOOSMAYER, supra note 1087 note 11-13; See e.g. OLG Stuttgart, 7. 9. 1976 - 3 Ss 526/76 - 
Überwachungspflicht des Betriebsinhabers, 1977 NJW 1410 (1976). 
1086 See e.g. Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2512. 
1087 Meier, supra note 47 at 779. 
1088 Bürkle, supra note 968 at 7 note 20. 
1089 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29. 
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criminal liability of the compliance officer, the attention afforded to and the 
significance of this position has increased.1090 The classification of the compliance 
officer as a guarantor for the purpose of criminal law1091 will have far-reaching 
consequences for their daily practice.1092 For this reason, it is necessary to identify 
and define the specific role and nature of this position within firms. For example, 
Deister argued that the current position of the compliance function is a separate 
role as an executive more “general controller” of the management board.1093 In 
some cases, this classification might be too simple. First, it could be useful to 
analyze the importance and the content of compliance work. For example, the 
academic literature describes six essential issues relating to the significance of the 
German compliance officer: 1094 
(1) The scope of the tasks and duties,  
(2) The criminal and civil liability of this function, 
(3) Duties in the case of a lack of or non-specific job description, 
(4) Limitation of responsibilities of this function, 
(5) The standards of the profession of the compliance officer, and 
(6) The further development of the compliance function. 
Although the responsibilities of the compliance officer depend on the size 
and structure of the company in which he works, they are generally responsible 
for organizing the internal compliance program.1095 In other words, the 
compliance officer plays a key role in the compliance system.1096 Nevertheless, 
there are many recurring tasks in their daily work. To provide a general 
overview, it is useful to divide the different nature of compliance work into 
separate categories. In the view of Renz & Wybitul, their work comprises three 
                                                     
1090 Thomas Rotsch, Grundfragen der Criminal Compliance,  in CRIMINAL COMPLIANCE: 
HANDBUCH (Katharina Beckemper & Thomas Rotsch eds., 1. ed. 2015) § 2 note 13. 
1091 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 note 19 (b). 
1092 Bürkle, supra note 968 at 5 note 11. 
1093 Jochen Deister & Anton Geier, Der UK Bribery Act 2010 und seine Auswirkungen auf 
deutsche Unternehmen, CCZ 12–18, 17 (2011). 
1094 See e.g. Campos Nave, supra note 468 at 2059; Wolf, supra note 43 at 1353–1360; 
Hartmut Renz & Tim Wybitul, Im Blickpunkt: Das Berufsbild des Compliance-Beauftragten Ein 
modernes Verständnis von Compliance, BB, VI (2012).  
1095 Hauschka, supra note 970 § 8 note 8 . 
1096 Id. § 8 note 23. 
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main tasks: (1) the advisory function, (2) review and control function, and (3) the 
reporting function.1097 In addition, Hauschka points out that the scope and 
diversity of compliance work includes training and information of employees, 
and support of the whistleblower-hotline.1098 Furthermore, Schulz & Renz 
emphasized the documentation of employee activities and the activities of 
compliance officers themselves.1099 Moreover, Kirsch presented the responsibilities 
in terms of law e.g. antitrust law, prevention of corruption, competition law, data 
protection law and other regulations.1100 Hastenrath provides a broad overview of 
the various fields of activity. She divides the field of activity into five pillars, (1) 
the law and standard, (2) the knowledge of processes, (3) the risk audits, (4) the 
interface management and (5) the communication.1101 It has been noted that there 
is a lack of knowledge of the compliance officer’s work. They should also be able 
to network internally and diplomatically cooperate with external regulators 
abroad. The general tasks of the compliance officer are summarized in Figure 6 
below. This overview does not claim to be exhaustive and does not present any 
ranking of the compliance officer’s tasks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1097 Renz and Wybitul, supra note 1094 at VI. 
1098 Hauschka, supra note 968§ 8 note 26. 
1099 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2515. 
1100 Kirsch, supra note 46. 
1101 Katharina Hastenrath, Bestellung und Pflichtendelegation,  in DER COMPLIANCE OFFICER: 
EIN HANDBUCH IN EIGENER SACHE , 28 (Jürgen Bürkle & Christoph E. Hauschka eds., 1. ed. 
2015) note 5. 
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Figure 6 - Field of Activities of the German Compliance Officer1102 
Finally, it has been mentioned that there is no legal or academic definition 
of the corporate compliance position in Germany.1103 The role as such is difficult 
to define because it is a product of circumstances and situations. A review of the 
German literature shows that the German compliance officer is an executive 
employee responsible for the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the 
compliance system and for advising and monitoring other employees to prevent 
legal violation by the firm.  
                                                     
1102 See e.g. Bürkle, supra note 32; Dann and Mengel, supra note 47; Gößwein and 
Hohmann, supra note 46; Hastenrath, supra note 1101; Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486; 
Klebeck and Zollinger, supra note 489; Krieger and Günther, supra note 47; Meier, supra 
note 47; Meier-Greve, supra note 486; Renz and Wybitul, supra note 1094; Schulz and Renz, 
supra note 46; Sünner, supra note 71; Wolf, supra note 46. 
1103 Meier, supra note 47 at 779. 
 Monitoring and evaluating the legal framework 
 Identification of compliance risks 
 Implementing and auditing of the compliance system 
 Monitoring and evaluating of compliance measures 
 Reporting 
 Documentation 
 Training of employees 
 Legal advice 
 Networking and interface management 
 Cooperation with external regulators abroad 
 An advisory, independent and control function 
 Executive employee 
 Guarantor status by the BGH 
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B. CONCLUSION 
Based on the results of the literature analysis, it can be concluded that in the 
US, UK and in Germany, the legal origins of compliance lie in the securities 
legislation. By surveying the literature and applicable provisions, it can be noted 
that the compliance function was first established by statute in laws governing the 
financial services sector. Accordingly, in the US the compliance function 
originated legally from the securities laws,1104 in the UK from the Financial 
Services Act,1105 and in Germany from the German Securities Trading Act and 
German Banking Act.1106  
Hence, this development was supported by legislation. The legislation and 
the creation of regulators arose on account of the importance of the financial 
services sector in the US and the UK, the global financial crisis, and numerous 
corporate scandals. Furthermore, the American system provides a legal definition 
of compliance and the compliance officer. Since the birth of the FSGO in 1991, the 
US has begun to continue to fill the legal gap. Thus, the legal framework of 
compliance set forth in the American legislation has had a significant influence on 
the global trade and, thus, also on European companies. For example, in recent 
years the British legislator has reevaluated the laws and procedures on corporate 
crime. In an effort to modernize and strengthen corporate these provisions, 
criminal laws and procedure from the US have been examined and, in some cases, 
“imported” to the UK.1107 Djilani referred to this phenomenon as the “Importation of 
American Corporate Compliance.”1108 Nevertheless, in the UK and in Germany there 
are no legal provisions specifically governing the position of corporate 
compliance officer. 
The development compared to US, UK and German compliance legislation 
at the beginning of the 19th century with the situation today it has been 
mentioned that over the last twenty years, an extraordinary increase has 
developed in the scope and complexity of regulations.1109 Since 1960, the 
                                                     
1104 See supra I., 2., p. 128. 
1105 See supra II., 2., p. 150. 
1106 See supra III., 2., p. 169. 
1107 Djilani, supra note 99 at 303. 
1108 Id. at 303. See supra II., 1., p. 145. 
1109 MILLER, supra note 25 at 141. 
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landmarks
administrative enforcement of compliance has occurred in three waves: First, with 
the foreign corrupt practice and environmental awareness in the US, second with 
the regulation in the financial services industry in the UK, and third with the 
legislative response to recurring corporate scandals in the US, UK, and Germany. 
The next figure shows the number of landmarks, the number of acts, regulations, 
codes, and landmark court decisions, which were created and took place 
regarding compliance and the compliance function in the US, UK, and Germany. 
 
Figure 7 - Numbers relating to Legislation and Landmarks in the History of Compliance  
 
As we have seen, in the US the term compliance, compliance efforts of 
companies, and the debate on organizational ethical culture are rooted in a 
longstanding tradition. There, the first origins of corporate compliance can be 
traced back to the 18th century. By contrast, in Germany, the nascence of 
corporate compliance began in the wake of corporate scandals since 2008. 
Compliance issues were highlighted in the landmark case decided in 2009.1110 
Consequently, in Germany companies began to deal with compliance issues 
through transportation from the US, through European and national legislation in 
the financial services sector, and under pressure from court decisions and 
corporate scandals over the last ten years. On account of this late development, an 
                                                     
1110 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29. See supra III., 3., p. 172. 
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applicable definition of the compliance officer is still lacking in Germany. The 
findings of the legal origins of the term compliance and the compliance function 
are presented in a brief overview in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2 – Overview of legal Roots of Compliance and the Compliance Function 
  US UK Germany 
Compliance CO Compliance CO Compliance CO 
Origins Railroads 1887 Watergate 
Scandal  
Since new legislation 1986 Since the Federal Supreme Court 
(BGH) obiter dictum in 2009 
Legal and 
cultural 
background 
Taylors Principles 1909, Self-
regulated companies, Ethics 
issues due to Protestantism  
Self-regulated system, European 
regulatory environment, 
Importation of American 
Corporate Compliance  
Importation of American and British 
Corporate Compliance, European 
regulatory environment, Corporate 
scandals 
Legal roots 
in the 
financial 
services sect. 
Federal Sec. 
Law 1933, 1934 
Amendments 
of the 
Federal Sec. 
Law 1964 
Fin. Service Bill 
1986, FSMA 2000, 
MiFID 2004 
Basel II German Banking 
Act, Securities 
Trading Act (1994) 
Basel II, III, 
KWG § 25a, 
WpDVerVO, 
§ 12 IV. s. 1 
Regulator ICC, SEC, EPA FSA, FCA, LAUTRO Bafin 
Legal roots 
in the 
private 
sector 
Antitrust Law, 
FCPA 1977, 
FSGO 1991, 
SOX 2002 
Since 2004 by 
FSGO  
UKBA 2010 § 7 (2) No origin No origin No origin 
Legal 
definition or 
guidelines 
in the 
private 
sector 
USSC § 8 B2.1 
2004 
USSC § 8 
B2.1.b (2)B 
2004, 2010 
Companies Act 
2006, Takeover 
Code Comb. Code 
No origin DCGK (2002)  No origin 
Department Legal or Compliance 
Department 
Usu. Compliance Department Usu. Compliance Department 
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In conclusion, the review of the literature shows a number of theoretical 
findings that provide a narrow definition of the term compliance. However, many 
authors view the term in a broader sense and include concepts of obedience, 
observance, deference, governability, the organizational aspects,…etc. It has been 
mentioned that defining corporate compliance is a difficult task. In brief, 
compliance could be defined as obedience to the law. However, this definition 
could be too restrictive. Compliance acknowledges not only adherence to rules 
and law, but also engagement with business risks. In addition, compliance should 
also deal with its legal and ethical responsibilities. 
Finally, this section summarizes the narrow and broader understanding of 
the term compliance in order to highlight the particular challenges facing 
companies. As has been noted, when business and legal scholars explore the 
question of compliance, they are actually interested in understanding the 
implementation and adoption of compliance programs within organizations. 
However, compliance is more than the integration in the day-to-day business and 
confirmation that employees have to comply with the law. Ultimately, this section 
provides a fairly broad definition of corporate compliance, which will apply 
throughout the rest of this thesis.  
Compliance is a package of formal and informal structures to ensure that all 
employees in the organization adhere to all applicable laws, regulations, internal and 
external policies to avoid loss of reputation and avoid penalties, with the goal of 
increasing the benefits for stake- and shareholders.  
The following figure illustrates the broad definition of the term corporate 
compliance: 
 
Role  Self-regulation, 
Risk-
management 
Dual-hatted, 
Oversight 
Function 
Self-regulation, 
Risk-management 
Multi-
functional  
Risk-management Guarantor 
status, 
Control 
Function 
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Figure 8 - The term Corporate Compliance in a broader sense  
 
The figure shows that the academic debate has considered the compliance 
function in a broad way that means for a firm. As mentioned in the preceding 
discussions, although the empirical research regarding this function is limited, 
there is a degree of diversity in the German literature in the interpretation of the 
day-to-day activities and responsibilities.1111 To summarize all the findings in 
literature of the corporate compliance officer, this function will be defined as 
follows: 
                                                     
1111 See supra Figure 6, p. 175. 
RULES 
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A corporate compliance officer is a high-level employee, who is responsible for 
implementation and organization of the compliance structure, for advising and reviewing 
of employees to prevent legal violations by the firm, and for diplomatic dealing with 
external regulators.  
Although it could be argued that this definition is general and 
comprehensive, the daily business of the compliance officer is complex and has a 
far-reaching significance for the company. In order to fill the gap between the 
nature and role of the German corporate compliance officers it is important to 
obtain a broader understanding of their integration and identification within 
companies. In short, a modern and dynamic role of the German compliance 
officer can be established only by means of a precise definition. 
To conclude, this chapter has focused on the legal roots and the cultural 
background of the compliance officer in the US, UK, and Germany. It has 
established the definition of corporate compliance and the corporate compliance 
officer that will apply throughout this thesis. Having introduced these definitions, 
chapters four to six first will introduce the legal framework with regard to the 
American, British, and German compliance function and secondly present the 
models of the corporate compliance officers.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4  
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN 
COMPLIANCE 
At the end of chapter three, the term compliance was defined as follows:  
….a package of formal and informal structures […] the organization adherence with all 
the laws… [   ].”1112  
As we have seen, compliance refers to a concept of internal control and to a 
process that has gradually evolved under pressure of the tightening of the legal 
environment, suppliers, customers, capital markets, insurers, and stakeholders.1113 
However, in the US, the legal framework of compliance comprises not only the 
body of rules, i.e. regulations such as ‘hard-law’, but also recommendations from 
the administrative and executive branch agencies e.g. the SEC.1114 This legal 
framework has a profound influence on the law of US compliance.1115 Hence, 
companies have a strong incentive to internalize the law and to establish a 
supervisory compliance function.1116 While one could argue that this view is too 
biased, a number of scholars1117 have acknowledged that the consequences of 
failure to comply with the applicable laws could be serious and far-reaching. This 
                                                     
1112 See supra Chapter 3, B., p. 176. 
1113 See supra Chapter 3, Figure 8, p.180; Miller, supra note 542 at 3. 
1114 See supra note 352, 44 USC, § 3502 (1); Jerry Ellig & Hester Peirce, SEC Regulatory 
Analysis: “A Long Way to Go and a Short Time to Get There,” 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 361–437, 364 (2014). 
1115 Miller, supra note 542 at 3. 
1116 Id. at 3. 
1117 See e.g. Constance E Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do With It?: Integrating Law and Strategy, 
47 AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 587–639 (2010); SARA SUN BEALE, THE DEVELOPMENT 
AND EVOLUTION OF THE US LAW OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 32 (2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2375318 (last visited Oct 2, 2015); Fairman and Yapp, 
supra note 781; Sharon Oded, Inducing corporate compliance: A compound corporate liability 
regime, 31 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 272–283 (2011); L. S. Paine, 
Managing for Organizational Integrity, 72 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 106–117 (1994). 
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is why many corporations have chosen to enhance the control of their business in 
a legal way and thereby enforce their compliance approach.1118 An earlier study1119 
examined the importance of law to business in general.1120 The findings of this 
study showed that the understanding of the legal framework could be useful for 
the executive officers responsible for corporate actions in a legal context.1121 Based 
on these findings a further study by Siedel presented six forces that determine the 
competitive advantage of a company including the importance of compliance. 
These forces are inter alia: (1) government regulation and (2) litigation as 
traditional forces and (3) compliance, (4) entrepreneurship, (5) globalization and 
(6) technology as accelerating forces.1122 The study describes the accelerated 
development of compliance as follows: Although many companies historically 
have had compliance programs, the enactment of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines in 19911123 enforced the further development of these programs.1124 
Lastly, the study concludes that the correct handling of the legal framework is 
beginning to play an increasingly important role in the success of the firm.1125 
In addition, in 1988, Schipani & Siedel found that with increasing liability for 
directors and officers, it is imperative that directors and officers know and 
understand their legal responsibilities.1126 Given the significant influence on 
observance of the legal framework, the executive officer1127 should also consider 
                                                     
1118 Fairman and Yapp, supra note 780 at 491. 
1119 Frank C. Pierson, The Education of American Businessmen: A Study of University-College 
Programs, Business Administration 266–267 (1959). 
1120 George J. Siedel, Six Forces and the Legal Environment of Business: The Relative Value of 
Business Law among Business School Core Courses, 37 AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, 729 
(2000). 
1121 Id. at 729. 
1122 Id. at 734. fig. 2. 
1123 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES USSC, supra note 58. 
1124 Siedel, supra note 1120 at 737. 
1125 Id. at 738. 
1126 Cindy A. Schipani & George J. Siedel, Legal Liability: The Board of Directors, 1 FAMILY 
BUSINESS REVIEW 279–285, 279 (1988). 
1127 In this part, the term ‘officer’ means a corporation’s president, chief financial officer, 
chief accounting officers, vice presidents of principal business units and any person with 
significant policy-making functions. This word is used in accordance with the definition 
of ‘officer’ in Rule 16a-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 15 USC § 78a, 17 CFR 240.16a-1. 
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this when developing the strategy of the company. For example, Paine describes a 
strategic concept of compliance as “a shared set of values and guidance principles” 
driven by organizational leadership.1128 She presented five elements of a 
compliance strategy from the Martin Marietta Corp., a US aerospace and defense 
contractor, in 1985.1129 At that time, the defense industry was under pressure due 
to mismanagement. For this reason, the management switched to an integrity-
based program from self-governance with five elements:  
(1) Ethos – in conformity with externally imposed standards, 
(2) Objective – to prevent criminal misconduct, 
(3) Leadership – lawyer-driven, 
(4) Methods such as education, auditing, controls, and penalties, 
(5) Behavioral assumptions for leading and guiding employees.1130 
In her view, the general purpose of compliance is to avoid legal 
sanctions.1131 She points out that for an organizational life, it is better to obey the 
law with appropriate internal programs and structures than for external 
authorities to impose constraints.1132 Overall, she concluded that the task of the 
management is to define and create a legal environment that supports ethical 
behavior.1133 Thereby, this concept focuses only on the development of internal 
structures relating to compliance, while the relationship between internal and 
external parties is absent.  
Additionally, Bagley argues that the academic discussion has already 
recognized that the significance of the legal framework for companies is 
continuing to grow. However, she finds that companies´ active management of 
the legal environment of business is less well-developed.1134 In her view, law 
affects every-single activity in the value chain. This comprises IT-Infrastructure, 
the Human Resource Management, Technology Development, Procurement, 
                                                     
1128 Paine, supra note 1117. 
1129 Id. at 112. 
1130 Id. at 113. 
1131 Id. at 111. 
1132 Id. at 111. 
1133 Id. at 111. 
1134 Bagley, supra note 1117 at 587. 
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Logistics, Marketing, Sales, and Service activities of each firm.1135 She asserts that a 
complete model of the resource-based view of the company must also include the 
legal environment.1136 Thus, she attempts to combine earlier theories1137 into a 
comprehensive theory of the law and strategy and proposes a conceptual 
framework for understanding the law and strategy.1138 This approach centers 
around the senior management team. She finds that this unit is the most critical 
resource for deciding a successful compliance strategy. This strategy is influenced 
by four elements: (1) public law, (2) company resources, (3) activities in the value 
chain, and (4) competitive environment.1139 However, she states that this model is 
dynamic. For example, public law will change in response to the altered ethical 
conduct of firms, or the competitive environment will change in response to the 
altered legal environment, etc.1140 In conclusion, this model sheds new light on the 
mutual influence of various and legal internal and external factors of the 
company. Bagley´s findings indicate that the most decisive importance of the law 
for companies lies in their understanding and correct application of the law. This 
could be a source of sustained competitive advantage for companies.1141 
Nevertheless, the model fails to consider the definition of the term “top 
management team.” It is not clear whether the term applies to the board of 
directors, or the executive officers. Lastly, this model reflects the fact that the law 
is more than merely a force that constrains the management team. This concept 
provides a fit between the companies’ legal, competitive, and social responsibility 
for the understanding of the law.1142  
To summarize the above, the recent corporate legal environment can be 
described as complex. Companies often operate in international legal transactions 
and have to deal with internal and external factors and parties. The participants 
involved are the executive officers, employees, agents, investors and regulators. 
                                                     
1135 Id. at 605. fig. 1. 
1136 Id. at 606. 
1137 See e.g. Kalman J. Cohen & Richard M. Cyert, Strategy: Formulation, Implementation, and 
Monitoring, 46 The Journal of Business 349–367 (1973). 
1138 Bagley, supra note 1117 at 624 fig. 2. 
1139 Id. at 624–625. 
1140 Id. at 625. 
1141 Id. at 599, 601. Table 1. 
1142 Id. at 639. 
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Misconduct, non-compliance, law breaking, or violation of law through the 
employees and executives could generate serious negative consequences for 
firms, resulting in criminal liability for their organizations.1143 In fact, the mere 
adherence to the letter of the law is no longer sufficient. Overall, the strategy of 
the board management needs to ensure that adherence to the law pervades the 
entire business conduct within the company. 
For this reason, the challenge for the next sections will be to examine the 
American legal framework and landmark cases relating to compliance and 
specifically to the corporate compliance function. Thus, the following sections will 
address the US federal law, the state law and court decisions on corporations, the 
power of administrative and executive branch agencies, regulators, and 
guidelines, which are closely tied to compliance and the American compliance 
officer. In addition, the next sections also explore the circumstances under which 
corporate officers could incur civil and criminal liability if they fail to implement 
corporate structures or to supervise employees.1144 This examination will also 
comprise the ‘doctrine of respondeat superior’1145 and the ‘employment at-will 
doctrine’1146 since the courts have used this theory and this doctrine in various 
                                                     
1143 Greenberg, supra note 710 at 1. 
1144 Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability for Supervision and 
Management: Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort Law, 59 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 1161–1715, 1162 (2010). 
1145 “Under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer is liable for the negligent acts 
or omissions of his employee which are committed within the scope of his employment. 
Liability based on respondeat superior requires some evidence that a master-servant 
relationship existed between the parties. The test to determine if respondeat superior 
applies is whether the person sought to be charged as a master had the right or power to 
control and direct the physical conduct of the other in the performance of the act. If there 
is no right to control, there is no liability.” See Wilson v United States, 989 F.2d 953, 958 (8th 
Cir. 1993). See supra in detail I., 1., a., p. 204. 
1146 “This refers to the presumption that employment is for an indefinite period of time 
and may be terminated either by employer or employee. This is the historical approach 
that courts have taken in interpreting employment relationships. By the end of the 
twentieth century, state courts found other exceptions to the doctrine of "at will" 
employment. The late twentieth century saw many states abandoning the "at-will" 
doctrine and an increase in protection of employee rights at work.” See John C. Busby, 
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE LII / LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (2009), 
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cases.1147 However, by means of presentation of the background of US Federal 
Law will first be traced in chronological order from 1970 to 2010 in more detail.1148 
Specifically, the following sections will examine the FCPA, the SOX and the 
FSGO. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act will not 
be discussed since it includes a huge change in the regulation of financial 
institutions and financial products.1149 The Act also provides a new regulatory 
framework for consumer protection and remittance transfers.1150 These issues fall 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
I. The Development of the US Federal Legislation  
Corporate bribery is bad business. In our free market system, it is basic that the sale of 
products should take place on the basis of price, quality, and service.1151 
The enforcement of the federal law relating to compliance in the US can be 
seen as a response to a number high-profile corporate bribery scandals and 
corruption in the 1960s and 1970s.1152 As a result, the US government’s objective 
was to enable US corporations to compete in the global economy under fair 
circumstances. The Department of Justice (DOJ)1153 cited an example put forward 
                                                                                                                                                  
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/employment-at-will_doctrine (last visited Apr 14, 2016). 
See supra in detail II., p. 279. 
1147 Petrin, supra note 1144 at 1674. 
1148 See also supra Chapter 3, A., I., 2, p. 128. 
1149 DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), supra note 
722. The Act was enacted as the response to the financial crisis that began in 2008. 
1150 Id.15 USC § 1693o-1. 
1151 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED 
DISCLOSURE ACTS OF 1977, 4 (1977).  
1152 See supra Ch. 3, p. 137, The Watergate scandal and the following investigation. See also 
Court E. Golumbic & Jonathan P. Adams, Dominant Influence Test: The FCPA’s 
Instrumentality and Foreign Official Requirements and the Investment Activity of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, The, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1–51 (2011); Richard, supra note 68. 
1153 “The Department of Justice (DOJ). The Department of Justice belongs to the executive 
branch. It works to enforce federal law and to defend the interests of the United States 
according to the law. The Office of the Attorney General was created by the Judiciary Act 
of (1789). In its strategic plan for 2014 – 2018 the DOJ decribes itself as an agency with 
unique authorities, opportunities, and capabilities,with the goal e.g. to prevent crime, 
protect the rights of the American people, and enforce federal law.” See OFFICE OF THE 
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by the World Bank Institute, which estimated the annual costs of corruption and 
bribes approximately one trillion US$ globally - three percent of the world 
economy.1154 Moreover, Congress emphasized that corruption undermines 
efficiency and good business practices.1155 Congress argued that bribery harms 
American business and creates foreign policy problems.1156 In addition, the US 
Senate also stated that corporate bribery is bad business.1157 Conversely, Richard 
argued that this could provide foreign corporations with an unfair advantage 
over US corporations.1158 Finally, despite these concerns, in 1977, the US Congress 
enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to combat foreign bribery.1159  
The Defense Industry Initiative (DII) on Ethics and Conduct introduced the 
second stage of legal enforcement in 1986. During the 1980s, as a result of 
government mismanagement, President Reagan established his Blue Ribbon1160 
Commission on Defense Management.1161 The purpose of this Commission was to 
explore the issues of defense management and organization, and to report its 
findings and recommendations to the President.1162 In its final report,1163 which 
intended to facilitate the legislative and executive branch, the Chairman 
                                                                                                                                                  
ATTORNEY GENERAL DOJ, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018 | DOJ | DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/about/strategic-plan-fiscal-years-2014-2018 (last visited 
Oct 20, 2015).See COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HEARING 
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY 6 (201AD), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-47_66886.PDF (last visited 
Oct 20, 2015). 
1154 Mark, supra note 665 at 424. 
1155 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 1153 at 6. 
1156 Id. at 3. 
1157 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED 
DISCLOSURE ACTS OF 1977, supra note 1151. 
1158 Richard, supra note 68 at 420. 
1159 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463. 
1160 Ronald Reagan, EXECUTIVE ORDER 12526 - PRESIDENT’S BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON 
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT (1985). 
1161 See The National Association of College and University Attorneys | NACUA, The Case 
for Compliance Programs: The Legal and Policy Mandates, 14, 3 (2011). 
1162 Reagan, supra note 1160 sec. 2. (a). 
1163 DAVID PACKARD, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON 
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 147 (1986), 
http://www.ndia.org/Advocacy/AcquisitionReformInitiative/Documents/Packard-
Commission-Report.pdf (last visited Oct 20, 2015). 
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recommended that excellence in management must displace systems and 
structures that measure quality by regulatory compliance.1164 These results were 
generally considered to be the starting point of formal organizational ethics and 
compliance programs.1165 Furthermore, these recommendations led to additional 
efforts to promote an ethical culture with formal codes and structures within the 
government-owned-industry.1166 
Additionally, in 1984, US Congress created the United States Sentencing 
Commission (USSC).1167 The Commission formulated national sentencing 
guidelines, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSG),1168 to provide certainty and 
fairness in sentencing and to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.1169 
Moreover, in 1991 the USSC extended the Federal Sentencing Guidelines1170 to 
include a new chapter on organizational crime and intended to encourage the 
scope of traditional compliance - “encourage ethical conduct and a commitment to 
compliance with the law.”1171 This extended chapter eight codified the components 
for an effective compliance program.1172 Since then, additional standards have 
been added to define the elements of an effective compliance program and to 
highlight the role of US ethics and compliance officers in daily business 
practice.1173 Hence, they have gained more visibility and attention within 
companies and among legal scholars. Murphy argued that the Guidelines have 
                                                     
1164 Id. Foreword. 
1165 NACUA, supra note 1161 at 4. 
1166 Examples include new structures in the Department of Defense (DoD). 
1167 The US Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”) was created by the SENTENCING 
REFORM ACT (1984), supra note 57., provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984. The US Supreme Court decided in Mistretta v. United States, 488 US 361 (1989) the 
constitutionality of the Commission. Hence, it is an independent agency in the judicial 
branch of government. Its major purpose is to establish sentencing policies and practices 
for the federal courts. See USSC, USSC | UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 
http://www.ussc.gov/about (last visited Feb 2, 2016). 
1168 The sentencing guidelines went into effect November 1, 1987. See USSC, supra note 
1167. 
1169 NACUA, supra note 1161 at 4. 
1170 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, USSC, supra note 57. 
1171 See US SENTENCING GUIDELINES USSC, supra note 58 Ch. 8, § 8 B2.1. 
1172 Greenberg, supra note 14 at 1. 
1173 Greenberg, supra note 710 at 1. 
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created an entirely new job description for the ethics and compliance officer.1174 
Many authors have found that, in response to the FSG, a number of companies 
have begun to enhance their corporate compliance programs.1175 Other critical 
voices identified that the Guidelines’ extrinsic, incentive-based approach has led 
to the persistence of ineffective compliance.1176 However, there is no evidence 
documenting features and reliable data on effective compliance programs within 
companies. 
The third stage began with a huge change in the American federal law 
shortly before the beginning of the new millennium. Despite the government 
efforts in the 1990s to encourage compliance, a number of high- profile corporate 
corruption scandals, such as Enron1177 and WorldCom accounting scandals 1178 and 
their auditor Arthur Andersen, terrified the public and highlighted persistent 
accounting and governance problems.1179 In the spring of 2002, additional 
revelations were discovered concerning other firms. One example was Adelphia, 
Inc., the sixth-largest US cable company. This scandal1180 involved one of the most 
extensive cases ever of insider dealing.1181 In the aftermath of these scandals, 
Congress came under increasing pressure to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
                                                     
1174 Murphy, supra note 676 at 710. 
1175 See, e.g. DeStefano, supra note 20 at 92–93; Greenberg, supra note 710 at 1; Paine, supra 
note 1117 at 106. 
1176 See e.g. MAURICE E. STUCKE, IN SEARCH OF EFFECTIVE ETHICS & COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
77 (2014), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2366209 (last visited Feb 2, 2016). 
1177 The Enron Board of Directors failed to safeguard Enron shareholders […] by allowing 
Enron to engage in high risk accounting. See Mark S. Schwartz, Thomas W. Dunfee & 
Michael J. Kline, Tone at the Top: An Ethics Code for Directors?, 58 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 
ETHICS 79–100, 80 (2005). 
1178 ”WorldCom, an US large long distance phone company, submitted the largest 
bankruptcy filing in United States history.”; See Romero and Atlas, supra note 9; Tran, 
supra note 9. 
1179 See e.g. Jonathan Shirley, International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV 501–528, 502 (2004).NACUA, supra note 1161 at 10. 
1180 “Adelphia disclosed Thursday that the debt incurred by the Rigas family is $ 3.1 
billion – instead of the $ 2.3 billion Adelphia previously reported. The level of self-dealing 
is extremely serious.” See Robert Frank & Deborah Solomon, Adelphia and Rigas Family Had 
A Vast Network of Business Ties, WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 24, 2002, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1022168448423792680 (last visited Nov 3, 2015). 
1181 Shirley, supra note 1179 at 504. 
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2002.1182 This legislative response developed rapidly. On July 24, 2002, the 
Conference Committee of the House and Senate drafted the final bill. The 
following day it passed in Congress. The President signed the Act into law five 
days later.1183 President Bush asserted that this Act was the “most far-reaching 
reform of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”1184 
He also stated that ''The era of low standards and false profit is over” and ''No 
boardroom in America is above or beyond the law.''1185 
Since then, the consequences of the SOX for corporations have been far-
reaching and pronounced. First, this Act made ‘best practices’ in corporate 
governance among public companies mandatory.1186 The term ‘best practices’ is 
explained in the SOX in Section 406 (c) with such standards including e.g. (1) 
“honest and ethical conduct,” (2) “full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable 
disclosure in the periodic reports” and (3) “compliance with applicable governmental 
rules and regulations.”1187 Secondly, the Act imposed significant changes in 
accounting and auditing companies’ rules, as well as with respect to monitoring 
of public accounting.1188 Thirdly, the SOX required a Management Assessment of 
Internal Controls,1189 which includes the requirement that public companies must 
                                                     
1182 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was 
passed in the House and Senate on July 25, 2002 and enacted in 2002. 
1183 Shirley, supra note 1179 at 505. 
1184 Elisabeth Bumiller, CORPORATE CONDUCT: THE PRESIDENT; Bush Signs Bill Aimed 
at Fraud In Corporations, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 31, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/31/business/corporate-conduct-the-president-bush-
signs-bill-aimed-at-fraud-in-corporations.html (last visited Nov 3, 2015).) 
1185 Id. 
1186 David C. Fischer, Responsibilities of principal executive officers under the Sarbanes‐Oxley 
Act of 2002: A compliance checklist, 5 JOURNAL OF INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 97–105, 97 
(2004). Public companies in terms of the SOX means an ‘issuer’ as defined in section 3 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC. 78c). See SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra 
note 56 § 2 (7). 
1187 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 406 (c), 15 USC § 7264. 
1188 Fischer, supra note 1186 at 97. 
1189 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 404 (a) (1). “The Commission shall 
prescribe rules requiring each annual report required by Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC §§ 78m or 78o(d)) to contain an internal control 
report, which shall-(1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and 
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adopt and publish a code of ethics. Furthermore, the Act addresses the criminal 
penalties for altering and destroying corporate audit records1190 and extends the 
timeline1191 under which any accountant is required to maintain, audit or review 
reports.1192 Overall, the two legal goals of this Act were to improve the quality of 
financial reporting and to bolster investor confidence.1193 
Although the US legislator was responding to domestic corporate scandals, 
its impact is global.1194 The new Act caused a ripple effect overseas prompting 
critics to claim that the costs would drive foreign companies away from the 
United States.1195 Nevertheless, legal scholars argued that this effect was only 
justified in the short term and that it was of a temporary nature only, since the 
SEC had not yet finalized its rules for SOX.1196 Moreover, they stated that for 
companies, the rewards for listing on the NSYE are higher because foreign 
companies obtain access to a huge pool of capital.1197 However, in 2006 the 
number of listed German companies on the NSYE was in fact still seventeen.1198 In 
contrast, by 2010 only four German companies were listed on the NSYE; Deutsche 
Bank, Fresenius Medical Care, SAP and Siemens.1199 In 2009, Infineon, Bayer, 
BASF and E.ON had already left the NSYE. In 2010, Daimler Benz also ended its 
                                                                                                                                                  
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial 
reporting.” 
1190 Id. § 802, 18 USC §§ 1519, 1520. 
1191 Id. § 802 (a) (2), 18 USC § 1520. 
1192 Shirley, supra note 1179 at 511.  
1193 Peter Iliev, The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and Stock Prices, 65 THE 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1163–1196, 1163 (2010). 
1194 Shirley, supra note 1179 at 511. 
1195 Id. at 527. 
1196 Id. at 527. 
1197 Hudson Hollister, Shock Therapy’ for Aktiengesellschaften: Can the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Certification Requirements Transform German Corporate Culture, Practice and Prospects?, 25 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS 453, 481 (2005); Shirley, supra note 1179 at 528. 
1198 WHISTLE BLOWING UND CONCERN-MANAGEMENT: NEUE HERAUSFORDERUNGEN FÜR 
UNTERNEHMER UND IHRE PRÜFER, 4 (Matthias Wolz ed., 1. ed. 2007). 
1199 Mark Pitzke, Wall Street und Co.: Amerikaner fürchten um ihre Börsenmacht, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE, November 22, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/wall-street-
und-co-amerikaner-fuerchten-um-ihre-boersenmacht-a-729965.html (last visited Feb 3, 
2015). 
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stock-exchange listing in New York.1200 According to its statement, the reason was 
to save administrative expenses and fees. Even the New York Times stated that:  
There is no question that the costs of complying with Section 404 of the law — 
requiring audits of corporate internal controls — has scared executives in the United 
States and abroad.1201 
In addition, a study by Doidge et al. found that 59 companies dropped their 
American registration at the NSYE in 2007. The reason behind this was a change 
brought about by a new rule, referred to as the Exchange Act Rule 12h-6.1202 The 
authors argued that this rule makes it easier for foreign firms to deregister from 
the NSYE.1203 The other reasons they put forward were both the new SOX 
requirements for listed companies, as well as other regulatory developments in 
the US. Overall, these factors have made it more costly for foreign firms to 
maintain an US listing.1204 The authors referred to this phenomenon as the “loss of 
competitiveness theory.”1205 They concluded that the value of a listing became 
negative for the leaving firms.1206 However, Doidge et al. held that the sample of 59 
deregistering firms was small and that there was no reliable evidence that foreign 
listed firms had suffered from the introduction of SOX.1207  
In spite of these misgivings, the SOX entered into force and today provides 
the framework for the SEC's oversight of the securities markets.1208 To ensure that 
the intent of the legislation is carried out in specific situations, the SEC also 
                                                     
1200 n-tv Nachrichtenfernsehen, Nicht mehr unter SEC-Fuchtel: Daimler verlässt NYSE, N-
TV.DE, 2010, http://www.n-tv.de/wirtschaft/Daimler-verlaesst-NYSE-article873265.html 
(last visited Feb 3, 2015).) 
1201 Floyd Norris, Reasons Some Firms Left the US, THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 7, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08norris.html (last visited Feb 3, 2015). 
1202 CRAIG DOIDGE, GEORGE ANDREW KAROLYI & RENE M. STULZ, WHY DO FOREIGN FIRMS 
LEAVE US EQUITY MARKETS? AN ANALYSIS OF DEREGISTRATIONS UNDER SEC EXCHANGE ACT 
RULE 12H-6 1 (2008).See supra note 629; SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 17 CFR 240.12h-
6. 
1203 DOIDGE, KAROLYI, AND STULZ, supra note 1202 at 1. 
1204 Id. at 1. 
1205 Id. at 28. 
1206 Id. at 28. 
1207 Id. at 28. 
1208 SEC, supra note 630. 
194 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
involved in rule-making.1209 For example, in 2003, the SEC implemented Section 
404 of SOX,1210 which requires that companies periodically carry out test 
procedures that monitor the internal systems.1211 The aim of this monitoring is to 
ensure accurate financial reports. Furthermore, Section 404 mandates that outside 
auditors have to attest to the findings of management.1212 Thus, this provision 
determines the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an 
adequate internal control structure and financial reporting procedures.1213 Hence, 
the amendments imposed through the SOX created new legal duties for corporate 
executive officers such as the CEO and CFO and aimed to increase accountability.  
This was the beginning of a new counter debate among business and legal 
scholars on the advantages and disadvantages of the Act. Since the 
implementation of Section 404 of the SOX, a large part of the debate has centered 
on the costs incurred by publicly traded companies in order to comply with its 
requirements.1214 The data from a recent survey by Alexander et al. examined the 
cost and benefits of compliance with Section 404 of the SOX within companies.1215 
They found that the effects of compliance depend on firm complexity, but are for 
the most part unrelated to the firm’s structure.1216 Furthermore, they figured out 
that more than two-thirds of the respondents acknowledge positive effects from 
compliance, but the costs of compliance far outweigh the benefits.1217 
Nevertheless, other authors, e.g. Hollister, argued that investors are likely to 
                                                     
1209 Id. 
1210 SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, supra note 624 § 404, 15 USC § 7262. 
1211 Iliev, supra note 1193 at 1163. 
1212 Id. at 1163. footnote 1. 
1213 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 404 (a) (1), 15 USC § 7262. 
1214 SEC, STUDY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 SECTION 404 INTERNAL CONTROL OVER 
FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 137 37 (2009), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox-404_study.pdf (last visited Feb 4, 2016). 
1215 Cindy R. Alexander et al., Economic effects of SOX Section 404 compliance: A corporate 
insider perspective, 56 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS 267–290 (2013). This 
survey included a sample of managers from 2,901unique US public companies and was 
conducted from 2008 until 2009. 
1216 Id. at 267. 
1217 Id. at 288. 
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reward corporations that comply with the standards, including the certification 
requirements.1218 
In 2007, the Senate passed a further amendment to Section 404.1219 This 
amendment aimed to reduce uncertainty about the requirements and to limit the 
burdens placed on small and mid-sized public companies.1220 An analysis of a 
web survey data study by the SEC in 2009 found that there appears to be a 
general downward trend in Section 404 compliance costs, irrespective of the 
company size.1221 Nevertheless, other empirical results by Iliev evidenced that the 
implementation of Section 404 led to a significant increase in costs for both 
domestic and foreign firms, particularly with regard to small firms.1222 In addition, 
a study by Hochberg et al. evaluated the impact of the SOX on shareholders.1223 
They found that investors expected that the legislation would increase the 
shareholder value.1224 Furthermore, they noted that significant increases in 
compliance costs as a result of SOX were causing concern among many firms.1225 
The last stage in the enhancement of the US federal legislation was the 
amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (FSGO) in 
2004 and 2010.1226 In accordance with Section 805 of the SOX, the United States 
Sentencing Commission shall review and amend so that the Guidelines that apply 
to organizations in United States Sentencing Guidelines are sufficient to deter and 
punish organizational criminal misconduct.1227 Hence, the first amendment 
enforced effective compliance programs in organizations by adding an eighth 
element. It requires that the organization periodically assess the risk of criminal 
                                                     
1218 Yael V. Hochberg, Paola Sapienza & Annette Vissing-Jørgensen, A Lobbying Approach to 
Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 47 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 519–583, 
565 (2009); Hollister, supra note 1197 at 481. 
1219 Amendments to rules regarding management’s report on internal control over 
financial reporting. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 SEC Release no. 8809. 
1220 Alexander et al., supra note 1215 at 283; Iliev, supra note 1193 at 1164. 
1221 SEC, supra note 1214 at 43–44 Table 8. 
1222 Iliev, supra note 1193 at 1193. 
1223 Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jørgensen, supra note 1218. 
1224 Id. at 565. 
1225 Id. at 574. 
1226 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 666 § 8 B2.1 (2004), (2010). 
1227 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 805 (a) (5), 28 USC § 994. 
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conduct.1228 The second amendment fostered compliance programs through 
reporting requirements for the high-level personnel with direct access to the 
board1229 and the organizations’ appropriate response following criminal 
conduct.1230 Therefore, with the 2010 releases, the Commission enhanced the 
independence of the function of US compliance and ethics officer.1231 In 
conclusion, one of the major aims of the FSGO has been to encourage compliance 
structural change within organizations.1232  
However, the next step suggested should be the true engagement and 
consistent support from the board for the compliance and ethics officers’ 
activities.1233 The structural compliance goal envisioned by the FSGO might be 
achieved through the governmental support for the compliance and ethics officers 
function by incentivizing compliance. 
In conclusion, over the last thirty years, the American federal law relating to 
compliance has strongly developed to protect investors in response to corporate 
bribery and misleading corporate disclosures. In recent years, the landscape of 
corporate compliance has begun to change significantly. The increasing influence 
of government legal resolutions have affected corporate compliance structures 
and, thus, corporate compliance has become a professionalized discipline in the 
US. This development has had a huge global impact. Therefore, both listed 
domestic and foreign firms have had to develop efficient compliance structures 
too. While the establishment of corporate compliance structures is expensive, it 
gives firms the opportunity to invest in their reputation for public, investors, and 
shareholders to gain credibility. Lastly, the companies are able to obtain benefits 
and remain competitive.  
The next sections will examine the statutes, administrative regulations, and 
landmark cases relating to the position of compliance officer in the US. The 
following three sections are structured as follows: The first step analyzes 
                                                     
1228 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 666 (2004), § 8 B2.1 (c). § 8 B2.1 
is called as a model template for a compliance and ethics program. 
1229 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id. (2010), § 8 B2.1 (b) (2) (C). 
1230 Id. (2010), § 8 B2.1 (b) (7). 
1231 Greenberg, supra note 710 at 8. 
1232 Id. at 1. 
1233 Id. at 12. 
CHAPTER 4 | 197 
 
American hard law: the Federal State Law, specifically the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the FSGO. The second step comprises 
the examination of the impact of the administrative agencies; e.g. the DOJ or SEC, 
and their case law concerning compliance and the compliance officer. The results 
provide an overview of the American legal framework and the most important 
provisions in relation to the corporate compliance officers’ function, which 
companies should take into consideration.  
1. The Key Provisions of the FCPA 
The most relevant statute refering to bribery and corruption is the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), which addresses bribery and improper 
record keeping.1234 Generally, the Act comprises three main provisions: (1) anti-
bribery provisions,1235 (2) accounting provisions,1236 and (3) provisions on other 
related legal issues, e.g. money laundering, reporting and tax violations.1237 Under 
this Act it is e.g. unlawful for any issuer and their officers, directors, employees, or 
agents to offer, payment, or promise to pay of payments to a foreign official, 
political party, or candidate for office in order to influence any act or an official 
decision.1238 Hence, the main purpose of the FCPA is to prohibit companies and 
individuals from corruptly providing, offering, or promising anything of value to 
foreign government officials to obtain or retain a business advantage.1239 
Firstly, the purview and definitions of the anti-bribery provisions need to be 
considered. After a rigorous analysis of the FCPA, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit stated that the scope for obtaining or retaining business pursuant to 
the FCPA could be broad.1240 In addition, the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA 
                                                     
1234 See FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78dd-1, et 
seq. 
1235 See supra note 463, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, § 102, 
15 USC §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (2006). 
1236 Id.§ 102, 15 USC §§ 78m(b)(4)–(5) (2006). 
1237 Mark, supra note 665 at 427. 
1238 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78dd–1, (a) (1) 
-(3). 
1239 Mark, supra note 665 at 427. 
1240 See e.g. United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2007), 440 (2007). In this case the 
District Court concluded, …”[,] that bribes paid to foreign officials in consideration for 
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could apply to all US individuals and foreign issuers of securities.1241 For example, 
Section 78dd–3 (a) stipulates: 
It shall be unlawful for any person other than an issuer that is subject to section 78dd–1 
of this title or a domestic concern (as defined in section 78dd–2 of this title), or for any 
officer, director, employee,[ ], while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make 
use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other 
act in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of 
any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of 
value to… 
(1) any foreign official for purposes of— 
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) 
inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of 
such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or…. 
The Act defines a ‘foreign official’ as 
….any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or 
instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person acting in 
an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or 
instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization.1242 
Despite this definition of the term ‘foreign official’, a heated debate on this 
term has emerged among legal scholars.1243 Further to the legal definition set forth 
in the FCPA, legal scholars discuss various definitions of a ‘foreign official’ under 
the FCPA. 1244 They attempt to clarify the question of precisely who is a foreign 
official, since in their view there is a lack of de minimis exception and consistent 
                                                                                                                                                  
unlawful evasion of customs duties and sales taxes could fall within the purview of the 
FCPA's proscription, …” 
1241 DOJ, supra note 700; Richard, supra note 68 at 423. 
1242 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463 § 102, 15 USC §78dd–3 
(f), (2006). 
1243 See e.g. Golumbic and Adams, supra note 1152; Alexander G. Hughes, Drawing Sensible 
Borders for the Definition of “Foreign Official” Under the FCPA, 40 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 254–278 (2013); Koehler, supra note 978; Richard, supra note 68. 
1244 See e.g. Golumbic and Adams, supra note 1152; Hughes, supra note 1243. 
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judicial definition.1245 Simultaneously, although there is no consensus of judicial 
definitions of foreign official, the DOJ appears to apply this term very broadly.1246 
Hughes argues that the DOJ considers every employee - regardless of rank 
or position as a foreign official.1247 Therefore, the scope of these provisions 
includes not only domestic companies, but also any stockholders, officers, 
directors, agents of companies, and employees.1248  
Moreover, the nature and scope of the FCPA is that it is both a civil statute 
and a criminal statute. Furthermore, it is part of the federal securities laws.1249 
Therefore, administrative agencies, both the DOJ and the SEC, have enforced 
authority.1250 Although their scope of enforcement is divided, they often 
simultaneously pursue FCPA proceedings against the same ‘issuer’.1251 The term 
‘issuer’ is legally defined as “any person who issues or proposes to issue any 
security.”1252 Hence, an issuer is an ‘entity’1253 that is required under the Securities 
                                                     
1245 See e.g. Hughes, supra note 1243 at 255; Mark, supra note 665 at 28. 
1246 See e.g. Richard, supra note 68 at 424.; Lanny A Breuer & Att’y Gen. DOJ Crim. Div., 
PREPARED KEYNOTE ADDRESS TO THE TENTH ANNUAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY AND 
COMPLIANCE CONGRESS AND BEST PRACTICES FORUM (2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/ll-1209breuer-
pharmaspeech.pdf (last visited Oct 3, 2015). “[   ] under certain circumstances and in 
certain countries, that nearly every aspect of the approval, manufacture, import, export, 
pricing, sale and marketing of a drug product in a foreign country will involve a "foreign 
official" within the meaning of the FCPA.”  
1247 Hughes, supra note 1243 at 15. 
1248 Golumbic and Adams, supra note 1152 at 15. 
1249 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC §§ 78m-1, 78dd-
1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2010). 
1250 Department of Justice DOJ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2016), 
http://www.justice.gov/ (last visited Feb 8, 2016); Securities Exchange Commission SEC, 
supra note 631. 
1251 Mark, supra note 665 at 426–428. 
1252 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78 (a)(8). The 
term 'person' means a natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, 
agency, or instrumentality of a government. § 78 (a)(9). 
1253 “An ‘entity’ is often referred to as ‘juridical person’ in the context of statutes, 
regulations, and legal texts. Generally, the term includes not only, a corporation, a limited 
liability company, or no-profit organization.” See in S.H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 74 (2. ed. 2010) footnote 49. 
200 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
Exchange Act of 19341254, to register under Section 78, or to ﬁle reports pursuant to 
section 78.1255 In general, publicly traded companies on a national exchange in the 
United States are issuers.1256 Therefore, the scope of the FCPA also includes 
foreign companies listed on the NSYE or NASDAQ. Traditionally, the DOJ 
handles all criminal actions against entities or individuals and the SEC handles 
civil actions limited against issuers and individuals such as officers, directors, 
employees, agents, and shareholders of issuers, i.e. public traded companies.1257 
Others civil enforcements are left to the DOJ, for example violations of the anti-
bribery provision of the FCPA.1258 Additionally, other authors point out that the 
government’s broad interpretation of jurisdiction under this Act: 
… includes US companies and their employees, US investors in a non-US entity, 
foreign subsidiaries of US-based companies, and non-US companies and nationals (non-
US persons) who commit an act in furtherance of bribery of a foreign official while in the 
territory of the United States.1259 
Hence, the FCPA applies also to non-US citizens and companies who act in 
the US. Overall, under the FCPA a company who acts in the US, an US citizen, or 
their agents will be liable to prosecution if they obtain their business by bribery of 
a governmental official of another country or a publicly traded US company.1260 
Nonetheless, it is striking that it is not a crime for an US company to pay bribes in 
                                                     
1254 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 15 USC §§ 78aff (2010). 
1255 DEMING, supra note 1253 at 8; Mark, supra note 665 at 427. See also FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC §§ 78m (a)(2) (2010). 
1256 DEMING, supra note 1253 at 8. 
1257 DEMING, supra note 1268 at 75; Mark, supra note 666 at 427; FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, §§78m-1(c)(2)(E), 78dd-1(e)(1), 78dd-2(f)(1) 
(2010). 
1258 DEMING, supra note 1253 at 75. 
1259 Zack Harmon, Confronting the New Challenges of FCPA Compliance: Recent Trends 
in FCPA Enforcement and Practical Guidance for Meeting These Challenges,  in FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT COMPLIANCE ISSUES: LEADING LAWYERS ON RESPONDING TO RECENT 
FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM AND 
NAVIGATING RISK IN EMERGING MARKETS. 62–63 (1. ed. 2010). 
1260 M.T. BIEGELMAN & D.R. BIEGELMAN, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT COMPLIANCE 
GUIDEBOOK: PROTECTING YOUR ORGANIZATION FROM BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION (1. ed. 
2010). 
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foreign countries where bribes are not illegal.1261 Regardless, it has been 
acknowledged that the local law must provide that bribes are legal.1262 However, 
such law has never been found.1263 In the same way, it has been recognized that 
‘facilitating or expediting payments’1264 like simple expenditure, e.g. gifts, travel and 
entertainment expenses, do not fall under the purview of the law.1265 Additionally, 
there are possibilities of protection for companies. For example, firms could 
defend themselves with a compliance program and by including specific clauses 
in their contracts. In these contract terms, local agents and partners would be 
required to confirm that they will not violate the law, particularly under the 
FCPA.1266 These recommendations with respect to compliance and enforcement of 
the FCPA are provided to companies of all shapes and sizes in a Resource Guide 
to the FCPA issued by the DOJ, which does not, however have force of law.1267 
Secondly, accounting provisions also need to be considered. In fact, the 
issuers are required to: 
(A)…make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, 
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; 
(B)… devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls…1268  
The aim of these provisions is to make accounting more transparent for 
investors and to expose illegal payments more easily.1269 It has been stated that 
                                                     
1261 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78dd–3 (b)(c), 
(2010). 
1262 Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Minefield for Directors, 6 VIRGINIA LAW & BUSINESS REVIEW, 157 (2011). 
1263 Id. at 157. 
1264 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78dd–3 (c) 
(2010). 
1265 Richard, supra note 68 at 424. 
1266 BIEGELMAN AND BIEGELMAN, supra note 1260. 
1267 DOJ & SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE US FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml (last visited Feb 5, 2016), [hereinafter FCPA 
RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
1268 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC 78m (b)(2)(A)(B) 
(2012). 
1269 Richard, supra note 68 at 423. 
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these provisions apply only to issuers of securities1270 registered on US stock 
exchanges.1271 Since 1977, the accounting provisions of the FCPA have, however, 
also applied to certain ‘foreign issuers.’1272 The FCPA Resource Guide also 
describes the term ‘issuer’ as a company, with a class of securities registered 
pursuant to Section 78 of the Exchange Act.1273 On December 31, 2011, 965 foreign 
companies were registered under Section 78 of the Exchange Act.1274 Specifically, 
the FCPA Guide points out that officers, directors, employees, agents, or 
stockholders acting on behalf of an issuer or a ‘domestic concern’1275 could also be 
prosecuted under the FCPA.1276 In brief, the essential conditions of violation the 
anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA are as follows:1277 
(a) An individual such an officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder of an 
issuer thereof acting on behalf of an issuer or a domestic concern, to make use 
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly 
in furtherance of an offer,1278 
(b) Willfully,1279 
                                                     
1270 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78m (a) (2012). 
The term ‘issuers’ means publicly traded companies.  
1271 Richard, supra note 68 at 423. 
1272 ‘Foreign issuers’ include both US public companies, as well as foreign companies 
whose shares trade on US exchanges. See in Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 
1262 at 149 note 10. 
1273 DOJ & SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE US FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 10 (2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml (last visited Feb 5, 2016); FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78 l. 
1274 FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1267 at 11. 
1275 “The term ‘domestic concern’ means any individual who is a citizen, national, or 
resident of the United States; and any corporation, [.], which has its principal place of 
business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the US.” 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78dd-2 
(h)(1)(A)(B) (2010). 
1276 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78dd-2 (a),(g) 
(2010); FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1267 at 11.  
1277 DEMING, supra note 1253 at 13. 
1278 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78dd-2 (a) 
(2010). 
1279 Id.15 USC § 78 dd-2 (g)(2)(A) (2010). 
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(c) Making an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of 
any money, or offer, gift,1280 
(d) To any foreign official, to any foreign political party, or to any person,1281 
(e) Corruptly,1282 
(f) For the purpose of influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, 
political party, or person,1283 
(g) In order to obtain or retain business.1284 
For example, in the civil action SEC v. Turner, the SEC found both foreign 
officials, David P. Turner - a citizen of the United Kingdom and director of 
Innospec's TEL group, and Ousama M. Naaman, a dual citizen of Lebanon and 
Canada, who was the agent in Iraq - guilty of bribery and falsifying books and 
records.1285 Another example is the well-known and largest FCPA settlement by 
the DOJ with Siemens AG. Siemens is a German corporation organized under 
German law with its headquarters in Berlin and Munich.1286 In 2008, Siemens AG 
pleaded guilty to violations of FCPA bookkeeping, records keepings, and internal 
control requirements and agreed to pay US$ 800 million.1287. As explained 
previously, issuers are corporations whose securities are listed on US exchanges. 
As such, both domestic and foreign issuers are subject to the FCPA.1288 The 
accounting provisions exclude only foreign subsidiaries that are not issuers of 
                                                     
1280 Id.15 USC § 78 dd-2 (a) (2010). 
1281 Id.15 USC § 78 dd-2 (a)(1)(2)(3) (2010). 
1282 Id.15 USC § 78 dd-2 (a) (2010). 
1283 Id.15 USC § 78 dd-2 (a)(1)(A)(i) (2010). 
1284 Id.15 USC § 78 dd-2 (a)(1)(B) (2010). 
1285 SEC, SEC v. David P. Turner and Ousama M. Naaman, No. 10-cv-1309 (2010). 
Charging a Lebanese/Canadian agent of a UK company listed on US exchange with 
violating the FCPA for bribes of Iraqi officials. 
1286 DOJ, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, (2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2013/05/02/12-15-
08siemensakt-plea.pdf (last visited Feb 5, 2016). 
1287 Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1262 at 164. 
1288 Id. at 150. 
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securities on the US stock exchange.1289 In conclusion, it is necessary for both 
corporate officers and directors to become experts in the FCPA.1290  
Thus, the findings have shown that the legal scope of the FCPA is far-reaching. 
Hence, US companies and listed foreign companies in the US ought to closely 
comply with the provisions of the FCPA. The best way of handling the FCPA’s 
statute for the company is to reduce bribery and thus, increase public 
confidence.1291 One factor in preventing corporate bribery could be for companies 
to have an effective anti-corruption compliance program. This compliance 
program should also consider the anti-corruption law and policies in other 
countries and generally, reduce improper conduct. In other words, nowadays 
FCPA expertise and compliance are inextricably linked.1292 For this reason, the 
next section will examine affirmative corporate defenses provided by the FCPA 
and its Guidance. 
a.  The Hallmarks of an effective Corporate Compliance Program   
This section will examine which requirements specified by the DOJ and SEC 
are likely to be relevant for a company’s compliance procedures and structure as 
a preventive measure to tackle bribery and misconduct. In addition, this section 
will outline the legal consequences that follow for companies guilty of violating 
provisions of the FCPA. 
The FCPA itself provides two corporate affirmative defenses at first, the 
payment is legal in the foreign official's home country and second, it is a 
‘facilitating or expediting payments’ expense.1293  
However, the FCPA provides different criminal, civil penalties and 
collateral consequences for companies and individuals for violations of its rules. 
For example, corporations could be subject to a fine of up to US$ 2 million for 
                                                     
1289 Id. at 152. 
1290 Id. at 180. 
1291 Koehler, supra note 978 at 609. 
1292 Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1262 at 180. 
1293 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78dd–3 (c) (1) 
(2). 
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each violation of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.1294 Moreover, pursuant 
to Sections 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), 78dd-3(e)(2)(A), 78ff(c)(2)(A) individuals, including 
officers, directors, stockholders, and agents of companies could be subject to a 
fine of up to $250,000 and imprisonment for up to five years. As discussed above, 
the DOJ has the authority to pursue criminal actions and civil action against 
foreign nationals and companies for violations of the FCPA,1295 while the SEC may 
pursue civil actions against issuers and their officers, directors, employees, 
agents, or stockholders for violations of the anti-bribery and accounting 
provisions.1296 In addition to criminal, civil penalties or imprisonment pursuant to 
the FCPA, individuals and companies may also face collateral consequences, 
including suspension from contracting with the federal government, or exclusion 
from certain export privileges.1297 Thus, the legal consequences for individuals 
and companies could be considerable. Overall, the penalties and consequences 
outlined above demonstrate that companies are under tremendous pressure to 
deter illegal behavior such as bribery or falsify records. 
Secondly, as a result, the FCPA Guide provides helpful information to 
companies of all sizes.1298 However, the Guide contains non-binding 
recommendations. In detail, the FCPA Guide outlines the hallmarks of an 
effective corporate compliance program.1299 Simultaneously, the DOJ and SEC 
admit that there is no “one-size-fits-all program.”1300 The DOJ itself recognizes that  
…no compliance program can ever prevent all criminal activity by a corporation's 
employees…” 1301 
                                                     
1294 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC §§ 78dd-
2(g)(1)(A), 78dd-3(e)(1)(A), 78ff(c)(1)(A); DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1275 at 68.  
1295 See e.g. DOJ, United States & SEC v. KPMG Siddharta & Harsono, et al., No. 01-cv-3105 
(2001). The company paid bribes to Indonesian government official and violated Sections 
15 USC §§ 78 dd-1 (a); 15 USC §§ 78m (b) (2) (A); 15 USC §§ 78m (b) (2) (B). 
1296 FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1267 at 69. 
1297 FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE Id. at 69–70. 
1298 FCPA Resource Guide DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1267 Foreword. 
1299 Id. Ch. 5. 
1300 Id. at 56. 
1301 DOJ, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS | [HEREINAFTER 
US ATTORNEY’S MANUAL], 
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In other words, a “check-the-box” approach may be inefficient because each 
compliance program should be targeted specifically to a company’s size, specific 
needs, risks, and challenges.1302 The Guide recommends ten principles for a robust 
and enforced compliance program.1303 Nevertheless, the compliance function is 
considered in chapter seven of the Guide, which features a list of anonymized 
cases of companies prosecuted by the DOJ and SEC.1304 For example, in case two, 
the DOJ and SEC declined to take enforcement actions against a public US 
company because  
The company reorganized its compliance department, appointed a new compliance 
officer dedicated to anti-corruption, improved the training and compliance program, and 
undertook a review of all of the company’s international third-party relationships.1305 
The example cases cited in the Guide focus on two main tasks of a 
compliance officer relating to the FCPA provisions (1) to abide by anti-corruption 
law and (2) to carry out due diligence on vetting distributors, suppliers and local 
partners.1306 It is difficult to see how a FCPA compliance program should work 
with regard to prevention of bribery. For this reason, corporations should 
consider the DOJ’s Principles of Prosecution of Business Organizations, which are 
found in the US Attorneys’ Manual.1307 For example, companies should consider 
the general principle that the prosecutors apply the same factors when charging a 
company as when prosecuting individuals.1308 In the course of an investigation, 
the DOJ and SEC will consider the following factors (1) the nature and 
seriousness of the offense, (2) the degree of pervasiveness of the misconduct, (3) 
the history of the company, (4) the prompt processing and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and (5) the existence and effectiveness of the corporation's pre-
existing compliance program.1309 The SEC and DOJ confirm that the general 
                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2008/08/28/corp-charging-
guidelines.pdf (last visited Feb 5, 2016). 
1302 DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1267 at 56. 
1303 Id. at 56–62. 
1304 Id. at 77–78. 
1305 Id. at 78. 
1306 Id. at 63–64. 
1307 US ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL DOJ, supra note 1294 Title 9, 9-28.000. 
1308 US ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL Id. Title 9, 9-28.300 - Factors to Be Considered. 
1309 US ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL Id.9-28.300. 
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principle of corporate liability apply also in the event of FCPA violation by an 
individual, acting within the scope of their employment.1310 In the event of 
misconduct of an employee, it will assume a lack of managerial oversight. One 
aspect of failure of oversight could be that the directors and executive officers’ 
due diligence was incomplete.1311 Thus, the idea of a ‘rogue employee’ is often 
rejected.1312 For this reason, it is vital that companies ensure that they have 
appropriate compliance procedures in place.  
However, the Manual points out that the prosecutors will evaluate the 
effectiveness of a compliance program in terms of whether it is designed for 
maximum effectiveness in order to prevent and detect misconduct and whether 
the management of the company enforces this program.1313 Nevertheless, the US 
courts determine that a corporate compliance program does not absolve the 
corporation from criminal liability. For example in United States v. Potter the Court 
stated that “the case law has rejected arguments that the corporation can avoid liability 
by adopting abstract rules.”1314 Under the doctrine of ‘respondeat superior’ a company 
can be held liable for the illegal acts of its directors, officers, employees, and 
agents.1315 As discussed previously,1316 the US government and US courts1317 do 
                                                     
1310 FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1267 at 27. 
1311 Id. at 65. 
1312 The law enforcement agencies do not recognize this theory; but sometimes they do not 
reject this theory in some cases. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST 
LAW, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES AND RESOURCES FOR CORPORATE COUNSELORS 
33 (2005). 
1313 US ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL Id.9-28.800. 
1314 United States v. Potter 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006); US Attorneys’ Manual DOJ, supra 
note 12929-28.800.  
1315 ‘Respondeat superior’ (Latin: "let the master answer) “is a legal doctrine, which states 
that, in many circumstances, an employer is responsible for the actions of employees 
performed within the course of their employment. The common-law doctrine of 
‘respondeat superior’ was established in 17th century in England to define the legal liability 
of an employer for the actions of an employee. The doctrine was adopted in the United 
States and has been a fixture of agency law. The legal relationship between an employer 
and an employee is called agency. A principle of agency law, which holds that a principal 
(or employer) is vicariously liable (also known as derivative liability) for the torts of his 
agent (or employee) which occur during the course of the agent's (or employee's) actions 
on behalf of the principal (or employer). The employer is called the principal when 
engaging someone to act for him. The person who does the work for the employer is 
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not agree with arguments based on a ‘rogue executives’ theory.1318 In general, the 
conduct of employees that appears in conjunction with his work will usually be 
considered within the scope of employment.1319 Contrary to the civil law system, 
corporations are legal persons, capable of suing and being sued, and capable of 
committing crimes.1320 Hence, the established approach is that the company is 
liable if officers are involved in wrongdoing, regardless of how well the 
compliance program and the compliance officer work.1321 
In contrast, more recently the DOJ has implemented a number of new 
policies,1322 for example those introduced by Deputy Attorney General Sally 
                                                                                                                                                  
called the agent. The theory behind ‘respondeat superior’ is that the principal controls the 
agent's behavior and must then assume some responsibility for the agent's actions.” See 
Respondeat Superior Definition, DUHAIME’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/R/Respondeatsuperior.aspx (last visited Feb 6, 
2016); Wolfram Müller-Freienfels, AGENCY THEORY ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/agency-law (last visited Feb 6, 2016). See also UNITED 
STATES V. POTTER 463 F.3D 9 (1ST CIR. 2006), supra note 1314 at 26. “The principal is held 
liable for acts done on his account by a general agent, which are incidental to or 
customarily a part of a transaction, which the agent has been authorized to perform. And 
this is the case, even though it is established fact that the act was forbidden by the 
principal.” 
1316 See supra p. 197. 
1317 See e.g. United States v. Ionia Management, S.A. 537 F. Supp.2d 321 (D. Conn. 2008), 
(2008)., THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS shooting down attempts to change the 
way corporations are held liable for the criminal acts of their employees. The respondeat 
superior doctrine has a great impact on enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
against corporations. See also Richard L. Cassin, NAKED CORPORATE DEFENDANTS | THE 
FCPA BLOG THE FCPA BLOG (2009), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/1/22/ 
naked-corporate-defendants.html#sthash.ZPktNvPJ.dpuf (last visited Feb 6, 2016). 
1318 Murphy, supra note 584 at 25. 
1319 See supra note 1314, Respondeat superior Definition. 
1320 US ATTORNEYS MANUAL DOJ, supra note 1292, 9-28.200. 
1321 Murphy, supra note 584 at 25. 
1322 John F. Savarese, DOJ ADOPTS NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR CORPORATIONS SEEKING CREDIT 
FOR COOPERATION HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/09/14/doj-adopts-
new-requirements-for-corporations-seeking-credit-for-cooperation/ (last visited Feb 6, 
2016). 
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Yates,1323 to focus on efforts to secure evidence against individuals responsible for 
corporate wrongdoing. The new approach suggests six key steps to strengthen the 
DOJ’s pursuit of individual corporate wrongdoing.1324 Yates explains this 
approach in a speech after the announcement of the new policies that cooperation 
credit now comprises “all or nothing,” and there is “[n]o more partial credit for 
cooperation that doesn’t include information about individuals.”1325 Legal scholars 
identified these words as a new direction in the governmental policy.1326 In 
practice, it remains to be seen how the DOJ will identify and prosecute criminal 
behavior of employees.  
One limitation of the evaluation of an effective corporate compliance 
program is that the DOJ has no specifically formulated requirements with regard 
to such program.1327 One recommendation is that the directors of the corporation 
should carry out an independent review and supervision by means of internal 
audit functions.1328 The most important question is whether the compliance 
program is merely a "paper program" or whether it is designed, implemented, 
and reviewed in an effective manner.1329 With respect to this question, the 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations refer to Chapter eight 
for factors determining an effective corporate compliance program.1330 
Nevertheless, the FCPA has no legal obligation to consider these factors when 
                                                     
1323 Deputy Attorney General Yates & DOJ, MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY 
GENERAL | INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CORPORATE WRONGDOING (2015), 
http://www.wlrk.com/docs/IndividualAccountabilityforCorporateWrongdoing.pdf (last 
visited Feb 6, 2016). 
1324 Id. at 2. For example, the first step (l) “In order to qualify for any cooperation credit, 
corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals 
responsible for the misconduct,[…]” 
1325 Yates and DOJ, supra note 1323; Savarese, supra note 1322. 
1326 See e.g. Savarese, supra note 1321. 
1327 US ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL DOJ, supra note 1292, 9-28.800. 
1328 US ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL Id.9-28.800; In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative 
Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra note 22 at 968–70.  
1329 US ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL DOJ, supra note 1292, 9-28.800. 
1330 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES USSC, supra note 667 § 8 B2.1; US ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 
DOJ, supra note 1292 at 7, 9-28.800. 
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deciding whether a prosecuted company will benefit from its commitment to 
compliance and any pre-existing compliance program.1331 
A further aspect could be that the DOJ or SEC take into consideration the 
compliance program as a preventing or mitigating factor. Actually, there is no 
consensus in the DOJ on these considerations. A number of authors1332 agree that 
the DOJ may consider a compliance program as a potential mitigating factor 
when prosecuting, but the Department is under no obligation to do this. In 
addition, the FCPA Guide itself points out that 
In appropriate circumstances, DOJ and SEC may decline to pursue charges against a 
company based on the company’s effective compliance program, or may otherwise seek to 
reward a company for its program, even when that program did not prevent the 
particular underlying FCPA violation that gave rise to the investigation.1333  
The SEC and DOJ argue that their Guidance includes the basic elements of a 
compliance program, which the government will evaluate and seek to reward in 
the case of a FCPA violation1334. These elements comprise the following hallmarks 
of an effective compliance program (1) commitment from senior management, (2) 
code of conduct, (3) oversight, autonomy, and resources, (4) risk assessment, (5) 
training and advice, (6) incentives and disciplinary measures, and (7) third-party 
due diligence and payments.1335 Both the SEC and DOJ will consider these 
elements of a corporate compliance program when they decide what action to 
take against the prosecuted company.1336  
In addition, in 2003, in the THOMSON MEMO, the Deputy Attorney General 
of the DOJ, outlined nine “factors to be considered” when the DOJ is determining 
whether to charge a corporation.1337 The fifth factor that was pointed out is “the 
                                                     
1331 See e.g. Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension between Corporate and 
Criminal Law, 19 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 1–14, 8 (2011); Koehler, supra note 978 at 
616. 
1332 See e.g. BEALE, supra note 1117; STUCKE, supra note 1176. 
1333 FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1267 at 56. 
1334 Id. at 56–60. 
1335 Id. at 56–60. 
1336 Id. at 56. 
1337 Deputy Attorney General Thompson & DOJ, THOMPSON MEMO | PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (2003), 
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existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program.”1338 That means a 
corporate compliance program should be: 
established by corporate management to prevent and to detect misconduct and to 
ensure that corporate activities are conducted in accordance with all applicable criminal 
and civil laws, regulations, and rules.1339  
The prosecutors should ask if the compliance program works.1340 
Furthermore, the Criminal Division of the Justice Department’s deals with 
and resolves cases through deferred prosecution (DPA) or non-prosecution 
agreements (NPA).1341 A DPA is filed with the court, but an NPA is filed by the 
parties without formal charges.1342 If the company agrees to obey the 
governmental demands such as restitution and structural changes, it could avoid 
criminal indictment and an expensive trial.1343 The most commonly cited reason 
for N/DPAs in the US is the disintegration of the auditing and consulting firm 
Arthur Andersen.1344 However, in the US, these agreements by the federal 
                                                                                                                                                  
http://federalevidence.com/pdf/Corp_Prosec/Thompson_Memo_1-20-03.pdf (last visited 
Feb 8, 2016). 
1338 THOMPSON MEMO Id. at 3. II. 
1339 THOMPSON MEMO Id. at 7. VII. General Principle. 
1340 “The answer is that the prosecutor should consider the comprehensiveness of the 
compliance program; the extent and pervasiveness of the criminal conduct; the number 
and level of the corporate employees involved; the seriousness, duration, and frequency 
of the misconduct; and any remedial actions taken by the corporation, including 
restitution, disciplinary action, and revisions to corporate compliance programs.” See 
THOMPSEN MEMO Id. at 8. VII. 
1341 “N/DPAs are contractual arrangements between the government and corporate 
corporations that allow the government to impose sanctions against the respective 
corporation and set up institutional changes in exchange for the government’s agreement 
to forego further investigation and corporate criminal indictment.” See, June Rhee, THE 
EFFECT OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 
(2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/09/23/the-effect-of-deferred-and-non-
prosecution-agreements-on-corporate-governance/ (last visited Feb 8, 2016). 
1342 DEMING, supra note 1253 at 79. 
1343 Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on 
Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993-2013, 70 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 1–60, 3 (2014). 
1344 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 US 696 (2005). “In 2002, the firm 
surrendered its licenses to practice as Certified Public Accountants in the United States 
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prosecutors are the subject of heated debate since these are not decided by judges 
or the legislature.1345 Despite the objections, the authors point out that the N/DPAs 
provide for the creation of compliance reforms through the enhancement of 
corporate internal investigation, while avoiding costly litigation.1346 Despite the 
political debate on the legitimacy of the N/DPAs, there is little consensus among 
scholars that these agreements have led to changes in governance of leading 
public corporations and entire industries.1347 A study by Kaal & Lacine underlined 
this development from 1993 to 2013.1348 They found that the DOJ and SEC have 
broadly expanded their traditional role by the D/NPAs.1349 Thus, the DOJ and SEC 
shifted in their prosecutorial approach to an ex-ante consideration of 
compliance.1350 The authors gathered their results by coding all publicly available 
N/DPAs [N=271] and by evaluating the impact of N/DPAs on corporate 
governance structures.1351 Their results showed that 97.41 percent [N=264] of these 
public N/DPAs contained mandated changes of corporate governance structures 
within these companies in the following areas: (1) business changes, (2) board 
changes, (3) senior management changes, (4) monitoring, (5) cooperation, (6) 
compliance program.1352  
Another empirical study by Garrett examined the terms in N/DPAs from 
2003 to 2007, which showed an increasing trend toward compliance features and 
revealed the imposition of deep structural corporate reforms.1353 Garrett coded 
terms from thirty-five deferred and non-prosecution agreements, derived from 
federal organizational prosecutions und identified twenty-four ordered 
                                                                                                                                                  
after being found guilty of criminal charges with a loss substantial loss of firm value and 
28,000 jobs.” See Kaal and Lacine, supra note 1343 at 10.  
1345 Kaal and Lacine, supra note 1343 at 1. 
1346 Id. at 4. 
1347 See e.g. Golumbic and Adams, supra note 1152; Koehler, supra note 978; Trautman and 
Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1262. 
1348 Kaal and Lacine, supra note 1343. 
1349 Id. at 2. 
1350 Id. at 2. 
1351 Id. at 8. 
1352 Id. at 9. 
1353 Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 853–957 
(2007). 
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compliance programs (69 percent).1354 He found that in ten of the non-examined 
eleven agreements, the corporation had already implemented a compliance 
program.1355 For example, in 2005, the DOJ provided a deferred prosecution 
agreement for radical structural change at KPMG. Ultimately, KPMG agreed to 
 …implement and maintain an effective compliance and ethics program, to install an 
independent, government-appointed monitor who will oversee KPMG’s compliance with 
the deferred prosecution agreement for a three-year period...1356  
Apparently, the DOJ follows the guidelines of the THOMPSON MEMO in 
emphasizing compliance.1357 However, only in one of the coded N/DPAs by 
Garrett, did the DOJ require the creation of a position of chief compliance 
officer.1358 Overall, legal scholars consider the prosecutors’ approach as the most 
important development in changes of corporate structures and the federal and 
corporate law in recent years.1359 Garrett criticizes that structural reform by 
prosecutors creates both benefits and problems that are unique to the role of 
prosecutors in the US federal system.1360 His main criticism is that, on the one 
hand, there could be a lack of legal remedy and a lack of discretion on the part of 
prosecutorial exercises.1361 On the other hand, the enforcement by the prosecutors 
could constrain the courts.1362 Notwithstanding academic criticism and skepticism 
leveled at this approach, the prosecutorial focus on compliance looks set to 
continue to increase. 
In conclusion, although there is a political debate on the legal power of the 
prosecutors’ D/NPAs, corporate compliance programs have emerged and been 
adopted through requirements enforced by both the DOJ and SEC in the US. This 
approach led to structural corporate changes within the prosecuted companies. 
                                                     
1354 Id. at 894–895. Table 1. 
1355 Id. at 895. 
1356 See DOJ, KPMG TO PAY $456 MILLION FOR CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS IN RELATION TO 
LARGEST-EVER TAX SHELTER FRAUD CASE (2005), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ 
opa/pr/2005/August/05_ag_433.html (last visited Feb 8, 2016). 
1357 Garrett, supra note 1353 at 896. 
1358 Id. at 952. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, (December 2005). 
1359 Id. at 937. 
1360 Id. at 913. 
1361 Id. at 913. 
1362 Id. at 913. 
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Additionally, the DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations, set forth in Chapter nine of the US ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL,1363 and 
the THOMPSON MEMO provide recommendations for “the existence and effectiveness 
of the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program.” In fact, the FCPA Resource 
Guide contains general characteristics and features of an effective compliance 
program but does not define the term effectiveness. However, domestic and 
foreign corporations, defined such as issuers, listed on the US stock exchanges 
should take account of the findings above in order to help prevent bribery and 
misconduct. These companies should be aware that in the event of an 
investigation, the prosecutors are able to define and require the framework of a 
compliance program in the D/NPAs. However, it has been noted that the 
corporate compliance function is not explicitly required. Hence, the FCPA 
Resource Guide and the DOJ Principles do not take account of the nature and role 
of the compliance function. 
b.  FCPA Settlements Review related to the Compliance Function 
In according with the findings in the section above, this section will 
examine a number of examples of FCPA Settlements to establish whether there 
are any requirements as to the effectiveness of the compliance program relating to 
the compliance function within companies. Under the legal mandate of the FCPA, 
the DOJ and SEC have struggled to enforce the federal law.1364 A study on 
international trends in the fight against bribery and corruption by Cleveland et al. 
found that the DOJ initiated only 16 prosecutions between 1977 and 1995.1365 
Within this period, the US was the only country to have such provisions in force 
against bribery.1366 However, recent trends and patterns in FPCA enforcement 
have shown that there has been an extraordinary increase in both DOJ and SEC 
                                                     
1363 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual Mark Filip & Deputy Attorney General DOJ, PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf 
(last visited Feb 10, 2016); Thompson Memo Thompson and DOJ, supra note 1337. 
1364 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED 
DISCLOSURE ACTS OF 1977, supra note 1153, 15 USC §§ 78d, 78dd-2 (e). 
1365 Margot Cleveland et al., Trends in the International Fight Against Bribery and Corruption, 
90 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 199–244, 205 (2009). 
1366 Id. at 205. 
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actions since 1998.1367 The authors found that the number of SEC and DOJ 
enforcement actions rose to 37 in 2007.1368 The largest fine imposed on a company 
was US$ 1.6 billion, which Siemens AG1369 was required to pay in 2008.1370 Hence, 
the study confirmed the growing trend toward prosecution enforcement.  
In recent years, the DOJ and SEC prosecutions led to high-profile 
settlements including AIG, America Online, Boeing, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 
Computer Associates, HealthSouth, KPMG, MCI, Merrill Lynch & Co., and 
Monsanto.1371 However, these FCPA Settlements have already been examined by 
Garrett.1372 To further examine the requirements and structural changes in terms of 
the compliance function, this thesis gathered publicly available N/DPAs for the 
period from 2010 until 2015. Initially, the keyword “compliance officer” was 
searched in order to code the N/DPAs across the DOJ website.1373 After coding, a 
number of agreements were identified, particularly those with banking 
organizations like JP Morgan, HSBC, BNP or private companies like Genzyme 
Corp., Transocean Inc. and Monsanto in which organizations agreed to enhanced 
compliance obligations including the compliance function. This thesis explores 
four of these in detail below. 
The first DOJ agreement which will examine is the DPA of HSBC Holdings 
Plc., a UK corporation headquartered in London and in the US.1374 From 2001 
through 2006, the HSBC Bank USA repeatedly told the senior compliance officers 
                                                     
1367 Id. at 210. 
1368 Id. at 211. Table IV. 
1369 SEC, SEC FILES SETTLED FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT CHARGES AGAINST SIEMENS 
AG FOR ENGAGING IN WORLDWIDE BRIBERY WITH TOTAL DISGORGEMENT AND CRIMINAL 
FINES OF OVER $1.6 BILLION (2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm (last visited Feb 8, 2016). 
1370 Cleveland et al., supra note 1365 at 211 Table IV. 
1371 Garrett, supra note 1353 at 853. 
1372 Garrett, supra note 1353. 
1373 See DOJ, US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2016), http://www.justice.gov/ (last visited Feb 8, 
2016).  
1374 OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS DOJ, HSBC HOLDINGS PLC. AND HSBC BANK USA N.A. 
ADMIT TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS, FORFEIT $1.256 BILLION 
IN DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENT | OPA | DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-
money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations (last visited Feb 9, 2016). 
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at HSBC Group that the use of cover payments constituted illegal payment 
transactions made through the US financial system.1375 Hence, the HSBC Group 
violated the IEEPA1376 by failing to maintain an effective anti-money laundering 
program. The bank was prosecuted by the Criminal Division of the DOJ. HSBC, 
finally agreed to enhance its compliance structures in 2012.1377 The DPA requires 
that the HSBC replace almost all of its senior management and compliance 
officers within a five-year period and has to implement structural changes across 
its entire global operations.1378 
In January 2005, the Monsanto company, a Delaware corporation, accepted 
and acknowledged violation of the FCPA provisions, having falsified books and 
records.1379 The company entered into a DPA with the Criminal Division of the 
DOJ, which provides the framework for an effective FCPA compliance 
program.1380 In Appendix B, Monsanto agreed to improve its existing compliance 
program. This compliance program is required to comprise, at a minimum, the 
following components: 
1. A clearly articulated corporate policy against violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and other applicable anti-bribery law. 
2. The assignment to one or more senior Monsanto corporate officials of responsibility 
for oversight of compliance with policies, standards, and procedures. Such officials shall 
have the authority and responsibility to implement and utilize monitoring and auditing 
systems. 
…… 
11. Monsanto will conduct periodic reviews, not less than once every five years, of its 
corporate policies and compliance programs regarding the FCPA. 
                                                     
1375 Id. 
1376 INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT | IEEPA, 50 US CODE §§ 1701-1708 
(1977). “If the President declares a national emergency, he may be exercised to deal with 
any unusual and extraordinary threat and can regulate commerce."  
1377 HSBC DPA, DOJ, supra note 1370. 
1378 Id. 
1379 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), See supra note 463, 15 USC § 78dd-I; § 
78m(b)(2) & (5). 
1380 DOJ, United States v. Monsanto Company Deferred Prosecution Agreement (2005), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/01-06-
05monsanto-agree.pdf (last visited Feb 9, 2016). 
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12. Monsanto will, using objective measures, determine the regions or countries in 
which it operates that pose higher risks of corruption.1381 
Monsanto had already had a pre-existing compliance program but was 
required to extend it further, as well as to perform a risk assessment throughout 
its internal compliance structures.1382 In addition, the company was ordered to 
periodically conduct rigorous FCPA audits of its operations.1383 For example, 
Monsanto is required to carry out detailed audits of the books and records of each 
operating unit, audits of selected agents, consultants, contractors, sub-contractors, 
and joint ventures, and interviews with relevant employees, consultant, agents, 
contractors, subcontractors, and joint venture partners.1384 Furthermore, an 
independent compliance expert is required to certify the policies and procedures, 
monitor the implementation of compliance and report his findings to Monsanto’s 
corporate compliance officer.1385 
The third DPA examined was settled by the US Department of Justice with 
the Genzyme Corporation, an American biotechnology company which was 
acquired by the Sanofi Group in 2011. Both agreed to the terms set forth in 
Attachment B in order to enhance compliance measures and continue to maintain 
compliance policies and procedures.1386 This Attachment specifically states the 
enhancement and maintaining of a compliance program, including the tasks and 
scope of authority of the compliance function and policies and procedures on the 
following subjects: e.g. sales compensation and incentives, off-label promotion, 
etc.1387 
Besides the requirements of maintaining an Sanofi compliance program, the firm has 
established a compliance committee which is met al least quarterly, and a Sanofi 
compliance officer. The compliance committee has to ensure the effectiveness of all 
components of the Sanofi compliance program. The Sanofi compliance officer has to 
report to the Global compliance officer of the parent company. He is responsible for 
                                                     
1381 UNITED STATES V. MONSANTO DPA Id. Appendix B. 
1382 UNITED STATES V. MONSANTO DPA Id. at 6. 
1383 United States v. Monsanto DPA DOJ, supra note 1380 Appendix B. 
1384 UNITED STATES V. MONSANTO DPA Id. Appendix B. 
1385 UNITED STATES V. MONSANTO DPA Id. at 7. 
1386 DOJ, Genzyme Corporation | DPA Attachment B (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767296/download (last visited Feb 9, 2016). 
1387 GENZYME CORPORATION DPA, Id. at 2. 
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overseeing the administration and implementation of the Compliance program and has 
direct access to the senior executives with the authority to direct and implement 
necessarily compliance changes in the organization. Moreover, he has also the authority to 
assess compliance-related matters and to seek advice from independent legal counsel and 
outside experts. In addition, the compliance officer is authorized to report any issues of 
any kind directly to officers and directors of Sanofi.1388  
Furthermore, the board of directors1389 is required review the effectiveness 
of the compliance program related to sales, marketing and promotion. This 
review shall include reports and updates by the compliance officer and other 
personnel with regard to compliance matters.1390 Lastly, the board of directors has 
to submit to the US government a “board resolution” including a written 
explanation that Sanofi has implemented an effective compliance program 
pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual,1391 and as set forth 
in this Attachment B.1392  
The fourth DPA that was examined is an agreement between the DOJ and 
the Transocean Inc.,1393 a large offshore drilling contractor headquartered in 
Switzerland that rents floating mobile drill rigs with the equipment and personnel 
for operations. The firm acknowledged having violated the FCPA1394 and accepted 
a DPA, which comprises relevant considerations with regard to a compliance 
program over a time period of three years.  
                                                     
1388 GENZYME CORPORATION DPA, DOJ, supra note 1382 at 2. 
1389 “The board of directors is responsible for governing a corporation.” See MILLER, supra 
note 25 at 27; tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, § 141 (a) (b). “The business and affairs 
of every corporation shall be managed by or under the board of directors.” “The board of 
directors of a corporation shall consist of one or more members, each of whom shall be a 
natural person. The number of directors shall be fixed by, or in the manner provided in, 
the bylaws.“ See also MILLER, supra note 25 at 31. “The board members are appointed for a 
term of office, which is also defined in the bylaws of the company. Usually, all members 
of the board are elected annually.”  
1390 GENZYME CORPORATION DPA, DOJ, supra note 1382 at 10. 
1391 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667 Ch. 8. 
1392 GENZYME CORPORATION DPA, DOJ, supra note 1382 at 10. 
1393 DOJ, UNITED STATES V. TRANSOCEAN INC. | DPA (2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/11-04-
10transocean-dpa.pdf (last visited Feb 9, 2016). 
1394 See supra note 463, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA),15 USC § 78dd-l and 
§ 78m. 
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The subsidiary of Transocean Ltd. has to consider about hiring a new chief compliance 
officer with a substantial expertise in corporate ethics and anti-corruption compliance 
policies and the compliance officer of Transocean Ltd. is responsible for the oversight of 
compliance for Transocean Ltd. and all of its subsidiaries.1395 
In Attachment C to this DPA, the Transocean Inc. agreed to conduct a 
corporate compliance program in order to address any deficiencies in compliance 
with the FCPA.1396 The company is required to adopt a rigorous, clearly 
formulated, and visible anti-corruption compliance code, and develop, review, 
and promulgate compliance standards at all levels of the company.1397 In addition, 
the company has to assign responsibility to one or more senior executives for the 
implementation, communication, training, and oversight of these standards.1398 
Furthermore, the company is required to establish an effective training system for 
guidance and advising agents, business partner and officers, directors on 
complying with compliance standards and policies and ensure disciplinary 
procedures to address violations of the anti-corruption law.1399 Moreover, the 
company was ordered to include standard provisions to prevent violations of 
anti-corruption law in agreements, contracts, and renewals with all agents and 
business partners. Lastly, in Attachment D the Transocean Inc. agreed to a 
periodic review and to report to the DOJ in terms of the Attachment C.1400 
The review of the small sample of settlements between the DOJ and the four 
companies reveals a huge change in the internal corporate structure and in the 
business operations on the one hand, as well as rigorous and far-reaching changes 
in staffing on the other. For example, the prosecutor even demanded that the 
company had to replace the compliance function or the board of directors or to 
appoint a new compliance officer.1401 Hence, these contractual agreements, which 
are sometimes referred to as a pretrial diversion method, influence the internal 
corporate structure, human resources, the relationship to business partners, the 
                                                     
1395 UNITED STATES V. TRANSOCEAN INC., DOJ, supra note 1389 at 7. 
1396 UNITED STATES V. TRANSOCEAN INC., DOJ, supra note 1389 Attachment C (C1-C7). 
1397 UNITED STATES V. TRANSOCEAN INC., Id. Attachment C (C1-C7). 
1398 UNITED STATES V. TRANSOCEAN INC., Id. Attachment C (C1-C7). 
1399 UNITED STATES V. TRANSOCEAN INC., Id. Attachment C (C1-C7). 
1400 UNITED STATES V. TRANSOCEAN INC., Id. Attachment D (D1-D2). 
1401 See e.g. HSBC DPA DOJ, supra note 1376; United States v. Monsanto DPA DOJ, supra 
note 1382; United States v. Transocean Inc. DOJ, supra note 1395. 
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contracts and the core business of the corporation.1402 In sum, the prosecuted 
domestic and foreign corporations listed in the US not only have to abide by the 
anti-corruption law (FCPA) but also with the requirements set forth in the 
governmental contractual agreements such as DPAs. Therefore, all companies 
listed on the US exchanges should seriously design and implement an effective 
working compliance program in accordance with Chapter Eight and appoint a 
compliance officer who is in charge of continuously supervising and controlling 
this program, employees and contract partners.1403 As we have seen an effective 
existing compliance program and a present compliance function with a defined 
purview of tasks and periodic reporting lines to the board of directors is unlikely 
to completely avoid all misconduct of directors, officers, employees, business 
partner, and agents. However, these structures required by the prosecutor would 
contribute to limiting criminal conduct, to prompt disclosures and responses to 
misconduct, which is reflected as credit for sentencing and hence, can help to 
avoid financial risks for companies. The changes of corporate structures through 
US prosecutors will be explored in terms of the 2008 FCPA Siemens AG case in 
the next section.1404  
c.  The FCPA Siemens AG Case and the huge Changes of 
Corporate Structures 
Among the FCPA cases against companies, the Siemens case played a 
significant role in the history of the FCPA.1405 Siemens, a German engineering 
                                                     
1402 “It is a method to avoid an expensive trial. Diversion, any of a variety of programs that 
implement strategies seeking to avoid the formal processing of an offender by the 
criminal justice system. Although those strategies, referred to collectively as diversion, 
take many forms, a typical diversion program results in a person who has been accused of 
a crime being directed into a treatment or care program as an alternative to criminal 
prosecution and imprisonment.” See Carrie A. Weise-Pengelly, DIVERSION | CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2015), 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/diversion (last visited Feb 9, 2016). 
1403 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, USSC, supra note 667. 
1404 United States v Siemens AG (2008), 08-CR-367-RJL. 
1405 See e.g. JGC Corporation (Japan) $218.8 million in 2011, BAE (UK): $400 million in 2010, 
KBR / Halliburton (USA): $579 million in 2009, Alstom (France): $772 million in 2014. See 
Richard L. Cassin, OUR TOP TEN LIST DIDN’T CHANGE IN 2015 (BUT HERE’S WHEN IT DID 
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company with over 400,000 employees operated in 191 countries.1406 In 2001, 
Siemens was listed on the New York Stock Exchange and was an ‘issuer’ pursuant 
to the FCPA provisions.1407 As a publicly traded corporation, it was registered 
pursuant to Section 78 of the Securities Exchanges Act 1934.1408 In 2008, it was 
alleged that Siemens had been engaged in a pattern of bribery “unprecedented in 
scale and geographic reach.”1409 Siemens was guilty as an issuer of making illegal 
payments to foreign government officials in exchange for business and for 
inaccurate internal controls, books, and records.1410 As early as 2006, 
investigations began into possible bribery of foreign public officials and 
falsification of corporate books and records. Since then, Siemens’ entire corporate 
structure - compliance, legal, internal audit, corporate finance, and business units 
came under the scrutiny of US prosecutors. Furthermore, the role of the 
management board1411 and supervisory board1412, known as a ‘two-tier system’ of 
the board structure, were also the subject of comprehensive investigations.1413 
Siemens’ new compliance function was established in 2001. The corporate 
compliance officer worked part-time and was staffed with two lawyers.1414 In 
                                                                                                                                                  
CHANGE) THE FCPA BLOG (2016), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/1/5/our-top-ten-list-
didnt-change-in-2015-but-heres-when-it-did.html (last visited Feb 15, 2016). 
1406 DOJ, SENTENCING MEMORANDUM | SIEMENS SENTENCING MEMO 1 (2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2008/12/19/siemens-sentencing-
memo.pdf (last visited Feb 15, 2016). 
1407 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78-c (a)(8). 
1408 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 15 USC § 78 l. 
1409 DOJ, SIEMENS AG AND THREE SUBSIDIARIES PLEAD GUILTY TO FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT VIOLATIONS AND AGREE TO PAY $450 MILLION IN COMBINED CRIMINAL FINES 
(2008), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html (last 
visited Feb 15, 2016); Koehler, supra note 978 at 612. 
1410 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC §§ 78m(b)(2), 
78(b)(5), and 78ff(a). 
1411 Known in Germany as the "Vorstand”. According to the German Stock Corporation 
Act (AktG) German stock corporations boards are consist of a so named ‘two-tier system’, 
the management board and the supervisory board.  
1412 “The highest-level board within Siemens AG, the supervisory board, was composed of 
twenty members, ten of whom were elected by the shareholders and ten of whom were 
elected by the employees. It has the authority to appoint and remove members of the 
management board.” See UNITED STATES V SIEMENS AG (2008), supra note 1404 at 3. 
1413 SIEMENS SENTENCING MEMO, DOJ, supra note 1402 at 2. 
1414 UNITED STATES V SIEMENS AG (2008), supra note 1404 at 12. 
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2004, a corporate compliance office based in Erlangen and Munich was set up.1415 
Until 2006, several lawyers were responsible for compliance issues while regional 
compliance officers, as employees with other full-time responsibilities, were 
responsible for compliance within the regional groups.1416 These individuals 
received minimal training or direction in terms of compliance issues.1417 Despite 
Siemens having both an audit committee, responsible for the supervision of 
accounting and risk management, and a compliance program, the company failed 
to comply with the anti-corruption law.1418 The investigation revealed, for 
instance, that several Siemens AG subsidiaries made significant ‘kickback 
payments’ to the Iraqi government.1419 Overall, the evidence showed that Siemens 
was engaged in a systematic effort to bribe and to falsify its books and records 
from 1995 to 2007.1420 Ultimately, the DOJ was able to prosecute Siemens for the 
misconduct of its managers under ‘respondeat superior’ theory.1421 
In this case, it was clear that the reasons for the failure to comply with law 
were attributable to significant control weaknesses. It transpired in the course of 
the DOJ investigations that the Siemens compliance program existed on paper 
only.1422 There was also a lack of effectiveness on the part of the regional 
compliance officers. For example, they reported to Siemens that there were no 
business consulting agreements with other regions and that no possible violations 
were visible.1423 As a rule, the regional compliance officers are required to sign off 
on consulting agreements and attach a due diligence questionnaire as part of the 
process.1424 Although a lack of effectiveness of this process by regional compliance 
officers was reported, there was no search for missing documents.1425  
                                                     
1415 United States v Siemens AG (2008) Id. at 4. 
1416 United States v Siemens AG (2008) Id. at 5. 
1417 United States v Siemens AG (2008) Id. at 5. 
1418 United States v Siemens AG (2008) Id. 
1419 Siemens Sentencing Memo DOJ, supra note 1406 at 3. See also the German case BGH, 
29.8.2008 - 2 STR 587/07, NSTZ 2009, 95, supra note 980. 
1420 Siemens Sentencing Memo DOJ, supra note 1406 at 4. 
1421 US Attorney’s Manual Filip and DOJ, supra note 1363; Koehler, supra note 978 at 615; 
Respondeat Superior Definition, supra note 1315. 
1422 UNITED STATES V SIEMENS AG (2008), supra note 1404 at 19. 
1423 United States v Siemens AG (2008) Id. at 20. 
1424 United States v Siemens AG (2008) Id. at 20. 
1425 United States v Siemens AG (2008) Id. at 20. 
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Prior to investigations, in 2005, Siemens additionally compared its 
compliance resources and structure with that of General Electric Company (GE). 
The benchmarking analysis found that the Siemens compliance office team is 
extremely understaffed in proportion to the numbers of employees.1426 The 
analysis furthermore showed that the GE program is more efficient than Siemens 
in diffusing compliance principles.1427 Despite these findings, Siemens took no 
action to enhance its compliance structure and to improve the quality of the 
regional compliance officer until the opening of the US investigation. Siemens 
finally agreed to plead guilty to (1) having knowingly failed to implement 
sufficient anti-bribery compliance policies and procedures (2) having knowingly 
failed to discipline employees involved in making illegal payments and (3) having 
failed to establish a competent corporate compliance office.1428  
Moreover, in its statement of offense, Siemens agreed to maintain an ethics 
and compliance program that comprises the minimum elements set forth in 
Attachment 1.1429 These minimum elements include, e.g. a clearly articulated 
corporate policy against violations of the FCPA, promulgation of compliance 
standards and procedures, one or more senior corporate officials of Siemens AG 
to be responsible for the implementation and oversight of compliance with direct 
access to the Audit Committee or the Supervisory Board of Siemens AG, periodic 
training for all directors, officers, employees, and business partners, an effective 
system to report criminal conduct, due diligence to oversee business partners and 
standard provisions in contracts with all agents and business partners.1430 
Furthermore, Siemens agreed to a four-year independent program monitoring by 
                                                     
1426 United States v Siemens AG (2008) Id. at 19. 
1427 United States v Siemens AG (2008) Id. at 20. 
1428 CRIMINAL DIVISION DOJ & UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, UNITED STATES V. 
SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT | PLEA AGREEMENT 15TH DECEMBER 2008 36 (2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2013/05/02/12-15-
08siemensakt-plea.pdf (last visited Feb 15, 2016). 
1429 United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Statement of Offense, , 40 (2008) 
Attachment 1. 
1430  UNITED STATES V. SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT | STATEMENT OF OFFENSE Id. at 40–42. 
Attachment 1. 
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the DOJ in order to review the effectiveness of its internal controls and ongoing 
compliance with the anti-corruption laws.1431 
Since then, Siemens compliance structures have been radically reorganized 
and revamped compliance system put into place over a period of two years.1432 In 
the course of 2007, the members of the management board were replaced.1433 At 
this time, more than 500 compliance employees worked full time worldwide at 
Siemens.1434 Until 2010, a chief compliance officer was responsible for all 
compliance matters and reported directly to the general counsel and the chief 
executive officer.1435 Siemens also implemented new compliance policies, for 
example, a new business partner policy including web-based tools for compliance 
matters, a compliance helpdesk, and a confidential communications channel for 
employees to report misconduct.1436 A new compliance audit function was also 
established to review the implementation of the compliance system while an anti-
corruption toolkit improved financial controls.1437 In addition, since 2007, over 
300,000 employees worldwide received compliance training.1438 Finally, today the 
Siemens compliance system is designed to systematically evaluate and improve 
continuously its process.1439 
In conclusion, the Siemens FCPA by the DOJ case provides strong evidence 
that the prosecution agreements lead not only to a settlement with huge fines, but 
also to radical changes in the corporate structure. Siemens has enforced its 
internal controls with a strengthened role for the compliance personnel, the 
                                                     
1431 UNITED STATES V. SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT | STATEMENT OF OFFENSE, supra note 
1429 Attachment 2. 
1432 Koehler, supra note 978 at 613; KLAUS MOOSMAYER & JOSEF WINTER, THE SIEMENS 
COMPLIANCE SYSTEM: “PREVENT – DETECT – RESPOND AND CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT” 3 
(2011). 
1433 MOOSMAYER AND WINTER, supra note 1432 at 4. 
1434 Koehler, supra note 978 at 613; Klaus Moosmayer, „Die Neuausrichtung heißt Compliance 
Ownership Culture“, COMPLIANCE-MANAGER.NET, December 12, 2014, 
http://www.compliance-manager.net/fachartikel/die-neuausrichtung-heisst-compliance-
ownership-culture-1534 (last visited Feb 15, 2016). 
1435 MOOSMAYER AND WINTER, supra note 1432 at 5. 
1436 Koehler, supra note 978 at 613. 
1437 Id. at 614. 
1438 MOOSMAYER AND WINTER, supra note 1432 at 9. 
1439 Id. at 14. 
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implementation of new compliance structures, tools, trainings, and review 
processes for business partners. In brief, the legal environment and its application 
through administrative agencies and prosecutors will continue to change the 
internal corporate structure, to enhance compliance issues and strengthen the 
corporate compliance function. 
d.  The new DOJ Guidelines Policy  testing during the recent VW 
Scandal  
As discussed previously, the DOJ is charting a new direction as far as its 
policy on individual liability in matters of corporate wrongdoing is concerned.1440 
Yates points out new principles of the DOJ that include a new approach seeking 
accountability from the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.1441 She cites 
the deterrence effect of future illegal activities, the enhancement of corporate 
behavior, the identification of the responsible individual and the promotion of 
public confidence in the US justice system as the reasons behind this approach.1442 
In her MEMO, she states six specific steps to holding individual corporate 
wrongdoers accountable. Additionally, the DOJ will revise several of the 
guidance documents, including the US Attorney’s Manual and the principles of 
federal prosecution of business organizations.1443 In her remarks at New York 
University School of Law, Yates claims, “The rules have just changed.”1444 In practice 
that means “…if a company wants any credit for cooperation, any credit at all, it must 
identify all individuals involved in the wrongdoing …” and “It’s all or nothing.”1445 
Moreover, she announces that this new threshold requirement does not mean that 
DOJ will wait for the company to deliver information on individual 
                                                     
1440 Deputy Attorneys’ Gen. Yates & DOJ, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL SALLY QUILLIAN 
YATES DELIVERS REMARKS AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW ANNOUNCING NEW 
POLICY ON INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY IN MATTERS OF CORPORATE WRONGDOING | OPA | 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-
general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-school (last visited Feb 
9, 2016). See supra I., 1.a., p. 204 
1441 Memorandum Yates and DOJ, supra note 1323 at 1. 
1442 MEMORANDUM Yates Id. at 1. 
1443 REMARKS Yates and DOJ, supra note 1440. 
1444 REMARKS Yates and DOJ, supra note 1440. 
1445 REMARKS Yates and DOJ, supra note 1440. 
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wrongdoers.1446 In contrast, “the department attorneys will be actively investigating 
individuals at every step of the process.”1447 Her final note on this point was a call for 
all defense lawyers to be actively involved in discussions with the DOJ 
concerning the scope of what is required.1448 The shift from corporate liability to 
individual liability in the DOJ approach may be the result of a recent study, which 
gathered data from records of the DOJ and federal courts. 1449 The study found 
that more than 1.6 million defendants were criminally prosecuted between 2004 
and 2014.1450 By means of illustration, 99.8 percent of these prosecutions were 
aimed at individuals; only two tenths, or one in 500, involved companies.1451 
The American academic debate views the new direction policy of the DOJ 
as a short-term political move.1452 The focus on individual corporate agents is 
discussed critically. Some authors compare this direction with the peculiar 
analogy of the “street crime enforcement model.”1453 They argue that those 
informants are “notoriously unreliable” and the DOJ might have underestimated 
the complexity of misconduct and decision-making in daily corporate practice.1454 
They explain that the informants can identify only people whom they know and 
that they the risk of focusing on people whom they dislike.1455 In addition, they 
concluded that the new DOJ policy would not actually provide the prosecutor the 
desired information regarding high-level officials.1456 Finally, other authors argue 
that the federal prosecutors’ investigations have the potential to become either 
                                                     
1446 REMARKS Yates and DOJ, supra note 1440. 
1447 REMARKS Yates Id. 
1448 REMARKS Yates Id. 
1449 DOJ, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DATA REVEAL 29 PERCENT DROP IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
OF CORPORATIONS (2015), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/ (last visited Feb 9, 2016). 
1450 Id. 
1451 Id. fig. 3. 
1452 Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas Wuil Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines 
on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 51–59, 52 (2015). 
1453 Id. at 54. 
1454 Id. at 55. 
1455 Id. at 58. 
1456 Id. at 59. 
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more resource intensive, or much longer, involving the building of multiple cases 
against both corporations and individuals.1457 
In September 2015, simultaneously with Yates’ announcement, Volkswagen 
AG, a German car manufacturer, had to admit responsibility for using software, 
designed to manipulate the light-duty test results in vehicles in real-world-
conditions.1458 This marked the beginning of a criminal investigation by the DOJ 
against VW, since the Clean Air Act (CAA)1459 gives the federal regulator 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)1460 the power to fine VW for a possible 
total penalty of US$18 billion1461 pursuant to Sections 204 and 205 of the Clean Air 
Act (CAA).1462 In the wake of the announcement of the manipulated software, VW 
CEO, Martin Winterkorn, resigned from his position on the board.1463 American 
legal scholars1464 noted that this scandal could be the first major test of the DOJ’s 
recently announced guidelines1465 focusing on individual accountability in white-
collar criminal investigations. In 2017, Volkswagen AG pleaded guilty to violating 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) and has been ordered to pay $4.3 billion, the statutory 
                                                     
1457 Daniel P. Chung, INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CORPORATE WRONGDOING 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 
(2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/09/21/individual-accountability-for-
corporate-wrongdoing/#more-71670 (last visited Feb 9, 2016). 
1458 Bill Vlasic & Aaron M. Kessler, It Took E.P.A. Pressure to Get VW to Admit Fault, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, September 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/business/it-
took-epa-pressure-to-get-vw-to-admit-fault.html (last visited Feb 9, 2016). 
1459 This Act (CAA) is the comprehensive federal law that regulates air emissions from 
stationary and mobile sources. This law authorizes the EPA to establish National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards. The EPA works with its federal, state regulatory partners to 
monitor and ensure compliance with clean air laws and regulations in order to protect 
human health and the environment. See CLEAN AIR ACT (1963), supra note 649. 
1460 EPA, supra note 371. 
1461 Vlasic and Kessler, supra note 1460; United States v. Volkswagen AG, Audi AG, Civil 
Action No. 16-CR-20394, https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/page/file/930026/download 
(last visited Feb 2, 2017). 
1462 See supra note 677, CLEAN AIR ACT (1963), 42 USC §§ 7523 and 7524, §§ 204, 205. 
1463 Winterkorn legt Amt als Audi-Aufsichtsratschef nieder, WELT ONLINE, November 12, 
2015, http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article148751371/Winterkorn-legt-Amt-als-Audi-
Aufsichtsratschef-nieder.html (last visited Feb 9, 2016). 
1464 See e.g. Joh and Joo, supra note 1452. 
1465 Memorandum Yates and DOJ, supra note 1323. 
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maximum fine, in criminal and civil penalties.1466 In addition, six German 
executives and employees have been indicted in connection with conspiracy to 
cheat US emissions tests. They are named in a public press release via the DOJ 
website.1467 
Another aspect of the complexity of misconduct could arise from corporate 
practice. The majority of the agreements between the DOJ and corporations were 
signed by CEOs, other board members or the general counsel of the company. 
Thus, these persons are highly likely to simply accuse lower-level employees of 
offences. In addition, in practice, corporations have already identified individual 
corporate misconduct through internal investigations. As a result, these 
employees are likely to have had their contracts terminated or to have been 
disciplined in internal investigations. However, the complex legal issue of 
whether a corporation can be held liable for the acts of its agents remains.1468 
The impact this new approach will have on compliance programs and the 
compliance function this new approach will involve is uncertain. The pressure on 
the compliance function to promptly report individual misconduct to the 
prosecutor and the board of director could increase. This would require the 
compliance officer to weigh the relevance of information. Furthermore, it is 
important for compliance officers to identify the responsibilities of each 
individual in the company and the relevant business to identify where risks are 
most likely to appear. In addition, corporations will have to select appropriate 
personnel more carefully and review their daily business in more detail. In 
conclusion, the new DOJ policy will enforce corporate compliance programs and 
strengthen the compliance function through periodic reporting, reviewing, 
evaluating, and monitoring. The next section will summarize the trends of the 
FCPA anti-bribery provisions and the prosecutor are likely to prompt in terms of 
the compliance function and the shaping of this role within companies. 
                                                     
1466 See UNITED STATES V. VOLKSWAGEN AG, AUDI AG, supra note 1461. 
1467 See DOJ, DOJ RELEASE | PRESS RELEASE NUMBER:  17-037 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
(201AD), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-
billion-criminal-and-civil-penalties-six (last visited Jul 2, 2017). 
1468 See e.g. Joh and Joo, supra note 1448 at 55; See also United States v. Potter 463 F.3D 9 (1ST 
CIR. 2006), supra note 1313; Respondeat superior Definition, supra note 1314. 
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e . Conclusion - The Compliance Officers Work under FCPA  
The following section summarizes the findings of the FCPA law and its 
enforcement through the DOJ with regard to the compliance function. This 
section therefore highlights the compliance officers’ work under the FCPA. 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) is now well-established US law, 
which must be observed by both US corporations and foreign issuers listed on the 
US Stock exchanges. 1469 The consequences in the event of non-compliance with 
the FCPA law are far-reaching and can prove costly. Although the US bribery law 
was passed forty years ago, the DOJ prosecuted only seven individuals and two 
corporations in 2015.1470 For example, the FCPA Blog1471 shows and provides a 
ranking of the top ten FCPA cases involving financial penalties.1472 Only two of 
the companies penalized are US corporations.1473 He identified six reasons why 
foreign issuers, non- US firms, dominate this list.1474 First, the DOJ stated that 
these companies did not have an effective anti-bribery compliance program. 
Second, they use bribery to operate in global business. Third, these companies are 
not aware of FCPA compliance requirements. Fourth, they do not cooperate with 
the DOJ in full. Fifth, the countries of origin of these companies have a weak 
enforcement record. However, when senior executives are responsible for the 
misconduct, their country is more likely to appear on the list. This applies to both 
US and non-US firms.1475 Overall, these reasons show that misconduct occurs 
                                                     
1469 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 USC § 78dd-1, §§ 
78m(b)(2)(A) and (B). 
1470 DOJ, RELATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: CHRONOLOGICAL LIST, 1977 | CRIMINAL-
FRAUD | DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/related-
enforcement-actions-chronological-list-1977 (last visited May 23, 2016). 
1471 The FCPA Blog founded by Richard L. Cassin, a publisher and editor founder. He was 
a senior partner in a major international law firm and the head of its Asia practice. See 
RICHARD L. CASSIN - THE FCPA BLOG THE FCPA BLOG, http://www.fcpablog.com/richard-
l-cassin/ (last visited Feb 16, 2016). 
1472 Cassin, supra note 1405. 
1473 Id. KBR / Halliburton (US) $579 million in 2009, Alcoa (US) $384 million in 2014. 
1474 See Richard L. Cassin, FROM ALSTOM: SIX REASONS WHY NON-US COMPANIES DOMINATE 
THE FCPA TOP TEN LIST - THE FCPA BLOG - THE FCPA BLOG THE FCPA BLOG (2015), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/1/5/from-alstom-six-reasons-why-non-us-companies-
dominate-the-fc.html (last visited Feb 15, 2016). 
1475 Id. 
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around the globe and that many companies still underestimate the risk of non-
compliance with the applicable legal rules.  
Apparently, the DOJ might consider the existence of an effective compliance 
program as a mitigating factor.1476 However, the DOJ opposes a formal or de facto 
compliance defense.1477 The compliance program has to be effective in stopping 
bribery. However, it is difficult to see how a FCPA compliance program should 
work effectively in order not to be evaluated as a purely paper compliance 
program.1478 Nevertheless, it has been mentioned that the DOJ de facto recognizes a 
compliance defense through its N/DPA settlement agreements. The company has 
to demonstrate its efforts to tailor its own FCPA compliance policies and 
procedures.1479 For example, in the DPA in the Monsanto case, the DOJ required 
an effective element of the compliance program by “using objective measures’’ to 
identify high-risk countries or regions in which Monsanto periodically does 
business.1480 In the Agreement with the Genzyme/Sanofi Corporation, the DOJ 
stated that the board should confirm that Sanofi US has implemented an effective 
compliance program, as defined in the United States Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines Manual, Chapter eight.1481 Having surveyed the five DPAs, the 
following seven minimum elements of a compliance program were identified, 
which in general should include:1482 
(1) a rigorous anti-corruption compliance code and clearly articulated and 
visible corporate internal policies to deter bribery, 
                                                     
1476 Mark Filip & Deputy Attorney General DOJ, Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations (2008), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/ 
legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf (last visited Feb 10, 2016). 
1477 Koehler, supra note 978 at 645. 
1478 Id. at 646. 
1479 Id. at 649., See supra p. 214 
1480 MONSANTO COMPANY DPA, supra note 1331 at 6 no. 12. 
1481 Genzyme Corporation | DPA DOJ, supra note 1386 at 10 Attachment B; U.S. Sentencing 
Guideline Manual USSC, supra note 666. 
1482 Genzyme Corporation | DPA DOJ, supra note 1386; HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC 
Bank USA N.A. DOJ, supra note 1374; Monsanto Company | DPA DOJ, supra note 1380; 
Transocean Inc. | DPA DOJ, supra note 1393; UNITED STATES V. SIEMENS 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT | STATEMENT OF OFFENSE, supra note 1429. 
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(2) develop and promulgate compliance standards and procedures for all 
directors, officers, employees, agents and business partners which 
include an effective system for reporting suspected criminal conduct, 
(3) periodic internal control and monitoring of these compliance standards, 
(4) the assignment of one or more senior corporate executives of the 
company who is responsible for the implementation and oversight of 
the compliance standards with direct reporting access to the board, 
(5) periodic trainings and provide guidance for all directors, officers, 
employees, agents and business partners, 
(6) appropriate documented risk-based due diligence and compliance 
requirements and oversight of all agents and business partners, 
(7) include standard provisions in agreements, contracts, and renewals with 
all agents and business partners to prevent violations of the anti-
corruption laws.1483 
As has been noted, the fourth element relates to the compliance function. 
Additionally, in the DPA Attachment B of the Genzyme/Sanofi Corporation, the 
DOJ pointed out that the compliance officer should have direct access to the 
board with the authority to implement compliance changes within the company 
as necessary.1484 He also has the authority to obtain independent advice in 
compliance issues from external experts.1485 The compliance officer must report 
his activities and the effectiveness of the compliance program to the board.1486 The 
findings of these agreements show that the requirements of the compliance 
program and compliance officer function are similar and make reference to the 
elements of an effective compliance program set forth in Chapter Eight of the US 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual.1487 
Overall, there are three key incentives and aspects for US corporations and 
foreign issuers listed on the US Stock exchanges to establish FCPA compliance 
                                                     
1483 Genzyme Corporation | DPA DOJ, supra note 1386; HSBC NA DOJ, supra note 1374; 
United States v. Monsanto DPA DOJ, supra note 1380; United States v Transocean DPA 
DOJ, supra note 1393; UNITED STATES V. SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT | STATEMENT OF 
OFFENSE, supra note 1429. 
1484 GENZYME CORPORATION | DPA DOJ, supra note 1382 at 2. Attachment B. 
1485 GENZYME CORPORATION | DPA Id. at 2. Attachment B. 
1486 GENZYME CORPORATION | DPA Id. at 10. Attachment B. 
1487 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667 Ch. 8, § B2.1. 
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policies and procedures. First, the DOJ will consider “the existence and effectiveness 
of the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program” as a mitigating factor in the 
course of investigations.1488 Second, the corporations ought to follow the 
recommended hallmarks of a corporate compliance program, which the FCPA 
Guide states in Chapter five.1489 Lastly, the effectiveness of a compliance and 
ethics program should be adapted in line with the requirements in Chapter Eight, 
§ B2.1.1490 Table 3 summarizes the most important FCPA recommendations 
relating to corporate compliance and the compliance function. 
 
Table 3 - FCPA Recommendations for issuers with respect to compliance and the compliance 
function1491 
Sources Compliance Program Compliance Function 
FCPA Resource Guide, DOJ 
and SEC, Ch. 5 
 Hallmarks of an effective 
compliance program, 
 existence and effectiveness of 
a pre-existing compliance 
program as a mitigating 
factor, 
 ex-ante considerations. 
Example cases: 
 Identify and assess bribery 
risk of business within the 
company, 
 Due diligence to oversee 
business partners. 
 Design and review  
contracts  that incorporate 
FCPA and anticorruption 
terms. 
Principles of Prosecution of 
Business Organizations 
 US Attorney’s Manual (2003) 
 Thompson Memo (2008) 
 Existence and adequacy of 
an effective compliance 
program, 
 Refers to Ch. Eight, § 8 B2.1 
 
                                                     
1488 US ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL DOJ, supra note 1292, Title 9, 28.300. 
1489 FCPA Resource Guide DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1267 at 56–60. 
1490 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id. Ch. 8, § B2.1. 
1491 Table 3 summarizes the findings accordingly to supra I., 1.a.-d., pp. 187 et seq. 
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N/DPAs impact on corporate 
structures 
 Changes in the corporate 
governance structure: 
 Clearly articulated anti-
bribery policy or code, 
 Establish a Compliance 
Committee 
 Implement and maintain a 
compliance program 
pursuant to Ch. Eight, § 8 
B2.1, 
 Periodic reviews and 
audits. 
 Changes in the personnel 
structure: 
 Replacement of senior 
management, or CCO, 
 Appointment of senior 
executives for oversight of 
compliance, or CCO, 
 Establish reporting 
structure, CCO should have 
direct access to the CEO, or 
to the board, 
 CCO responsible for 
implementing, 
communication, training on 
FCPA standards and 
compliance program, 
 To ensure disciplinary 
procedures, 
 Independent compliance 
expert to certify the policy 
and compliance procedure.  
 US Courts follow the 
respondeat superior 
doctrine, but New Policy by 
the DOJ 
 Yates Memo (2015), Six 
key steps 
  
  New approach: 
 Individual Accountability for 
Corporate Wrongdoing, 
 Identify the compliance 
responsibilities within the 
company, 
 Weigh the relevance of 
information, 
 Promptly report 
misconduct to the board 
and to the prosecutors. 
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In addition, the compliance officer and the general counsel must ensure that 
every international contract includes clear FCPA terms. These terms are non-
negotiable.1492 Furthermore, the compliance staff needs to be aware of 
requirements and restrictions of the FCPA provisions. The compliance officer has 
to communicate and train the management and every employee on FCPA 
standards, policies, and processes.1493 In other words, the company should 
appoint a compliance officer who should conduct a risk assessment and guide the 
management, employees, and business partners on FCPA standards.1494 Klehm and 
Roseman emphasize the fact that a compliance officers benefits from having a 
written job description that describes his scope of authority in terms of 
compliance issues.1495 Finally, the compliance officer has to get the compliance 
program in work.  
In conclusion, the findings above have shown that the FCPA legislation 
with its emphasis on anti-bribery, trends in enforcement and penalties, has 
wakened many companies to the need to implement and maintain strong 
compliance programs.1496 The major tasks and duties of compliance officers under 
the FCPA provisions comprise (1) to identify and assess bribery risk of business 
within the company, (2) to identify and evaluate bribery risk of business of the 
third-party relationships, (3) to improve the training on standards, and (4) to 
implement, maintain, and improve the compliance system, (5) to lead the periodic 
review process on the compliance program. Under the FCPA agreements, the 
compliance officers have the authority and are under an obligation to report 
compliance activities and matters directly to the board and to implement 
                                                     
1492 Stephen Clayton, TOP TEN BASICS OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT COMPLIANCE 
FOR THE SMALL LEGAL DEPARTMENT ACC | ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL (2011), 
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/SLD-FCPA-Compliance.cfm (last 
visited Feb 16, 2016). 
1493 Jones Day | Ten Questions Henry Klehm & Joshua S. Roseman, JONES DAY | TEN 
QUESTIONS EVERY DIRECTOR SHOULD ASK ABOUT FCPA COMPLIANCE JONES DAY 
PUBLICATIONS (2010), http://www.jonesday.com/ten_questions/ (last visited Feb 16, 2016). 
1494 Anti-Corruption Ethics and Compliance Handbook OECD, UNODC & WORLD BANK, 
ANTI-CORRUPTION ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK FOR BUSINESS 74, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2013/Anti-
CorruptionEthicsComplianceHandbook.pdf (last visited Feb 16, 2016). 
1495 Jones Day | Ten Questions Klehm and Roseman, supra note 1493. 
1496 Cleveland et al., supra note 1365 at 223. 
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compliance changes within the company as necessary. Therefore, it can be stated 
that the FCPA strengthened the role and nature of the compliance officer.  
2. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
This part introduces the second wave of US federal legislation at the 
beginning of the 21st century. Legislation such the FCPA has made the 
compliance function necessary to manage and maintain the compliance programs 
within companies.1497 This section examines whether the SOX has strengthened 
the importance of the compliance function in the US. The next sections aim to 
clarify the relevant definitions and provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)1498 
with regard to compliance and the compliance officer, and its impacts on 
domestic and foreign companies, public companies,1499 which list securities on the 
US Stock exchanges.1500 Among other traditional securities regulations,1501 the SOX 
seeks to increase and to recover the confidence of investors in the US capital 
market.1502 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is Federal Public Law and mandatory.1503 All 
listed companies must comply. The legislation introduced major changes to the 
                                                     
1497 Freeman, supra note 70 at 357. 
1498 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56. 
1499 “A public company is a company that has issued securities through an initial public 
offering (IPO) and is traded at one stock exchange. Public companies are highly regulated. 
Public companies must meet stringent reporting requirements set out by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), including the public disclosure of financial statements 
and annual 10-k reports discussing the state of the company. The shareholders elect a 
board of directors who oversees the operations of the company.” See Public Company 
Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (2003), 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/publiccompany.asp (last visited Mar 1, 2016). 
1500 See e.g. New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), See The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, 
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (NYSE) | STOCK EXCHANGE, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, 
UNITED STATES ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/New-York-
Stock-Exchange (last visited Feb 17, 2016); The New York Stock Exchange | NYSE, , 
https://www.nyse.com/index (last visited Feb 17, 2016).and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (Nasdaq), See NASDAQ’s Homepage for Retail 
Investors, NASDAQ.COM, http://www.nasdaq.com/ (last visited Feb 17, 2016). 
1501 SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, supra note 624; SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 
629. 
1502 Shirley, supra note 1179 at 528. 
1503 The history and significance of the SOX has already been explained. See supra A., p. 
187. 
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regulation of financial accounting practice and corporate governance.1504 As has 
been mentioned, this Act was the legislative response of several further corporate 
accounting and governance scandals like WorldCom, Adelphia, and Enron.1505 
Therefore, the SOX aims to establish higher standards for corporate accounting 
and governance.1506 The new approach of the SOX was that it made corporate 
responsibilities and disclosure obligations mandatory through written 
standards.1507 The SOX also targets corporate corruption and seeks to protect 
companies’ investors.1508 Overall, it focuses on corporate disclosure, risk 
management, auditing and financial reporting.1509  
Specifically, the SOX first makes it  
unlawful knowingly to alter, destroy, mutilate, conceal, cover up, falsify, or makes a 
false entry in any record, and document or to obstruct and influence the investigation of 
the federal agency.1510 
For these reasons, the violation of this Act could be a criminal offence under 
SOX and individuals may face imprisonment for a period of up to twenty-five 
years.1511 Second, any accountant who conducts an audit of an issuer shall 
maintain all documents relating to the audit or review for a period of five years 
from the end of the fiscal period.1512 The knowing and willful destruction of 
                                                     
1504 See supra footnote 788, p. 140; See also Ravij Prabhakar, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | 
BUSINESS ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/corporate-
governance (last visited Mar 1, 2016). US corporate governance refers to the important 
legal relationship that exists between shareholders, management, auditors, and the board 
of directors. See Shirley, supra note 1179 at 508. 
1505 See supra Ch. 3, A., I., p. 118; Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jørgensen, supra note 
1218 at 526. 
1506 See e.g. Principles-Based Accounting Standards – Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles US GAAP, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 17 CFR 228, 229, 
240, 249 and 274 . ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER (ERC), supra note 685 at 5. 
1507 Fischer, supra note 1201 at 97; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, §§ 301-308, 
401-409. 
1508 Freeman, supra note 70 at 359. 
1509 Id. at 359.; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, §§ 101-109. 
1510 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 802, 18 USC § 1519. 
1511 Id. § 802, 18 USC § 1519. 
1512 Id. § 802, 18 USC § 1520 (a) (1). 
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records carries a maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment.1513 Furthermore, 
any person who knowingly defrauds other persons in connection with any 
security of an issuer could be imprisoned for up to twenty-five years.1514 Similarly 
to the FCPA, the SOX includes a number of provisions pertaining to financial 
reporting and the quality and control of such audits. In addition, the SOX also 
includes a number of independent standards.1515. 
The SOX is organized into eleven titles. There are a number of provisions 
dealing specifically with compliance and professional standards.1516 The following 
sections examine inter alia the three most significant provisions of the SOX in 
terms of compliance. The first section contains the important definitions used in 
this Act. The second section focuses on Section 302 of the SOX concerning the 
certification as to the accuracy of periodic financial disclosures. The third section 
focuses on Section 404 on the responsibility of management for establishing and 
maintaining an adequate internal control structure.1517 The last section provides 
the rules of professional responsibilities for attorneys pursuant to Section 307 and 
the shifting in corporate responsibilities between the attorneys and compliance 
officers.1518 
a.  Important Definitions of the SOX  
Similar to the FCPA, the SOX comprises a number of important definitions. 
The first term explicitly defined in the SOX is ‘the Commission.’ This means the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).1519 The SEC was established by the 
                                                     
1513 Id. § 802, 18 USC § 1520 (b). 
1514 Id. § 807, 28 USC 994, § 1348. 
1515 Id. § 108, 15 USC 7218 - Accounting standards, Id. § 103, 15 USC 7213 - Auditing, 
quality control, and independence standards and rules. 
1516 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, §§ 301, 401, 404, 406, 806. 
1517 Id. § 302 - Corporate Responsibility for financial reports, Id. § 404 - Management 
assessments of internal controls. 
1518 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 307 (1)(2), 15 USC 7245. 
1519 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 2 (a)(6). “The SEC [hereinafter also 
referred to as the ‘‘Commission’’] is the primary overseer and regulator of the US 
securities markets with the goal to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation. It regulates the US securities markets as an 
independent regulatory agency.” See also SEC, supra note 630. 
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934, when the bill passed into law on June 1, 1934.1520 
As discussed previously, the main purpose of securities laws was also to recover 
investor confidence in the US capital markets following the stock market crash in 
October 1929.1521 This Act empowers the SEC with great authority over the 
securities industry. For example, the SEC can require periodic reporting by 
companies with publicly traded securities.1522 Since then, the SEC has overseen the 
activities of over 20,000 financial firms, and other US exchange listed 
companies.1523 The SEC consists of five commissioners who are appointed by the 
President.1524 The SEC is organized into five divisions and twenty-three offices 
and employs approximately 3,500 staff.1525 Staff in the enforcement division 
conduct investigations into possible violations of the federal securities laws, and 
can recommend that the Commission file civil actions or complaints in the federal 
courts.1526 Investigations may concern conduct by misrepresentation or omission 
of important information about securities.1527 Nevertheless, just like the DOJ – the 
SEC settles many cases out of court. The Commission could take a second 
procedural step, an administrative action in which the court can exclude 
companies from stock exchanges or, following due process and hearing, exclude a 
corporate officer or director from employment with a registered firm.1528 The third 
possibility is that the Commission seeks a criminal prosecution, if fraud or other 
willful, criminal misconduct is established.1529 The SEC also has the power to 
impose penalties, or demand the return of illegal profits.1530  
                                                     
1520 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, § 4; Rowan Bosworth‐Davies, The 
SEC: An Examination of its Structures, Powers and Procedures, 2 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 31–41, 33 (1993). 
1521 See also supra note 630. 
1522 Federal Securities Law SEC, supra note 632; SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra 
note 629, § 13 (1934), § 78m (2012). 
1523 Ellig and Peirce, supra note 1114 at 361. 
1524 See also supra note 630. 
1525 SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission Organization Chart, 
http://www.sec.gov/images/secorg.pdf (last visited Feb 17, 2016). 
1526 SEC, SEC | DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, https://www.sec.gov/enforce (last visited Feb 17, 
2016). 
1527 See also supra note 630. 
1528 Bosworth‐Davies, supra note 1520 at 38. 
1529 Id. at 38. 
1530 See also supra note 630. 
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The SEC also has an office of compliance inspections and examinations 
(OCIE). This office conducts examinations to facilitate compliance with the 
securities laws and to detect violations of the law.1531 The OCIE is responsible for 
(1) improving compliance, (2) preventing fraud, (3) monitoring risk, and (4) 
informing policy.1532 The Commission applies the results of these examinations to 
initiate rule-making intentions.1533 
The SOX specifically authorizes the SEC to begin with rule-making 
activities.1534 For instance, the SEC’s rule-making activity established a new 
whistleblowing regime.1535 This is why the SEC describes itself as a law 
enforcement agency.1536 Lastly, the American financial regulator SEC has 
developed a degree of American regulatory control and a pragmatic approach 
with a set of minimum standards.1537  
In addition, the SOX created the ‘Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board,’ also known as the PCAOB or ‘the Board.’1538 The Board was established 
pursuant to Section 101.1539 The Board is responsible for overseeing the 
preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports of public 
companies that are subject to the securities laws.1540 It is subject to action by the 
Commission under Section 107.1541 As a result, the Commission has oversight and 
enforcement authority over the Board. Therefore, the Commission also has 
                                                     
1531 Id. 
1532 SEC, SEC | ABOUT OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, 
https://www.sec.gov/ocie/Article/about.html (last visited Feb 17, 2016). 
1533 Id. “Rule-making is the process by which federal agencies implement legislation 
passed by Congress and signed into law by the President.” See e.g., concept releases, 
proposed rules, final rules, interpretive releases, and policy statements. See SEC, SEC | 
REGULATORY ACTIONS, http://www.sec.gov/rules.shtml (last visited Feb 18, 2016). 
1534 Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jørgensen, supra note 1218 at 526.  
1535 Ellig and Peirce, supra note 1128 at 363; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 
806 (a), 18 USC § 1514 A - Whistleblower Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded 
Companies. 
1536 See also supra note 630. 
1537 Bosworth‐Davies, supra note 1520 at 39. 
1538 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 101, 15 USC 7211; SEC, supra note 632. 
1539 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 101 (a), 15 USC 7211. 
1540 Id.§ 101 (c), 15 USC 7211. 
1541 Id.§ 107, 15 USC 7217 - Commission oversight of the Board. 
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oversight responsibility for all of the activities of the PCAOB, including the 
approval of its annual budget.1542  
The SOX also considers the word ‘issuer’,1543 which is defined in the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1544 Thus, the SOX applies when an issuer 
becomes subject to US registration requirements and must register its securities in 
the United States.1545 Additionally, SEC Rule 3b-4 explains the term ‘foreign private 
issuer.’ This means a company organized outside the US, with more than 50 
percent of its voting shares owned by US citizens, where the majority of the 
executive officers are US citizens and the business is generally administered in the 
US.1546 Therefore, there is a permanent academic and political debate on the 
extraterritorial application of US laws in securities fraud actions. Legal scholars 
refer in this context to the financial service regulation of 1934.1547 It provides that 
Sec. 10 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange- 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities based 
swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.1548 
In addition, in order to classify the extraterritorial range of the US Securities 
Law, the US Code defines ‘Interstate Commerce’ as follows: 
                                                     
1542 See also supra note 630. 
1543 See supra part I, 1, p. 197 
1544 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 2 (a) (7). The term ‘issuer’ means any 
person who issues or proposes to issue any security… See supra note 624, SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 15 USC 78c (8). “The term ‘person’ means a 
natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality 
of a government.” See Id. 15 USC 78c (9). 
1545 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 2 (a) (7); Shirley, supra note 1194 at 523. 
1546 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 17 CFR 240.3b-4. 
1547 See e.g. JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF US 
SECURITIES FRAUD PROHIBITIONS IN AN INCREASINGLY GLOBAL TRANSACTIONAL WORLD 
(2012). 
1548 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, § 10 (b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
CHAPTER 4 | 241 
 
…trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or 
between any foreign country and any State, or between any State and any place or ship 
outside thereof.1549 
However, Heminway argued that this is a blurred definition and it is not 
explicitly clear that Section 10(b) has an extensive extraterritorial range.1550 This 
legal issue was also dealt with in a recent US Supreme Court decision.1551 In its 
opinion, the Supreme Court held that: 
The canon or presumption that federal law is not meant to have extraterritorial effect is 
applicable in all cases, whenever party seeks to give any federal legislation extraterritorial 
effect, including cases arising under the Securities Exchange Act.1552 
In the view put forward by Heminway, this court opinion affects 
international business law and practice.1553 Before Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd, 
the US federal courts consistently followed a line of cases laws with a test that 
assessed the involvement of the defendant to justify the exercise of jurisdiction.1554 
The courts evaluated the conduct and effects of the defendant’s activities in the 
US and the impact on US markets and investors.1555 However, a number of 
commentators criticized this judicial test because it has no textual basis.1556 
Heminway argued that the decision in Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. defines a 
clearer and narrower rule of the extraterritorial range of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.1557 Therefore, the US Supreme Court has created more stringent limits for 
the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in securities fraud 
                                                     
1549 Id. 15 USC § 78c (a) (17). 
1550 HEMINWAY, supra note 1547 at 3. 
1551 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). In this case foreign investors 
brought action against Australian banking corporation, alleging securities fraud as to 
foreign transaction. See also HEMINWAY, supra note 1547 at 2. 
1552 MORRISON V. NAT’L AUSTL. BANK LTD., 130 S. CT. 2869 (2010), supra note 1551. The US 
Supreme Court held that “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on 
an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United 
States.” Id. note 2888. See also HEMINWAY, supra note 1547 at 7. 
1553 HEMINWAY, supra note 1547 at 7. 
1554 Id. at 8. 
1555 Id. at 8. 
1556 Id. at 9. 
1557 Id. at 9. 
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actions.1558 Consequently, the SOX will apply to issuers who have securities 
registered on the US Stock exchanges and are required to file reports.1559 In 2003, 
there were more than 1,300 foreign companies with securities listed on the US 
Stock exchanges.1560 As a result, the SOX has led to the creation of a complex legal 
environment for the foreign companies concerned. In 2004, thirty-one German 
companies were registered.1561 At that time, Germany held the top spot on the list 
of European countries listed on both NSYE and NASDAQ.1562 Today, as 
mentioned previously, only five German companies are still listed on the US 
Stock Exchanges.1563 Hence, the SOX does not have such a significant effect on 
German companies. Despite this fact, the next sections examine the effects of the 
SOX provisions as regards compliance issues and the compliance function within 
foreign corporations in order to obtain standards for corporate structures. 
b.  Section 302 of  the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
One of the major goals of Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was 
to improve the quality of corporate reporting in the United States and, thus, 
recover investors’ confidence. 1564 The requirements of this Section relate not 
directly, but indirectly to compliance issues. The chief executive officer (CEO) and 
the chief financial officer (CFO), or persons, performing similar functions, have to 
sign each annual or quarterly accounting report.1565 Before doing so, they must 
fulfill six requirements stipulated in Section 302: (1) must have reviewed the 
report, (2) ensure that the report does not contain any untrue statement, (3) 
financial information included in the report is fairly current, (4) responsibility for 
establishing and maintaining internal controls, (5) disclosure to the issuer’s 
                                                     
1558 Id. at 19. 
1559 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 2 (a) (7). 
1560 Shirley, supra note 1179 at 511. 
1561 Id. at 512. 
1562 Id. at 512. 
1563 Aixtron, Deutsche Bank, Fresenius Medical Care, SAP, Voxeljet. See The Complete List 
of German ADRs Trading on the US Markets | TopForeignStocks.com, 
TOPFOREIGNSTOCKS.COM (2015), http://topforeignstocks.com/foreign-adrs-list/the-german-
adrs-trading-on-the-us-markets/ (last visited Feb 20, 2016). 
1564 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 302, 15 USC 7241 - Corporate 
responsibility for financial reports. 
1565 Id. § 302 (a). 
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auditors and the audit committee1566 of the board of directors and (6) indicate in 
the report any significant changes in internal controls or in other factors.1567 These 
certifications refer to Rule 13a-14 of the SEC. 1568 Every issuer has to report and file 
to the SEC separate Forms 10-Q, 10-K or 10-KSB1569 for each foreign private issuer 
under Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act.1570 The certification required by paragraph (d) 
of this Section must be signed by each chief executive officer and each chief 
financial officer of the issuer.1571 Therefore, this SOX provision refers directly to 
the conduct of corporate directors and officers.1572 For example, in Form 20-F, the 
company is required to disclose annually that it has adopted a code of ethics that 
applies to the registrant’s chief executive officer, chief financial officer, chief 
accounting officer, or chief controller.1573 The term ‘code of ethics’ means written 
standards that are reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and to promote, e.g. 
(1) honest and ethical conduct, (2) compliance with applicable governmental laws, 
rules and regulations and (3) prompt internal reporting of violations of the code 
to an appropriate person.1574 The issuer should design disclosure controls or 
procedures to ensure that the necessary information is communicated to the 
management.1575 
                                                     
1566 Id. § 202 (3). The audit committee is present in every public company. The SOX 
requires that the audit committee is staffed by independent directors. “Each audit 
committee must have the authority to engage independent counsel and other advisers, as 
it determines necessary to carry out its duties. It has to establish procedures regarding 
accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters.” See also SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 17 CFR 240.10A-3 - Listing standards relating to 
audit committees. 
1567 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 302 (a) (1)-(6). 
1568 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629 § 240.13a-14 Certification of 
disclosure in annual and quarterly reports. 
1569 SEC, SEC | FORM 10-K, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm (last visited Feb 19, 
2016). 
1570 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629 § 78m (a) (2012). 
1571 Id.17 CFR 240.13a-14 (a). 
1572 Fischer, supra note 1186 at 101. 
1573 SEC, SEC | FORM 20-F, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form20-f.pdf (last visited Feb 
19, 2016) Item 16B Code of Ethics. 
1574 Id. Item 16B Code of Ethics. 
1575 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 17 CFR 240.13a-14 (a). 
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Overall, it is important to note that Section 3021576 (the requirement for CEO 
and CFO certification of financial statements) provides no exemptions for foreign 
issuers and the rule specifically emphasizes that the Act requires a ‘no exemption’ 
policy.1577 Another aspect to be taken into account under Section 302 is that the 
CEOs and CFOs could be held personally liable for any misstatements in their 
firms' financial periodic reports.1578 Thus, this provision could distract top 
management focus from business issues towards compliance with rules.1579 
Although the compliance officer is not mentioned in Section 302 of the SOX, it 
may well be that the CEO and CFO could be responsible for establishing, 
improving and maintaining internal controls concerning compliance issues. Thus, 
the next section will analyze the Section 404 of the SOX relating to compliance. 
c.  Section 404 of  the Sarbanes-Oxley Act  
As has been noted previously, in 2003, the SEC implemented Section 404 of 
SOX.1580 Similar to Section 302 of the SOX, Section 404 requires companies to put 
in place a periodic monitoring and assessment of their internal systems to ensure 
accurate ﬁnancial reports.1581 This provision states, inter alia, that the management 
is responsible for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control 
structure and procedures for financial reporting.1582 In addition, Section 404 
requires that an independent outside auditor attests to the management’s 
                                                     
1576 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 302. 
1577 Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Flow of International Listings, 46 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 383–425, 392 
(2008). 
1578 Alexander et al., supra note 1215 at 275; T. Jean Engebretson & Heidi Hylton Meier, The 
Perceived Effectiveness of the Officer Certification Requirement under Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AUDITING 176–190, 178 (2011). 
1579 Piotroski and Srinivasan, supra note 1577 at 393. 
1580 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 404 - Management assessment of internal 
controls; FINAL RULE: MANAGEMENT’S REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL 
REPORTING AND CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN EXCHANGE ACT PERIODIC REPORTS; REL. 
NO. 33-8238, 17 CFR 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270 and 274 (2003). 
1581 Iliev, supra note 1193 at 1163. 
1582 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 404 (a) (1). 
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assessment of the company controls.1583 According to the final SEC Rule, the 
internal control report should include: 
a statement to identify the framework used by management to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting.1584  
The SEC explains the term "internal controls and procedures for financial 
reporting” as follows:1585 
It means controls that pertain to the preparation of financial statements for external 
purposes that are fairly presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles as addressed by the codification of statements on auditing standards.1586  
Under the supervision of, the issuer's principal executive and principal financial 
officers, or persons performing similar functions, [.] to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements 
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.1587 
Therefore, Section 404 of the SOX lays down a number of internal 
monitoring requirements, accounting and auditing standards, and disclosure 
requirements on issuers.1588 Hence, companies need to invest time and resources 
in both Section 404 compliance and in their compliance programs to prevent 
wrongdoing. The compliance officer of the issuers should read carefully the 
legislation and the rules to enable him or her to provide support and assistance 
                                                     
1583 Iliev, supra note 1193 at 1163. 
1584 FINAL RULE: MANAGEMENT’S REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL 
REPORTING AND CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN EXCHANGE ACT PERIODIC REPORTS; REL. 
NO. 33-8238, supra note 1601; SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 15 USC 
78, 17 CFR 240.13a-15 - Controls and procedures. 
1585 FINAL RULE: MANAGEMENT’S REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL 
REPORTING AND CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN EXCHANGE ACT PERIODIC REPORTS; REL. 
NO. 33-8238, supra note 1580. 
1586 Id. The AICPA Statements and Standards - this codification supersedes all existing 
non-SEC accounting standards. See ICAEW, AICPA STATEMENTS AND STANDARDS | 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS | LIBRARY | ICAEW, http://www.icaew.com/en/library/subject-
gateways/accounting-standards/us-accounting-standards/aicpa-statements-and-standards 
(last visited Feb 19, 2016). 
1587 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 15 USC 78, 17 CFR 240.13a-15 (f). 
1588 Sale, supra note 26 at 724. 
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for senior management and boards of directors faced with having to interpret 
SEC disclosure rules.1589  
Due to the political and academic debate1590 on the costly effects of Section 
404, small US companies and foreign companies were granted a “stay of execution” 
for a reasonable period from 2002 until 2004.1591 Small companies with a public 
float1592 under US$ 75 million were required to file their first management report 
for the fiscal year 2007.1593 Foreign companies with a public float of less than US$ 
700 were not required to file an auditor’s attestation to the report in the first year, 
namely 2006.1594 
In addition to the increased cost incurred as a result of Section 404 there are 
also other consequences for companies. A study by Nagy and Cenker revealed that 
the internal audit within companies “shifted toward a compliance focus.”1595 Their 
findings present expected benefits for internal auditors, like job security and 
increased pay, but it is possible that the compliance workload could increase and 
reduce professionalism as a result.1596  
Today, however, Section 404 and its regulations set forth elements of 
internal monitoring requirements and standards that the compliance officer also 
needs to give careful consideration.1597 The result within companies could be the 
                                                     
1589 Preeti Choudhary, Jason D. Schloetzer & Jason D. Sturgess, Boards, Auditors, Attorneys 
and Compliance with Mandatory SEC Disclosure Rules, 34 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION 
ECONOMICS 471–487, 9 (2013). 
1590 See supra A., I., p. 187. 
1591 Iliev, supra note 1193 at 1165. 
1592 “Also known as public equity float. The portion of a company's outstanding shares 
that is in the hands of public investors, as opposed to company officers, directors, or 
stockholders that hold controlling interests. These are the shares that are available for 
trading.” See PLC - Public Float, http://us.practicallaw.com/6-382-3723 (last visited May 
24, 2016); See also CATEGORY OF FILER SEC, supra note 1568. 
1593 Iliev, supra note 1193 at 1165. 
1594 Id. at 1165. 
1595 Albert L. Nagy & William J. Cenker, Internal Audit Professionalism and Section 404 
Compliance: The View of Chief Audit Executives from Northeast Ohio, 11 INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF AUDITING 41–49, 41 (2007). “This study is based upon the responses from 
interviews conducted with 17 Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) of large US public 
companies.” 
1596 Id. at 41–42. 
1597 Sale, supra note 26 at 724. 
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more conscious handling with compliance issues. Therefore, the next section 
introduces the enforcement of compliance followed by a summary of the 
enhanced responsibilities of the compliance officer’s work under the SOX. 
d.  The Shifting in Responsibilities for Compliance Tasks  
Despite the fact that the SOX rules do not provide a section that refers 
directly to the compliance officer, Section 307 points out the professional role and 
responsibilities of corporate attorneys in the disclosure process.1598 For example, 
attorneys should assist the senior management1599 with the preparation of SEC 
disclosure documents.1600 The Sarbanes-Oxley requires the SEC to set minimum 
standards of professional conduct, as for lawyers.1601 In accordance with the SEC 
Rule pursuant to Section 307, the attorney has the duty to report evidence of a 
material violation to the issuer's chief legal officer or chief executive officer.1602 
Therefore, the SEC requires attorneys with evidence of material violations of 
federal securities laws to report misconduct to the chief legal counsel or the chief 
executive officer of the company.1603 In the event of no response from the chief 
legal officer or chief executive officer within a reasonable time, the attorney shall 
report the evidence of a material violation to the audit committee or another 
committee or the board of directors.1604 An attorney who violated these 
requirements shall be subject to the civil penalties and remedies in an action by 
the SEC.1605 An exemption shall apply to an attorney practicing outside the US.1606 
                                                     
1598 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 307, 15 USC 7245. 
1599 Examples including the executive officers, CEO and CFO.  
1600 Form 10-K, SEC, supra note 1509; Form 20-F, SEC, supra note 1513. 
1601 Stephen M. Cutler, SEC SPEECH: THE THEMES OF SARBANES-OXLEY AS REFLECTED IN THE 
COMMISSION’S ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092004smc.htm (last visited Feb 24, 2016). 
1602 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 307 (1), 15 USC 7245; SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 17 CFR 205.3. 
1603 Cutler, supra note 1601., See also SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 307 (1). 
1604 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 307 (2), 15 USC 7245; SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 17 CFR 205.3 (3). 
1605 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 17 CFR 205.6 (a). 
1606 Id.17 CFR 205.6 (d). 
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In addition, the SEC requires the accuracy of mandatory disclosure 
timeliness.1607 For example, the annual reports on Form 10-K must be filed within 
60, 75, or 90 days of the fiscal year end.1608 In 2005, the SEC filed approximately 80 
enforcement actions against corporate attorneys’ pursuant to Section 307.1609 The 
total number of SEC enforcement actions increased from 676 in 2013 to 807 in 
2015.1610 These actions include prosecution on grounds of accounting violations, 
misstating financial results, disclosure failures, suspending accountants for bad 
auditing or the liability of attorneys, accountants and other executive officers for 
failures to comply with professional standards.1611 
Although today many companies in the US have a senior officer responsible 
for compliance, originally, the general counsel was the corporate compliance 
officer.1612 However, in recent years their responsibilities have passed into the 
hands of the compliance personnel.1613 Generally, the corporate attorneys are 
classic ‘gatekeepers’ within the corporate environment because their services are 
often needed to achieve corporate objectives.1614 In other words a ‘gatekeeper’ is: 
An independent professional who plays one or two distinct roles, which tend to 
overlap in practice. First, the gatekeeper may be a professional who is positioned so as to 
be able to prevent wrongdoing […]. Second an agent who acts as a reputational 
intermediary to assure investors as to the quality of the ‘signal’ sent by the corporate 
issuer.1615  
Coffee identifies four basic factors that comprise the gatekeeper function; 
liability, regulation, reputational resources and supervision by a principal.1616 One 
theory by Kraakman describes the ‘gatekeeper’ as an actor with the capacity to 
                                                     
1607 Choudhary, Schloetzer, and Sturgess, supra note 1589 at 18. 
1608 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, 17 CFR 240.12b-2. 
1609 Choudhary, Schloetzer, and Sturgess, supra note 1589 at 10. 
1610 SEC, SEC ANNOUNCES ENFORCEMENT RESULTS FOR FY 2015, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-245.html (last visited Feb 24, 2016). 
1611 Id. 
1612 See supra Ch. 3, A., I., 2., p. 128; Miller, supra note 542 at 8; MILLER, supra note 25 at 129. 
1613 MILLER, supra note 25 at 129. 
1614 “The gatekeeper has control over the ‘gate’. The ‘gate’ is a metaphor, which separates 
the company from corporate objective.” See Id. at 296. 
1615 J.C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (1. ed. 
2006). 
1616 COFFEE, supra note 1615. 
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monitor, to control, and thus to deter wrongdoing.1617 Generally, ‘gatekeeper’ are 
considered to be actors who are able to deter corporate wrongdoing.1618 
However, there is an American debate on the question of whether the 
corporate lawyer ought to actually have compliance gatekeeping 
responsibilities?1619 DeStefano argues that it is difficult to describe “where legal ends 
and compliance begins”1620 and therefore, it could be argued that law and 
compliance go hand in hand.1621 Similarly, Langevoort does not acknowledge any 
clear distinction between legal advice and compliance oversight.1622 Nevertheless, 
nowadays, large American corporations have ethics and compliance officers with 
separate departments from the legal department.1623 Hence, the enforcement of 
corporate responsibilities distinguishes the compliance function from the legal 
department.1624 In spite of this development both legal and compliance functions 
rely on legal expertise to perform their duties.1625 Additionally, the compliance 
personnel are responsible for risk assessment and for communicating and 
providing training on the legal regulations to employees.1626 However, having a 
law degree is not a prerequisite for becoming a compliance officer.1627 Finally, 
Tuch emphasized the ‘multiple gatekeeper’ phenomenon within companies.1628 
Nowadays, the boundaries between legal, accounting, and financial skills are 
blurring within the corporate environment.1629 Overall, the question that arises 
from the developments outlined above is whether the compliance officer is 
considered to be a ‘gatekeeper.’ While, there is currently no academic debate on 
                                                     
1617 Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 THE 
YALE LAW JOURNAL 857, 890 (1984). 
1618 Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1583–1672, 1590 (2010). 
1619 Pro SEC, supra note 625, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
1620 DeStefano, supra note 20 at 91. 
1621 Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk and 
the Financial Crisis, WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 495–519, 500 (2011). 
1622 Id. at 500. 
1623 Id. at 500. 
1624 DeStefano, supra note 20 at 71. 
1625 Id. at 91. 
1626 Id. at 96. 
1627 Id. at 101. 
1628 Tuch, supra note 1618 at 1601. 
1629 Id. at 1601. 
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this consideration, the compliance officer should be aware that he has the capacity 
to monitor, to control, and thus to deter wrongdoing.  
Furthermore, governmental agencies such as such as the Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) of the SEC and the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) promote the separation between legal and compliance departments with 
governmental agreements. When corporations are involved in governmental 
investigations, the SEC emphasizes the formal structure and compliance 
programs within companies.1630 For example, in the corporate integrity 
agreement1631 between Grace Healthcare and the OIG, the company was required 
to establish and maintain a compliance program and appoint an individual as 
compliance officer.1632 In addition, the OIG requires: 
The compliance officer shall be a member of senior management of Grace, shall report 
directly to the chief executive officer of Grace, shall make periodic (at least quarterly) 
reports regarding compliance matters directly to the board of directors of Grace, and shall 
be authorized to report on such matters to the board of directors at any time. The 
compliance officer shall not be or be subordinate to the general counsel or chief financial 
officer.1633 
A 2013 survey by PWC of 800 chief compliance officers in UK and US-based 
companies found an emerging trend in US companies for the CCO to first report 
to the chief executive officer.1634 These results showed that the CEO is beginning 
to play a greater role in compliance oversight.1635 The study confirmed that the 
role of compliance has evolved via the formality of compliance structures.1636 The 
                                                     
1630 DeStefano, supra note 20 at 110. 
1631 DHHS, OIG, CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT (CIA)  BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG) OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES (HHS) (2013), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/Grace_Healthcare_ 
03042013.pdf. 
1632 Id. at 2. 
1633 Id. at 3. 
1634 SALLY BERNSTEIN, BARBARA KIPP & TRACEY GROVES, PWC-2013-SURVEY | DEEPER 
INSIGHT FOR GREATER STRATEGIC VALUE | STATE OF COMPLIANCE 2 (2013), 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/risk-management/assets/pwc-soc-survey-2013-final.pdf (last 
visited Feb 25, 2016). Twenty percent of the CCO reported to the CEO in 2012 vs. 28 
percent in 2013.  
1635 PWC SURVEY 2013 Id. at 9. 
1636 Id. at 7. 
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study also found a growing demand for effectiveness of the compliance program 
from both regulators and the board.1637 A study by the Society of Corporate 
Compliance and Ethics and Health Care Compliance (SCCE) examined the 
relationship between the board of directors and the compliance officer.1638 The 
results showed that among publicly traded companies the percentage reporting to 
the board has increased from 41% to 53% since 2010.1639  
In addition, the SEC adopted a new rule under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 in 2004.1640 This rule requires each registered investment company and 
investment adviser to designate one responsible individual - the chief compliance 
officer - to administer the fund's policies and procedures to prevent violation of 
the Federal Securities Laws.1641 Hence, the enforced legislation and rule-making 
activities by regulators enhanced the independent, separate compliance function 
and changed the reporting structure within both US and foreign listed companies. 
In contrast to the general counsel, the compliance officer must remember to report 
wrongdoing not only to the board but also to the government in order to get 
credit.1642 Thus, the legal framework and requirements of the SOX and the SEC 
rule-making activities have supported the separate development of a standalone 
corporate compliance function since compliance tasks and responsibilities have 
increased significantly since 2002. 
e . The SEC cases against Compliance Officers  
The results of a survey of SEC enforcement actions against chief compliance 
officers and compliance officers showed that from 2003 to 2015, the SEC brought 
only five actions against CCOs at investment advisers within the financial 
services sector who were involved in violations under compliance-related 
                                                     
1637 Id. at 7. 
1638 SCCE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND THE COMPLIANCE AND 
ETHICS OFFICER (2014), http://www.corporatecompliance.org/ (last visited Feb 25, 2016). 
1639 SCCE Survey 2014 Id. at 2. 
1640 INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940, PUB.L. 76–768, 15 USC §§ 80A-1–80A-64 (1940), 17 
CFR 270.38a-1. 
1641 Id. 17 CFR 270.38a-1 (a) (1) (4). 
1642 DeStefano, supra note 20 at 124. 
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rules.1643 In these cases, the SEC held the CCO responsible for the compliance 
failures of his firm.1644 The director of the Division of Enforcement made it clear 
that 
Being a CCO does not provide immunity from liability.1645 
The research did not yield any SEC actions or cases against corporate 
compliance officers. As well as providing an understanding of the enforced 
approach of the SEC against compliance officers, this section examines one of 
these cases against CCOs at investment advisers in detail. This could be helpful in 
showing specific types of misconduct in order to clarify the compliance officers’ 
duties and define the role of this function outside the financial services sector. The 
corporate compliance officer needs to consider how the administrative agencies 
lead their enforcement activities.  
The results of the cases analyzed reveal that the SEC targets compliance 
officers for securities law violations in particular. However, the number of actions 
against chief compliance officers under compliance-related rules is small. For 
example, in 2015, the SEC brought two actions against registered investment 
adviser, Pekin Singer and Carl Johns. Some commentators argue that the last two 
SEC actions1646 against CCOs seem to indicate to a policy change on the part of the 
SEC and they conclude that enforcers in other industries are liable to follow.1647 In 
                                                     
1643 Over the term of this period, the total amount of the SEC actions was 8,000 and 807 in 
2015. SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2015 3, 
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/select-sec-and-market-data/secstats2015.pdf (last visited 
May 25, 2016). 
1644 Andrew Ceresney & Division of Enforcement, SEC | 2015 NATIONAL SOCIETY OF 
COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONALS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE: KEYNOTE ADDRESS (2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/keynote-address-2015-national-society-compliance-prof-
cereseney.html (last visited Feb 25, 2016). In 2015, the SEC brought two actions against 
CCOs of Adviser firms, BlackRock (BLK) Advisers and LLC SFX Financial Advisory 
Management Enterprises Inc. 
1645 Id. 
1646 SEC, United States before the SEC v. Pekin Singer Strauss Asset Management Inc., et al., 
Release No. 31688 (2015); SEC, United States before the SEC v. SFX Financial Advisory 
Management Enterprises, Inc. and Eugene S. Mason, No.  3-16591 (2015). 
1647 Ben DiPietro, SEC ACTIONS STIR CONCERNS OVER COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY (2015), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/06/24/sec-actions-stir-concerns-over-
compliance-officer-liability/ (last visited Feb 25, 2016). 
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the SEC action against SFX, the CCO was charged because the required policy 
was not effectively implemented.1648 In the second SEC action against Pekin Singer, 
the firm failed to conduct timely annual compliance program reviews and to 
implement and enforce certain provisions of its procedures and the code of 
ethics.1649 The chief compliance officer joined Pekin Singer in November 2006 to 
fill a variety of roles, including backup trader, backup trade reconciliation, 
research analyst, and portfolio manager.1650 However, the CCO had no 
compliance background and no compliance staff.1651 He learned from a 
compliance conference in 2008 and wanted to improve the efficiency of the 
compliance program.1652 Additionally, the CEO knew that the CCO had limited 
experience and training in compliance issues.1653 Nevertheless, the compliance 
program was not a priority for the firm or the board.1654 As a result, Peking Singer 
violated the Advisers Act1655 and the SEC charged the adviser’s president based 
on these violations.1656 The CCO was not charged since he received no support 
from the board in his attempts to improve compliance issues.1657 
Andrew Ceresney, Director of the Division of Enforcement of the SEC made it 
clear that the SEC will bring actions against CCOs as soon as they become 
involved in misconduct, in fraudulent activity or other conduct that harms 
investors and is unrelated to their compliance function.1658 In these cases, the chief 
compliance officer was also in charge of other roles in the company.1659 Secondly, 
                                                     
1648 SEC, United States before the SEC v. SFX Financial Advisory Management Enterprises, Inc. 
and Eugene S. Mason, File No. 3-16591, 3 (2015). 
1649 United States v Pekin Singer, SEC, supra note 1642 at 2. 
1650 Id. at 3. 
1651 Id. at 4. 
1652 Id. at 4. 
1653 Id. at 4. 
1654 Id. at 4. 
1655 INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, PUB. L. 112-90, 15 USC. § 80B-1-80B-21 (1940). 
1656 Richard L. Cassin, SEC: WE PROTECT COMPLIANCE OFFICERS, EXCEPT WHEN WE PROSECUTE 
THEM, THE FCPA BLOG (2015), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/11/9/sec-we-protect-
compliance-officers-except-when-we-prosecute.html (last visited Feb 25, 2016). 
1657 Id. 
1658 Ceresney and Division of Enforcement, supra note 1644. 
1659 Id. 
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the SEC charges CCOs who obstruct or mislead the Commission staff.1660 Thirdly, 
the SEC charges CCOs who fail to carry out their responsibilities, such as under 
rule 206(4)-7 and other compliance-related rules.1661 
To conclude, the SEC cases against CCOs at investment advisers and the 
declared approach of the SEC show that the corporate compliance officer needs to 
familiarize himself with and establish effective compliance policies and 
procedures. In the event of the compliance officers’ failure to establish an effective 
compliance program, he could be held liable. However, in the event of any lack of 
support or resources from the board, the compliance officer should document his 
proposals on the improvement of compliance policies and procedures. 
Considering this SEC approach examined above, the corporate compliance officer 
ought to pay attention to the course of action of the SEC within the financial 
services sector, to the SEC rules and to the responsibilities under the SOX. 
f .  Conclusion - The Compliance Officers Work under SOX  
Legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has improved the accounting 
and reporting responsibility for the chief executive officers within companies. 
Although this Act is part of the federal law, it also affects corporate structures 
within publicly traded companies, issuers, that are listed on the US Stock 
exchanges. The main SOX provisions address certified periodic financial 
reporting by CEOs and CFOs,1662 internal control structure of the financial 
reporting,1663 corporate and lawyer accountability,1664 disclosure requirements,1665 
                                                     
1660 “The SEC brought an action against a former Wells Fargo Advisors compliance officer 
who allegedly altered a document before it was provided to the SEC during an 
investigation.” See Id.; SEC, SEC ANNOUNCES ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST FORMER 
WELLS FARGO ADVISORS COMPLIANCE OFFICER FOR ALTERING DOCUMENT (2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543175814 (last visited 
Feb 25, 2016). 
1661 Ceresney and Division of Enforcement, supra note 1644; INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 
1940, supra note 165517 CFR 275.206(4)-7(a) “Adopt and implement written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to prevent violation, by you and your supervised 
persons, of the Act and the rules that the Commission has adopted under the Act.” 
1662 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 302, 15 USC 7241. 
1663 Id. § 404, 15 USC 7262. 
1664 Id. § 302, 15 USC 7241; § 307, 15 USC 7245. 
1665 Id. §§ 401-403, 15 USC 7261. 
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the role of the independent auditor of the issuer,1666 and criminal penalties.1667 The 
SOX also created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)1668 
to regulate and oversee the auditing practices of listed companies. Overall, this 
legislation affects corporate structures, increases reporting and disclosures 
obligations, and compliance responsibilities. The responsibilities for the 
executives’ officers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are shown in a checklist, Table 
4, below:  
 
Table 4 - Checklist - The SOX Responsibilities for Executives Officers 
Requirements under 
SOX 
Compliance with SEC 
Rules 
Responsibilities for 
Executive Officer 
Section 302 Certification 
Corporate Responsibility for 
Financial Reports 
17 CFR 240.13a-14  
 
Certification of disclosure in 
annual and quarterly reports - 
filed on Form 10-Q, Form 10-K, 
Form 20-F. 
Signed by an issuer's principal 
executive and principal 
financial officers, CEO or CFO. 
Section 404 Management 
Assessment of Internal 
Controls. 
17 CFR 240.13a-15 (e)(f) 
Every issuer must maintain 
disclosure controls and 
procedures, and internal 
control over financial 
reporting, required to file an 
annual report. 
Under the supervision of the 
issuer's principal executive and 
principal financial officer. 
The reports have to 
communicated to the issuer's 
management by a body or 
group. 
Section 307 Rules of 
Professional Responsibility 
for Attorneys 
17 CFR 205.3, 205.4, 205.5, 205.6 
Duty to report evidence of a 
material violation, 
Responsibilities of supervisory 
attorneys, Sanctions and 
discipline, Civil penalties and 
remedies. 
The attorney is required to 
report a material violation of 
securities law or breach of 
fiduciary duty to the chief legal 
counsel or the chief executive 
officer. 
In the case of no response, then 
the attorney is required to 
report to the audit committee 
                                                     
1666 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629, § 3, 15 USC 78(c); SARBANES-OXLEY 
ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 2 (a) (7), 15 USC 7201. 
1667 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 807, 18 USC 1348. 
1668 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 101, 15 USC 7211. 
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of the board of directors. . 
 
A number of U.S companies and foreign listed companies responded with a 
shift in compliance responsibilities and the separation between the legal and 
compliance department, with the appointment of a compliance officer1669 and with 
changes to the internal reporting structures in ‘less regulated’1670 industries also. 
Both the requirements of the SOX and the rule-making activities of the SEC have a 
considerable influence on the work of the executives’ officers, particularly of the 
CEO and CFO, attorney and indirectly of the compliance officer. Since the 
enactment of the SOX, the responsibilities and duties of these functions have 
increased markedly.1671 
To conclude, the challenges that arose in the SEC actions against compliance 
officers in the financial services sector are wide-ranging and include challenges 
for the corporate compliance officer. The compliance officer’s skills need to be 
diverse, e.g. legal, accounting, financial and communication skills.1672 The 
compliance officer has to continuously improve compliance policies and 
procedures, to oversee reporting deadlines, to provide information on compliance 
issues to the board or CEO, to manage audits and investigations into regulatory 
compliance issues, to establish and maintain excellent relationships with 
regulators, and to respond to requests for information from administrative 
agencies.1673 The compliance officer should be aware that he could be held liable, 
and charged and fined by the SEC for violating the federal law. The SEC held that 
if a compliance officer has a sufficient position of influence and resources within a 
firm, he or she might be responsible for actively deterring misconduct. Overall, 
the compliance officer needs to ensure and document that the compliance policies 
and procedures work effectively within the company. Hence, the function of the 
                                                     
1669 E.g. 82 percent of tech companies, 80 percent of manufacturing companies have 
appointed a CCO in 2013. See PWC Survey 2013 BERNSTEIN, KIPP, AND GROVES, supra note 
1634 at 8. 
1670 In the U.S: the regulated industries are for example, the financials service industry and 
the health care industry. 
1671 See supra A,. I., 2.d., p. 247.  
1672 See supra A,. I., 2.e., p. 251. 
1673 See supra A,. I., 2.e., p. 251; Freeman, supra note 70 at 360. 
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compliance officer began to develop separately, to become more independent and 
more visible. 
For these reasons, the compliance officer is required to establish and 
document clear lines of supervision within the firm.1674 He should know who is 
responsible for supervising the employee or agent in the event of wrongdoing.1675 
Furthermore, the compliance officer should periodically review the firm's 
policies. If there are any policies that are not being followed, he should repeal 
these.1676 Even in the event of investigation, the compliance officer is required 
continue the periodic compliance review.1677 The evidence highlights that holding 
multiple functions besides the compliance function can lead to inefficiency.1678 A 
compliance officer with a “two or more hats” role could result in difficulties and 
conflicts of interests. As a result, in their enforced actions against firms and 
individuals such as the CCO, the SEC requires prosecuted firms to establish a 
separate and standalone compliance department, to appoint a CCO with his or 
her own reporting structure and lines directly to the board of director or the 
CEO.1679 In brief, the requirements of the compliance function have increased and 
extended since the SOX has increased the responsibilities for chief executive 
officers and the SEC has prosecuted compliance officers for violating securities 
law as follows: 
(1) Shift in corporate responsibilities for compliance, 
(2) Increased pressure to separate corporate legal and compliance function, 
(3) Improved legal, accounting, financial and communication skills of the 
compliance function, 
(4) Periodically review and document compliance policies and procedures, 
(5) Establish and document clear lines of supervision within the firm, 
(6) Oversee reporting deadlines, 
(7) Manage audits and investigations into regulatory compliance issues, 
                                                     
1674 See supra A,. I., 2.e., p. 251; Richard D. Marshall, BNA INSIGHTS: COMPLIANCE OFFICER 
LIABILITY-- SEC JUDGE SIDES WITH THE COMPLIANCE PROFESSION BLOOMBERG LAW (2015), 
http://www.bna.com/bna-insights-compliance-n17179935485/ (last visited Feb 26, 2016). 
1675 Id. 
1676 Id. 
1677 Id. 
1678 Id. 
1679 See supra A,. I., 2.e., p. 251. 
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(8) Establish and maintain excellent relationships with regulators, 
(9) Demand a standalone compliance function.1680 
Although, to the present date, the SEC has prosecuted only CCOs who 
work within financial services companies, such as investment advisors, and 
broker-dealers, under the Investment Adviser Act and Investment Companies 
Act, all issuers need to adhere to the provisions of the SOX Act. The SEC could 
also use its compliance-rules1681 as a model for unregulated industries.1682 In 
conclusion, the overall role of the compliance officer that emerges from the above 
is a separate function with growing responsibilities and duties within firms. 
Therefore, the SOX, the compliance rules and actions of the SEC look likely to 
further strengthen the corporate compliance function within companies. 
3. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (FSGO) 
Having examined the federal law relating to the compliance function, this 
section introduces guidelines, standards, and recommendations regarding all 
aspects of the compliance officer. Specifically, this section provides a brief history 
of the organizational guidelines1683 and reviews their impact on the sentencing of 
organizations in court cases involving compliance issues.1684 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Senate passed the Sentencing Reform Act 
(SRA)1685 as a “legislative effort to deal with sentencing disparity.”1686 The actual 
                                                     
1680 See supra A,. I., 2.a.-e., p. 237 et seq. 
1681 See e.g. supra note 1571, INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, 17 CFR 275.206(4)-7. 
1682 Fanto, supra note 70 at 37.  
1683 Federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations (FSGO), which apply to corporations, 
partnerships, labor unions, pension funds, trusts, non-profit entities, and governmental 
units. See PAULA DESIO & DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL USSC, AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
ORGANIZATION GUIDELINES, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
training/organizational-guidelines/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf (last visited Mar 8, 2016). 
1684 See supra note 350, United State Code 18 USC, supra note 352, § 18; US SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667, § 8 A1.1., Commentary 1. The term 
‘organizations’ includes corporations, partnerships, associations, joint-stock companies, 
unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organizations, governments and political 
subdivisions thereof, and non-profit organizations. 
1685 SENTENCING REFORM ACT (1984), supra note 57. 
1686 See Senator Kennedy, 1984, Simplification Draft Paper | United States Sentencing 
Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/working-group-
reports/simplification/simplification-draft-paper-2 (last visited Mar 2, 2016). 
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purpose of this Act was to reject the belief that “prisons could reform all criminals 
merely by isolating them from society.”1687 Hence, this Act pursues three major goals 
(1) fulfilling the purposes of sentencing listed in the statute; i.e., punishment, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation; (2) providing certainty and fairness 
among similar cases, and (3) reflecting "advancement in knowledge of human behavior 
as it relates to the criminal justice process."1688 It also establishes an independent 
commission in the judicial branch of the United States - the United States 
Sentencing Commission,1689 which creates sentencing policies and practices for the 
Federal criminal justice system.1690 The Commission has the power to develop 
guidelines and policy statements which help secure the purposes of sentencing 
pursuant to Section 3553 (a)(2).1691 Furthermore, the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 empowers the Commission to monitor the guidelines and submit to 
Congress appropriate modifications of the guidelines.1692 Although the guidelines 
of the Commission are not set forth in law, the Commission states that the 
importance of these guidelines is acknowledged by the US Supreme Court in 
United States v. Booker.1693 The Court held in this case that the enhanced 
application of the federal sentencing guidelines can be justified by the judge’s 
determination of the “real conduct underlying the crime of conviction.”1694 The court 
concluded that the guidelines were not unconstitutional, but they were 
considered to be an “advisory guideline system”.1695 
                                                     
1687 ABA, APRIL 2011 CASES | PUBLIC EDUCATION PREVIEW OF US SUPREME COURT CASES 
(2011), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/april_2011.html#tapia 
(last visited Mar 2, 2016). See, e.g. Tapia v. United States 131 S. Ct. 2382, 180 L. Ed. 2d 357, 
(2011). The question that was presented to the United States Supreme Court: Does 18 USC 
§ 3582(a) allow a district court, when setting the length and term of imprisonment, to 
consider an individual defendant’s need for an in-prison drug treatment program? 
1688 See supra note 350, UNITED STATES CODE 18 USC, supra note 352 § 3553 - Imposition of a 
sentence. See also APRIL 2011 CASES, ABA, supra note 1677. 
1689 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, USSC, supra note 59, 28 USC §§ 991-998. 
1690 Id.28 USC § 991 (a)(b) (1). 
1691 Id.28 USC § 991 (b)(1)(A); 18 USC, supra note 352, § 3553 (a)(2). 
1692 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, USSC, supra note 59, 28 USC § 995. 
1693 United States v. Booker, 543 US 220 (2005).  
1694 Id. at 250. 
1695 Id. at 265–266. 
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Originally, the Guidelines were used by courts when sentencing 
individuals. The guidelines for individuals focus on punishment.1696 In contrast, 
the organizational guidelines focus on providing restitution.1697 However, the 
statistics have shown that a small number of organizations have been sentenced 
each year.1698 During the period from 1984 to 1990, the Commission conducted an 
empirical analysis of organizational sentencing practices and drafted and 
implemented supplementary organizational guidelines.1699 The Commission 
found a lack of consideration among scholars with regard to how organizations 
ought to be sentenced and a great disparity in sentencing practices for 
organizations.1700 In 1988, a working group of private defense attorneys was 
established to develop a set of practical principles for sentencing organizations.1701 
This working group submitted its “recommendations regarding criminal penalties for 
organizations” to the Commission.1702 At the end of this, the Commission used 
three approaches to organize guidelines for narrow ranges for organizations. 
First, the statutory maxima based on pecuniary loss or gain1703, second the 
statutory maxima based on class of offense1704 and third the statutory maxima 
based on type of offense.1705  
The US Code includes provisions on the sentencing of organizations.1706 
Since there are literally hundreds of criminal statutes in the United States Code, 
the Commission attempted to examine the application of these provisions, framed 
                                                     
1696 Murphy, supra note 676 at 702. 
1697 Id. at 703. 
1698 Id. at 698–699. 
1699 USSC, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS 2 
(1991), [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT] http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
training/organizational-guidelines/selected-articles/OrgGL83091.pdf (last visited Mar 2, 
2016). 
1700 Murphy, supra note 676 at 700. 
1701 Supplementary Report , supra note 1699 at 3. 
1702 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, Id. at 3. 
1703 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT Id. at 10.; 18 USC., supra note 352, § 3571 (d) “the defendant 
may be fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss.” 
1704 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT , supra note 1691 at 12; 18 USC, supra note 352 e.g. § 3571 (c) (5) 
“for a Class A misdemeanor that does not result in death, not more than $200,000.” 
1705 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT , supra note 1691 at 12; 18 USC, supra note 352 e.g. § 3571 (c) (5) 
“for a felony, not more than $500,000.” 
1706 18 USC, supra note 352, § 3571 (c) Fines for Organizations. 
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ranges of categories, and placed them in a rational order.1707 Finally, on May 1, 
1991, following many years of research and debate, the Commission promulgated 
an entirely new Chapter Eight to the guidelines for organizations pursuant to 
Section 994 (a).1708  
a.  Chapter Eight -  Sentencing of Organizations 
One of the objectives of the new organizational sentencing guidelines is to 
prevent and deter organizational criminal conduct by providing organizations 
credit for an effective compliance program.1709 The importance of these amended 
guidelines amendments (1991) is that it gives corporations the opportunity to 
reduce criminal penalties if they are able to prove that they had established 
compliance procedures and programs within the firm.1710 The organizational 
guidelines set forth seven minimum criteria for an effective compliance program 
as follows: 
(1) The organization shall exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal 
conduct, 
(2) The board of directors should be competent for exercising reasonable 
oversight of the content and operation of the compliance and ethics program, 
(3) High-level personnel of the organization must be involved in oversight tasks, 
(4) Specific individual(s) shall be delegated day-to-day responsibility and 
appropriate authority for the compliance and ethics program, 
(5) Effective communication to ensure that the organization's compliance program 
is followed to all level of employees, 
(6) Standards must be consistently enforced, 
                                                     
1707 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, USSC, supra note 57. 
1708 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 8 USSC, supra note 667; UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMMISSION, USSC, supra note 59, 18 USC. § 994 (a). 
1709 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 8 Id.§ 8 B2.1, Commentary 1. NACUA, supra 
note 1173 at 4. 
1710 Smith, supra note 527 at 637. 
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(7) Reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct and to 
prevent further similar criminal conduct.1711 
Corporations need to meet these requirements. Furthermore, the 
commentary has added three more factors, that ought to be considered when 
sentencing organizations; first, applicable governmental regulation and industry 
practice; second, the size of the organization; and third, repetition of similar 
misconduct in prior history of the company.1712 Thus, Chapter Eight outlines a 
culpability score that determines the factors that could mitigate sentencing. This 
system begins with five points then proceeds from subsections (b) through (g) 
and at the end, adds or subtracts points to determine the applicable fines.1713 The 
offense level fine table ranges between six or less points with US$ 8,500 and 38 or 
more points with US$ 150,000,000.1714  
Furthermore, the courts also have to ensure that organizations remedy any 
harm caused by the offense.1715 The academic view is that the main aim of the 
guidelines is to promote good corporate governance and best practice by 
encouraging the implementation of effective compliance programs within 
companies.1716  
b.  The FSGO Amendments in 2004 and 2010  
Despite the introduction of the organizational guidelines in 1991, which was 
outlined above, further high-profile corporate scandals involving Enron and 
WorldCom revealed a crucial gap in the effectiveness of corporate compliance 
efforts.1717 In response, the 2004 Amendments of the FSGO added an eighth new 
element for an effective compliance program. This states:1718 
                                                     
1711 Megan Barry, Why Ethics & Compliance Programs can fail, 23 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 
STRATEGY 37–40, 38 (2002); US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch. 8 USSC, supra note 
667 § 8 B 2.1.; Murphy, supra note 677 at 703–704. 
1712 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch. 8 USSC, supra note 667, § 8 B2.1, 
Commentary 2. 
1713 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id.§ 8 C2.5. (a)-(g). 
1714 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id.§ 8 C2.4 . 
1715 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id. Introductory Commentary. 
1716 See e.g. Baer, supra note 610; DeStefano, supra note 20; Murphy, supra note 676 at 706. 
1717 NACUA, supra note 1161 at 5. 
1718 Id. at 5. 
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(c) …the organization shall periodically assess the risk of criminal conduct and shall 
take appropriate steps to design, implement, or modify each requirement set forth in 
subsection (b) to reduce the risk of criminal conduct identified through this process.1719 
Therefore, the FSGO defined the term ‘effective’ for a compliance program 
that is lacking in the FCPA Resource Guide.1720 Based on this, an organization 
needs to periodically assess the risk of criminal conduct, including assessing the 
following aspects: first, the nature and seriousness of such criminal conduct, 
second, the nature of the organization's business - for example, in sales business, 
the organization should establish standards and procedures designed to prevent 
and detect price-fixing; and lastly, the prior history of the types of criminal 
conduct which occurred within the organization.1721 In the view of the 
Commission, Section 8 B2.1 sets forth the requirements for an effective 
compliance and ethics program and responds to Section 805(a)(5) of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, which determines that the Commission shall review and amend the 
guidelines that apply to organizations in Chapter Eight.1722 The guidelines have to 
ensure that they are “sufficient to deter and punish organizational criminal 
misconduct.”1723 
Furthermore, the 2004 Amendments clarified the leadership responsibilities 
relating to compliance.1724 First, the board of directors should be familiar with the 
content and operation of the compliance program and exercise reasonable 
oversight in terms of compliance issues.1725 Second, the director, the executive 
officer, and the individual in charge of a business or functional unit of the 
organization must ensure that the company has an effective compliance program 
as described in the guidelines and a specific individual should be responsible for 
                                                     
1719 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667, § 8 B2.1. (c) (2004). 
1720 FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1267 Ch. 5 - Hallmarks of an effective 
compliance program. See supra A., I., 1.a., p. 204. 
1721 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id.§ 8 B2.1. Commentary 7. 
1722 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id.§ 8 B2.1. Commentary 7. 
1723 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, § 805 (a)(5); UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, USSC, supra note 59, 28 USC § 994. 
1724 ERC, ECOA & SCCE, LEADING CORPORATE INTEGRITY: DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF 
ETHICS &COMPLIANCE OFFICER (CECO) 32 (2007). 
1725 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667, § 8 B2.1 (b) (2) (A). 
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the compliance program.1726 Third, this individual should be responsible for the 
day-to-day operations of the compliance program and should have adequate 
resources, appropriate authority, and direct access to the board of directors.1727 
Therefore, the board of directors must take extra efforts to ensure compliance. 
Compliance issues must be placed on the board’s agenda, with time reserved for 
compliance records, and the compliance officer needs to have at his disposal 
adequate resources and appropriate authority.1728 Thus, these Amendments made 
it clear that a direct relationship between the board and the compliance officer is a 
key element to ensure the board’s oversight duty of compliance.1729 In return, the 
compliance officers themselves have to seek a direct reporting line to the board.1730 
In addition, they have to ensure that the code of conduct and compliance 
standards will continue to be promoted and apply to agents1731, business partners, 
and others serving the organization.1732 According to the federal sentencing 
guidelines, both the board of directors and the compliance officer should work 
closely together. Moreover, the 2004 Amendments also provide additional 
guidance with respect to the implementation of compliance and ethics programs 
by small organizations with fewer than 200 employees.1733  
In 2010, the guidelines were amended again with several changes regarding 
the sentencing of organizations. For example, Section 8 C2.5 (f) was amended by 
inserting: 
                                                     
1726 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id. § 8 B 2.1 (b) (2) (B) (2004). 
1727 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id. § 8 B 2.1 (b) (2) (C) (2004). 
1728 Leading Corporate Integrity ERC, ECOA, AND SCCE, supra note 1724 at 33. 
1729 Greenberg, supra note 601 at 22. 
1730 Leading Corporate Integrity ERC, ECOA, AND SCCE, supra note 1724 at 34. 
1731 The term ‘agent’ relating to the guidelines means any individual, including a director, 
an officer, an employee, or an independent contractor, authorized to act on behalf of the 
organization. See US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667 § 8 A1.2. 
Commentary. 
1732 Leading Corporate Integrity ERC, ECOA, AND SCCE, supra note 1724 at 34. 
1733 USSC, 2011 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL - APPENDIX C - VOLUME III - 
AMENDMENTS TO THE GUIDELINES MANUAL 120 (2011), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2011/manual-
pdf/Appendix_C_Vol_III.pdf (last visited Mar 7, 2016), Amendment 674 (2004). 
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(1) If the offense occurred even though the organization had in place at the time of the 
offense an effective compliance and ethics program, as provided in § 8B2.1 (Effective 
Compliance and Ethics Program), subtract 3 points.1734 
In addition, this section also comprises a mitigating factor if the individual 
with operational responsibility for the compliance program has direct reporting 
obligations to the governing authority or an appropriate subgroup thereof, e.g., an 
audit committee or the board of directors.1735 This obligation includes reporting 
promptly on any matter involving criminal conduct or potential criminal 
conduct.1736 Furthermore, the organization could be given credit for promptly 
reporting the offense to appropriate governmental authorities; and if the 
compliance program revealed the offense before it went public and no 
compliance personnel involved willfully ignored the committal of the offense.1737  
In sum, these four criteria could allow an organization to be granted a 
decrease in sentencing. Overall, the FSGO Amendments 2010 respond to the 
question as to how effective the compliance officer is within a company. Such 
effectiveness could be achieved through direct reporting duties and adequate 
resources. These will strengthen the compliance officers’ role and authority 
within the firm and integrate this function into strategic decision-making.1738 To 
whom the compliance officer reports will continue to determine his or her 
position in the company. 
c.  The Impact of the Organizational Guidelines  (FSGO) 
A study by Murphy found that the organizational guidelines influence four 
areas: sentencing practice, corporate culture, government enforcement and 
regulation, and corporate law.1739 Firstly, the study compares the level of fines 
imposed in the pre-and post-era of the organizational guidelines from 1990 to 
                                                     
1734 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667 § 8 C2.5 (f) (2010). 
1735 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Id. § 8 C2.5 (f) (3) (C) (2010); USSC, supra note 
1675 at 358, Amendment 744 (2010). 
1736 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667 § 8 C2.5 (f) (3) (C) (2010), 
Application Notes. 
1737 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id. § 8 C2.5 (f) (3) (C) (i)-(iv); USSC, supra note 
1724 Amendment 744 (2010). 
1738 Greenberg, supra note 601 at 23. 
1739 Murphy, supra note 676 at 707. 
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2000.1740 Although the number of organizations sentenced does not vary greatly, 
the results show an upwards trend in terms of fines imposed. The median of the 
fine imposed rose from US$ 15,000 to US$ 100,000 between 1990 and 2000.1741 
Apparently, these results represent a move away by the courts from pre-
guidelines sentencing practice for organizations.1742  
An evaluation of the sourcebooks of the Commission for the number of 
organizations sentenced pursuant to Section 8 B2.1 shows the number of cases in 
which the guidelines on the imposition of fines were applied to organizations 
over the period from 2004 to 2014. Table 5 presents a comparison of the number 
and percentage of cases in which the guidelines were applied and the number 
and percentage of cases in which the guidelines were not applied.1743 The chart in 
Figure 9 shows the proportions of each percentage.1744 
 
Table 5 - Number of Organizations sentenced pursuant to § 8 B 2.11745 
Year Cases Applied 
Not 
Applied 
Percent 
Applied 
Percent Not 
Applied 
2004 86 54 32 62.79% 37.21% 
2005 45 22 23 48.89% 51.11% 
2006 217 122 95 56.22% 43.78% 
2007 197 90 107 45.69% 54.31% 
2008 199 98 101 49.25% 50.75% 
2009 177 96 81 54.24% 45.76% 
2010 149 60 89 40.27% 59.73% 
2011 160 74 86 46.25% 53.75% 
                                                     
1740 Id. at 708. 
1741 Id. at 708.; USSC & OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SOURCEBOOK 2000 | UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMMISSION (2000), Table 52. 
1742 Murphy, supra note 676 at 708 footnote 47. 
1743 See supra Table 5, p. 266. 
1744 See supra  
Figure 9, p. 267. 
1745 Sources: USSC & OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORTS & SOURCEBOOKS 
ARCHIVES | UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-
publications/annual-reports-sourcebooks/annual-reports-sourcebooks-archives (last 
visited Mar 22, 2016). 
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Percent App. 62,79% 48,89% 56,22% 45,69% 49,25% 54,24% 40,27% 46,25% 36,90% 40,70% 35,19%
Percent Not 37,21% 51,11% 43,78% 54,31% 50,75% 45,76% 59,73% 53,75% 63,10% 59,30% 64,81%
30,00%
35,00%
40,00%
45,00%
50,00%
55,00%
60,00%
65,00%
70,00%
Proportion of the cases in which the FSGO were applied and to those they were not 
applied from 2004 to 2014 (Source: US Sentencing Commission, Sourcebooks) 
2012 187 69 118 36.90% 63.10% 
2013 172 70 102 40.70% 59.30% 
2014 162 57 105 35.19% 64.81% 
Average 159.18 73.82 91.73 46.94% 53.06% 
Median 172 70 95 46.25% 53.75% 
 
 
Figure 9 - Proportion of the cases in which FSGO were applied and to those they were not applied. 1746 
Table 5 above provides a comparison of the percentage of cases 
(organizations) in which the FSGO were applied and those in which the 
guidelines were not applied.1747 The results reveal that, in 2004, the percentage of 
cases in which the FSGO were applied was twice that of the cases in which they 
                                                     
1746 Sources: See Id. 
1747 See supra Table 5, p. 266. 
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were not applied. This situation has reversed since 2010 and in 2014, the number 
of cases in which the FSGO were not applied was two times higher than the 
number of the cases in which the guidelines were applied.1748 
These results could be attributable to the Amendments of the guidelines in 
2010. These Amendments introduced a new element to the compliance and ethics 
program and tightened the sentencing conditions.1749 Conversely, this means that 
the courts imposed restrictive probation conditions of the fulfillment of the 
requirement to implement and maintain an effective compliance program. 
Companies thus have to consider compliance issues more seriously. Lastly, as 
these findings illustrate, the impact of the organizational guidelines on sentencing 
has been significant and costly. 
Secondly, at the beginning of the 1990s, the organizational guidelines 
supported the creation of an entirely new job description: that of the corporate 
compliance officer.1750 The compliance officer is responsible for developing, 
implementing, maintaining, and reviewing an effective compliance program.1751 
As discussed previously, the corporate compliance function includes creating and 
managing policies and procedures around compliance issues in order to uncover 
and prevent misconduct.1752 Hence, over time, a new corporate compliance 
structure has developed.1753 Furthermore, if the company is able to demonstrate 
that an effective compliance program is in place, the organizational sentencing 
guidelines mitigate corporate criminal penalties.1754 
However, a number of academics state a critical distinction between 
compliance programs that have the designated features on paper only and merely 
served as “window dressing,” like those at Enron or Anderson.1755 In addition, in 
                                                     
1748 See supra Table 5, p. 266. 
1749 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667, § 8 B2.1 (b) (5) (c) (2010). 
1750 Murphy, supra note 676 at 710. 
1751 Id. at 710. 
1752 DeStefano, supra note 20 at 87. 
1753 Id. at 84. 
1754 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667, § 8 C2.5 (f). 
1755 See e.g. BEALE, supra note 1117 at 20; Virginia Bodolica & Martin Spraggon, An 
Examination into the Disclosure, Structure, and Contents of Ethical Codes in Publicly Listed 
Acquiring Firms, 126 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 459–472, 460 (2015); Greenberg, supra 
note 12 at 27 Appendix C; Oded, supra note 1117 at 276; STUCKE, supra note 1176 at 80. 
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several cases, the court has actually found that the corporate compliance program 
was no more than a “paper program.”1756 In 2012, a report by the Ethics Resource 
Center (ERC) conducted an independent assessment of the experience of the 
organizational guidelines over the past twenty years, as well as the effectiveness 
of those guidelines.1757 In this report, the authors acknowledged that the 
guidelines have achieved significant success in reducing workplace misconduct 
by enhancing compliance issues.1758 Additionally, a study by Weber and Fortun 
stated that the business landscape has changed dramatically since the 
promulgation of the organizational guidelines and the SOX. Corporations have 
responded by creating compliance programs and establishing the function of the 
compliance officer.1759 In 2013, a study by Weber and Wasieleski found similar 
results to the effect that the Federal Organization Sentencing Guidelines (FSGO) 
and the SOX support the creation of an internal reporting mechanism and shape 
the current state of compliance programs within companies.1760 Overall, the 2012 
ERC report summarized a list of criteria for a compliance program to be 
considered by companies, for instance:1761 
 The FCPA compliance program requirements imposed by DOJ in recent 
DPAs and the hallmarks of an effective compliance program in the 
FCPA Resource Guide.1762 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance provisions,1763 
 The elements of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations,1764 
                                                     
1756 Oded, supra note 1117 at 276 footnote 21; See e.g. United States v LBS Bank-New York, 
Inc., (E.D.PA. 1990), 757 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Pa. 1990), Crim. A. No. 88-00516-05 (1990). 
1757 ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER (ERC), THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR 
ORGANIZATIONS AT TWENTY YEARS A CALL TO ACTION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROMOTION AND 
RECOGNITION OF EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS. (2012). 
1758 Id. Foreword. 
1759 Weber and Fortun, supra note 4 at 97. 
1760 Weber and Wasieleski, supra note 515 at 617. 
1761 ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER (ERC), supra note 1757 at 58. 
1762 FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1269; See supra A., I., 1a.-e., pp. 197 et 
seq. 
1763 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56; See supra A., I., 2.a.-f., pp. 264 et seq. 
1764 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667, § 8 B2.1.; See supra A., I.; 
3.a.-b., pp. 261 et seq. 
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 Guidance on monitoring internal control systems and Handbooks such 
as COSO, and by the OECD,1765 
 The NYSE and/or NASDAQ listing standard requirements.1766 
Thirdly, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines influence the prosecutorial 
policy of the DOJ.1767 In their memos, the Deputy Attorney Generals listed a 
number of factors for consideration when charging corporations.1768 Both memos 
include “the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program.”1769 Thus, 
an effective compliance program can help defer federal prosecution and mitigate 
criminal penalty.1770 In addition, in practice, the DOJ provides the framework of 
an effective compliance program in their DPAs with prosecuted firms.1771 In these 
agreements, the DOJ refers to Section 8 B2.1. in order to shape the framework and 
conditions of the effectiveness of this program. Thus, it can be seen that the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines have a major impact on government enforcement 
and regulation in terms of corporate compliance structures. 
Fourthly, the last significant influence of the guidelines can be seen in 
corporate law, which will analyze later.1772 In the 1996 landmark case, Caremark,1773 
                                                     
1765 THE COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY, COSO GUIDANCE 
ON MONITORING INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (2009), 
http://www.coso.org/documents/coso_guidance_on_monitoring_intro_online1_002.pdf 
(last visited Feb 16, 2016); OECD, UNODC, AND WORLD BANK, supra note 1494. 
1766 See e.g. NASDAQ, INITIAL GUIDE LISTENING | NASDAQ (2016), 
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/initialguide.pdf (last visited Mar 4, 2016). 
1767 Murphy, supra note 676 at 712. 
1768 Eric Holder & DOJ, Deputy Attorney General, MEMORANDUM | BRINGING CRIMINAL 
CHARGES AGAINST CORPORATIONS (1999), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-
corps.PDF (last visited Mar 4, 2016); Thomson Memo Thompson and DOJ, supra note 
1337. 
1769 Holder and DOJ, Deputy Attorney General, supra note 1768; Thompson and DOJ, supra 
note 1337.  
1770 Murphy, supra note 676 at 712. 
1771 See supra A., I., 1.b., p. 214. 
1772 See supra A., II.,1.a.-c., pp. 290 et seq. 
1773 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22. 
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the organizational guidelines expanded corporate directors’ potential liability to 
their shareholders.1774 In this decision, the court applied the guidelines, citing  
The Guidelines offer powerful incentives for corporations today to have in place 
compliance programs to detect violations of law, promptly to report violations to 
appropriate public officials when discovered, and to take prompt, voluntary remedial 
efforts.1775 
To conclude, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have shaped more clearly 
corporate compliance structures, have supported the creation of direct reporting 
mechanism within companies, have strengthened the compliance officer’s 
position and have also influenced the corporate law over the past twenty years.  
d.  Conclusion –  The Work of the Compliance Officer under the 
FSGO 
The FSGO and the amendments thereto were designed with two key 
sentencing purposes in mind: (1) “punishment,” and (2) “deterrence.”1776 A number 
of authors view the guidelines as an important step in the development of 
corporate compliance because they provide firms incentives to adopt compliance 
programs.1777 These guidelines lead the organizations to measures of preventing 
and detecting crime through the eight elements of an effective compliance 
program. By means of appropriate features of compliance, such as the 
appointment of a compliance officer responsible for the daily compliance 
operations with direct access to the board of directors, the company can be given 
credit in sentencing practice. In brief, the guidelines led to a new focus on 
compliance structure, board oversight, and independent compliance reporting.1778 
However, this approach does not offer precise details for implementation; 
instead, it flexibly enables organizations to act in designing their own appropriate 
compliance program, giving due consideration to the defined framework.1779 It 
                                                     
1774 Murphy, supra note 676 at 713. 
1775 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 969; Murphy, supra note 676 at 714. 
1776 An Overview of the Guidelines DESIO AND USSC, supra note 1675. 
1777 See e.g. Koehler, supra note 978 at 618; MILLER, supra note 25 at 269; Murphy, supra note 
676 at 706; Weber and Fortun, supra note 4 at 97. 
1778 Greenberg, supra note 14 at 1. 
1779 An Overview of the Guidelines DESIO AND USSC, supra note 1675. 
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has been recognized that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations 
have set standards for corporate compliance programs, compliance structure, and 
compliance reporting.1780 Under the FSGO, the compliance officer is required to 
immediately bring compliance problems to the attention of the board of directors 
and establish a direct reporting relationship with the board. In supporting the 
board with compliance issues, the compliance officer should propose to the board 
the establishment of a compliance committee. 
To compare these findings with recent studies by PWC show that only 
approximately 40 percent of US companies from the consumer or retail sectors 
actually have and use a compliance committee.1781 In contrast, in the regulated 
sectors (financial services or healthcare) approximately 60 percent of 
organizations have a compliance committee.1782 While the 2014 study by PWC 
found that investors’ expectations concerning compliance issues rank higher in 
terms of priority than its priority at board level,1783 regulatory compliance is not 
particularly high on the list of priorities for either boards or investors.1784 A 
subsequent study by PWC with 1,102 responses from compliance executives of 
companies from 23 US industry sectors, states that, today, only 35 percent of chief 
compliance officers are actively involved in strategic planning.1785 For this reason, 
the compliance officer needs to use the regulatory framework to embed 
compliance messages into board and management reports in order to bring 
compliance into the consciousness of the board member.1786 The board of directors 
has to understand that strengthening the authority of the compliance officer could 
                                                     
1780 See e.g. Greenberg, supra note 710 at 1; Greenberg, supra note 545 at 3; ERC, ECOA, AND 
SCCE, supra note 1724 at 5; Weber and Wasieleski, supra note 515. 
1781 PWC STUDY 2013 , supra note 1636 at 10; PWC STUDY 2014 , supra note 8 at 5. This 
specialized committee operates separately from the audit committee and it is usually 
composed of a majority of independent directors. See MILLER, supra note 25 at 83. 
1782 PWC STUDY 2013 , supra note 1636 at 10. 
1783 PWC STUDY 2014 supra note 8 at 13. 
1784 PWC STUDY 2014 Id. at 13. 
1785 SALLY BERNSTEIN & ANDREA FALCIONE, PWC-2015 COMPLIANCE SURVEY | MOVING 
BEYOND THE BASELINE LEVERAGING THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION TO GAIN A COMPETITIVE EDGE 
4 (2015), [hereinafter PWC Study 2015] www.pwc.com/us/stateofcompliance. This survey 
includes 1,102 responses to the 2015 survey from compliance executives (compliance 
officers, chief compliance and ethics officers) from companies of the industry sector.  
1786 PWC STUDY 2014 supra note 8 at 13. 
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help to support the board in fulfilling its responsibility for compliance 
oversight.1787 The board should see the compliance officer as a primary supporter 
in overseeing compliance.1788 An empowered role of the compliance officer could 
also provide a defense against directors’ liability.1789  
In addition, in order to achieve these goals, compliance officers should 
provide compliance issues and ensure that the board of directors implements 
compliance into the business strategy of the company.1790 Thus, the compliance 
officer could initiate measures to combine compliance with corporate goals.1791 In 
so doing, he would be able to familiarize himself with the business and could 
evaluate and discover compliance risks in corporate business more effectively.1792 
Furthermore, in order to address compliance risk and to handle compliance tasks, 
the compliance officer needs to be provided with appropriate staff resources and 
budgets.  
Evidently, laws, regulations, and guidelines may help to facilitate and to 
enhance the role of the compliance officer, but compliance officers themselves 
noted that strong government mandates for corporate compliance have resulted 
in some instances in a ‘check-the-box’ mentality within corporations.1793 A number 
of compliance officers mentioned that the establishment of a “specific individual” 
by the Commission for dealing with corporate compliance issues as a point of 
contact for compliance officers could help facilitate better communication and 
reporting lines within companies and between industry and government.1794  
In conclusion, over the past twenty years, the sentencing guidelines for 
organizations have further refined the role of the compliance function in the US. 
With respect to organizations, the original targets of the FSGO - to provide 
certainty and fairness among similar cases - were expanded to include directing 
companies to establish effective compliance procedures and structures. The 
                                                     
1787 Greenberg, supra note 12 at 6. The duty of oversight of the board will be discussed later 
in this part of this thesis. See supra II., 2., p. 290. 
1788 Id. at 7. 
1789 Id. at 8. 
1790 PWC STUDY 2014 , supra note 8 at 12. 
1791 PWC STUDY 2014 Id. at 12. 
1792 PWC STUDY 2014 Id. at 12. 
1793 Greenberg, supra note 12 at 14. 
1794 Id. at 14. 
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guidelines aim to integrate compliance responsibilities into strategic business 
objectives, both in the corporate structure and in the consciousness of the 
board.1795  
4. The Line of Federal Law and the Challenges posed by the Role of Compliance 
Officers 
Having examined the line of relevant federal law, over the course of more 
than 100 years, it can be stated that a strong and complex legislation has evolved 
with respect to compliance issues and the compliance officers’ function in the US. 
In the wake of various corporate scandals, cases of bankruptcy and stock market 
crashes, both the government and the regulators have enforced legislation and 
compliance requirements for corporations. This line of legislation began with the 
introduction of the Interstate Commerce Act of 18871796 and the Sherman Antitrust 
Act of 1890,1797 which were designed to regulate the private sector. Following the 
Great Depression on the stock market, the government introduced additional far-
reaching legislation for publicly traded companies in order to regulate the offer 
and sale of securities and to restore investors’ confidence.1798 The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 19771799 was enacted with the objective of making it unlawful for 
US persons and foreign issuers of securities to make payments to foreign 
government officials in return for business.1800 After a number of high profile 
corporate scandals at the beginning of the new century, Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. In recent years, the enforcement of legislation has 
ended preliminary with the signing of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act as a response to the global economic downturn in 
2010.1801 This extensive legislation empowered the regulators with broad authority 
over all aspects of the securities industry.  
                                                     
1795 Leading Corporate Integrity ERC, ECOA, AND SCCE, supra note 1724 at 17. 
1796 INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT (ICA), supra note 620. 
1797 SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT, supra note 643. 
1798 SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, supra note 624; SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 
629; INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, supra note 1655; INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 
1940, supra note 1640. 
1799 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463. 
1800 FCPA | Criminal Fraud DOJ, supra note 700. 
1801 DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), supra note 
722. 
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To summarize the line of enforcement of Federal Law, Table 6 shows the 
extent of the federal statutes.  
 
Table 6 - Overview of the Extent of Federal Legislation 
Legislation United State Code Number of Sec., Pages 
Interstate Commerce Act Terminated in 1995 n.a. 
Sherman Antitrust Act 15 USC §§ 1–7 Three Sections 
Securities Act (1933) 15 USC §§ 77a-77aa 22 pages 
Securities Exchanges Act 15 USC §§ 78a-78pp 28 pages 
Investment Advisers Act 15 USC §§ 80b 1-21 10 pages 
Investment Comp. Act 15 USC §§ 80a 1-64 58 pages 
FCPA  15 USC §§ 78dd-1 3 pages 
SOX 15 USC, 18 USC 65 pages 
Dodd Frank 12 USC, 15 USC 848 pages 
 
Accordingly, the legal environment of companies has increased. Companies 
and their directors, officers, employees, agents and business partners have to deal 
with the altered legal framework every day. The ongoing enhancement of federal 
law have changed and increased the responsibilities for corporate compliance. In 
today’s complex regulatory environment, corporate reputations or indeed an 
entire company can stand and fall with the issue of compliance with the law. 
Additionally, more recently, regulators such as the DOJ and the SEC have 
required effective corporate compliance policies, procedures, and even the 
designation of a chief compliance officer position. As a result, the compliance 
officer now faces new challenges in order to avoid governmental investigations, 
fines, and expensive settlements for the company. For this reason, legal scholars 
have named the compliance officer the ‘second defense line’1802 or ‘gatekeepers’ after 
the business units within a company. The following tabular comparison between 
the FCPA, SOX and FSGO, which were examined above, provides the 
                                                     
1802 Miller, supra note 542 at 4; Traeger, Guidroz, and Jimbo, supra note 511 at 25. 
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recommendations on required compliance responsibilities with respect to the 
compliance function within companies. 
 
Table 7 - Comparison between the FCPA, SOX and FSGO Recommendations with respect to 
the Compliance Function1803 
FCPA, Resource Guide, DOJ, 
N/DPA 
SOX and the SEC cases FSGO, Manual Chapter Eight, 
§ 8 B2.1  
Clearly articulated policy 
against corruption from the 
management 
Periodic improvement of 
compliance policies and 
procedures  
High-level personnel of the 
organization shall ensure that 
the organization has an 
effective compliance program 
Code of conduct and 
compliance policies and 
procedures 
Maintain disclosure controls 
and procedures, and internal 
control over financial 
reporting, file an annual report 
Promotion of an organizational 
culture that encourages ethical 
conduct and a commitment to 
compliance with the law 
Oversight, autonomy, and 
resources of a company’s 
compliance program 
Increase , e.g. legal, accounting, 
financial and communication 
skills of the compliance officer 
Compliance program shall be 
reasonably designed, 
implemented, and enforced 
Risk assessment to developing 
an effective compliance 
program 
Shift in corporate compliance 
responsibilities, separation 
between the legal and 
compliance department 
The organization shall 
periodically assess the risk of 
criminal conduct to reduce the 
risk of criminal conduct. 
Training and continuing advice 
on anti-bribery regulations  
Manage audits and 
investigations into regulatory 
compliance issues, 
Reasonable steps to 
communicate and conduct 
effective training programs 
Incentives and disciplinary 
Measures 
Establish and maintain 
excellent relationships with 
regulators, and to respond to 
requests for information 
Specific individual(s) within 
the organization shall be 
delegated day-to-day 
operational responsibility for 
the compliance program 
Third-party due diligence and Establish and document clear Exercise due diligence to 
                                                     
1803 See generally A., I., 1. to 3., pp. 187 et seq. 
CHAPTER 4 | 277 
 
payments, designing anti-
bribery contract terms, ongoing 
monitoring and reviewing  
lines of supervision within the 
firm 
prevent and detect criminal 
conduct 
Confidential reporting and 
internal investigation 
Oversee reporting deadlines, 
Provide information on 
compliance issues to the board 
or CEO 
Individual(s) with operational 
responsibility shall report 
periodically to high-level 
personnel and, as appropriate, 
to the governing authority. 
 
As we have seen, in response to an increased line of federal law and the rule 
making activities by regulators, corporate compliance departments were assigned 
more responsibilities for compliance issues and an effective compliance program 
to reduce violations of law and fines in the event of an offense. While in the 
recommendations of the FCPA the compliance function is not specifically 
mentioned or required, since 1991 the FSGO have required an effective program 
with specific “high-level personnel” of the organization to be responsible for the 
compliance and ethics program.1804 Individuals who have “day-to-day operational 
responsibility” have to report regularly to high-level personnel “on the effectiveness 
of the compliance and ethics program,” and shall obtain “adequate resources, 
appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing authority.”1805 The FCPA 
required the risk assessment to develop an effective compliance program without 
defining the effectiveness of such a program. In addition to the FCPA and the 
SOX, the FSGO required and created the position of the corporate compliance 
officer with a provided reporting structure to the CEO or board. Furthermore, the 
SOX, the FSGO and the Rules of the SEC have actually defined the effectiveness 
with periodic risk assessment and periodic reporting and disclosure obligations to 
reduce criminal conduct. Hence, federal law places new legal duties on corporate 
officers aimed at increasing reporting and disclosure accountability. In the course 
of time, trough each new legislation, the requirements on the compliance officers’ 
and executive officers’ responsibilities have increased and extended. In the last 
years, the regulators additionally have been encouraging the separation between 
                                                     
1804 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667, § 8 B2.1 (b)(2)(B). 
1805 Id. § 8 B2.1 (b)(2)(C). 
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the legal and compliance function and changed corporate structures by means of 
N/DPAs. 
As a result of this line of federal law, there are three key aspects of the 
compliance officer’s role, which need to be carefully considered by the board of 
directors and executive officers to ensure that this function provides an effective 
and successful response to the legal environment. 
(1) Separation between the legal and the compliance function 
A growing body of legislation has meant an increase in corporate 
compliance tasks and duties. As such, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
fulfill these tasks and duties on the side. What this means in practice is that, given 
the clearly defined duties and tasks for the compliance officer, this position can be 
a full-time employment with focus on compliance issues. At the same time, there 
continues to be an academic debate on the separation between the general counsel 
and the compliance officer; the corporate settlement agreements by prosecutors 
examined place the compliance officer function in a direct reporting line to the 
board and provide new guidance or standards for this function.1806 Thus, the 
regulator sets standards for the corporate compliance officer within the private 
sector. Overall, the prevalence of the corporate compliance officer as a separate 
and standalone function looks set to continue to rise in view of these 
developments and standards.1807 Therefore, the multifunctionale or dual hatted 
role of the compliance officer is gradually changing into a standalone corporate 
function.  
(2) Changes in corporate reporting structures 
Due to the separation of the compliance officer from the legal function and 
based on the requirements of the 2010 amendments to the FSGO, “direct reporting 
obligations to the governing authority,” the compliance officer should have direct 
access to the board.1808 It is important that the quality of relevant information does 
not change through reporting through and to third parties. In order to establish 
                                                     
1806 See generally A., I., 1.b., p. 214. 
1807 PWC Study 2013 BERNSTEIN, KIPP, AND GROVES, supra note 1634 at 16; PWC Study 2014 
BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 8 at 11. 
1808 See supra Table 7, p. 276, US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667, § 8 
B2.1 (f)(3)(C). 
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an effective compliance program the day-to-day compliance issue should reach 
the board unfiltered. The reporting lines should be clearly determined, 
periodically timed and communicated within the company.1809 Furthermore, the 
compliance officer should have formal and informal connections with the 
business units and functions of the company. He should be invited to important 
business meetings such as risk meetings, review meetings, and planning 
meetings. 
(3) The corporate authority for the effective compliance officer 
In order to be effective and to carry out his extended responisbilities under 
US Ferderal Law, the compliance officer should have authority to establish, 
maintain, and review periodically corporate compliance policies and procedures. 
He can gain authority through unfiltered board access, adequate budgets and 
resources, as well as adequate compliance staff. Through the increase in authority, 
the effectiveness of the compliance officer will continue to improve. Thus, the 
compliance officer will become increasingly visible within the company.1810 
These three essential aspects of the compliance officers’ role could be 
applied by all companies irrespective of the size, corporate purpose, risk profile, 
and industry to help deal with the challenges of this function. However, a PWC 
study from 2012 to 20151811 showed that there are still many hurdles in practice for 
companies to overcome if they wish to successfully and effectively integrate the 
compliance officer function.  
After analyzing the US federal legal framework in terms of the compliance 
officers’ role and work, the next part introduces the US State Corporations Law, 
landmark cases, and US Employment Law with respect to the compliance officers’ 
role, duties and liability. 
                                                     
1809 See supra A.,I.,3.a.-d., pp. 261 et seq. 
1810 See supra A.,I.,3.a.-d., pp. 261 et seq. 
1811 PWC Study 2012 KELLY, BERNSTEIN, AND KIPP, supra note 7; PWC Study 2013 
BERNSTEIN, KIPP, AND GROVES, supra note 1634; PWC Study 2014 BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, 
supra note 8; PWC Study 2015 BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 52. 
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II. State Corporation Law and Employment Law 
Generally, corporation law governs the creation, organization, and 
regulation of corporations.1812 In the US, the most corporation law is run by state 
corporation law and thus, it varies from state to state. Additionally, US 
corporation law also includes the US Principles of Corporate Governance 2012 by 
the Business Roundtable which comprises eight customized principles, but 
effective corporate governance practices for the board and corporate 
management.1813 
However, the most corporation law of each state in the US comprises the 
‘articles of incorporation’ and ‘bylaws’ for forming a corporation.1814 US State 
Corporation Law is a primary source relating to corporate directors’ and officers’ 
liability.1815 Pursuant to corporate law, directors and officers have a number of 
                                                     
1812 “A corporation is a legal entity created through the laws of its ‘articles of 
incorporation’. The corporation is treated as a legal ‘person’.” See in: US Legal Inc., supra 
note 1. 
1813 THE US PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2012, (2012), which were updated in 
2016; Business Roundtable (BRT), PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE HAVARD LAW 
SCHOOL FORUM (2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/08/principles-of-
corporate-governance/ (last visited Oct 15, 2016). 
1814 PAT K. CHEW, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY 9 (4. ed. 1993). “The ‘articles of 
incorporation’ must include the corporation’s name, whether the corporation will exist for 
a limited period of time or perpetually, the lawful business purpose of the corporation, 
the number of shares that the corporation will issue to shareholders as well as the types 
and preferences of the shares, the corporation’s registered agent and address for the 
purpose of accepting service of process in the event that the corporation is sued, and the 
names and addresses of the corporation’s directors and incorporators.” ’Bylaws’ are rules 
that dictate how the corporation is going to be run. Bylaws are fairly easy to amend. They 
may include rules regarding the conduct of corporate officers, directors, and shareholders, 
and typically they designate times, locations, and voting requirements for corporate 
meetings.” See US Legal Inc, FORMING A CORPORATION – CORPORATIONS US LEGAL, 
https://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-corporations/forming-a-corporation/, 
https://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-corporations/forming-a-corporation/ (last 
visited Jul 7, 2015). 
1815 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 8. Under corporation law the term ‘directors’ includes the 
“governing body of a corporation who are usually elected by the shareholders.” See US 
Legal Inc, DIRECTORS – CORPORATIONS US LEGAL, https://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-
of-corporations/shareholders-directors-and-officers/directors/, 
https://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-corporations/shareholders-directors-and-
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duties that may give rise to liability.1816 These duties establish standards and if 
these standards are neglected, directors and officers could be held liable.1817 In 
addition, approximately one half of the US States govern their corporation laws 
on the Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA), which was approved by the 
American Bar Association (ABA).1818 The MBCA of the ABA is often used as an 
exemplary source of corporate law principles.1819 
As examined previously, case law is also a major source of common law in 
the US and thus, the corporate law is further embodied in judicially decided 
cases.1820 The holdings in court decisions may differ on the applicable state 
corporation law. The applicable law is determined by the ‘internal affairs 
doctrine.’1821 ‘Internal affairs’ include, for example, the procedural matters and 
transactions of the company.1822 Under this rule, the company is governed by law 
of the state, in which the company was incorporated. The majority of publicly 
traded companies are incorporated in Delaware.1823  
                                                                                                                                                  
officers/directors/ (last visited Jul 7, 2015).; “The roles of ‘corporate officers’ comprise the 
corporation’s president, vice presidents, treasurer, and secretary, are defined by the 
corporate bylaws, and articles of incorporation. They act as agents of the corporation.” See 
US Legal Inc, OFFICERS – CORPORATIONS US LEGAL, 
https://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-corporations/shareholders-directors-and-
officers/officers/, https://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-corporations/shareholders-
directors-and-officers/officers/ (last visited Jul 7, 2015). 
1816 CHEW, supra note 1814 at 8; See supra IV., 2., p. 329. 
1817 Id. at 8; See supra V., p. 335. 
1818 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, 4th Edition BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT (2010), 
(1950). It contains model corporate law provisions and it was first published and 
approved in 1950 by the American Bar Association (ABA). A number of model provisions 
are adopted by twenty-four states in the US. See US Legal Inc, LAWS GOVERNING 
CORPORATIONS – CORPORATIONS US LEGAL, https://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-
corporations/laws-governing-corporations/, https://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-
corporations/laws-governing-corporations/ (last visited Jul 7, 2015). 
1819 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 8. 
1820 See supra Chapter 2, p. 47. 
1821 See e.g. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, (US Supreme Court), 481 69, 78 (1987). 
Finally, the US Supreme Court addressed the ‘internal affairs’ doctrine, a "principle of 
conflict of laws” ... designed to make sure that the law of only one state shall govern the 
internal affairs of a corporation or other association. 
1822 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 9. 
1823 Id. at 10. 
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For this reason, the following part introduces the most important definitions 
and provisions of Delaware Corporation Law and the Model Business 
Corporations Act, as far as corporate directors, officers, and their duties and 
liabilities, their possible indemnification, are concerned, the landmark decisions 
with respect to the fiduciary duties of directors and officers since this obligation 
has become important in the era of corporate scandals in the assessment of 
responsibility to shareholders for their actions in the Delaware courts, and the 
applicable standards.1824 This part also provides findings of an examination of the 
American board structure and an analysis of the corporate (compliance) officers’ 
agreements. Finally, this part explores the role and status of corporate directors, 
officers and compliance officers under employment law and their protection 
against unfair dismissal. 
1. Relevant Definitions and Provisions relating to US Corporation Law 
Corporate law implies that directors and officers are the ‘fiduciary’1825 of the 
company.1826 The general and federal statute, the United State Code, provides a 
broad definition of ‘fiduciary’ and includes the following: 
A ‘fiduciary’ is a person, who 
(i) exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting 
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting 
management or disposition of its assets, 
(ii) renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, 
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any 
authority or responsibility to do so, or 
(iii) has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan.1827 
This definition is set forth in title 29, labor law, chapter 18 Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)1828 - a complex statutory regime that will 
                                                     
1824 McMillan, supra note 238 at 521. 
1825 29 USC, supra note 351 § 1002. 
1826 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 24. 
1827 Id. at 162.; 29 USC, supra note 351 § 1002 (21)(A). 
1828 EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA), Pub. L. 114-38, 29 USC §§ 1001-
1461 USC 88 Stat. 829 (1974). 
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be discussed later.1829 One element that must be maintained under a plan is that of 
a ‘named fiduciary.’1830 Therefore, directors and officers, who are named are liable 
as fiduciaries.1831 In addition, a number of cases have held that “ofﬁcers and 
directors owe ﬁduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.”1832  
Furthermore, the core idea of liability is the theory of the ‘good faith’ 
obligation of directors and officers.1833 As previously discussed, the duty of good 
faith has long been under the statutes.1834 In addition, Sections 8.30 and 8.42 of the 
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) comprise general standards for 
directors and officers.1835 When a director or officer is discharged of his duty, he 
shall act in good faith.1836 Hence, a number of corporate statutes impose a duty of 
good faith on directors and officers.1837 While these statutes do not precisely 
define this duty, the ABA Guidebook includes inter alia the task of “establishing 
and monitoring effective compliance systems and policies for ethical conduct.”1838 Hence, 
corporate monitoring systems are part of the directors’ oversight duty.1839 
Directors derive their information they need to make important decisions from 
those established systems.1840  
The ‘duty of good faith’ has also long been recognized in case law in form of 
the ‘business judgment rule.’1841 The business judgment rule was established in a 
                                                     
1829 See supra III., 1., p. 305. 
1830 CHEW, supra note 1780 at 162; 29 USC, supra note 352, § 1105 (c)(1). 
1831 CHEW, supra note 1780 at 162; 29 USC., supra note 352, § 1105 (c)(2). 
1832 See e.g. Guth v. Loft, Inc., (Del 1939), A.2d 5 503, 510 (1939); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., (Del. Ch. 2004), 38 (2004)..."the fiduciary relationship that an officer or 
director owes to the corporation and its shareholders has long been recognized in 
Delaware jurisprudence." 
1833 Sale, supra note 26 at 723. 
1834 See supra Chapter 2, II 1 (c), p. 61; See e.g. supra note 228, Commercial law UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC), § 1-203; Contract law Id. § 205. 
1835 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, 4th Edition § 8.30 (a) (1), § 8.42 (a) (1). 
1836 Id. § 8.30 (a) (1), § 8.42 (a) (1). 
1837 See e.g. DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24 § 145 (a) (b); NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION 
LAW, N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW (1890) § 717 (a); Eisenberg, supra note 239 at 4. 
1838 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS & AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION SECTION OF BUSINESS LAW, 5. CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 12 (2007). 
1839 Sale, supra note 26 at 724. 
1840 Id. at 724. 
1841 See supra footnote 659; p. 131; Eisenberg, supra note 239 at 4. 
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number of Delaware judicial decisions1842 and based on the good faith 
obligation.1843 Seemingly, courts tend to recognize the business judgment rule as a 
standard of liability.1844 It has been recognized that in conscious decisions by 
directors, the business judgment rule is implied.1845 A decision is present, for 
example, when directors participate in board meetings, discuss, consult, or reject 
a proposal.1846 The purpose of the business judgment rule is that directors need 
flexibility, discretion, and autonomy to make business decision.1847 Hence, the 
directors need all relevant and material information. Sometimes, a number of 
decisions have to be made under pressure.1848 Thus, it is difficult and 
inappropriate for courts to assess director’s judgment.1849 However, the case law 
has shown that the business judgment rule does not protect any decisions by 
directors that are made involving unlawful conduct, fraudulent conduct or which 
present a conflict of interest for the directors.1850 A conflict of interest could 
generally arise when directors have a personal financial interest, as was the case 
in Gantler v. Stephens.1851  
Similarly, under Delaware Corporation Law,1852 directors are not held liable 
for corporate losses if they act and make decisions on behalf of a company with 
good intentions.1853 The Supreme Court of Delaware confirmed that under 
Delaware law the business judgment rule is a fundamental principle, codified in 
Section 141(a).1854 Furthermore, in Aronson v. Lewis, the court explained the rule as 
follows: 
                                                     
1842 McMillan, supra note 238 at 521. 
1843 GOOD FAITH, WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (The Gale Group, Inc., 2. ed. 
2008), http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/good+faith (last visited Mar 24, 2016). 
1844 McMillan, supra note 238 at 529. 
1845 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 30. 
1846 Id. at 30. 
1847 Id. at 30. 
1848 Id. at 30. 
1849 Id. at 30. 
1850 Id. at 29–30. 
1851 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27. 
1852 See e.g. supra note 24, 8 DELAWARE CODE, § 141 (a). 
1853 Id.  
1854 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
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The rule itself "is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company."1855 
Nevertheless, McMillan argues that the rule constitutes a type of 
immunity.1856 In practice, the courts have used it as a test to determine whether 
the directors or officers’ conduct leads to personal liability.1857 The courts 
examined the ‘duty of loyalty’ and the ‘duty of care’ in the context of the standard of 
liability. In 1985, for example, in the context of a proposed merger, the Delaware 
Supreme Court defined the ‘duty of care’ in Smith v. Van Gorkom as follows: 
In the specific context of a proposed merger of domestic corporations, a director has a 
duty under Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(b), along with his fellow directors, to act in an 
informed and deliberate manner in determining whether to approve an agreement of 
merger before submitting the proposal to the stockholders.1858 
The court concluded that the directors were uninformed and thus, the 
decision of the Trans Union Corp board’s to sell the company was grossly 
negligent.1859 Hence, under the business judgment rule the directors’ liability is 
predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.1860 
To summarize, the majority of director’s decisions are protected by the 
business judgment rule.1861 Conversely, US State Courts have not unequivocally 
ruled on whether the business judgment rule should apply to officer’s 
decisions.1862 It appears that State Corporation Law does not cover officers’ 
limited liability.1863 In the US, there is sometimes a degree of uncertainty 
regarding who is classified as an officer.1864 As has been mentioned, State 
Corporation Law does not make any clear distinction between the fiduciary 
                                                     
1855 Aronson v Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
1856 McMillan, supra note 238 at 521. 
1857 Id. at 529. 
1858 SMITH V VAN GORKOM, (DEL. 1985), supra note 1853 at 873. 
1859 Id. at 884. 
1860 Id. at 873.; Aronson v Lewis, supra note 1826 at 812. 
1861 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 41. 
1862 See e.g. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27. 
1863 See e.g. tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, § 102 (b) (7). 
1864 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 19. 
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duties of corporate directors and those of corporate officers.1865 Generally, the 
provisions of these statutes describe the powers of directors and officers as 
follows: 
(a) In addition to the powers enumerated in § 122 of this title, every corporation, its 
officers, directors and stockholders shall possess and may exercise all the powers and 
privileges granted by this chapter or by any other law or by its certificate of 
incorporation.1866 
The powers of directors are codified in Section 141 (a) of the Delaware 
Code: 
(a) The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise 
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.1867 
The powers and duties of directors, which are determined in the statutes, 
are specified in the bylaws of the company. For example, the general power 
provision includes the following: 
The business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed, and all corporate powers 
shall be exercised by or under the direction of, the board of directors.1868 
In addition, the bylaws determines the specific duties of the directors: 
(a) Select and remove all officers, agents, and employees of the Corporation; prescribe 
any powers and duties for them that are consistent with law, with the Articles of 
Incorporation, and with these bylaws; fix their compensation; and require from them 
security for faithful service. 
(b) Adopt, make, and use a corporate seal; prescribe and alter the forms of certificates 
of stock. 
(c) Borrow money and incur indebtedness on behalf of the Corporation, and cause to 
be executed and delivered for the Corporation’s purposes, in the corporate name, 
                                                     
1865 CALIFORNIA CORPORATION CODE (CORP), CAL. CORP. CODE (1947) §§ 204 (a) (10) (C), 
309; tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, §§ 141 (a), 142 (a). 
1866 tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, § 121 (a). 
1867 tit. 8 Id.§ 141 (a). 
1868 Bylaws of a Holding, Inc., State of California, (2009) Sec. 3.1. 
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promissory notes, bonds, debentures, deeds of trust, mortgages, pledges, hypothecations, 
and other evidences of debt and securities.1869 
In contrast, the duties of officers are not clearly defined in Corporation Law: 
(a) Every corporation organized under this chapter shall have such officers with such 
titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of 
directors.1870 
Each officer has the authority and shall perform the duties set forth in the bylaws or, to 
the extent consistent with the bylaws, the duties prescribed by the board of directors or by 
direction of any officer authorized by the bylaws or the board of directors to prescribe the 
duties of other officers.1871 
In order to provide an initial overview of whether there is any legal 
protection for directors and officers against the risks inherent to decision-making, 
this part will further examine State Corporation Law concerning possible 
‘indemnification.’ Indemnification implies reimbursement for the costs of litigation. 
If directors and officers are personally liable, they could be required to pay a large 
amount of money. These costs could include: 
(1) Fines, judgments, or settlement payments, 
(2) Case initiation, expenses of trial, expenses against claims,1872 
(3) Attorneys’ fees.1873 
A review of State Corporation Law highlights that a number of states have 
adopted provisions on when the company has power or may indemnify its 
officers and directors “against expenses including attorneys' fees, judgments, fines, and 
amounts paid in settlement”, if they “acted in good faith.”1874 Thus, under Delaware 
Corporation Law “any person a director, officer, employee or agent of a corporation” 
                                                     
1869 BYLAW OF A HOLDING, INC. Id. 
1870 tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, § 142 (a). 
1871 FLORIDA BUSINESS COORDINATION ACT, FLA. STAT. ANN. (2015) Ch. 606§ 607.0841. 
1872 In 2013, the median cost of litigation by liability are approximately $54,000 and by 
malpractice $122,000 including initiate, settlement and trial costs but without attorney fee. 
See e.g. PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, ESTIMATING THE COST OF CIVIL 
LITIGATION 7 (2013) Figure 2. 
1873 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 230. 
1874 Id. at 231.; See also DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24 § 145 (a)-(e); MODEL BUSINESS 
CORPORATION ACT, supra note 1788, § 8.56; NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW, supra 
note 1808, § 722. 
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can be indemnified “against expenses including attorneys' fees, judgments, fines and 
amounts paid in settlement” when “they acted in good faith and in the best interest of the 
corporation.”1875 
Generally, these provisions distinguish between (1) mandatory 
indemnification, (2) permissive indemnification, and (3) court indemnification.1876 
The Delaware indemnification provisions are expressly applicable to “officers, 
directors, employees, and agents”1877 while the New York indemnifications 
provisions apply to directors and officers.1878 Nevertheless, there are many 
requirements for indemnification of directors. For mandatory indemnification, the 
MBCA states “a corporation shall indemnify a director who was wholly successful.”1879 
Under the MBCA, this means the result of the litigation must be that the director 
was not found liable. If the director appeals, the decision is not final.1880 In 
contrast, the Delaware Corporation Law requires that the director or officer “has 
been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of any action, suit, or 
proceeding.”1881 However, in Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corporation v. Wolfson the 
court states that “the statute does not require complete success.”1882 Therefore, it 
allows partial indemnification for partial success.1883 Furthermore, in the same 
case, when directors achieve a settlement without any admission of liability, the 
courts tend to interpret statutes similarly to the Delaware approach.1884 However, 
in contrast, in Galdi v. Berg, the court stated in the event of dismissal of an action 
without prejudice that, “an indemnification award would be premature and contrary to 
the spirit of the statute.” 1885 In accordance with the provision "has been successful on 
                                                     
1875 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, (DEL. 2006), supra note 580 at 65. 
1876 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 231. The wording within the provisions are: "shall" is 
mandatory and "may" is permissive. 
1877 tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, § 145. 
1878 NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW, supra note 1808, § 722. 
1879 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, supra note 1788, § 8.52. 
1880 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 234. 
1881 tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24 § 145 (c). 
1882 Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corporation v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974). 
1883 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 234; MERRITT-CHAPMAN & SCOTT CORPORATION V. WOLFSON, 
(DEL. SUPER. CT. 1974), supra note 1881 at 141. 
1884 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, 64 F.3d 1282 
(9th Cir. 1995). 
1885 Galdi v. Berg, 359 F. Supp. 698, 702, (D. Del. 1973). 
CHAPTER 4 | 289 
 
the merits or otherwise,”1886 the court held that “the director is entitled to indemnity if 
he is vindicated on the merits or otherwise.”1887 In addition, under the MBCA, a 
director may also apply for a court-ordered indemnification or an advance for 
expenses to the court.1888 Delaware Corporation Law determines that “the Court of 
Chancery may summarily determine a corporation's obligation to advance expenses 
including attorneys' fees.”1889 Often, the indemnification provisions set forth in the 
State Corporation Law are non-exclusive statutes.1890 For example, Delaware 
companies may be entitled to other indemnification rights under the bylaws, 
agreements, or by vote of stockholders.1891 According to State Corporation Law, 
directors and officers may indemnify corporate and court indemnification, if they 
are held liable. Whether and how much indemnification they could be awarded 
depends on the applicable statutes, bylaws, or agreements.1892 
Having defined relevant terms and having examined State Corporation Law 
provisions as it relates to directors and officers duties and their possible 
indemnification, there follows a brief overview of key cases with respect to 
directors’ and officers’ compliance duties. To begin, the most important, most 
cited,1893 and most analyzed decision in the academic literature was the Delaware 
Court decision in re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation,1894 which 
marks the initial starting point, in which the court shifts from the duty of care to 
monitoring and oversight obligations of directors.1895 This landmark case was the 
beginning of a line of cases concerning the ‘duty of oversight’ of the board of 
                                                     
1886 tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24 § 145 (c). 
1887 GALDI V. BERG, (D. DEL. 1973), supra note 1884 at 701. 
1888 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 235–236; tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24§ 145 (e); MODEL 
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, supra note 1817§ 8.51 (a). 
1889 tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24§ 145 (k). 
1890 tit. 8 Id.§ 145 (f); NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW, supra note 1808, § 721. 
1891 tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, § 145 (f). 
1892 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 241–242. 
1893 See e.g. Baer, supra note 610; Brown, supra note 518; Mark, supra note 665; Sale, supra 
note 26. 
1894 See supra note 22. In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation (698 A.2D 959), 
note 961-962. Caremark realized significant revenues from third party payments, 
including payments from insurers and Medicare reimbursements.  
1895 Sale, supra note 26 at 719. 
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directors.1896 In these Delaware cases, the court established standards of conduct 
for directors requiring them to act in the best interests of the corporation, with a 
view towards maximizing corporate profit and shareholder gain.1897 The duty of 
care and the duty of oversight are part of the director’s legal responsibility.1898 As 
previously discussed, directors are fiduciaries1899 and, as such, owe their company 
and shareholders a fiduciary duty.1900 In Caremark, the Delaware Chancery Court 
examined whether the board of directors was guilty of breaching their fiduciary 
duty as a result of their failure to monitor and oversee the corporation’s legal 
compliance efforts and risks.1901 The holding of the Delaware Court of Chancery 
in this case was that directors can be held liable for losses resulting from the 
corporation's failure to comply with applicable legal standards.1902 This 
responsibility for adherence to the law could form a substantial part of 
management duties; in other words, the board of director is responsible for 
compliance.1903 This has triggered an academic debate on the board's role in 
ensuring compliance.1904  
2. The Caremark Litigation and the Duty of Oversight 
Caremark, today CSV Health Corporation, a Delaware corporation, is a 
large US pharmacy services provider and listed on the NYSE. Nowadays, the 
company is headquartered in Woonsocket, Rhode Island and employs nearly 
                                                     
1896 This duty was established in the Caremark case and is based on the concept of good 
faith. See supra 2., pp. 290 et seq. 
1897 Eisenberg, supra note 239 at 5. 
1898 MILLER, supra note 25 at 49. 
1899 Additionally, Miller defines the term ‘fiduciary’ as “a person who is in charge under the 
law with making decisions fundamental to the welfare of someone else.” See Id. at 49. This 
term was often discussed in court decision beginning with Meinhard v. Salmon 249 N.Y. 
458, 164 N.E. 54, (1928). In this case, the court held that partners in a business have a 
fiduciary duty to each other. See Id. at 546.; MILLER, supra note 25 at 49. 
1900 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22. 
1901 Mark, supra note 665 at 479; McGreal, supra note 518 at 134; Miller, supra note 542 at 55. 
This means the directors ‘duty of oversight’ that the company complies with applicable law 
and regulation. 
1902 Brown, supra note 518 at 1. 
1903 MILLER, supra note 25 at 55. 
1904 Brown, supra note 518 at 1. 
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215,000 employees in 47 US states.1905 The history of the Caremark case began in 
1991. At that time, Caremark came under an extensive four year investigation by 
the Department of Health and Human Services.1906 One year later, the DOJ joined 
the investigation to include Caremark's billing practices and inadequate record 
keeping.1907 Over the course of the government investigation, Caremark designed 
an internal audit plan, intended to ensure adherence with business policies.1908 In 
addition, Caremark employed an outside auditor, PWC.1909 In 1993, PWC attested 
that there was no significant weakness in Caremark’s control structure.1910 
Furthermore, the audit and ethics committee of Caremark implemented a new 
audit charter that requires a review of compliance policies and the chief financial 
officer was appointed as Caremark's compliance officer.1911 Despite these efforts, 
on August 4, 1994, a federal grand jury in Minnesota charged two Caremark 
officers with having made illegal payments.1912 They were accused of possible 
unlawful "kickback" payments to physicians in exchange for referrals for 
treatment to Caremark facilities.1913 The Anti-Referral Payments Law (ARPL)1914 
prohibits health care providers from paying any form of remuneration.1915 
In June 1995, Caremark approved a plea agreement with the DOJ. In this 
agreement Caremark pleaded guilty and paid approximately US$161 million in 
criminal fines, civil restitution and damages for kickbacks and fraud.1916 Together, 
                                                     
1905 CSV HEALTH, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 7 (2014). 
1906 Brown, supra note 518 at 17. 
1907 MILLER, supra note 25 at 55. 
1908 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 963; MILLER, supra note 25 at 56. 
1909 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 963. 
1910 Id. at 963.; MILLER, supra note 25 at 56. 
1911 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 963. 
1912 Id. at 963–964.  
1913 Id. at 961–962.; Sale, supra note 26 at 725. 
1914 Physician Self-Referral (Stark II), Anti-Kickback Laws and Safe Harbor Regulations 
1915 IN RE CAREMARK INTERNATIONAL INC. DERIVATIVE LITIGATION, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 
1996), supra note 22 at 961–962. 
1916 DOJ, #342 CAREMARK BRIEFING RELEASE (1995), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/ 
Pre_96/June95/342.txt.html (last visited Mar 23, 2016). 
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with other agreements Caremark paid a total of US$250 million.1917 After the 
conclusion of the agreement with the DOJ, the federal and state proceedings were 
concluded and no senior officers or directors were individually charged with 
wrongdoing in the Government Settlement Agreement.1918  
However, this did not mark the end of the case; in the meantime, five 
shareholder derivative actions had been filed.1919 These actions alleged that 
Caremark's directors had breached their duty by failing to monitor their 
employees.1920 The shareholders claimed that the breach of duty involved 
violations by Caremark employees of federal and state laws and regulations 
applicable to health care providers.1921 They argued that directors should be aware 
of what is going on in the company and need to be more active in monitoring the 
employees. 
a.  The Legal Principles of Caremark  and the Impact thereof 
In his judgment, Chancellor Allen first stated that the Court would attempt 
to protect the best interests of the corporation.1922 At that time, the US courts and 
legal scholars followed the traditional corporate model,1923 meaning that the board 
of directors has the power to manage the company.1924 Based on this position of 
power, the directors are viewed as fiduciaries with obligations towards all 
shareholders and are required to act in good faith.1925 The Delaware Court 
specifically examines the potential liability for directorial decisions. Chancellor 
Allan made it clear that there are only two “distinct contexts” in which a breach of 
                                                     
1917 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 961. 
1918 Id. at 964.; Brown, supra note 518 at 18. 
1919 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 964. 
1920 Id. at 964. 
1921 Id. at 960. 
1922 Id. at 966. 
1923 Brown, supra note 518 at 7. 
1924 Id. at 7. 
1925 Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557 (N.Y. 1984), 557 (1984) 568-569. The New 
York Court of Appeal viewed the fiduciary role as "guardians of the corporate welfare.” 
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the directors’ oversight duty may arise.1926 The first is in instances in which a 
board decision is “ill advised” or "negligent" and results in a loss.1927 The second 
context is when the loss arises from an ‘unconsidered failure’ of the board of 
directors.1928 Furthermore, Allan pointed out that “the business judgment rule is 
process oriented” and with “a deep respect for all good faith board decisions.”1929 He 
refers to the statement of Judge Hand in Barnes v. Andrews, 
True, he was not very suited by experience for the job he had undertaken, but I cannot 
hold him on that account. After all, it is the same corporation that chose him that now 
seeks to charge him... Directors are not specialists like lawyers or doctors... They are the 
general advisors of the business and if they faithfully give such ability as they have to 
their charge, it would not be lawful to hold them liable. Must a director guarantee that his 
judgment is good?1930 
Allan identifies this statement as “the core element of any corporate law duty of 
care.”1931 
Secondly, the Chancellor examines the liability for failure to monitor when 
the loss is caused by “unconsidered inaction”.1932 He considers the question of what 
the board's responsibility is with respect to monitoring the company and its 
employees.1933 In his answer, he weighs the fact that this question has become 
more increasingly important in recent years under federal law. The broader 
interpretation of Graham v. Allis Chalmers,1934 namely that of the board of directors 
is under no responsibility to assure that management establishes an information 
and reporting system, was not accepted by the Delaware Supreme Court in 
                                                     
1926 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 967. 
1927 Id. at 967. 
1928 Id. at 967. 
1929 Id. at 968. 
1930 Barnes v. Andrews, 208 App. Div. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) in: In re Caremark International Inc. 
Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra note 22 at 968. 
1931 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 968. 
1932 Id. at 968. 
1933 Id. at 969. 
1934 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 188 A.2D 125 (DEL. 1963), supra note 
657. 
294 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
1996.1935 In order to cope with this responsibility, the directors should be informed 
of the facts and law relating to a corporate decision.1936 Hence, directors have a 
duty of oversight. However, the Delaware Court has established a high threshold 
for directors’ liability.1937 In fact, Chancellor Allen cites the phrases “utter failure” 
and “sustained or systematic failure.”1938 In his view, only such a test of liability will 
establish a lack of good faith and a lack of standard of the board's compliance 
oversight responsibility.1939 In addition, Brown pointed out that there should be 
"specific indicia suggesting misconduct," i.e. “red flags” of the directors’ and officers’ 
conduct.1940 The discussion of Caremark included the consideration of when 
directors’ liability can arise. Ultimately, the liability could be established where a 
"loss eventuates not from a decision but, from unconsidered inaction."1941  
The commentators concluded that the Delaware Court established the 
standard for determining liability based on a director or officer’s failure to fulfill 
oversight responsibility.1942 Since federal law began to pay attention to internal 
corporate procedures, the Delaware courts have had to establish their own 
directors’ and officers’ theory of liability.1943 American legal scholars refer to these 
legal principles as the Caremark theory.1944 Jones concluded that the Delaware Court 
took a stance that courts would pay greater attention to the law of director and 
officer misconduct in the next years.1945 In general, since the Caremark decision, the 
federal and state courts have recognized a cause of action against directors for 
                                                     
1935 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 970. 
1936 Brown, supra note 518 at 9. 
1937 McGreal, supra note 518 at 136. 
1938 Brown, supra note 518 at 31; McGreal, supra note 518 at 135; In re Caremark International 
Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra note 22 at 971. 
1939 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 971. 
1940 Brown, supra note 518 at 15. 
1941 Id. at 24. 
1942 Mark, supra note 665 at 479. 
1943 Jones, supra note 518 at 477. 
1944 See also Id. at 477. 
1945 Id. at 477. 
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their failure to exercise oversight and their failure to take minimal steps to 
achieve legal compliance.1946 
Furthermore, the established standards of liability of a breach of directors’ 
oversight duty had great influence in subsequent cases such as Stone v. Ritter1947 
and Gantler v. Stephens1948. In these cases, the court formally confirmed the 
Caremark standard for oversight liability.1949 
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director 
oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or 
information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, 
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from 
being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.1950 
Here, the court directly addressed compliance issues. At first, a director of a 
company violated the Caremark duty by failing to take any action directed toward 
establishing a compliance program.1951 Secondly, the court stated that there is an 
ongoing duty to address compliance.1952 That means, for example, that the board 
of directors has to request reports on the design, implementation, and operation 
of the program itself.1953 
b.  The Holding in Caremark and the Settlement  
Although Chancellor Allen shifts away from the ‘no responsibility’ of 
directors to establish and to monitor reporting systems and despite his analysis of 
a director's responsibility to fulfill a monitoring role, he concluded, “there is a very 
low probability that the directors of Caremark breached any duty to appropriately monitor 
and supervise the company.”1954 He refers to the active consideration and handling of 
the Caremark board in terms of the establishment of corporate policies and 
                                                     
1946 McGreal, supra note 518 at 134. 
1947 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2D 362 (DEL. 2006), supra note 240. 
1948 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27 at 708–709. 
1949 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2D 362 (DEL. 2006), supra note 237 at 370. 
1950 Id. at 370. 
1951 McGreal, supra note 518 at 135. 
1952 Id. at 135. 
1953 Id. at 135. 
1954 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 961. 
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structure, prior to 1996.1955 In his view, there was no knowing violation of the 
ARPL law and no systematic or sustained failure of the board to exercise 
oversight.1956 
However, the Court proposed a settlement that resulted in the terms, 
including (1) that Caremark and its employees and agents complies with the 
ARPL law, (2) that the board shall discuss all relevant material changes in 
government health-care regulations, (3) that the board will establish a compliance 
and ethics committee of four directors, with two non-management directors, 
which will meet four times a year and directly report compliance issues by each 
business segment to the board and (4) that corporate officers responsible for 
business segments shall serve as compliance officers who must report semi-
annually to the compliance and ethics committee with the review of existing and 
new contracts.1957 Finally, the court approved this settlement because it facilitated 
the assurance of shareholders that Caremark will continue to implement an active 
supervisory system in the future.1958 
c.  Significance of Caremark  and the Consequences thereof 
In his opinion, Chancellor Allen derives a compliance duty from the 
business judgment rule.1959 He states that the traditional rule does not protect 
directors in case of an “utter” or “systematic” failure to exercise proper supervision 
and oversight or from “unconsidered inaction." Hence, the Delaware Chancery 
Court establishes a fiduciary duty, in particular the duty of oversight or 
compliance duty, over and above this, as well as standards of directors’ 
liability.1960 As a result, the good faith obligation is increasingly becoming a 
subject of federal law.1961 Under the SOX, the CEO and CFO are required to 
disclose all significant information and reports in the design or operation of 
internal controls to the audit committee of the board of directors before filing.1962 
                                                     
1955 Id. at 961. 
1956 Id. at 971. 
1957 Id. at 966. 
1958 Id. at 972. 
1959 MILLER, supra note 25 at 60. 
1960 Id. at 60. 
1961 Sale, supra note 26 at 720. 
1962 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 302 (a) (5), 15 USC § 7241. 
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Therefore, the board of directors is under an obligation to fulfil its compliance 
duty.1963 
Caremark was a decision by the Delaware Chancery Court; the opinion by 
Chancellor Allen was influential, but its scope and precedential effect did not 
become clear some time.1964 Critics have also argued that it was an unpublished 
opinion that then evolved into a key opinion.1965 A later decision1966 by the 
Delaware Supreme Court confirmed the standards of Caremark’s liability under 
Delaware law.1967 This Caremark liability is known as the Caremark theory and legal 
scholars cite it as a landmark decision.1968 Since this case was decided, US federal 
and state courts have recognized a cause of action against directors for their 
failure to exercise oversight to ensure legal compliance.1969 
A 2010 study by Erickson found that more than ninety percent of 141 
derivative suits ﬁled in federal district courts against public companies over a 
twelve-month period in 2005 and 2006 involved Caremark claims or other good 
faith claims.1970 Thus, compliance issues have entered into the courtroom. 
Nevertheless, the study showed that only two of forty-one derivative suits of 
private companies provided favorable judgments, eleven provided a settlement, 
twenty-four were dismissed, and four are still pending.1971 None of the 141 public 
company suits actually reached the stage of a judgment being passed.1972 Overall, 
forty-two suits (29.8 percent) were settled.1973 Ninety-one of the public company 
                                                     
1963 MILLER, supra note 25 at 60. 
1964 Id. at 63. 
1965 Sale, supra note 26 at 720. 
1966 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2D 362 (DEL. 2006), supra note 237. 
1967 MILLER, supra note 25 at 63. 
1968 See e.g. ERC PAPER , supra note 3 at 10; Mark, supra note 666 at 479; Murphy, supra note 
677 at 714. 
1969 McGreal, supra note 518 at 134. 
1970 Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 
WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW 1749, 1756, 1770, 1777 (2010). 
1971 Id. at 1797. Table 1. 
1972 Id. at 1798. Table 2. 
1973 Id. at 1798. Table 2. 
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suits (64.5 percent) were dismissed.1974 Eight suits (5.7 percent) are still 
pending.1975  
These results show that, in courts, an oversight claim “is possibly the most 
difﬁcult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a 
judgment.”1976 It has been noted that Caremark duties are hard to violate.1977 Under 
the settlements in the courts, private and public companies are required to 
establish an effective compliance structure. Thus, corporate directors could be 
subject to liability when they (1) “utterly” fail to implement reporting or 
information system, or (2) having implemented such a system, but they 
consciously fail to oversee business operations. In addition to the federal law 
regulations, the decisions of the courts in the US continue to contribute to a 
corporate structural reform.  
3. Stone v. Ritter1978 – The Confirmation of “oversight” liability 
In October 2006, the shareholders William and Sandra Stone brought a 
derivative action on behalf of the AmSouth Bancorporation, a Delaware 
corporation, against the bank’s directors for breach of their fiduciary duties 
through failure to monitor internal controls to guard against violations of the 
Bank Secrecy Act1979 and anti-money laundering regulations.1980 On January 26, 
2006, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the derivative litigation under 
Court of Chancery Rule 23.1.,1981 since the plaintiffs failed to plead facts 
demonstrating any lack of adequate board and management oversight.1982 The 
subsequent appeal was also dismissed. The Delaware Supreme Court also stated 
a shortcoming in the plaintiffs' argument that the directors did not exercise their 
                                                     
1974 Id. at 1798. Table 2. 
1975 Id. at 1798. Table 2. 
1976 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22 at 967. 
1977 Mark, supra note 665 at 480. 
1978 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2D 362 (DEL. 2006), supra note 237. 
1979 BANK SECRECY ACT OF 1970, PUB. LAW 91-508, 31 USC. § 1051 84 Stat. 1114-2 (1970). 
1980 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2D 362 (DEL. 2006), supra note 237 at 365. 
1981 Rules of the Delaware State Courts - Delaware Courts - State of Delaware, 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Rules/ (last visited Apr 7, 2016). 
1982 WILLIAM B. CHANDLER, OPINION | Stone, et al. v. Ritter, et al. (2006). 
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oversight responsibility in good faith.1983 Only a sustained or systematic failure of 
management oversight will result in liability.1984 The Court clearly pointed out 
“that good faith in the context of oversight must be measured by the directors' actions” to 
obtain reasonable information about the reporting system and not by evaluating 
results “after the occurrence of employee conduct.”1985 The Delaware Supreme Court 
argued that Caremark states the “necessary conditions” for director oversight 
liability: 
… (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or 
controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to 
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks 
or problems requiring their attention.1986 
The holding of this case was that the Supreme Court of Delaware applied 
the Caremark theory and finally dismissed the plaintiffs' derivative complaint.1987 
Hence, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the judgment of the Court of 
Chancery and, thus, confirmed the Caremark standard of oversight liability.1988 
4. Gantler v. Stephens1989 - What is an officer’s duty? 
A review of the Delaware Courts’ decisions shows that only a minority of 
cases specifically involve compliance officers’ duties.1990 The research at the 
Delaware Courts found only one case between 1990 and today in which a 
compliance officer was involved as a party and his duties were discussed.1991 In 
two other cases, Hampshire Group, Limited v. Kuttner1992 and Ironworkers District 
                                                     
1983 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2D 362 (DEL. 2006), supra note 237 at 373. 
1984 Id. at 369. 
1985 Id. at 373. 
1986 Id. at 370. 
1987 Id. at 373. 
1988 Id. at 373. 
1989 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27. 
1990 Court of Chancery of Delaware and Supreme Court of Delaware. 
1991 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27. 
1992 Hampshire Group, Limited v. Kuttner, C.A. No. 3607-VCS (Del. Ch. 2010). “Generally, like 
directors, Clayton and Clark were expected to pursue the best interests of the company in 
good faith (i.e., to fulfill their duty of loyalty) and to use the amount of care that a 
reasonably prudent person would use in similar circumstances (i.e., to fulfill their duty of 
care).” 
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Council of Philadelphia & Vicinity Retirement & Pension Plan v. Andreotti,1993 the 
Court of Chancery of Delaware examined the duties of corporate officers in 
general. 
However, first, it need to be establish precisely who is an ‘officer’ and 
secondly, what an officer’s duty is. According to Delaware Corporation Law, an 
‘officer’ is anyone who: 
(1) Is or was the president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial 
officer, chief legal officer, controller, treasurer or chief accounting officer of the 
corporation at any time during the course of conduct alleged in the action or proceeding 
to be wrongful; 
(2) Is or was identified in the corporation's public filings1994 with the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission because such person is or was one of the most 
highly compensated executive officers of the corporation at any time during the course of 
conduct alleged in the action or proceeding to be wrongful; or 
(3) Has, by written agreement with the corporation, consented to be identified as an 
officer for purposes of this section. 1995 
Furthermore, Section 142 (a) states that  
Every corporation organized under this chapter shall have such officers with such 
titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of 
directors.1996 
Although the compliance officer is not explicitly enumerated in Section 3114 
(b)(1), he could be an officer under Section 3114 (b)(2) or (3). However, in the 
event that the chief legal compliance officer is responsible for compliance issues, 
he could be included indirectly. Even in the case that the chief compliance officer 
is identified as a corporate officer in a written agreement, he will be considered as 
an officer under Delaware Corporation Law.  
Furthermore, pursuant to Section 8.40 of the MBCA, a person is an ‘officer’, 
if:  
                                                     
1993 Ironworkers District Council of Philadelphia & Vicinity Retirement & Pension Plan v. 
Andreotti (Del. Ch. 2015), C.A. No. 9714-VCG (2015).  
1994 See e.g.Form 10-K SEC, supra note 1579. 
1995 tit. 10 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, § 3114(b). 
1996 tit. 8 Id. § 142 (a). 
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(a) A corporation has the officers described in its bylaws or appointed by the board of 
directors in accordance with the bylaws.1997  
To summarize, an ‘officer’ is a person with various titles, appointed by the 
board, described in the bylaws, identified in the public filings of the SEC1998 or by 
a written agreement with the company. The officers or senior executives are 
referred to as the management of the company.1999 They are given their power by 
the board of directors, which has the power to delegate much of its management 
authority.2000 In general, officers are responsible for day-to-day operation and 
have the authority to legally bind the company in contracts on behalf of the 
corporation. 
However, the duties of the officers are not described under Delaware 
Corporation Law. For this reason, the research must focus on other legal sources. 
For example, both the MBCA and the CEO Guide recommend that an officer’s 
duty shall include informing the board of director of the affairs of the corporation 
and about probable material breaches of duty by other officers.2001 In addition, as 
previously discussed,2002 in the case of publicly traded companies, the most 
important compliance responsibility of the management consists in establishing 
and, maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for 
financial reporting and an assessment of this structure under Federal Law.2003 For 
particular executives, like the CEO or CFO, Section 302 requires that they certify 
in the annual and quarterly reports and that they have disclosed all significant 
deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls.2004 However, one 
                                                     
1997 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, supra note 1817 Sec. 8.40 (a). 
1998 See e.g. FORM 10-K SEC, supra note 1568, "All officers are appointed annually by the 
board of directors and, subject to existing employment agreements (of which there is 
currently one), serve at the discretion of the board."(This statement is included and 
published in 10-K SEC form in a company within the healthcare industry). 
1999 MILLER, supra note 25 at 103. 
2000 tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, §§ 141(a), 142. 
2001 CHIEF EXECUTIVE GROUP, CEO LEGAL GUIDE 6–6 (2012); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION 
ACT, supra note 1817 Sec. 8.42 (b) (1) (2). 
2002 See supra I., 2.c., p. 244 
2003 MILLER, supra note 25 at 104; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 404 (a) (1) 
(2), 15 USC 7262. 
2004 MILLER, supra note 25 at 108; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 302 (a) (2) 
(3), 15 USC 7241. 
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question remains: where does Federal or State Law regulate the corporate 
compliance officer’s duties? The previous research reveals that under State and 
Federal Corporate Law this corporate officer is afforded limited specific 
attention.2005 
In contrast to the corporate chief compliance officer in the private sector, the 
chief compliance officers’ duties are defined in specific areas under Federal 
Securities Law.2006 Although corporate officer’s misconduct has been linked to 
corporate scandals, their duties are underdeveloped and legally unenforced.2007 
Therefore, on the other hand, a useful approach might be to analyze the case 
Gantler v Stephens in order to specify the officers’ duties. 
In 2009, a fiduciary duty action of shareholders by First Niles Financial, Inc. 
was appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court in which the plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendants, the officers and directors of First Niles, violated their fiduciary 
duties by rejecting a valuable opportunity to sell the company for the purpose of 
retaining the benefits of continued incumbency.2008 This decision is worth 
discussing because the Court clarified “that the fiduciary duties of officers of Delaware 
corporations are the same as those of directors.”2009  
The First Niles, a Delaware company, headquartered in Niles, Ohio, is a 
holding that owns the Savings and Loan Association of Niles.2010 One of the 
defendants was the compliance officer during the sale process period from 2003 
until 2006; he had worked as a full-time employee, in both institutions since 
1996.2011 Nevertheless, the Court of Chancery inter alia dismissed the claim against 
the compliance officer [defendant] under Court of Chancery Rule 12 (b) (2)2012 
                                                     
2005 Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Corporate Officers’ Duties, 48 UC DAVIS LAW 
REVIEW 271–336, 276 (2014). 
2006 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 629 § 78m (6)(B) This section describes 
the duties of a chief compliance officer of a security-based swap data repository. 
2007 Shaner, supra note 2004 at 276. 
2008 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27 at 704. 
2009 Id. at 709.; Petrin, supra note 1144 at 1691. 
2010 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27 at 699. 
2011 MEMORANDUM OPINION | Gantler v. Stephens,  2008 WL 401124, (DEL. CH. 2008); Gantler 
v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27 at 699. 
2012 Rules of the Delaware State Courts - Delaware Courts - State of Delaware, supra note 
1980. 
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because he was not a director, did not hold an officer position pursuant to 
Delaware Corporate Law and was not identified as an executive officer by the 
company.2013 Nevertheless, according to the status of the company presentation on 
the Internet, he was the compliance officer at that time:  
Mr. Csontos has served Home Federal [Savings and Loan Association of Nile] as 
compliance officer since 1996, as Vice President since 2007, and as a director since 2006.2014 
In contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that, “fiduciary duties of 
officers are the same as those of directors.”2015 In the Court’s view, both have identical 
fiduciary duties; this has long been an articulated principle of Delaware Law.2016 
Despite this principle, the consequences of a fiduciary breach by directors or 
officers would not necessarily be the same.2017 Under Delaware Corporate Law, it 
is possible to adopt a provision in the certificate of incorporation that eliminates 
or limits “the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for 
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director.”2018 However, there is no 
statutory provision of comparable exculpation of corporate officers.2019 In Gantler 
v. Stephens, there were no indications of a provision of exculpation of Nils’s 
directors. Hence, the Supreme Court of Delaware considered the legal sufficiency 
of this action against Nils’s directors. Although, the Court examined the decision 
of the board to reject the “First Place” bid under the business judgment rule, it 
concluded that the directors and officers of Nils breached either their duty of 
loyalty or their duty of care.2020 The decision was reached for the following 
reasons: first, the reclassification proxy admits a conflict interest of on the part of 
the company’s directors and officers.2021 They could structure the reclassification 
in order to benefit from their interest contrary to the interest of the unaffiliated 
                                                     
2013 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27 at 704; 10 DELAWARE CODE, 
supra note 24, § 3114 (b). 
2014 Home Federal Savings and Loan Association of Niles | Board of Directors, , 
http://www.homefedniles.com/asp/services/service_4_5.asp (last visited Apr 12, 2016). 
2015 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27 at 699. 
2016 See e.g. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), 361 (1993). 
2017 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27 at 37. 
2018 Id. at 37.; tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24§ 102 (b) (7). 
2019 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27 at 37. 
2020 Id. at 706. 
2021 Id. at 707. 
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stockholders.2022 Second, an analysis of Nils’s board of directors showed that a 
majority of the board was conflicted.2023 The members of the board were 
attempting to maintain their financial interests. For example, the CEO never 
responded to a due diligence request and he failed to deliver the necessary due 
diligence materials and information.2024 Hence, the Court concluded that Nils’s 
directors and officers had a personal interest to “sabotage” the Sales Process and 
breached their duty of loyalty.2025 Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the 
appeal and overruled the judgment of the lower court.  
To conclude, the most notable aspects of this decision were that it imposed 
the same duties on corporate officers as are imposed on members of the board 
and examined the conflicts of interest under the business judgment rule. Thus, a 
corporate officer could have the same duties, such as a duty of care, a duty of 
loyalty and a duty of oversight. However, there is little case law on the officers’ 
fiduciary duties and the Delaware Courts have not clarified whether the business 
judgment rule should apply to officers.2026 Therefore, the potential scope of 
officer’s duties remains uncertain under Delaware Corporation Law.2027 For this 
reason, the next sections will examine the corporate compliance officer under US 
Employment Law. 
III.  Is the Compliance Officer covered by the Employment-At-Will 
Doctrine? 
A more detailed understanding of the legal status and the duties of the 
compliance officer could be achieved by turning to the employment law, in 
particular the individual employment law. This section also explores whether 
there is any dismissal protection in the US. In addition, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at the corporate employment relationship. The applicable legal rules 
can be found in employment law and case law.2028 The employment relationship 
                                                     
2022 Id. at 707. 
2023 Id. at 707. 
2024 Id. at 707. 
2025 Id. at 709. 
2026 CHIEF EXECUTIVE GROUP, supra note 2000 at 6–5. 
2027 Id. at 6–6. 
2028 Jones, supra note 518 at 487. 
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by law involves the ‘employment at-will doctrine.’2029 Therefore, this section 
provides an explanation of the ‘employment at-will doctrine,’ followed by a brief 
overview of the Federal and State Employment Law, the case law concerning the 
question of whether compliance officers are at-will employees, a summary of 
similarities and differences between directors and officers, and lastly an 
examination of termination provisions applicable to compliance officer contracts.  
A number of American commentators consider the ‘at will’ rule and its 
approach to constitute the “exceptionalism of American employment law” and call for 
the rule to be reconsidered.2030 A 2013 comparative study found that the absence 
of a constitutional, statutory, or secondary legislation or ruling restricting the 
grounds for termination in the US is unique in comparison to twelve countries 
including France, Germany, Italy or the even the UK.2031 However, there is one 
exception in the case of collective dismissal, but this issue falls outside the scope 
of this section and will not be discussed any further. 2032 In contrast, other authors 
argue that such a rule would prevent greater labor-market flexibility and, thus, a 
productive economy.2033 In fact, in 2016 the Bureau of Labor Statistics presented 
the actual figures for the employment situation in February.2034 The number of 
hires increased to 5.4 million, the highest level since November 2006, and the 
number of layoffs and discharges was 1.7 million.2035 Hence, the number of layoffs 
was smaller than the number of hires.  
1. US Employment Law 
Traditionally, there is no uniform regulation under employment law in the 
US. American employment law consists of a variety of federal, state and local 
                                                     
2029 ‘At- will’ means the legal default, if the matter is not speciﬁed contractually. See Id. at 
487 at 60. 
2030 Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing 
American Exceptionalism, 92 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 343–480, 348 (2013). 
2031 Id. at 480. Appendix, Table 13. 
2032 Employers with over 100 employees have to provide at least sixty days’ notice to 
employees, before closings and mass layoffs. See 29 USC, supra note 352 § 2102 (a). 
2033 See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 UNIVERSITY OF 
CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 947–982 (1984) He tends to the maintenance of the at-will rule; In: 
Estreicher and Hirsch, supra note 2029 at 8. 
2034 US DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE |BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2016). 
2035 Id. 
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regulations, which are not harmonized with one another and are overlap 
mutually. Originally, the employmemt law comprised principles and rules of 
common law. As discussed above, the original and most important principle of 
American labor law is the ‘employment at-will doctrine.’2036 This doctrine is the 
historical approach that courts have taken in interpreting of employer and 
employee relations.2037 That is why, an employer can terminated at any time, and 
for any reason, or no reason an ‘at-will’ employee and the courts will as a rule not 
protect the employee. However, there are also exemptions.  
In addition, since 1935 federal and state antidiscrimination laws have 
developed. This federal regulation focuses on matters of minimum wage and 
maximum hour requirements as well as exemptions of the employment-at-will 
doctrine.2038 US labor law has seen two major developments since its beginning. 
The first step was the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 
1935,2039 which is a statute of United States employment law.2040 The purpose of 
this Act is to protect the national interests of the United States as regards labor 
within the country. It defines the interests and protects the rights of employers, 
employees, and labor unions.2041 The second step was the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (CRA), which stated, for example, that it is unlawful 
“to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”2042  
                                                     
2036 HAY, supra note 126 at 245 note 666; See supra note 1148 Busby, Definition, 
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE 
2037 See in: Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad Company, 81 Tenn. 507, 519–520 
(1884)“All may dismiss their employes at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no 
cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.”; 
Employment-at-will Doctrine Busby, supra note 1146. 
2038 See e.g. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 (FSLA), PUB. L. 114-38, 29 USC, §§ 201-219 
Chapter 8 (1938). 
2039 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (NLRA), PUB. L. 49 STAT. 449, 29 USC §§ 151-169 ch. 
372 (1935). 
2040 Epstein, supra note 2032 at 947. 
2041 John C. Busby, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (NLRA) LII / LEGAL INFORMATION 
INSTITUTE (2009), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/national_labor_relations_act_nlra (last 
visited Apr 14, 2016). 
2042 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, PUB. L. 114-38, 42 USC  §§ 2000E–17 78 Stat. 253 (1964). 
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These two statutes had a huge impact on the at-will doctrine and pervade 
the employment case law.2043 The US employment relationship is governed by 
contractual agreements. Similar to the UK and Germany, this relationship is based 
on a contract of employment.2044 This contract can be agreed in written, oral or 
implied. Contrary to the UK and Germany an employment contract between an 
employer and an executive officer is an exception.2045 Whether exists an 
employment contract between the both parties, the term ‘employ’ must define. It 
“includes to suffer or permit to work.”2046 Section 203 of the FSLA also explain the 
terms ‘employer’ and ‘employee’, but these terms are not clearly legally defined.2047 
Therefore, similar to Germany the US Courts apply an overall picture of factors to 
decide if a person falls in the scope of the FSLA. Two of those factors are:  
(1) the degree of the alleged employer's right to control the manner in which the work 
is to be performed, and (2) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss 
depending upon his managerial skill.2048  
From that the courts conclude that without being an employee, the person is 
qualified as an independent contractor.2049  
As we have seen, under the American employment at-will doctrine, it is 
permissible for both the employer and the employee to end an employment 
contract without cause or notice.2050 For this reason, courts have taken this 
approach in interpreting employment relationships.2051 Only one state, Montana, 
has an unfair dismissal statute, the Montana Wrongful Discharge from 
Employment Act.2052 Every other state uses the at-will doctrine.2053 Over the years, 
the courts have developed a growing number of statutory and common-law 
                                                     
2043 Epstein, supra note 2032 at 947. 
2044 Compare Ch. 5, A., IV., p. 423; Ch. 6, A. IV., p. 534.  
2045 Executive officers are only subordinate to the members of the board. 
2046 FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 (FSLA), supra note 2028 § 203 (g). 
2047 Id.§ 203 (d) (e). 
2048 See in: Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates Inc. D J, F.2d 748 603 (1979). 
2049 Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates Inc. D J, 603 F.2d 748 (1979). 
2050 Estreicher and Hirsch, supra note 2029 at 343. 
2051 Busby, supra note 1146. 
2052 MONTANA CODE AN., MONTANA WRONGFUL DISCHARGE FROM EMPLOYMENT ACT (1987) 
§§ 901-914. 
2053 Estreicher and Hirsch, supra note 2029 at 443. 
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exceptions.2054 In conclusion, nowadays, state courts tend to abandon the at-will 
doctrine and lean towards greater protection of employee rights under a variety 
of theories.2055 This may also be important for compliance officers, in the event 
that they refuse to violate the law at the employer's request or report violation of 
the law to administrative agencies or regulators. The next section examines the 
kind of agreements into which corporate officers enter in practice in order to find 
their specific duties, their termination terms, and to show whether they may 
benefit from dismissal protection.  
2. The Employment Agreements of Corporate Officers  
In practice, it seems that, unlike normal employment relationships, 
corporate ofﬁcers negotiate ‘‘cause’’ and “good reason “contracts.2056 An empirical 
analysis of CEO employment contracts found that three-quarters of the sample 
were employment agreements and that the most common defined causes were 
‘‘willful misconduct’’, ‘‘moral turpitude’’, “failure to perform duties” and “fiduciary 
breach.”2057 By surveying the public corporate information as filed and published 
by the SEC in the EDGAR database, it appears that although the companies had 
appointed directors or officers, like CEO, CFO, COO or CCO, approximately 
sixty-seven percent (two thirds) of companies did not enter into a written 
employment agreement with their directors or officers.2058 The search in the 
EDGAR database for employment agreements proved difficult on account of the 
researcher having to know the filing date, filing number and form in which the 
contract is incorporated. Thus, thirty-three companies with employment 
agreements with directors and officers is likely to be higher than the number 
found. Ultimately, seventy-one contracts of corporate officers were found and 
                                                     
2054 Id. at 349. 
2055 Busby, supra note 1146; See e.g. in: Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628 (1992) The Courts 
consider the unique characteristic of the legal profession and the special releationshipt to a 
law firm. See also supra footnote 2079, p. 314. 
2056 Jones, supra note 518 at 489. 
2057 Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, What Do CEOs Bargain For? An Empirical Study 
of Key Legal Components of CEO Employment Contracts, 63 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW 
REVIEW 231–270, 242, 249 (2006) Table 3. 
2058 For the purpose of this thesis, the search examined the filings of SEC Form 10-K and a 
sample of one hundred US registered (publicly traded) companies from all sectors, which 
were filed within two days in April 2016.  
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analyzed.2059 Additionally, in the course of the search, a number of consulting 
agreements, brief confidential agreements, non-competition agreements, and 
stock option agreements were found; however, these were not examined.  
For the purpose of obtaining an informative and complete picture of the 
common reason for terminating provisions in employments agreements of 
corporate officers, the provisions of the agreements were structured and codified. 
In the sample, the majority of employment agreements referred to the CEO, CFO, 
COO and CTO. Only in two companies, was a chief compliance officer appointed 
and entered into a written employment contract. It has been mentioned that the 
CEO and CFO may hold various positions, such as President, Vice-President, 
treasurer, or secretary. The majority of the companies appointed two officers: 
CEO and CFO. This is necessary for signing and certifying the certification of the 
CEO pursuant to Section 302 and the certification of the CEO and CFO pursuant 
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act.2060 Only three of the sixty-eight 
appointed officers were female. Two of them were the CCO and General Counsel 
and one the CFO. In this sample, the average base salary of the officers was US$ 
245,828 and the average of officer’s ages was 53 years.2061  
Overall, by analyzing the termination terms of officer’s employment 
agreements, four kinds of termination were identified. They can be categorized as 
follows: 
(1) With “cause” or “just-cause” agreements (28; 41 percent)2062 
(2) Without cause agreements (19; 28 percent) 
(3) Good reasons agreements. (17; 25 percent) 
(4) At –will Employment (4; 6 percent) 
Thus, approximately one third of the employment agreements are without 
cause agreements, while only six percent are at-will employments. Most of the 
contracts were concluded for a definite term. The range varies from two, three, 
and five years.2063 Moreover, the vast majority of termination provisions are “just-
cause” agreements in the event that officers are involved in fraud, dishonesty, or 
                                                     
2059 See supra Table 8, p. 312 and Appendix.  
2060 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, §§ 302, 906; 15 USC 7241, § 1350. 
2061 See supra Table 8, p. 312. 
2062 See supra Table 8, p. 312 and Appendix. 
2063 See supra Table 8, p. 312 and Appendix. 
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moral turpitude or when they are indicted or charged with a felony or crime. 
Willful misconduct, refusal to perform employee's duties and breach of a 
fiduciary duty follow. Thus, the officers can assess the circumstances under which 
they may be laid off. Figure 10 presents a chart on the distribution of causes 
within the officers’ employment agreements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 - Distribution of causes within officers’ employment agreements2064 
Interestingly, in seventeen agreements there is a cause provision “change in 
or of control.” For example, in the event of a sale of all, or substantially all of the 
assets of the company or any of its affiliates or any division, the company can 
terminate the agreement without financial disadvantage. In addition, eight 
                                                     
2064 See supra Table 8, p. 312 and Appendix, The two missing causes within  were: uses 
illegal drugs and alcohol and breach of information of the board.  
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contracts feature a provision on disclosure of information by officers. This means 
disclosure of proprietary or confidential information without specific 
authorization from the employer. Poor performance and incompetence on the job 
rarely constitutes cause in the officers’ contracts. Only eight agreements include 
this cause. Finally, only one contract includes the cause “breach of information of the 
board,” which means the officer failed to resolve any act or omission that 
purportedly formed the basis for the board's determination. Although the 
recognition by courts since Caremark that a cause of action could be given against 
directors’ on account of their failure to exercise oversight, it seems that this cause 
is rarely afforded any attention in practice. Furthermore, it is interesting to note 
that a breach of fiduciary duties is only subject to termination for cause and not 
for damages. In general, in the event of termination with cause, the officers leave 
the company without any severance compensation. Seventeen agreements allow 
the officer to terminate the contract for a “good reason,” but it appears that 
officers would be in breach of their contracts in the event of termination without 
good reason. The most important good reasons are a material breach by the 
company of the agreement, material diminishment of position, material reduction 
in base salary, and relocation of geographical location. The review of the 
agreements showed that the officers are given severance compensation in the case 
of termination for good reason and when they are fired without cause. 
Nevertheless, no agreement comprises any protection against unfair dismissal. 
Furthermore, the terms of these agreements state the officers’ duties. The 
range of contractual duties varies from not becoming involved in fraud, 
dishonesty or moral turpitude, no breach of a fiduciary duty, no breach of policies 
until the board has been informed. The duty to inform the board could be 
adopted from the increased legislation and enforced regulation. This term could 
be significant for the compliance officer in the forthcoming period. 
Table 8 shows the range of reasons for termination stated in officers’ 
agreements.  
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Table 8 - Range of Causes of Termination2065 
Causes Agreements 28 
Breach of a fiduciary duty 19 
Breach of information of the Board 1 
Breached any provision of corporate policy or code of 
conduct 
14 
Breached any provision of the agreement 15 
Change of control 17 
Disclosed without specific authorization from employer 8 
Gross incompetence 8 
Gross negligence 9 
Involving fraud, dishonesty or moral turpitude 37*) 
Refused to perform employee's duties 24 
Uses illegal drugs or alcohol 4 
Willful misconduct 27 
Good Reason Agreements 17 
Material breach by the Company of the agreement 15 
Material diminishment of position 17 
Material reduction in base salary 14 
Relocation of the geographical location 11 
*) This cause comprises more provisions such as fraud, dishonesty etc. 
 
Two of the seventy-one agreements provide for the fullest extent of 
indemnification permitted by State Corporation Law for directors and officers. 
Three agreements comprise an indemnification and limitation on liability of 
directors and officers. Overall, it appears that corporate officers could minimize 
their risk of damage by means of employments agreements. On the other hand, 
however, there are advantages for the companies as well. In cases where officers 
                                                     
2065 See Appendix. 
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have an employment agreement, this is justified with the profit and benefit for the 
company. For example, a company within the food industry explained as follows: 
The loss of the services of our CEO, other senior officers or other key employees could 
have a material adverse effect on our business and plans for future development. We have 
no reason to believe that we will lose the services of any of these individuals in the 
foreseeable future; however, we currently have no effective replacement for any of these 
individuals due to their experience, reputation in the industry and special role in our 
operations.2066 
In conclusion, evidently officers have power to negotiate employment 
agreements and their terms. Finally, it seems that compliance officers are not 
exclusive under the employment at-will doctrine.2067 Hence, they could negotiate 
terms in their agreements, for example an indemnification against fines, 
judgments or settlements but negotiate a term of dismissal protection could be 
difficult. Additionally, in order to clarify whether the US compliance officer 
enjoys specific protection under the common law employment at-will doctrine, 
the next section provides two examples of employment law cases involving 
compliance officers. 
a.  Sullivan v. Harnisch  and the New York At-Will Employment 
Doctrine 
In 2012, the Court of Appeals of New York marked a move contrary to 
federal regulation. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision that 
New York common law does not recognize any cause of action for the wrongful 
discharge of an at-will employee.2068 Sullivan was a 15 percent partner, the 
executive vice president, treasurer, secretary, chief operating officer, and chief 
compliance officer of a hedge fund.2069 The Defendant, Harnisch, was the majority 
owner, chief executive officer, and president.2070 Sullivan claimed against 
Harnisch for wrongful termination after Sullivan provided information to a 
lawyer concerning a proposed agreement that would have eliminated his 
                                                     
2066 See e.g. Form 10-K (2016) SEC, supra note 1571 Statement from a food company. 
2067 See e.g. Jones, supra note 518 at 489; Schwab and Thomas, supra note 2046 at 266. 
2068 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 19 N.Y.3d 259, 261 (2012). 
2069 Id. at 261. 
2070 Id. at 261. 
314 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
ownership interest.2071 He confronted Harnisch about improper trading and 
emphasized the importance of federal regulation for registered investment 
advisers.2072 Sullivan pointed out his duty to avoid improper trading as chief 
compliance officer under federal securities laws and the company’s Code of 
Ethics.2073 The SEC requires every investment company and investment adviser 
registered to adopt and implement written policies, and designates a chief 
compliance officer to be responsible for administering the policies and 
procedures, but it provides no protection for wrongful termination of the 
compliance officer.2074 However, the Court did not acknowledge any reason for 
wrongful termination, on the grounds that Sullivan was not a full-time 
compliance officer. He had four other titles and even held a 15 percent share in 
the hedge fund.2075 Thus, he had many other responsibilities and employment 
duties.2076 Sullivan acted in his own interest, and failed to report to the SEC, which 
was why the Court did not apply the federal law2077 to Sullivan’s conduct and 
confirmed the application of the employer-employee relationship.2078 In this case, 
the Court of Appeal did not recognize the application of an exception as in Wieder 
v. Skala.2079 In this case, Wieder [plaintiff], a lawyer, sued his former employer, a 
law firm, for wrongfully discharging as an associate.2080 Wieder was fired after 
reporting on unethical conduct of another associate. The Court of Appeals of the 
State of New York recognized the unique characteristics of the legal profession 
and the special relationship of an associate to a law firm.2081 The Court concluded 
that Wieder’s employment differs in several aspects from other corporate 
                                                     
2071 Id. at 262. 
2072 Id. at 264. 
2073 Id. at 262. 
2074 INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, supra note 1651; INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 
1940, supra note 1636, 17 CFR § 270.38a-1. 
2075 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 19 N.Y.3D 259, supra note 2066 at 264. 
2076 Id. at 264. 
2077 DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), supra note 
721, § 922 (a), 15 USC § 78u-6. 
2078 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 19 N.Y.3D 259, supra note 2066 at 265. 
2079 Wieder v. Skala,, supra note 2054. 
2080 Id. at 628. 
2081 Id. at 637. 
CHAPTER 4 | 315 
 
employments.2082 For example, each lawyer and judge has the duty to report to the 
Disciplinary Committee of the Appellate Division any potential violations of the 
Disciplinary Rules (DR 1-103 (A)).2083 Hence, the Court held that Wieder had a 
valid claim for breach of his contract. This was the only time that the New York 
State Court of Appeals has recognized an exception from the employment-at-will 
doctrine.2084 
Sullivan was not a lawyer at a law firm and the Court pointed out that the 
Wieder exception is a “narrow one”2085 and declined an exception to that rule for the 
compliance officer of a hedge fund.2086 Therefore, under the employment at-will 
doctrine2087 Harnisch was authorized to fire Sullivan at any time for any reason or 
for no reason because regulatory compliance, "was at the very core and, indeed, the 
only purpose" of Sullivan's employment,2088 since he had four other titles.2089 
However, critics argue that the non-recognition of the exception for compliance 
officers provided a misleading sign to companies intending to improve their 
compliance and risk management functions.2090 In conclusion, this decision 
confirmed that compliance officers fall within the scope of the at-will employment 
doctrine and that better protection could be established through the conclusion of 
full-employment agreements. 
                                                     
2082 Id. at 635. 
2083 Id. at 636. The rule provides: “A lawyer possessing knowledge, not protected as a 
confidence or secret, of a violation of DR 1-103 that raises a substantial question as to 
another lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness in other respects as a lawyer shall 
report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act 
upon such violation.” 
2084 SULLIVAN V. HARNISCH, 19 N.Y.3D 259, supra note 2066 at 263. 
2085 Id. at 263. 
2086 Id. at 261. 
2087 The judicially created New York at-will employment doctrine was initially recognized 
in 1895 in the case of Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117 (1895). 
2088 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 19 N.Y.3D 259, supra note 2066 at 261, 264; Murphy v. Am. Home 
Prod., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 297 (1983). 
2089 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 19 N.Y.3D 259, supra note 2066 at 264. 
2090 Clearly Gottlieb, NEW YORK’S EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE PUTS PRIVATE COMPANY 
COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL AT RISK 5 (2012). 
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b.  Mayers v. Stone  and the Employment Agreement  
In this case, Plaintiff Mayer was the company's general counsel, chief 
compliance office and a member of the board of Stone Castle Partners, LLC, an 
equity fund.2091 In contrast to Sullivan, he had an employment agreement. In 
addition to his employment with Stone Castle Partners, LLC Mayers established 
his own company called TP Investments, LLC, which also dealt with 
collateralized debt obligations. When Stone Castle Partners became aware of his 
company and trading, the board confronted Mayers about his dealings and 
provided him two choices: (1) to sell his TP Investment or (2) if he refused, 
termination for cause.2092 Mayers sold his TP Investment. Nevertheless, he was 
fired for cause. Hence, Mayers claimed inter alia for breach of the employment 
agreement for terminating without cause and for breach of the duty of good 
faith.2093 
The Supreme Court of New York County examined the terms of Mayers’ 
LLC Agreement. Under Section 6.01 of this agreement, Mayers was required to 
"devote substantially all of his full professional time to the performance of his duties as an 
employee of the company” and under Section 5.01 “to disclose any conflict of interest” 
as a board member.2094 Furthermore, the termination clause stipulated in the 
agreement stated that the board could terminate his agreement for “cause” at any 
time.2095 For this reason, Mayers was not able to claim good faith, since the terms 
of a contract govern the parties, not an implied covenant of good faith.2096 The 
court concluded that Mayers had the right to challenge whether his conduct was 
the reason for his termination, but that he was unable to replace the terms with a 
claim of good faith.2097 In the end, the court dismissed Mayer’s claims.  
In conclusion, cases concerning compliance officers’ agreements are rare. 
Both cases show that there is no specific protection against dismissal for the 
compliance officer. Under the employment at-will doctrine, the New York Court 
                                                     
2091 Mayers v. Stone Castle Partners, LLC, No. 650410/2013 (US N.Y. 2014). 
2092 Id. 
2093 Id. 
2094 Id. 
2095 Id. 
2096 Id. 
2097 Id. 
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of Appeal granted protection for lawyers only in an exceptional case. Thus, the 
compliance officer position has the same legal nature as other corporate officers 
under the State Corporation Law and under Employment Law. 
3. Conclusion – The Compliance Officers Work under US State Corporation Law 
and Employment Law 
Additionally to the US federal law, State Corporation Law and the Courts 
have responded to focus greater attention on the role of corporate officers and on 
the legal duties of officer in the last thirty years. Delaware Corporation Law 
clearly states that corporate officers such as directors are fiduciaries. In a number 
of Delaware cases, the courts concluded, “officers and directors owe fiduciary duties 
to the corporation and its shareholders.’’2098 Although both officers and directors are 
fiduciaries, over a long period it was unclear what the corporate officers’ 
fiduciary duties are. Specifically the officers’ duties and the duties of the 
compliance officer are lacking in the State Corporation Law.  
Since 1996, the Delaware Courts have developed a line of cases, which have 
clarified the compliance duties of directors and officers, as summarized below.2099 
 
Table 9 - The Line of Delaware Cases relating to Corporate Compliance 
Line of Delaware Cases Compliance issue 
1996 Caremark2100  Recognition of shareholders litigation against corporate 
directors for fail to exercise oversight, 
 Established standards for liability, breach of directors 
oversight with necessary conditions “ systematic failure”, 
“utterly failure” or “ unconsidered inaction”, 
 Development of a new duty of oversight or compliance 
duty for directors, 
 Development of the Caremark standard or Caremark theory 
                                                     
2098 See e.g. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2D 503 (DEL 1939), supra note 1831 at 510; In re Walt Disney 
Co. Derivative Litig., (DEL. CH. 2004), supra note 1831 at 16. 
2099 See supra A., II., 2.-4., pp. 290 et seq. 
2100 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22. 
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 Ongoing duty to address compliance 
2006 Stone v Ritter2101  Confirmation of duty of oversight for directors and the 
Caremark standard of oversight liability.  
2009 Gantler v Stephen2102  Officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors such 
as the duty of oversight.  
 
While the compliance duties of directors and officers are now clearly 
defined under corporation case law, the protection from liability or from 
wrongful termination for officers, specifically for compliance officers, remains 
uncertain. Corporate law provides statutory provisions of exculpation for 
directors, but not for officers. In addition, the business judgment rule generally 
applies to decisions within a director’s authority. However, it seems that officers 
do not have the protection of the rule. For this reason, two recent cases with 
respect to the compliance officer under employment case law were examined.2103 
 
Table 10 - The Employment Law with respect to wrongful termination of Compliance Officer 
Employment Law Cases Wrongful Termination of Compliance Officers 
2012 Sullivan v. Harnisch2104  No exception from the employment at- will doctrine due 
to the employment relationship, 
 Sullivan was not a full-time compliance officer, 
 Under at-will doctrine he could terminated without 
cause or notice.  
2014 Mayers v Stone2105  Mayers was a general counsel and a compliance officer, 
 Due to his employment agreement he breached his duty 
of loyalty, he had a conflict of interest, 
 The court confirmed the cause of termination without 
specific protection for the compliance officer. 
                                                     
2101 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2D 362 (DEL. 2006), supra note 237. 
2102 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27. 
2103 See supra A., III., 2.a.-b., pp. 313 et seq. 
2104 Sullivan v. Harnisch, 19 N.Y.3D 259, supra note 2066. 
2105 Mayers v. Stone Castle Partners, LLC, NO. 650410/2013 (U.S. N.Y. 2014), supra note 2089. 
CHAPTER 4 | 319 
 
The case law does not support the application of the business judgment rule 
to officers on the same basis as directors. In their employment agreements, 
directors negotiate exact termination and indemnification terms. Since the vast of 
majority of corporate officers are at-will employees, they fall under the 
employment at-will doctrine.2106 Thereby, the employer can terminate their 
contracts for any reason at any time. Generally, under the common law at-will 
doctrine courts did not recognize any cause of actions for wrongful discharge in 
the US. Thus, no specific dismissal protection for compliance officers was found 
under the US Employment Law.  
IV. The Role of the Corporate Officer 
Having examined US State Corporation Law, US Employmemt Law and 
landmark cases with respect to compliance and compliance officers, this part 
identifies the role of the corporate compliance officer through examining the 
corporate bylaws and other sources together with his responsibilities, duties, and 
liability in practice in order to present the model of the US compliance officer at 
the end of chapter 4.  
As we have seen, US courts tend to deal with the duties of both directors 
and officers together.2107 However, there are a number of pronounced distinctions. 
First and foremost, pursuant to State Corporation Law, directors are elected and 
can be removed by stockholders.2108 Officers are usually elected or appointed by 
the board of directors and can be removed from office by the directors.2109 By 
reviewing the bylaws of companies, they prescribe that “The officers of the 
corporation shall be elected by, and serve at the pleasure of, the board” or “The board may 
                                                     
2106 This is not applicable to the executive officers such as CEO, CFO, etc. See supra Table 
11, p. 320. 
2107 See supra A., II.,.1. to 4., pp. 282 et seq.; See also CHEW, supra note 1790; Eisenberg, supra 
note 242 at 3; Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2D 503 (DEL 1939), supra note 1808 at 510. “Corporate 
officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to 
further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary 
relation to the corporation and its stockholders.” 
2108 tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, § 211 (b); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, 
supra note 1798 § 7.28 (a). 
2109 Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 
WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW 1597, 1605 (2005). 
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appoint such other officers and agents as it shall deem necessary.”2110 A review of ten 
bylaws of companies in recent SEC filings showed a variety of officer titles. These 
bylaws also outline the responsibilities and duties in terms of the corporate 
purpose. 
 
Table 11 – Officers’ Duties in the Bylaws2111 
Officers appointed in the 
Bylaws 
No. Officers duties (examples) 
Chief Executive Officer 8 
General power to execute bonds, deeds, and contracts in the name of 
the Corporation, to appoint or designate all employees and agents of 
the Corporation, shall be a member of the Board and shall have general 
charge and supervision of the business of the Corporation, shall have 
general management and control over the policy, business and affairs 
of the corporation. 
Chief Financial Officer 4 
He shall render to the Board of Directors, whenever the Board may 
require, an account of the financial condition of the corporation, shall 
be responsible for the system of financial control of the corporation, 
including internal audits, the maintenance of its accounting records, 
and the preparation of the corporation's financial statements. 
Chief Operating Officer 2 
He shall be the officer of the Corporation charged with supervision 
and management of the daily operations of the Corporation in support 
of the Chief Executive Officer. 
General Counsel 2 
The GC shall supervise and direct the legal affairs of the Corporation, 
Whenever an applicable statute, decree, rule, or regulation requires a 
document to be subscribed by a particular officer of the Corporation, 
such document may be signed on behalf of such officer, shall advise 
the board of directors and officers on legal matters, except those 
relating to taxes.  
Other Officer 5 
Any other elected officer shall have such powers and perform such 
duties as may from time to time be granted, or assigned by the Board 
or, subject to the control of the Board, by a committee thereof or by the 
Executive Committee. 
                                                     
2110 Form 10-K SEC, supra note 1569 The Bylaws of companies were found in the SEC 
Filings in the EDGAR database. The sample includes six small companies and four 
corporations at the Fortune 500 list. See Appendix. 
2111 See also Id. 
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Secretary 8 
The Secretary shall attend to the giving of notice of all meetings of 
stockholders and of the Board of Directors and shall keep and attest 
true records of all such proceedings, The Secretary shall have charge of 
the corporate seal and have authority to attest any and all instruments 
or writings to which the same may be affixed and shall keep and 
account for all books, documents, papers, and records of the 
Corporation relating to its corporate organization. 
Treasurer 5 
The Treasurer shall have the care and custody of all moneys, funds, 
and securities of the Corporation, and shall deposit or cause to be 
deposited all funds of the Corporation. The Treasurer shall have power 
to sign stock certificates, to indorse for deposit or collection, or 
otherwise, all checks, drafts, notes, bills of exchange, or other 
commercial paper payable to the Corporation, and to give proper 
receipts therefore.  
 
The reviewed bylaws of the companies do not show any appointed 
standalone compliance officer. However, in this sample of large publicly traded 
corporations, (Fortune 500) the issues of compliance are within the purview of the 
legal department. The general counsel has multiple responsibilities for law, 
governance, and compliance, as specified in the 10-K file. One aspect of his duties 
is to advise the board of directors and officers on legal matters, except those 
relating to taxes.  
Secondly, Sale identifies corporate officers as counterparts to the 
directors.2112 She compares the number of decisions taken in day-to-day 
activity.2113 Directors have to make strategic decisions and to oversee the 
corporation's affairs and business.2114 Hence, this position includes a variety of 
responsibilities, which are described in the Corporate Director's Guidebook.2115 
Therefore, in the view put forward by Sale, monitoring systems are within the 
directors' purview since they are responsible for approving and overseeing 
                                                     
2112 Sale, supra note 26 at 724. 
2113 Id. at 723. 
2114 Brown, supra note 518 at 14. 
2115 CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1819 at 12. “The overall responsibilities 
of directors are, e.g. monitoring the corporation performance with regard to operating, 
financial, and other significant plans, strategies and objectives; selecting the CEO and 
other senior executives; understanding the corporations risk profile, reviewing and 
overseeing the risk management programs; monitoring the internal financial program; 
establishing and monitoring effective compliance programs; etc.”  
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them.2116 In contrast, officers manage daily business operations.2117 They are 
responsible for maintaining and improving corporate procedures and business. 
Thirdly, however, State Corporation Law allows the board of directors to 
delegate its own managerial responsibility to the senior officers. Nevertheless, 
Section 141(a) of Delaware Corporation Law permits a board of directors to 
delegate managerial duties to officers of the corporation, except to the extent that 
the corporation's certificate of incorporation or bylaws may limit or prohibit such 
delegation.2118 For example, a bylaws of a Delaware company states the following 
the Board of Directors may delegate to the Chief Executive Officer the right to appoint 
such Executive Vice Presidents, Senior Vice Presidents, Vice Presidents, Assistant Vice 
Presidents, Assistant Secretaries, Assistant Treasurers and agents, as the Chief Executive 
Officer shall deem appropriate and necessary from to time.2119 
According to this bylaws, the Chief Executive Officer can also delegate his 
responsibilities to other corporate officers: 
The Chief Executive Officer shall have the power to execute any and all instruments 
and documents on behalf of the corporation and to delegate to any other officer of the 
corporation the power to execute any and all such instruments and documents.2120 
In addition, the courts have confirmed that directors are not required to 
supervise every detail of business operation.2121 Instead, the directors can delegate 
to officers limited responsibilities relating to day-to-day business.2122 Specifically, 
the Delaware Court examined the scope of delegation by a CEO. The employment 
agreement provides that the CEO "shall be responsible for the general management of 
                                                     
2116 Sale, supra note 26 at 724. 
2117 Johnson and Millon, supra note 2107 at 1601. 
2118 tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24 § 141 (a) “If any such provision is made in the 
certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board 
of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such 
person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation.” 
2119 BYLAW OF A DELAWARE CORPORATION, Article IV, Sec. 1. 
2120 BYLAW OF A DELAWARE CORPORATION Id. Article IV, Sec. 7. 
2121 See. e.g. Myers & Chapman, Incorporated v. Thomas G. Evans, 374 S.E.2d 385, 392 (N.C. 
1988) "Directors are not ... insurers of the honesty and integrity of the officers and agents. 
Neither are they required to personally supervise all the details of business transactions.” 
2122 Petrin, supra note 1144 at 1677 at 90. 
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the affairs of the company."2123 Therefore, the board of directors delegated the 
general management to the CEO. The Court concluded that this term of the 
agreement is contrary to law and the bylaws.2124 This term was “void as a matter of 
law.”2125 Furthermore, such delegation does not relieve directors of their general 
duty to act with care.2126 
Fourthly, a small number of scholars disagree with the theory that officers 
are fiduciaries. They argue that officers are ‘agents’ since they are appointed by 
the board.2127 The principal source of agency law is the Third Restatement by the 
American Law Institute (ALI), which defines the term ‘agency’ as the 
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a "principal") manifests assent to 
another person (an "agent") that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to 
the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.2128 
Hence, whenever one person acts on behalf of another, the principles of 
agency define the relationships and the responsibilities of both parties. 
Furthermore, this person is subject to the principal's control.2129 Therefore, 
according to this theory, officers are subject to the control of directors acting on 
behalf of the corporate principal, the director.2130 Notwithstanding this, as agents, 
corporate officers owe also a number of fiduciary duties.2131 For example, the 
agent must act loyally for the principal's benefit.2132 Moreover, the agent owes a 
duty of performance, a duty of care, a duty to provide information, and a duty of 
good conduct.2133 Thus, the officer as agent has a duty to inform the principal 
using “reasonable effort to provide the principal with facts that the agent knows, has 
                                                     
2123 Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Del. 1996). 
2124 Id. at 1211, 1214. Directors may not delegate duties which lie “at the heart of the 
management of the corporation.” 
2125 Id. at 1212. 
2126 Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 50 N.E.2d, 602, 603 (111. App. Ct. 1943). 
2127 See e.g. Eisenberg, supra note 242 at 47“Officers are a special class of agents, and the 
rule has long been established in agency law that agents have a duty to duly inform their 
principals.”; Generally Johnson and Millon, supra note 1811. 
2128 ALI American Law Institute, THIRD RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW | AGENCY (2006) § 1.01. 
2129 Id.§ 1.01. 
2130 Johnson and Millon, supra note 2107 at 1607. 
2131 THIRD RESTATEMENT , supra note 2076, § 8.01. 
2132 THIRD RESTATEMENT, Id. § 8.01. 
2133 Id. §§ 8.07-8.12. 
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reason to know, or should know.”2134 The MBCA adopted the duty to provide 
information in section 8.42 (b)(1).2135 In fact, in Smith v. Van Gorkom the court 
concluded that Van Gorkom, a Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, had 
violated his disclosure obligation by withholding material information from the 
board and stockholders.2136 Another example seen in corporate scandals like 
Enron shows that the court-appointed examiner held that the corporate officers 
owed a fiduciary duty of good faith, duty of care and duty of loyalty to Enron.2137 
In that case, “knowing dissemination of false information about the financial condition of 
the company” constituted a breach of the officer’s fiduciary duties.2138 Eisenberg’s 
view confirmed that an officer who fails to provide material information is in 
violation of his duty of good faith.2139 Officers may also be guilty of breaching 
their duty of loyalty. In Hampshire Group, Limited v. Kuttner, the Delaware Court 
held that two former officers and employees of Hampshire breached their 
fiduciary duties by having knowingly falsified financial records of the 
company.2140 Moreover, Johnson and Millon argue that officers have a duty to 
establish adequate internal monitoring procedures and have primary 
responsibility for the corporation's business activities and financial reporting.2141 
While State Corporation Law does not clearly describe the role of officers, Federal 
Law governs a number of duties incumbent upon officers under the SOX.2142 With 
respect to current developments in Federal Law, the agent theory should be given 
due consideration.  
                                                     
2134 Id. § 8.11. 
2135 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, supra note 1798, § 8.42 (b)(1) “The duty of an 
officer includes the obligation: (1) to inform the superior officer to whom, or the board of 
directors or the committee thereof to which, the officer reports of information about the 
affairs of the corporation known to the officer.” 
2136 Smith v Van Gorkom, (DEL. 1985), supra note 1853 at 893. 
2137 Neal Batson, In re Enron Corporation, et al., Case No. 01-16034 (AJG) (S.D.N.Y.), Third 
Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-appointed Examiner, 24 (2003). 
2138 Id. at 24. 
2139 Eisenberg, supra note 239 at 50. 
2140 Hampshire Group, Limited v. Kuttner, C.A. NO. 3607-VCS (DEL. CH. 2010), supra note 
1991. 
2141 Johnson and Millon, supra note 2107 at 1636. 
2142 Id. at 1636.; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 Sec. 302, 906. 
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The conclusion from the foregoing is that corporate officers duties and 
liabilities are conversely discussed. Their fiduciary duties are original and derive 
from Agency Law, not only from the board's delegation of powers to oversee the 
company’s daily business.2143 Hence, some legal scholars and some courts argue 
that the business judgment rule applies also at that time to officers and their 
decisions.2144 If the courts do not apply the business judgment rule to officers, they 
could probably be held personally liable more often for breaching their duties.2145 
In addition, it has been mentioned that there is no need for any transplant into 
Corporation Law, because Agency Law also comprises the officers' relationship 
with the corporation.2146 
1. The Role of the Corporate Compliance Officer 
The ensuing question is: where is the role of the corporate compliance 
officer defined. Some Corporation Law Statutes identify a variety of officers’ 
titles. Generally, these include a president, vice-president, a secretary and a 
treasurer, as well as other officers determined in or provide for in the bylaws.2147 
Meanwhile other statutes state only that 
A corporation shall have the officers described in its bylaws or appointed by the board 
of directors in accordance with the bylaws.2148 
Thus, State Corporation Law and the sample of corporation bylaws2149 make 
no mention of compliance officers. The reason for the absence in law of 
specifically defined officers could be the stronger focus on the duties of the 
highest corporate management, such as the directors and executive officers, rather 
than on titles.2150 However, when dealing with cases concerning fiduciary duties, 
                                                     
2143 Johnson and Millon, supra note 2107 at 1638. 
2144 Id. at 1642.; Lyman Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 
BUSINESS LAWYER, 440 (2005); CEDE & CO. V. TECHNICOLOR, INC., 634 A.2D 345 (DEL. 1993), 
supra note 2015 at 367–368. 
2145 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 20. 
2146 Johnson and Millon, supra note 2107 at 1638. 
2147 See e.g NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW, supra note 1836§ 715. 
2148 See e.g. FLA. STAT. ANN. (2015), supra note 1971 § 607.08401; ILLINOIS BUSINESS 
CORPORATION ACT (ILCS), 805 ILCS 5/ (1983) 805 ILCS 5/8.50. 
2149 See supra Table 11, p. 320. 
2150 CHEW, supra note 1813 at 20. 
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the courts tend to refer to “key employees.” Key employees have positions that are 
comparable to enumerated officers in the law and bylaws.2151 The courts examine 
whether these individuals have access to confidential business information and 
increased authority.2152 Based on this, they could be subject to a fiduciary duty. 
Therefore, this section first looks at instances in which the compliance function is 
incorporated into the corporate structure and, second, which are the main duties 
of corporate compliance officers. 
2. The Compliance Officer within the Corporate Structure 
In the US corporations, traditionally, the general counsel took the 
compliance officer position.2153 The general counsel continues to perform this 
position to this day in a number of companies.2154 In other companies, the role of 
the corporate compliance officer illustrates that general counsels with a “dual-
role”2155 are appointed as corporate executives with responsibility for compliance 
issues at large publicly traded corporations.2156 A 2005 survey by the ACC 
confirmed that the person who deals with daily operational responsibility for 
compliance activities is the general counsel (forty percent) and the chief 
compliance officer (twenty percent).2157 In addition, the survey found that the 
“primary driver” of compliance programs is the general counsel’s office or the legal 
department and the CEO or the board of directors.2158 Following on from this, a 
study by PWC shows that the legal department is in charge of oversight for 
                                                     
2151 Id. at 20. 
2152 Id. at 20. 
2153 MILLER, supra note 25 at 129. 
2154 Id. at 129. 
2155 ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL ACC, COMPLIANCE PROGRAM AND RISK 
ASSESSMENT BENCHMARKING SURVEY 2005 8 (2005). “The general counsel of companies has 
daily operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics function 40% of the time.”; 
See supra Table 11, p. 320. 
2156 See supra Table 11, p. 320. 
2157 Compliance Program and Risk Assessment ACC, supra note 2115 The representation 
was broken down with 15 percent coming from foreign-based corporations and 85 percent 
from U.S-based corporations in all major industries. Nearly 60 percent of the companies 
represented by survey participants are publicly-traded on a major US stock exchange.” 
2158 Id. at 27. 
CHAPTER 4 | 327 
 
compliance.2159 The majority of responsibilities for compliance are assumed by the 
senior vice president (forty-seven percent) and by other executives (twenty-four 
percent).2160 There thus appears to be a lack of breadth in the compliance officers’ 
function.2161  
However, in recent years, the role of the general counsel - just like the role 
of the compliance officer, has evolved within companies.2162 Compliance issues 
are no longer exclusively a legal task.2163 For example, the requirements of an 
effective compliance program, the establishment, the processing, the monitoring, 
and the auditing of internal compliance structures, codes, and policies cannot be 
met by a department staffed solely by lawyers.2164 Furthermore, as previously 
discussed, the administrative agencies such as the SEC and DOJ enforce the 
separation between legal and compliance structures.2165 
Another aspect derived from that corporate structure is that the compliance 
officer rarely reports to the CEO or to the board of directors, because “that is what 
the CEO wants.”2166 A compliance study by PWC and Compliance Week found 
that only three percent of chief compliance officers report to the board of directors 
while thirty-five percent report to the general counsel.2167 This number had not 
significantly changed by 2015. Thirty-one percent of compliance officers report to 
the general counsel, and twenty-one percent report to the board of directors.2168 
                                                     
2159 PWC STUDY 2013 BERNSTEIN, KIPP, AND GROVES, supra note 1630 at 17 In forty percent 
of the US Companies, the oversight for compliance resides with the legal department. 
2160 PWC STUDY 2013 Id. at 18. 
2161 DeStefano, supra note 20 at 126. 
2162 MILLER, supra note 25 at 129. 
2163 Id. at 129. 
2164 Id. at 129. 
2165 See supra I.,1.b., p. 214. 
2166 DeStefano, supra note 20 at 126. This study carried out telephone interviews with 
general counsels. This is a response from a general counsel and compliance officer. 
2167 PWC STUDY 2012 KELLY, BERNSTEIN, AND KIPP, supra note 7 at 17 Chart 4. "Survey data 
supporting the Compliance Week-PwC State of Compliance 2012 Study was collected 
from February 28 through April 6, 2012. The survey instrument was directed to senior-
level compliance officers at US corporations with annual revenue of $1 billion or more.” 
See Id. at 18. 
2168 PWC study 2015 BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 52 at 12. 
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The general counsel has a great deal of power, influence, and credibility.2169 
Hence, the CEO tends to trust the legal advice provided by the general counsel. In 
contrast, the compliance officers themselves explain that they are often viewed as 
“cops,” “watchdogs,” or “outsiders.”2170 However, due to its duty of oversight, the 
board of directors would be well advised to assure itself that the compliance 
officer provides objective information, analyses, and recommendations on 
compliance procedures.2171  
However, the key problem is that the compliance officer may not recognize 
ex ante the effectiveness of a compliance program, and the prosecutors instead 
decide ex post if the compliance program was effective.2172 In 2005, a study by 
Weber and Fortune found that approximately half of the compliance officers 
surveyed had no direct reporting responsibilities. Furthermore, the average ethics 
and compliance departments has 3.58 employees.2173 In contrast, in 2012, the 
compliance study2174 by PWC and Compliance Week showed an increased 
number of full-time staff including CCO, working in the compliance department. 
Sixty-one percent of the compliance executives surveyed had more than six 
employees in their compliance department.2175 In short, the majority of 
compliance officers describe the compliance structure in their companies as a 
“centralized leadership with dedicated central resources supported by remote resources 
embedded in the business reporting.”2176 
However, critics view the structural corporate compliance changes as 
nothing more than “cosmetic compliance” or “window-dressing.”2177 The reason for 
this is that they see the weaknesses in enforcement through an “informal quasi-
                                                     
2169 DeStefano, supra note 20 at 127. 
2170 Id. at 129.; Freeman, supra note 70 at 360. 
2171 José A. Tabuena & Jennifer L. Smith, The Chief Compliance Ofﬁcer versus the General 
Counsel: Friends or Foes? Part II, JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 13–18, 17 (2006). 
2172 Baer, supra note 610 at 997. 
2173 Weber and Fortun, supra note 4 at 109. 
2174 PWC STUDY 2012 KELLY, BERNSTEIN, AND KIPP, supra note 7. 
2175 PWC STUDY 2012 Id. at 17. Chart 2. 
2176 PWC Study 2013 BERNSTEIN, KIPP, AND GROVES, supra note 1634 at 29. 
2177 Baer, supra note 610 at 952; BEALE, supra note 1117 at 20; Oded, supra note 1117 at 276; 
Rosen, Parker, and Nielsen, supra note 759 at 361. 
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adjudicative process” by the government.2178 A number of scholars refer to the 
governmental compliance regulation as ‘adjudicative compliance.’ They argue that it 
is a procedural shortcoming process leading to significant costs.2179 They conclude 
that, despite strengthened governmental focus on compliance, companies 
nowadays are no more transparent than in the past.2180 Instead, the administrative 
agencies use companies to obtain information about individual employees for 
investigations and prosecutions.2181 Finally, as discussed previously, the 
governmental response is to attempt to restore investors’ confidence by means of 
periodic statutory disclosure obligations and recommended corporate structures, 
which then taken into consideration when sentencing companies.2182 
The compliance officer has also to deal with governmental regulators like 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).2183 In the financial services industry, 
the regulators expect that this function will become a significant position as a part 
of management.2184 In the same way, in the private sector, the compliance officers 
find themselves in the middle between the demands of the board management 
and the employees. Sometimes, they have to make decisions to the detriment of 
their own colleagues in charge of operations, procurement, business acquisition, 
and contracting in order to comply with the law.2185 As a result, this post is highly 
complex and complicated to handle. The SEC therefore supports the corporate 
compliance function in the private sector.2186 Ceresney, the director of the SEC 
Division of Enforcement, considers the following questions with respect to the 
compliance function within companies: 
(1) Are compliance personnel included in critical meetings? 
                                                     
2178 Baer, supra note 610 at 952. 
2179 Id. at 975. 
2180 Id. at 952. 
2181 Id. at 956. 
2182 Id. at 956.; FCPA GUIDANCE DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1275; US SENTENCING MANUAL 
USSC, supra note 667, §8 B2.1; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 54. 
2183 Fanto, supra note 70 at 2. 
2184 Id. at 4. 
2185 Greenberg, supra note 14 at 34. 
2186 SEC 2015 National Society of Compliance Professionals Ceresney and Division of 
Enforcement, supra note 1644. 
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(2) Do compliance officers report to the CEO and have significant visibility with the 
board? 
(3) Is the compliance department viewed as an important partner in the business and 
not simply as a support function or a cost center? 
(4) Is compliance given the personnel and resources necessary to fully cover the 
entity’s needs?2187 
The SEC has recognized the absence of real compliance involvement in 
company considerations, for example that there is sometimes a lack of resources 
and information for the compliance function.2188 On these grounds, the SEC 
enforces and encourages companies to afford compliance the prominence and 
resources it needs in order to be effective.2189 Conversely, in practice, it appears 
that the corporate compliance officer often occupies a dual-hatted or 
multifunctional role than rather a standalone function. In most instances, legal 
departments carry out the responsibilities of oversight for compliance issues. The 
compliance officer title is not enumerated in State Corporation Law and 
precedents involving corporate compliance officers are few and far between. 
Nevertheless, the administrative agencies like the SEC will enforce the integration 
and creation of a standalone position of the compliance officer. The role of the 
compliance officer looks set to continue to remain separate from the general 
counsel’s role in future. 
3. The Duties and Responsibilities of the Corporate Compliance Officer 
Due to the absence of statutory codification or definitions of the duties of 
the corporate compliance officer, which are conversely discussed, the relevant 
duties and responsibilities can derive from requirements, guidelines, agreements 
by prosecutors or from the definition of compliance. In a narrow sense, 
compliance can be understood as a form of internal control.2190 Hence, the 
compliance function is “a form of internalized norm enforcement within companies.”2191 
Sometimes, this function is compared with that of a policymaker who has to 
                                                     
2187 SEC 2015 NATIONAL SOCIETY OF COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONALS Id. 
2188 SEC 2015 NATIONAL SOCIETY OF COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONALS Id. 
2189 SEC 2015 NATIONAL SOCIETY OF COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONALS Id. 
2190 Miller, supra note 542 at 3. 
2191 MILLER, supra note 25 at 137. 
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devise the compliance system in the company.2192 In this narrow, internal context, 
the key duties of the compliance officer include establishing, implementing, 
maintaining, overseeing, and monitoring the corporate compliance program, if 
the board has approved the program.2193 Furthermore, this function includes a 
periodical reporting duty of compliance issues to the CEO or the board. In other 
words, this position includes the operational responsibilities for the compliance 
program. In addition, this function also comprises an external component. The 
compliance officer has to ensure that the board of directors, executive officers, 
employees, and agents of the company adhere to the law and rules of 
regulators.2194 He has to uncover any illegal business practices or misconduct. For 
this reason, this function is dependent on connections with and insights into other 
business units.  
Subject to the condition that the court considers that the compliance officer 
operates as a fiduciary or a key employee, he has to act in the best interests of the 
company. In this case, the compliance officer has a duty of care, a duty of loyalty 
and since Caremark a duty of oversight. The duty of oversight of the compliance 
officer comprises the management and assessment of all compliance risks. The 
compliance officer should directly provide all compliance responsibilities and 
issues to the CEO and the board within the company.2195 If the court considers that 
the compliance officer is covered by the agent theory, compliance officers also 
owe fiduciary duties. The agent owes a duty of care and has a duty to provide 
material information to the principal. Before reaching a decision, the court will 
examine the scope of the delegation by the board and the terms of agreements of 
the compliance officer. 
However, there are forerunners for establishing legal duties and 
responsibilities of compliance officers, for example in the financial services under 
Federal Law, its regulators like the SEC, and in the SEC cases against compliance 
officers.2196 Additionally, the SOX established duties and responsibilities for 
CEO’s and CFO’s within publicly traded companies. Furthermore, the FSGO set 
                                                     
2192 Id. at 138. 
2193 Id. at 128. 
2194 Id. at 128. 
2195 PWC Study 2015 BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 52 at 17. 
2196 US SEC v. Pekin Singer SEC, supra note 1644; US SEC v. SFX SEC, supra note 1644. 
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up standards for compliance officers’ reporting duties. Nevertheless, the 
corporate compliance officer should be aware that the regulatory requirements 
relating to compliance officers in the financial services sector could provide a 
model for the private sector in future. In the same way, it is possible that the 
compliance officer could be required to annually report and certify the 
effectiveness of the compliance program to the regulators. In brief, it seems that 
one important legal duty of the compliance officer is to provide regular 
information about compliance issues within the given reporting line in the 
company. 
Nowadays, compliance officers’ responsibilities and duties are as varied as 
their titles.2197 The scope of duties and responsibilities of the compliance officer 
can vary significantly based on such factors as company size, sector, and specific 
risks. The study by Weber and Fortune shows a wide range from ensuring 
compliance with internal standards and state and federal laws, conducting 
investigations, to carrying out trainings, managing, and performing audits.2198 The 
compliance officer is often viewed as an educator with respect to policies and 
standards.2199 Moreover, compliance officers and their teams write, revise, 
promote codes of business conduct, and monitor and discipline employees.2200 
Together with the general counsel, compliance departments support the 
investigation of wrongdoing by employees.2201 A recent study by PWC2202 
measures the order of priority and the primary accountability, of the compliance 
officers’ function. First and foremost, the corporate compliance officer is 
responsible for the code of conduct (86 percent), then for the ethics and 
compliance program (84 percent), and thirdly for anti-bribery and anti-corruption 
issues under the FCPA (76 percent).2203 These are followed by responsibilities for 
investigations, hotlines, compliance audits, policy process management, and 
lastly, responsibility for customs and trade compliance.2204 
                                                     
2197 See supra Table 11, p. 320. 
2198 See also Freeman, supra note 70 at 360; Weber and Fortun, supra note 4 at 107 Figure 3. 
2199 Fanto, supra note 70 at 1. 
2200 Baer, supra note 610 at 960. 
2201 Id. at 961. 
2202 PWC Study 2015 BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 52. 
2203 PWC STUDY 2015 Id. at 6. 
2204 PWC STUDY 2015 Id. at 6. 
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In conclusion, the compliance officer should have a comprehensive 
overview of compliance obligations throughout the company. In addition, the 
compliance officer needs to know who carries following compliance 
responsibility within the company. An appropriate solution might be an 
agreement on the scope and details of responsibilities. Finally, it appears that the 
most important legal duties of this function are (1) to manage and to oversee all 
compliance issues within the company and (2) to provide timely material 
information about compliance issues to the CEO or board of directors. 
4. The multifunctional Role of the Corporate Compliance Officer 
Instead, of simply listing the tasks of the corporate compliance officer this 
section discusses the role of this function, which is often described as wearing 
“multiple hats.” As examined previously, the responsibility for compliance often 
lies with the vice-president or the general counsel.2205 In addition, a number of 
studies show that the range of titles and responsibilities varies widely.2206 The 
compliance officers with “two or more hats” themselves note that it is sometimes 
challenging to have enough time to properly coordinate and handle compliance 
issues.2207  
There is an academic and political debate on the separation of the 
compliance function from that of the general counsel. Critics argue that 
compliance is not a biased subject and that comprises a number of areas: 
“competition law, employment law, environmental law, labor and employment law, 
international law, accounting rules, and disclosure law,” etc.2208 For this reason, all 
experts in areas of formal rules and legal should report to the general counsel.2209 
However, they acknowledge that lawyers have legal and ethical expertise but less 
                                                     
2205 See supra A., III., 2., pp. 308 et seq. 
2206 PWC Study 2014 BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 8; PWC Study 2015 BERNSTEIN 
AND FALCIONE, supra note 52. 
2207 PWC Study 2014 BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 8 at 10. 
2208 Ben W. Heineman, DON’T DIVORCE THE GC AND COMPLIANCE OFFICER HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2010), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/12/26/dont-divorce-the-gc-and-compliance-officer/ 
(last visited Jun 3, 2016). 
2209 Id. 
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procedural skills.2210 Other authors argue that the compliance and the legal 
function have different objectives and specific tasks.2211 The compliance officer on 
the one hand has to monitor business activity and employee conduct in order to 
detect and prevent misconduct and to cooperate with the government and should 
have open relationship with regulators. On the other hand, the general counsel 
has to provide legal analysis, advice and defend the company.2212 In contrast, the 
compliance position is a control function. Despite this, the compliance officer and 
the general counsel should collaborate closely. Combining the two functions 
could, however, cause conflict.2213  
The evidence shows that larger companies are more likely than smaller 
companies to have a standalone chief compliance officer on account of their larger 
resources and budgets.2214 Smaller companies also have simpler business 
structures. Nevertheless, in a number of large companies, the compliance function 
remains in the legal department because the general counsel is the de facto 
compliance officer at 48 percent of the surveyed companies that do not have a 
named chief compliance officer.2215 However, maintaining and reviewing 
compliance policies and procedures will continue to be a primary responsibility 
of compliance officers. Finally, the enhancement of the regulatory environment, 
enforcement by the regulator and the shift in focus toward greater accountability 
will lead to a more standalone, “one-hatted” and equal role of the compliance 
officer.  
5. The evolving Role of the Corporate Compliance Officer 
The perspective of compliance officers shows an ambivalent picture. The 
majority of authors and regulators assume that the compliance officers’ role will 
                                                     
2210 Id. 
2211 PWC Study 2014 BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 8 at 11; Traeger, Guidroz, and 
Jimbo, supra note 511 at 25. 
2212 PWC STUDY 2014 BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 8 at 11. 
2213 PWC Study 2014 Id. at 11.; Tabuena and Smith, supra note 2169 at 16. 
2214 PWC Study 2013 BERNSTEIN, KIPP, AND GROVES, supra note 1634 at 5; PWC Study 2014 
BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 8 at 7. 
2215 PWC Study 2015 BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 52 at 12. 
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evolve into an independent standalone function.2216 Today, compliance is a control 
function rendered through various monitoring and reviewing procedures and 
activities.2217 As the role of compliance evolves to reflect the enforced legal 
environment, many companies have assumed the compliance functions to 
provide greater responsibility and accountability.2218 Hence, new regulations have 
assigned more accountability and involved the compliance function in new areas 
of responsibility for risk assessments, oversight, monitoring, internal 
investigations, regulatory examinations and investigations, education and 
training.2219 However, practice shows that the majority of companies in the small 
sample did not name a standalone chief compliance officer in their bylaws.2220 
A strategic outlook by PWC sees an increasingly valuable role for the 
corporate compliance officer by 2025.2221 Compliance policies and procedures will 
be increasingly automated and assimilated into daily corporate life.2222 Due to 
global megatrends such as technological development, accelerating urbanization 
and climate change, compliance issues will pervade every corporate function.2223 
The compliance officer will develop innovative tools to collect and analyze risk 
data across the company.2224 Compliance will have a corporation-wide focus; it 
will be integrated into all business units and all business operations.2225 Finally, 
the compliance officer will be recognize as a strategic business partner by the 
board and the CEO in view of changing legislation and with the objective of 
changing public perception of the company.2226 
                                                     
2216 See e.g. Dando et al., supra note 571 at 10; DeStefano, supra note 20 at 74; Greenberg, 
supra note 710 at 21; Greenberg, supra note 14 at 1; Majewski, supra note 18 at 23; Tabuena 
and Smith, supra note 2174 at 14. 
2217 The Evolving Role of Compliance SIFMA, supra note 733 at 4. 
2218 The evolving Role of Compliance Id. at 18. 
2219 THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE Id. at 4. 
2220 See supra Table 11, p. 320. 
2221 Sally Bernstein & Andrea Falcione, Resilience | The CCO Star in 2025, A JOURNAL OF 
STRATEGY AND RISK, 2 (2014). 
2222 RESILIENCE | THE CCO STAR IN 2025 Id. at 3. 
2223 RESILIENCE | THE CCO STAR IN 2025 Id. at 3. 
2224 RESILIENCE | THE CCO STAR IN 2025 Id. at 3. 
2225 RESILIENCE | THE CCO STAR IN 2025 Id. at 4. 
2226 RESILIENCE | THE CCO STAR IN 2025 Id. at 4. 
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V. The Liability of the Corporate Compliance Officer 
As discussed previously, US Federal Law and State Corporation Law 
impose broad and new duties on directors and officers.2227 Today, directors and 
officers inter alia have a duty of oversight in relation to the company.2228 
Consequently, a personal liability based on inadequate management or failure to 
supervise and manage corporate affairs and subordinates could follow.2229 In 
addition, the general agency principle states that an agent is subject to liability to 
a third party for all torts he commits, notwithstanding that the person acts as an 
agent or as an employee.2230 
1. Statutory Supervisory Liability 
The title of compliance officer alone does not establish liability on the part 
of this position.2231 Under common law, “officers are not personally liable for torts of a 
company or of any other agent due to their position.”2232 The courts require additional 
facts and circumstances to make a judgment.2233 Hence, the court examines and 
focuses on whether any duty of the officers has been breached.2234 This means that 
corporate officers could be subject to statutory liability, but the plaintiffs would 
have to prove a breach of duty, citing material facts. For example, in 2010, In re 
                                                     
2227 See supra II., 2.-4., p. 290 et seq. 
2228 See supra II., 2., p. 290. 
2229 Petrin, supra note 1144 at 1662. 
2230 See e.g. Bowles v. Ruppel, (3d Cir. 1946), 157 F.2d 944, 946 (1946)“Nor is it an excuse from 
legal liability generally that one has acted, in what he did, as agent for another.”; Petrin, 
supra note 1159 at 1666 note 17; THIRD RESTATEMENT AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 
2083, § 7.01. 
2231 See e.g. SEC COMPLIANCE FAQ SEC Division of Trading and Markets:, FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT LIABILITY OF COMPLIANCE AND LEGAL PERSONNEL AT BROKER-
DEALERS UNDER SECTIONS 15(B)(4) AND 15(B)(6) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT (2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-cco-supervision-093013.htm (last visited 
May 6, 2016) Question 3. 
2232 See e.g. Bernstein v. Starrett City, Inc., (2d Dept. N.Y.2003), 303 A.D.2d 530, 532 (2003). 
“It is well settled that a corporate officer may not be held liable for the negligence of the 
corporation merely because of his or her official relationship to it.” See also Felder v R&K 
Realty, 295 A.D.2d 560 (2002); Clark v Pine Hill Homes, 112 A.D.2d 755 (1985)."; Petrin, supra 
note 1157 at 1667 note 22. 
2233 Petrin, supra note 1144 at 1667. 
2234 Id. at 1667. 
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Dow Chemical Co. Derivative Litigation,2235 the plaintiffs alleged that directors and 
officers of Dow Chemical had failed to detect and prevent FCPA bribery.2236 The 
court dismissed this claim because  
“plaintiffs have failed to allege facts suggesting that the Dow board "utterly failed" to 
supervise insiders, or that any director acted with anything other than good faith.”2237  
The pleading standard is rigorous when a plaintiff alleges breaches of the 
ongoing duty to oversee compliance.2238 In the view of the legal scholars, the 
Delaware standards of the directors’ duty are very low.2239 However, it has not yet 
been conclusively decided whether a director is individually liable for losses 
resulting from a failure to oversee and monitor the corporation's activities.2240 
Furthermore, officers can be liable under US bribery and federal law, and 
statutes like the FCPA, and the SOX.2241 Additionally, nowadays, the regulators 
are beginning to focus on individual accountability.2242 As discussed above, the 
SEC has enforced actions against compliance officers in the financial services 
sector.2243 For example, the SEC held a compliance officer of an investment adviser 
liable for failure to implement compliance policies, failure to conduct an annual 
review, and responsible for a material misstatement in an SEC Form filing.2244 This 
leaves compliance officers in a potentially vulnerable position. Although there is 
no specific case law relating to personal liability of a corporate compliance officer, 
there is an expectation that potential personal liability of this function is likely to 
                                                     
2235 In re Dow Chemical Company Derivative Litigation, NO. 4349-CC (DEL. CH. 2010), supra 
note 656. 
2236 Id. 
2237 Id. 
2238 McGreal, supra note 518 at 136. 
2239 Id. at 135. 
2240 Brown, supra note 518 at 15. 
2241 See supra A., I., pp. 187 et seq. 
2242 See supra A., I., 1.d., p. 225; See also. Keynote Ceresney and Division of Enforcement, 
supra note 1646; REMARKS Yates and DOJ, supra note 1442. 
2243 See supra A., I., 2.d., p. 251 
2244 See e.g. U.S. SEC v. SFX SEC, supra note 1668; INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, supra 
note 1677, § 203 (e)(f)(k); SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 630, 17 CFR 
275.206(4)-7 (2003). 
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increase.2245 This assumption is encouraged by several SEC cases against 
compliance officers. Two recent SEC cases have shown that a compliance officer 
could be potentially liable.2246 In this context, Traeger et al. identified three 
potential indications of personal liability under Federal Securities Law: 
(1) a person violates the federal securities laws or rules, (2) this person is a subject to 
the supervision of another individual, and (3) the supervising individual does not 
reasonably fulfill his or her supervisory responsibilities.2247 
Hence, supervisory obligations of a compliance officer could arise under 
federal securities laws. The Investment Advisers Act defines a “supervised person” 
as 
Any partner, officer, director (or other person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions), or employee of an investment adviser, or other person who provides 
investment advice on behalf of the investment adviser and is subject to the supervision 
and control of the investment adviser.2248 
Specifically, In re John H. Gutfreund, et al., the SEC examines, when a 
compliance professional becomes a “supervisor.”2249 The criteria of this analysis are 
acknowledged as the “Gutfreund Standard.”2250 Under Federal Securities Law, the 
SEC does not presume, for example, “broker-dealer’s compliance or legal personnel are 
supervisors solely of their compliance or legal functions.”2251 The SEC determined that, 
under certain circumstances, persons who occupy positions in the compliance 
departments of broker-dealers are supervisors for the purposes of Sections 78o 
(b)(4)(E) and 78o (b)(6).2252In fact, the SEC argued that compliance personnel of 
broker-dealers who have “a requisite degree of responsibility, ability, or authority to 
                                                     
2245 BNA Insights Marshall, supra note 1668 By surveying the US Supreme Court Cases and 
the Delaware Court Ceases between 1990 and 2016 there was no specific case, in which a 
corporate compliance officer was held personal liable. 
2246 US SEC v Pekin Singer SEC, supra note 1644; US SEC v SFX SEC, supra note 1642. 
2247 Traeger, Guidroz, and Jimbo, supra note 511 at 26. 
2248 INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, supra note 1677, 15 USC § 80b-2 (a)(25) (2010). 
2249 In re John H. Gutfreund, et al. | Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554, 51 SEC 93 (1992) 
2250 Traeger, Guidroz, and Jimbo, supra note 511 at 27. 
2251 Division of Trading and Markets:, supra note 2229. 
2252 In re John H. Gutfreund, et al. | Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554, supra note 2095 at 
[Fn25]. 
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affect the conduct of the employee” could become supervisors.2253 Additionally, the 
SEC identified a number of criteria of supervisory authority, such as the power to 
hire, reward, or to punish others, and the power to prevent illegal behavior.2254 
Furthermore, the provisions of the Securities Exchanges Act authorized the 
SEC2255 to sanction 
“any person associated with such broker or dealer, who has failed reasonably to 
supervise violations of the provisions of such statutes, rules, and regulations.”2256  
In re John H. Gutfreund, et al., the legal and compliance officer discovered 
that an employee had violated the securities laws and informed three senior 
executives.2257 All of them failed to supervise, e.g. to conduct an investigation, 
failed to discipline and failed to limit the activities of this employee.2258 The SEC 
concluded, based on the circumstances of this case, the role and influence of the 
legal and compliance officer position, that such a person becomes a supervisor for 
the purposes of securities law.2259 Hence, this person “is obligated to take affirmative 
steps to ensure that appropriate action is taken to address the misconduct.”2260 However, 
the findings of this case are applicable only to this proceeding and are not binding 
on any other persons.2261 
Consequently, under the enforced federal legal framework, the courts tend 
to hold compliance officers personally liable.2262 In a recent decision, the Federal 
                                                     
2253 In re John H. Gutfreund, et al. | Exchange Act Release NO. 34-31554, supra note 2095 at 
[Fn24]; Traeger, Guidroz, and Jimbo, supra note 512 at 27. 
2254 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Division of Trading and Markets:, supra note 2229 
Question 2. 
2255 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 630, 15 USC. § 78u (a) (2010). 
2256 Id.15 USC. § 78o (b)(4)(E) (2010). 
2257 In re John H. Gutfreund, et al. | Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554, supra note 2094 at 
[Fn2]. 
2258 Id. at [Fn19]. 
2259 Id. at [Fn25]. 
2260 Id. at [Fn25]. 
2261 Id. at [Fn2]. 
2262 Brett Ingerman et al., EXPANDING PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICERS: 
MN FEDERAL COURT DECISION, PROPOSED NY REGULATION CONTINUE THE TREND | INSIGHTS | 
DLA PIPER GLOBAL LAW FIRM DLA PIPER (2016), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2016/02/expanding-personal-
liability/ (last visited May 6, 2016). 
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District Court of Minnesota held that a compliance officer in the financial services 
sector “could be civilly liable for failing to ensure their institution’s compliance with the 
Bank Secrecy Act’s anti-money laundering provisions.”2263 The chief compliance officer 
worked for a money transfer and payment services company for five years.2264 In 
that role, he was responsible for ensuring that his financial institution complied 
with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).2265 Specifically, he was responsible for ensuring 
that the institution implemented and maintained an effective anti-money 
laundering (AML) program.2266 The court denied and dismissed the motion of the 
CCO that the Bank Secrecy Act applies to institutions, not individuals.2267 In 
contrast, the Court pointed out that Section 5321(a)(1)'s explicitly refers to 
"partners, directors, officers, and employees.”2268 The case has not yet been decided, 
but the approach makes clear that compliance officers could be held personally 
liable for failure to maintain an effective compliance program that avoids illegal 
transactions.2269 The CCO faces to pay a fine $1 million and to a permanent ban 
from employment in the financial services industry.2270 
Federal Securities Law requires that firms registered as broker-dealers, 
investment advisers, or investment companies designate a chief compliance 
officer charged with overseeing compliance tasks. If the chief compliance officer 
has to supervise subordinates who committed illegal acts, he or she could be 
liable (1) due to failure to perform supervisory obligation and (2) for failure to 
maintain an effective compliance program under Federal Securities Law. Hence, 
in the financial services sector, the compliance officer could have enforeced duties 
as supervisor.  
In a broader sense, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) defines a 
statutory definition of the term ‘supervisor’ as follows:2271  
                                                     
2263 Id.; US Department of the Treasury v. Haider, No. 15-1518 (D. Minn. 2016). 
2264 US Department of the Treasury v. Haider, NO. 15-1518 (D. MINN. 2016), supra note 2228. 
2265 BANK SECRECY ACT OF 1970, supra note 195531 US Code § 5311. 
2266 US Department of the Treasury v. Haider, NO. 15-1518 (D. MINN. 2016), supra note 2228. 
2267 Ingerman et al., supra note 2260. 
2268 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY V. HAIDER, NO. 15-1518 (D. MINN. 2016), supra note 
2261. 
2269 Ingerman et al., supra note 2260. 
2270 Id. 
2271 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (NLRA), supra note 2038. 
CHAPTER 4 | 341 
 
The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual having authority, in the interest of the 
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or 
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or 
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of 
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment.2272 
Despite this legal definition in the area of employment law, the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded in the case Am. Fed. of Tele. & Radio v. 
Storer Broadcasting: 
There are no bright lines controlling the determination of whether a particular position 
comes within the definition of “supervisor” under the NLRA.2273 
Hence, the ambiguity of the application of the compliance officers’ position 
will remain. In the context of holding a compliance officer in other industry liable 
for the actions of others, it is uncertain which definition, the financial service or 
employment law definition, of the term ‘supervisor’ the courts will prefer and 
apply. In the event that a corporate compliance officer will recognized as a 
supervisor and subjected to liability, it could lead to undesirable inaction. 
2. Liability for Breach of Duty of Oversight  
A fundamental legal principle under common law is “without duty, there is 
no liability.”2274 The requirement of duty is “fundamental to the whole concept of tort 
liability.”2275 Courts could impose liability on corporate officers who negligently 
fail to oversee daily business transactions.2276 Generally, the negligent supervision 
is likely to consist in an omission rather than an action.2277 Although there is no 
recent case concerning the liability of the corporate compliance officer, in re World 
Health Alternatives, Inc., the United States Bankruptcy Court held a corporate 
general attorney personally liable for corporate misconduct through failure of 
oversight.2278 
                                                     
2272 Id. 29 USC § 152 (11). 
2273 Am. Fed. of Tele. & Radio v. Storer Broadcasting 745 F.2d 392, 399 (6th Cir. 1984). 
2274 Troy Robillard v. Asahi Chem. Indus. Co., (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995), 44 Conn. Sup. 510, 524. 
2275 Id. at 524. 
2276 Petrin, supra note 1144 at 1676. 
2277 Id. at 1676. 
2278 In re World Health Alternatives, Inc., (B.R. Del. 2008), 385 B.R. 576 (2008). 
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In the line of cases concerning the duty of oversight,2279 the courts tend to 
expand this duty to corporate officers and even to the general counsel. In 2008, in 
the case In re World Health Alternatives, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that a corporate 
officer, specifically the general attorney, was responsible for failing to implement 
an internal monitoring system.2280 According to Section 307 of the SOX, the 
general attorney must observe minimum standards of professional conduct.2281 
This standard requires “an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of 
securities law or a breach of fiduciary duty.”2282 The plaintiffs asserted that the general 
attorney has a duty to know of corporate wrongdoings and has to report such 
misconduct.2283 The attorney was not actively engaged in the alleged wrongful 
activities, but he knew, or should have known, about the mismanagement.2284 The 
Court confirmed that other courts have also recognized “both officers and directors 
owe fiduciary duties to the corporation.”2285 The court also expands the Caremark duty 
to include the general attorney. Finally, the general attorney was held personally 
liable for corporate fraud and misconduct because he failed to implement an 
adequate monitoring system. 
Following these approaches, the courts have held corporate officers 
personally liable for e.g. corporate misconduct and wrongful activities by 
directors, other officers, and employees. The courts tend also to apply liability for 
failure of the duty of oversight to corporate officers. This could imply that courts 
also intend to apply this duty to corporate compliance officer in the future. In fact, 
a study by Erickson found that in derivative litigation between 2005 and 2006, 
corporate officers like the CEO, CFO and COO are also named.2286 Plaintiffs even 
named lower-ranking officers like general counsels.2287 Nevertheless, the focus on 
the personal liability of compliance officers is increasing.  
                                                     
2279 See supra A., II., 1. to 4., pp. 282 et seq. 
2280 In re World Health Alternatives, Inc., 385 B.R. 576, 590 (B.R. Del. 2008). 
2281 Id. at 590.; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 307, 15 USC 7245. 
2282 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 § 307 (1), 15 USC 7245. 
2283 IN RE WORLD HEALTH ALTERNATIVES, INC., (B.R. DEL. 2008), supra note 2276 at 590. 
2284 Id. at 593. 
2285 Id. at 593. 
2286 See supra A., II., 2.c., p. 296; Erickson, supra note 1969 at 1772. 
2287 Id. at 1772. 
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3. Increasing Personal Liability of the Corporate Compliance Officer 
The US regulatory environment covering areas as varied as investors’ 
protection, reporting and disclosures obligation, and foreign corrupt practices, 
establish increasing liability of corporate officers, sentencing, and settlement 
incentives for the voluntary implementation of effective corporate compliance 
policies and procedures.2288 A study by Engebretson and Meier shows that the 
executive officers expect that the certification requirements of the SOX will 
establish personal liability for the information that is reported.2289 As previously 
discussed,2290 under the FSGO, companies are required to have specific “high-level 
personnel” in the organization responsible for the compliance and ethics 
program.2291 The “day-to-day operational responsibility” for the compliance program 
shall be delegated to specific individuals who shall report to periodically to “high-
level personnel.”2292 Hence, the corporate compliance officer is charged with 
overseeing compliance tasks. The company’s governing authority shall “exercise 
reasonable oversight” of “the implementation and effectiveness of the compliance 
program.”2293 Additionally, regulators are putting more pressure and liability on 
corporate officers. Furthermore, the courts have established personal liability for 
corporate directors and officers when they have failed to avoid corporate 
misconduct and non-compliance with the law through effective compliance 
policies and procedures.2294 
Although the courts have confirmed that officers’ duties are the same as 
directors, the consequences are not the same. A company can use a provision in 
its certificate of incorporation to exculpate its directors from personal liability for 
breach of fiduciary duty as a director under Delaware Law Section 102.2295 In fact, 
                                                     
2288 Parker, supra note 466 at 339. 
2289 Engebretson and Meier, supra note 1578 at 187–188. 
2290 See supra A., I., 3., p. 271. 
2291 See supra A., I., 3., p. 271 et seq.; US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supra note 667 § 8 
B 2.1(b)(2)(B). 
2292 See supra A., I., 3., pp. 271 et seq.; US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id.§ 8 B 
2.1(b)(2)(C). 
2293 See supra A., I., 3., pp. 271 et seq.; US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Id.§ 8 B 
2.1(b)(2)(A). 
2294 See supra A., V., 2., p. 341. 
2295 tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, § 102 (b)(7). 
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there is no statutory provision governing comparable exculpation of corporate 
officers.2296 What remains is the possibility of indemnification. The company can 
provide indemnification for directors and officers e.g. “against all expense, liability, 
and loss including attorneys’ fees, judgments, fines, taxes or penalties, and amounts paid 
in settlement” in its bylaws.2297 
However, how can a corporate compliance officer establish any form of self-
protection? In practice, the compliance officer could potentially face personal 
liability if he “directly participated in the misconduct, mislead or obstructed regulators, 
ignored their compliance responsibilities, or wore multiple hats.”2298 The SEC will focus 
on the compliance officers’ responsibilities and how the compliance officer 
handles misconduct when it occurs within the company.2299 Thus, the scope of 
liability that compliance officers face is broad. As such, the compliance officer 
should take the following measures recommended by the SEC:  
(1) Document every decision, which was made after an occurrence of misconduct, 
(2) Document every decision during an investigation by prosecutors, 
(3) Document every disciplinary measure e.g., terminate agents for criminal 
misconduct and illegal activities, 
(4) Be active not inactive in the event of misconduct.2300 
Overall, the SEC in its cases2301 against and statements2302 does not establish 
any clear standard of liability for corporate compliance officers.2303 In light of this 
uncertainty, the corporate compliance officers should take reasonable measures to 
protect themselves: 
                                                     
2296 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2D 695 (DEL. 2009), supra note 27 at 37. 
2297 See e.g. BYLAWS OF THE BOEING COMPANY, (2015) SEC. 3.1; BYLAWS OF THE OFFICE DEPOT, 
INC., Art. VII, Sec. 1. 
2298 Keynote Ceresney and Division of Enforcement, supra note 1644; Jaclyn Jaeger, The Real 
State of CCO Legal Liability, 2015 COMPLIANCE WEEK 28–30, 29 (2015). 
2299 Jaeger, supra note 2296 at 29. 
2300 Id. at 29. 
2301 US SEC v Pekin Singer SEC, supra note 1644; US SEC v SFX SEC, supra note 1642. 
2302 Keynote Ceresney and Division of Enforcement, supra note 1644. 
2303 BNA Insights Marshall, supra note 1674. 
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(1) Identify compliance risks in all business units and develop and 
document clear compliance responsibilities, 
(2) Identify and document the line of supervisory within the company, 
(3) Identify and review periodically the compliance policy and procedure, 
(4) Identify problematic activities, take measures and escalate compliance 
issues immediately to the senior management, 
(5) Identify possibilities to avoid a multifunctional role and try to get a 
standalone compliance function, 
(6) Identify standards by prosecutors and follow them, 
(7) Identify possibilities to obtain adequate indemnification.2304 
In response to the increasingly complex legal environment and regulatory 
requirements, companies now pay greater attention and provide larger budgets 
for executive oversight of compliance issues.2305 This ought to allow compliance 
departments and compliance personnel to maintain and review compliance 
policies and procedures more effectively and enable compliance officers to 
address compliance risks more efficiently and thereby prevent potential liability. 
B. THE MODEL OF THE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE OFFICER IN THE US 
I. Development of Responsibilities and Duties of the Compliance Officer 
The conclusion from the above is that the challenges for the corporate 
compliance officer work have increased significantly in the US. Due to the 
enhanced legal framework of federal law, the development of compliance 
standards by the courts and the rule-making activities by regulators, the 
responsibilities for compliance officers have increased, more duties pertaining to 
compliance officers have emerged and, therefore, more personally liability can 
arise. After the enactment of the FCPA, the SOX and the promulgation of the 
                                                     
2304 BNA INSIGHTS Id. 
2305 PWC STUDY 2012 KELLY, BERNSTEIN, AND KIPP, supra note 7 at 9 “In the 2011 State of 
Compliance survey, nearly one-third of respondents had budgets of less than $1 million 
last year. In 2012, that group dropped to 20 percent.” 
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FSGO, corporate compliance officers’ key responsibilities have established as 
followed:2306 
 
Table 12 - Key Responsibilities for Corporate Compliance Officers 
FCPA SOX FSGO 
 Identify and assess bribery 
risk of business within the 
company, 
 Conduct periodic trainings 
for all directors, officers, 
employees, agents and 
business partners, 
 Document appropriate 
risk-based due diligence 
and compliance 
requirements and oversee 
of all agents and business 
partners, 
 Include standard 
provisions in agreements, 
contracts, and renewals 
with all agents and 
business partners to 
prevent violations of the 
anti-corruption laws. 
 Implement and maintain 
disclosure controls and 
procedures, and internal 
control over financial 
reporting, 
 Improve legal, accounting, 
financial and 
communication skills, 
 Periodically review and 
document compliance 
policies and procedures, 
 Oversee reporting 
deadlines. 
 
 Promotion of an 
organizational culture that 
encourages ethical conduct 
and a commitment to 
compliance with the law, 
 Reasonably design and 
implement a compliance 
program, 
 periodically assess the risk 
of criminal conduct to 
reduce the risk of criminal 
conduct, 
 Periodically report to 
high-level personnel on 
the effectiveness of the 
compliance program. 
 
 
As the overview shows, the SOX and the FSGO added a new time element 
of the risk-assessment, the periodic review, audit and monitoring of the 
compliance program. The setting of time standards aims companies to evaluate 
periodically the effectiveness of their internal controls and their compliance 
                                                     
2306 See generally A., I., 1. to 3., pp. 187 et seq. 
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programs.2307 Hence, the compliance officers should improve their legal and 
financial skills, and develop a resubmission system in order to oversee reporting 
deadlines to regulators. Additionally, the FSGO added a new periodic reporting 
line for individuals with operational responsibility for the compliance program 
such as the compliance officer, to high-level personnel such as the CEO or the 
board, on the effectiveness of the compliance program.2308 Additionally, the SEC 
and DOJ have extended the reporting obligations of companies and the need to 
document compliance responsibilities within companies. Therefore, the 
legislation, the Guidelines, and regulations increased the number of 
responsibilities for the corporate compliance function at the same time. This 
development also influenced the case law particularly in the area of corporation 
law. The Delaware Courts developed a new duty of oversight or compliance duty 
for directors and corporate officers.2309 In addition, if the courts consider the 
compliance officer as an agent of the company he has a duty to provide material 
information to the principal under the agency law. Agency law also supports the 
required reporting responsibilities for compliance officers to report the material 
information of compliance issues to the CEO or the board. The most important 
responsibility of the compliance officer should be one of oversight on behalf of the 
board of directors, but the overall responsibility remain with the board.2310 
On account of these responsibilities and duties the corporate compliance 
officer can face supervisory liability or liability for breach of the duty of oversight. 
The SEC has applied the statutory supervisory liability against compliance 
officers in the financial services sector. However, to this day, the US courts did 
not have held a corporate compliance officer liable for failing to oversee an 
effective compliance program or supervise subordinates for misconduct.2311 
                                                     
2307 Compare SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 54, § 302 (a)(4)(C), 15 USC 7241; US 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667, §8 B2.1 (b)(5)(B). 
2308 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667, §8 B2.1 (b)(2)(C). 
2309 See supra Table 9, p. 317. 
2310 See generally A., pp. 182 et seq. 
2311 See generally A., pp. 182 et seq. 
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II. The Corporate Compliance Officer within the typical corporate 
structure 
This section presents the position of the corporate compliance officer within 
the structure of a typical US corporation. This model is a simplified representation 
of the averaged structure within a large corporation. Generally, the corporate 
structure consists of two main groups: directors and officers. The first group, the 
board of directors, is generally responsible for supervision and oversight of 
corporate affairs.2312 As examined previously, the board of directors can delegate 
certain responsibilities to board committees.2313 Furthermore, the board of 
directors has the option of delegating partial tasks to executive officers.2314 The US 
unified board of directors is referred to as “one-tier” board and comprises the 
CEO, executives directors, a chairman, and independent directors.2315 Large 
corporations have established additionally a number of committees, such as 
audit, compensation, risk or compliance committees. If the corporation does not 
have a specific compliance committee, the audit committee is the most important 
committee in the context of compliance.2316 In general, directors are selected to 
committees based on their qualifications, such as skills, expertise, and 
background.2317  
Studies have shown that the board size tends to correlate with the 
company’s revenues.2318 The average board size in small firms with revenue of 
                                                     
2312 See supra A, II.,1., p. 282; tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, § 141 (a). 
2313 See supra A., II.; pp. 280 et seq.; “All State Corporation Laws allow for the 
establishment of board committees.” See MILLER, supra note 25 at 27. 
2314 See supra A., II.; pp. 280 et seq.; tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, §§ 141 (a), 142; and 
based on corporation’s certificate of incorporation or bylaws. 
2315 David Block & Anne-Marie Gerstner, One-Tier vs. Two-Tier Board Structure: A 
Comparison Between the United States and Germany, Paper 1 COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, 6 (2016). 
2316 MILLER, supra note 25 at 73. 
2317 David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, BOARD OF DIRECTORS: STRUCTURE AND CONSEQUENCES 
(2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-quick-guide-05-
board-directors-structure-consequences.pdf (last visited Jun 4, 2016). 
2318 Jeffrey Coles, Naveen D. Daniel & Lalitha Naveen, Boards: Does one size fit all, 87 
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 329–356 (2008); David Yermack, Higher market valuation 
of companies with a small board of directors, 40 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 185–211 
(1996). 
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less than US$10 million revenue is seven directors, while in larger firms with 
more US$10 million revenue, the average twelve directors.2319 This number is 
often stated in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.2320 The directors are 
elected for terms defined in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of the 
company. Usually, the directors elect a chairman who leads the board and exerts 
a great deal of authority.2321 The chairman has the power, for example, to call 
special meetings of the shareholders and also sets the agenda for board 
meetings.2322  
The second corporate group comprises the corporation’s officers, who 
oversee the day-to-day business operations. At the annual meeting, the board of 
directors elects the officers for the transaction of business.2323 These officers are 
referred to as the “executive officers” or “management” of the company.2324 These 
titles are stated in the bylaws. The most important are the president, vice-
president, secretary, treasurer, CEO, CFO, COO, and sometimes the GC, who has 
also compliance responsibilities.2325 For publicly traded companies, the 
compliance requirements for the management are set forth in Section 404 (a) of 
the SOX.2326 Special corporate responsibility for financial reports is required for 
the CEO and CFO, who are required to certify each annual or quarterly report 
filed under the SOX.2327 The chief compliance officer is not specifically named in 
the sample bylaws examined.2328 Hence, the responsibilities delegated from the 
board are not clearly defined. Generally, the CCO act as staff to the CEO and 
                                                     
2319 Board of Directors Larcker and Tayan, supra note 2315. 
2320 BYLAWS OF THE MERCK & CO., INC., (2015) Art. II, Sec. 1; RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF 
INCORPORATION OF SCHERING-PLOUGH CORPORATION (MERCK & CO, INC.), (2009) Art. VI, 
Art. XII “The number of directors of the Corporation shall be such number, not less than 
three nor more than eighteen, as may, from time to time, be determined in accordance 
with the bylaws.” 
2321 MILLER, supra note 25 at 66–67. 
2322 Bylaws of the Pico Holding, Inc. Exhibit 3.1, supra note 1867 Art. II, Sec. 2.3. 
2323 Bylaws of the Boeing Company Exhibit 3.2, supra note 2295 Art. II, Sec. 4. 
2324 MILLER, supra note 25 at 103. 
2325 See supra Table 11, p. 320. 
2326 See supra A., I., 2.c., p. 244; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56 Sec. 404 (a), 15 
USC 7262. 
2327 Id. Sec. 302 (a), 15 USC 7241. 
2328 See supra Table 11, p. 320. 
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compliance committee.2329 As discussed previously, their key responsibility is to 
oversee and monitor the compliance program.2330 The CCO should report all 
efforts, results, or irregularities relating to compliance issues to the compliance 
committee or directly to the board.  
To conclude, as the study above shows, the corporate compliance officer is 
not specifically integrated in the structure set out in the bylaws or certificate of 
incorporation and their role is not always clear. The compliance officers 
themselves have to clarify their responsibilities and tasks by means of job 
descriptions or employment agreements. Although the US legislation and the 
regulators have repeatedly attempted to enforce the position of the corporate 
compliance officer, there is no federal or state statutory provision that clearly 
requires a designation of or which stipulates in detail what the duties of the 
corporate compliance officer are. The FSGO only provides that “high-level 
personnel of the organization” are responsible for an effective compliance 
program.2331 By contrast, in the regulated industry, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, for example, comprises a number of 
designation requirements and uniquely defined duties of the chief compliance 
officer in specific financial organizations, such as derivatives clearing 
organizations or swap dealers.2332 
Lastly, Figure 11 shows the classification of the CCO and CO within a 
typical US corporate structure. The connections between the first and second 
corporate group are depicted by reporting lines (green) and possible lines of 
delegation lines (blue).  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2329 MILLER, supra note 25 at 128. 
2330 See supra A., IV., 3., p. 330; Id. at 128.  
2331 See supra A., I., 3. p. 258; US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL USSC, supra note 667, § 8 
B2.1 (b)(2)(B). 
2332 See supra A., IV., 3., p. 330; tit. VII DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT (2010), supra note 721, WALL STREET TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2010; §§ 725, 731, 15 USC §§ 8301. 
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Figure 11 - The Model of the US Corporate Compliance Officer 
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III. The changing and evolving Model of the US Compliance Officer 
As a middle line, on the one hand, between the business units and the 
oversight and control compliance department, and on the other hand, between 
the company and the regulators, the corporate compliance officers face a difficult 
and complex job. An additional aggravating aspect is that the appointment of a 
corporate compliance officer is not required by statute, but the estimated 
appointment through recommendations and the FSGO. Hence, in practice, the 
corporate compliance officer often holds various titles and has to fulfil a 
“multifunctional” or “dual-hatted” role within smaller companies in particular. It is 
a frequent business practice in smaller companies for an officer to serve as the 
CEO, CFO, vice-president, and secretary while simultaneously having compliance 
responsibilities.2333 An officer holding multiple positions can have supervisory 
duties with respect to his or her supervisory responsibility for subordinate 
employees.2334 The same duties can arise from the dual-hatted role of the general 
counsel who wears a legal and a compliance hat, when he has to carry out 
supervisory tasks in a reasonable manner, preventing violations of corruption and 
of other areas of law and rules. However, the SEC does not view compliance and 
legal personnel as "supervisors" of business line personnel solely for purposes of 
securities law because they occupy compliance or legal positions.2335 Combining 
the two functions, general counsel and compliance officer, is unlikely to be 
expedient. The general counsels owe their professional and legal duties to the best 
interest of the company. They have to act loyally to their clients.2336 In contrast, the 
compliance officer could be subject to a broader public interest such as the 
regulators.2337 Therefore, it is difficult for the “dual-hatted” role of the compliance 
officer to be aware of all potential conflicts and to be effective in managing them.  
                                                     
2333 See supra Table 11, p.320. 
2334 See supra A., IV., 3., p. 330; Traeger, Guidroz, and Jimbo, supra note 512 at 26–27; In re 
John H. Gutfreund, et al. | EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 34-31554, supra note 2260 at [24]. 
2335 See supra A., IV., 3., p. 330; SEC Compliance FAQ Division of Trading and Markets:, 
supra note 2229 Question 3; IN RE JOHN H. GUTFREUND, ET AL. | EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE  
NO. 34-31554, supra note 2247. 
2336 Miller, supra note 542 at 8. 
2337 Id. at 8. 
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Over the years, the role of the compliance officer has changed from a mere 
administrating, policing role to an active advising, training, overseeing, and 
communicating role. Each of the business units must be responsible for 
compliance with both external and internal rules, policies, and laws affecting their 
function. Therefore, the compliance department should play a larger role as a 
business support function. Additionally, the compliance officer should provide 
guidance, direction, and reports to the board or the CEO on related matters. It is 
important for the compliance officer to have an excellent and thorough 
understanding of all processes, products, and supervisory lines within the 
company. As we have seen, in particular, the SOX and the FSGO as well as the 
regulators rule making activities and N/DPAs require and incentivize companies 
to assign a standalone function, the compliance officer, with clearly defined 
reporting lines and direct acces to the board.2338 In the course of the last twenty 
years, the enhanced regulatory framework and landmark cases pertaining to 
compliance has developed a new duty of oversight for directors and officers. For 
this reason, US corporations face widening compliance responsibilities. That is 
why the board has to ensure compliance and thus, corporate officers are assigned 
with compliance tasks.  
In addition, the findings of the examined studies and surveys of compliance 
officers in US corporations show a trend that the compliance function will become 
a standalone position, independent from the general counsel and legal 
department with appropriate resources and authority.2339 However, it seems that 
without legal requirements for the appointment of the corporate compliance 
function such as in securities laws in the federal law or in corporate law 
compliance responsibilities will remain in a number of various executives’ hands. 
Nevertheless, the development of this function will continue to change into a 
business partner in every business unit. The corporate compliance officer will 
understand the business risks and operate as an risk advisor. Finally, he will 
participate in strategic planning- 
                                                     
2338 See supra A., I., 3. p. 258; Transocean DPA DOJ, supra note 1393; US Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual USSC, supra note 666. 
2339 See supra A., IV., pp. 319 et seq. 
CHAPTER 5 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UK COMPLIANCE 
While the main source of law in the UK is case law, there is also a legislative 
framework in place with respect to compliance.2340 For example, the amended UK 
Companies Act 2006 has expanded the fiduciary duties of directors.2341 This 
chapter now provides a general overview of the nature of the UK legislative 
framework for the function of the compliance officer, of the various self-
regulatory organizations (SROs)2342 and the common law governing UK 
companies. The common law applicable to companies comprises the rules of the 
courts and judgments related to companies, compliance, and the compliance 
officer. Furthermore, it examines the duties, responsibilities and liability of 
corporate directors and company secretaries relating to compliance tasks.  
In contrast to the US and Germany, the United Kingdom does not have a 
written constitution, but an unwritten unitary constitution.2343 The cornerstone of 
the constitution is the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.2344 The UK 
constitution comprises a number of sources. The legal sources include e.g. statutes 
passed by Parliament2345 and case law. As previously discussed, the English 
                                                     
2340 The examination in this thesis of the legal framework with respect to compliance and 
the compliance officer focuses on the law as it applies in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.  
2341 GREAT BRITAIN ET AL., ANY OF OUR BUSINESS? HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UK PRIVATE 
SECTOR: FIRST REPORT OF SESSION 2009-10. VOL. 2, VOL. 2, 155 (2009). 
2342 SRO’s such as the Serious Fraud Office SFO and Financial Conduct Authority FCA. See 
supra III., 2. p. 407; IV., 3., a, b, p. 423. 
2343 Commission of the European Communities, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND 
THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS ON CERTAIN COMMUNITY MEASURES TO COMBAT 
DISCRIMINATION 3 (1999). 
2344 GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM: 2016-2017 190 (17. ed. 
2016). 
2345 The Parliament in UK has three functions: (1) to legislate, (2) to deal with public 
finance and (3) to provide a forum. See WILSON ET AL., supra note 335 at 35. 
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common law was developed by the courts and judges through cases.2346 Today, 
the UK has an organized system of appeals in criminal cases and law reports.2347 
Both the UK and the US have highly developed stock markets and, thus 
strictly regulated securities markets. Since the enactment of the Financial Services 
Act 1986, all investment businesses are subject to authorization.2348 Likewise, 
similar to the US, there is a huge regulatory environment in the UK financial 
service sector for organizations. Traditionally, regulators are also involved in the 
financial service sector in the UK.2349 Under the Financial Services Act 1986 and 
later the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000, a number of self-
regulating organizations (SROs) such as the Investment Management Regulatory 
Organization Ltd (IMRO) or the Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory 
Organization (LAUTRO) were established as regulators for specific sectors of the 
financial service industry.2350 They provide governance standards and rules to 
promote the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders.2351 Financial 
regulators, such as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)2352 and its predecessor, 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA), have established a principles-based 
regulation.2353 The FCA is empowered to issue delegated legislation.2354 Its 
authorities’ general functions are rule making, preparing and issuing codes, and 
the provision of general guidance.2355 The FCA will also take enhanced actions 
                                                     
2346 See supra Ch. 2, p. 47. 
2347 SLAPPER AND KELLY, supra note 2342. 
2348 Ashall, supra note 770 at 47. 
2349 Alexander Kern, UK Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator’s Role as 
Stakeholder, 33 STETSON L. REV. 991, 993 (2003). 
2350 Ashall, supra note 770 at 48; Linsley, supra note 771 at 364. 
2351 Kern, supra note 2347 at 993. 
2352 “The FCA is the regulator for 56,000 financial services firms and 125,000 approved 
persons and financial markets in the UK. It was established on April 1, 2013, taking over 
responsibility for conduct and relevant prudential regulation from the Financial Services 
Authority.” See FCA, FCA UK | OUR ROLE (2016), https://business-plan-2016-17.the-
fca.org.uk/1-our-role (last visited Jun 10, 2016). 
2353 I.H.Y. CHIU, REGULATING (FROM) THE INSIDE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL 
CONTROL IN BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2015). 
2354 D. FRENCH, S.W. MAYSON & C. RYAN, MAYSON, FRENCH & RYAN ON COMPANY LAW 12 
(32 ed. 2015). 
2355 FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 806, § 1 (4)(a)(b)(c). 
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against firms and individuals when they do not act in compliance with the 
rules.2356 However, unlike the SEC, the FCA does not often take actions.2357 
Although the UK has a similar ﬁnancial system to the US federal securities 
law, its company law is significantly different.2358 The centralized UK legal system 
has one set of laws relating to corporate governance; the US has a decentralized 
State Corporation Law for each US State.2359 Similar to the situation in the US, the 
UK legal framework for companies has increased in volume over the past 30 
years. The legislation includes the Companies Directors’ Disqualification Act 
1986,2360 the Insolvency Act 1986,2361 the Financial Services and Markets Act 
20002362, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 20132363, and the amended 
Companies Act2364. The Companies Act is accompanied by a comprehensive 
review of the Company Law Review Steering Group.2365 Chapter 4 of the 
Companies Act 2014 sets out the statutory role and advisory responsibilities of the 
Review Group.2366 The Group aims to modernize the law to bring it “into line with 
today’s business needs.”2367 Furthermore, on March 26, 2015, the Parliament enacted 
the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 with the aim of 
improving access to finance for businesses and individuals.2368 In addition, in the 
                                                     
2356 (FCA) THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2014/15 - 
FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY 15 (2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/corporate/annual-report-14-15 (last visited Jun 20, 2016). 
2357 FCA ANNUAL REPORT 2014/15 Id. at 64. Figure 26. 
2358 Tylecote and Ramirez, supra note 819 at 167. 
2359 Id. at 167. 
2360 COMPANY DIRECTORS’ DISQUALIFICATION ACT 1986, supra note 791. 
2361 INSOLVENCY ACT 1986, supra note 792. 
2362 FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 805. 
2363 ENTERPRISE AND REGULATORY REFORM ACT 2013, c.24 (2013). 
2364 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 554. 
2365 The Company Law Review was established by the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) in March 1998 in order to modernize the company law and to make 
recommendations for an effective framework for carrying out business. See FRENCH, 
MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 12. See also Statutory Role - Company Law Review 
Group, http://www.clrg.org/About-Us/Statutory-Role/ (last visited Jun 9, 2016). 
2366 Statutory Role - Company Law Review Group (CLRG), supra note 2363. 
2367 Corporate Law and Governance Directorate & Department of Trade and Industry, 
COMPANY LAW REFORM 3 (2005). 
2368 SMALL BUSINESS, ENTERPRISE AND EMPLOYMENT ACT 2015, c. 26 (2015). 
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UK there is a set of non-binding self-regulatory standards such as the UK Listing 
Rules,2369 the Turnbull Guidance2370 or the City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers.2371 Moreover, the UK Corporate Governance Code sets out principles, 
standards of good practice and reporting duties for governing corporations.2372 All 
listed companies in the UK are required under the Listing Rules to report in their 
annual report and accounts on how they have applied the Code.2373 
In addition, the UK has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 
January 1, 1973, without joining the European Monetary Union (EMU).2374 Hence, 
in contrast to the US, English common law is affected by EU law. On June 23, 
2016, however, a referendum was held in the UK on the issue of remaining part of 
the European Union. The outcome of that referendum is that Britain has voted to 
leave the European Union,2375 meaning that the UK has to commence withdrawal 
negotiations pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union within the next two years.2376 The UK will then have to conclude 
an agreement setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal and the framework 
for its future relationship with the EU in accordance with Article 218.2377 The legal 
consequences of withdrawal from the EU, are as follows: EU law will continue to 
have an effect on UK law, since many aspects of EU law bind UK companies 
doing business in the EU, including competition rules regarding mergers.2378 The 
                                                     
2369 The Listing Rules of the UKLA (the UK Listing Authority) can be found in the FCA 
Handbook. See in: LSE, RULES AND REGULATIONS | LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE | ADMISSION 
AND DISCLOSURE STANDARDS 5 (2016). 
2370 Financial Reporting Council FRC, REVISED TURNBULL GUIDANCE 2005 | REVISED 
GUIDANCE FOR DIRECTORS ON THE COMBINED CODE (2005). 
2371 SALEEM SHEIKH, A GUIDE TO THE COMPANIES ACT 2006 371 (3. ed. 2008). 
2372 UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) CADBURY COMMITTEE, supra note 467. 
2373 FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY FCA, LR 9.8 ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT | FCA 
HANDBOOK (2014), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR/9/8.html (last visited 
Jun 10, 2016). 
2374 SLAPPER AND KELLY, supra note 2342 at 190. 
2375 Jessica Elgot, Brexit, the fallout and the UK’s future: what we know so far, THE GUARDIAN, 
June 24, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/brexit-fallout-what-we-
know-so-far (last visited Jun 25, 2016). 
2376 CONSOLIDATED VERSIONS OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND THE TREATY ON THE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, C326/01-C326/407 (2012) Art. 50 (2). 
2377 Id. Art. 218. 
2378 THE LAW SOCIETY, THE EU AND THE LEGAL SECTOR 5 (2015), www.lawsociety.org.uk. 
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EU law that was incorporated into UK law will remain in force until repealed by 
an Act of Parliament.2379 The forthcoming withdrawal negotiations could result in 
continued application of EU law in the UK or could lead primary and secondary 
EU law to cease to be effective.2380 
During its period of membership of the EU, European law was a source of 
English law with an effect on many aspects of business activity in the private and 
financial service sector. However, the response in Europe to the high-profile 
corporate scandals was much lazier than that in the US.2381 In order to establish a 
common market for goods and services, the EU aims to ensure the harmonization 
of company law in the EU member States.2382 This harmonization is facilitated by 
Directives on company law, which are usually implemented by Act of Parliament 
in the UK.2383 
Moreover, since 2000, the EU has instigated a series of reforms of corporate 
governance.2384 In 2003, the EU developed an Action Plan to meet the following 
two objectives: (1) strengthening shareholders rights and third party protection 
and (2) fostering efficiency and competitiveness of business.2385 This Plan 
comprises the requirement that listed EU companies e.g. enhance corporate 
governance disclosure in their annual report and accounts.2386 However, a 2002 
comparative study of corporate governance codes on behalf of the European 
Commission found that only two EU member states - Belgium and the United 
Kingdom - have merged or consolidated codes for disclosure purposes at that 
                                                     
2379 Id. at 26. 
2380 Peter Bußjäger & Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, BREXIT, WAS WÄRE 
WENN... SZENARIEN RUND UM DAS EU-AUSTRITTSREFERENDUM IM VEREINIGTEN KÖNIGREICH 
4 (2015), http://www.oegfe.at/cms/uploads/media/OEGfE_Policy_Brief-2015.26.pdf (last 
visited Jun 25, 2016). 
2381 MASSIMO BELCREDI & GUIDO FERRARINI, THE EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 5 (2013). 
2382 TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (TFEU),  Art. 50 (2) (g); FRENCH, 
MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 21. 
2383 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 21. 
2384 BELCREDI AND FERRARINI, supra note 2379 at 5; Corporate Governance , supra note 1504. 
2385 Commission of the European Communities, MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND 
ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION - A PLAN TO MOVE 
FORWARD C5-0378-03 COM (2003) 284 FINAL 8–9 (2003). 
2386 Id. at 12. 
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time.2387 This led to the adoption in 2006 of a new Article 46a of Directive 
78/660/EEC, which requires companies on the stock exchanges to include a 
corporate governance statement in their annual report.2388 Further, if a company 
decides not to apply any provisions of a corporate governance code, it must state 
its reasons for doing so.2389 This approach is the opposite of the mandatory 
approach of the US SOX.2390 
In the UK, the financial services sector is one of the most important sectors 
for the economy.2391 The City of London, specifically the Square Mile or City of 
London Corporation, is the greatest financial center in the world and the ninth 
largest economy in the EU.2392 It generated a trade surplus greater than all other 
exporting industries combined.2393 Just like the private sector, the financial 
services sector has been affected by European Law. A research paper by the 
House of Commons Library found that from 1980 to 2009, 186 UK Acts, -14.3 
percent, - included the incorporation of one or more EU obligations.2394 For 
instance, through the implementation of EU Directives, the requirement for banks 
that carry out investment business, to establish a compliance function was 
introduced.2395 The FSA extended these requirements to all regulated 
                                                     
2387 The Combined Code CADBURY COMMITTEE, supra note 467; (WG&M) WEIL, GOTSHAL & 
MANGES LLP, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES RELEVANT TO THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES 26 (2002). 
2388 DIRECTIVE 2006/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 14 JUNE 
2006 AMENDING COUNCIL DIRECTIVES 78/660/EEC ON THE ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF CERTAIN 
TYPES OF COMPANIES, 83/349/EEC ON CONSOLIDATED ACCOUNTS, 86/635/EEC ON THE 
ANNUAL ACCOUNTS AND CONSOLIDATED ACCOUNTS OF BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND 91/674/EEC ON THE ANNUAL ACCOUNTS AND CONSOLIDATED ACCOUNTS OF 
INSURANCE UNDERTAKINGS, OJ L 224 (2006) Art. 1 § 7 (1). 
2389 Id. Art. 1 § 7 (1)(b). 
2390 See supra B., III., pp. 450 et seq., Comparison between the “mandatory” Approach of 
the SOX and the “comply or explain” Approach of the UK Code, p. 464. 
2391 THE LAW SOCIETY, supra note 2376 at 14. 
2392 Id. at 14. 
2393 Id. at 14. 
2394 HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, HOW MUCH LEGISLATION COMES FROM EUROPE? 19 (2010). 
The research based on data from the UK Statute Law database. 
2395 DIRECTIVE 2004/39/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON MARKETS 
IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AMENDING COUNCIL  DIRECTIVES 85/611/EEC AND 93/6/EEC AND 
DIRECTIVE 2000/12/EC (MIFID 2004), supra note 457 Art. 6 (3)(b). 
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organizations such as banks and credit institutions. Under EU reforms, the 
concept of “financial stability” comprises internal control by the financial service 
sector.2396 Internal control is defined as including e.g. a compliance function.2397 In 
order to fulfill this requirement, the senior management has to appoint executives 
to review the expanding legislation in order to understand the implications 
thereof for the company’s business.2398 Finally, the impact of European social and 
employment law on the UK is also extremely important and highly complex.2399 
In conclusion, the UK legal framework with respect to compliance plays an 
equally important role as the US counterpart, specifically for organizations in the 
financial service sector. However, in contrast to the US, company law in the UK 
developed in a centralized way with a highly-developed corporate governance 
regime encompassing various standards and rules for listed companies. In 
addition, European Law has influenced all areas of UK laws for forty years.  
I. The Development of English Company Law 
This section provides an overview of the development of company law in 
the UK in order to understand and define firstly the liability of company 
members secondly, the enhancement of the protection of shareholders, creditors, 
and investors; thirdly, the requirements on companies or their directors and then 
the duties and responsibilities of companies directors and officers relating to 
compliance. It goes on to analyze the main provisions of the recently amended 
UK Companies Act 2006 with regard to the duties of directors and officers 
applicable to compliance. To help explain and understand the importance of 
English Company Law, it should be borne in mind that English Company Law 
                                                     
2396 CHIU, supra note 2351. 
2397 Id. at 59. 
2398 Taylor, supra note 14 at 54. 
2399 THE LAW SOCIETY, supra note 2394 at 49; See e.g. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 89/654/EEC OF 30 
NOVEMBER 1989 CONCERNING THE MINIMUM SAFETY AND HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
WORKPLACE (FIRST INDIVIDUAL DIRECTIVE WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 16 (1) OF 
DIRECTIVE 89/391/EEC), L393/1-393/12 (1989); DIRECTIVE 2002/14/EC OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 11 MARCH 2002 ESTABLISHING A GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR INFORMING AND CONSULTING EMPLOYEES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY - JOINT 
DECLARATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION ON 
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, L080/29-080/34 (2002). 
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was the first codification of the law on corporations in the world.2400 Originally, 
this Act was created for large companies with a great number of investors.2401 
Nowadays, the majority of companies have five or fewer shareholders.2402  
1. The Roots of Legislation in English Company Law 
Initially, UK Company Law was fragmented and included case law, 
principles of contract law, self-regulation rules, best practices, and a number of 
legislative acts.2403 The Bubble Act of 17202404 allowed the issue of transferable 
shares and the limitation of liability only with a royal or parliamentary charter.2405 
Since then, a variety of companies in a number of businesses such as banking, 
insurance, textiles, paper and metal manufacturing have been established as joint-
stock companies.2406 While a number of legal historians view the Bubble Act as the 
promotion of joint- stock companies as a legitimate form of business corporation, 
only a few consider the Act itself.2407 The first provisions stipulated the 
incorporation of two marine insurance companies.2408 The eighteenth provision of 
the Act regulated the transferring of shares without legal authority by Parliament 
or by any charter from the Crown.2409 These actions were illegal and void. The 
next three provisions set forth penalties and remedies.2410 Scholars consider the 
Act as Parliament’s first attempt to legislate for companies although there were 
also a number of other not widely known statutes.2411 The formal process of 
incorporation was slow and cumbersome and as a result, many partnerships and 
                                                     
2400 SHEIKH, supra note 2369 at 2. 
2401 Id. at 2. 
2402 Id. at 2. 
2403 Id. at 1. 
2404 THE BUBBLE ACT OF 1720, 6 Geo, I. c. 18 (1720). 
2405 MARK FREEMAN, ROBIN PEARSON & JAMES TAYLOR, THE POLITICS OF BUSINESS: JOINT 
STOCK COMPANY CONSTITUTIONS IN BRITAIN, 1720-1844 1; Gower, supra note 775 at 535. 
2406 FREEMAN, PEARSON, AND TAYLOR, supra note 2403 at 1. 
2407 RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844 60 (2000). 
2408 Id. at 67. 
2409 Id. at 67. 
2410 Id. at 67. 
2411 R. H. Watzlaff, The Bubble Act of 1720, 7 ABACUS 8–28, 8 (1971). 
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unincorporated associations with a large number of members2412 used the 
unincorporated deed of settlement companies to do business.2413 One of the 
greatest risks of this approach was that the members were personally liable for 
the obligations of the association without any limitation of liability.2414 
2. The Joint Companies Act of 1844 and 1856 
On account of the bureaucratic incorporation procedure and the increase in 
the number of companies, there was a rise in fraudulent activities at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.2415 In response, the legislature attempted to 
develop new methods to improve the members' legal liability.2416 These attempts 
affected the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844.2417 This Act was founded on the 
‘principle of publicity.’2418 Under the Act, unincorporated associations could be 
incorporated by registering their constitution by means of a deed of settlement at 
Companies House.2419 Thus, the first legislation governing the incorporation of 
companies came into effect in 1844. As a result, legislation is the primary source 
of UK company law.2420 According to the Act, the members of the incorporated 
company could held be personally liable for debts of the company.2421  
Since then, there has been an ongoing debate on how company law ought 
best to regulate and establish limited liability.2422 Company members’ liability was 
first limited with the introduction by Parliament of the Limited Liability Act of 
                                                     
2412 “A registered company is been seen as an association of persons (natural or legal) who 
are called the members’ of a company. The membership of a company is based on holding 
company’s shares. That’s why the terms member and shareholders are synonymous.” See 
in FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2371 at 6; See also COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra 
note 555, §§ 8(1)(b), 16(2).  
2413 Gower, supra note 775 at 535; SHEIKH, supra note 2369 at 11. 
2414 Gower, supra note 775 at 536. 
2415 Id. at 536. 
2416 Id. at 536. The members of an English company are the shareholder and directors. 
2417 JOINT STOCK COMPANIES ACT 1844, supra note 776; SHEIKH, supra note 2369 at 3. 
2418 Gower, supra note 775 at 537. 
2419 Companies House - GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ 
companies-house (last visited Jun 27, 2016); Gower, supra note 776 at 536; SHEIKH, supra 
note 2323 at 11. 
2420 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 11. 
2421 Id. at 54.; Gower, supra note 775 at 536. 
2422 SHEIKH, supra note 2369 at 12. 
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1855.2423 The limitation of liability must always be indicated with the abbreviation 
‘Ltd.’ as the last word of the company's name.2424 This means that, liability is 
assumed by the registered company, not its members.2425 However, after a few 
months the 1844 Act and the 1855 Act were repealed and consolidated into the 
Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856.2426 Thereafter, two main kinds of companies 
have been established in England: the incorporated, registered company with a 
minimum of seven members with limited liability and the unincorporated 
partnership with unlimited members’ liability.2427 The Act of 1856 thus excluded 
the one-man business or the small family partnership.2428 Under the common law, 
limited partnerships had no root in England until the end of the 20th century.2429 
In contrast, in the civil law countries such as Italy, the introduction of limited 
partnerships derived from the French commandite or commenda, began in the early 
19th century.2430  
The issue of limited liability of members of small registered companies was 
subject of a court decision in 1897 when the House of Lords2431 overruled a 
decision by the Court of Appeal ([1895] 2 Ch. 323) in a landmark case in UK 
                                                     
2423 LIMITED LIABILITY ACT 1855, supra note 777; FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 
2352 at 54; Gower, supra note 775 at 536. 
2424 ‘Ltd.’ is short for limited, or a limited company. This structure is used mostly in 
European countries and Canada.” Gower, supra note 776 at 537; The Difference Between 
Inc. & Ltd. & Co., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/difference-between-inc-ltd-co-
38627.html (last visited Jul 2, 2016). 
2425 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 55. 
2426 JOINT STOCK COMPANIES ACT 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47 (1856); Gower, supra note 775 at 
536. 
2427 Gower, supra note 775 at 537. 
2428 Id. at 537. 
2429 Id. at 537; Charles R. Hickson & John D. Turner, PARTNERSHIPS 6 (2005). 
2430 Hickson and Turner, supra note 2427 at 6. 
2431 “The House of Lords is the upper chamber of Great Britain’s bicameral legislature. 
Originated in the 11th century, when the Anglo-Saxon kings consulted counsels 
composed of religious leaders and the monarch’s ministers, it emerged as a distinct 
element of Parliament in the 13th and 14th centuries. One element the Law Lords, 
consisting of the judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature (the Court of Appeal and the 
High Court of Justice), acted as Britain’s final court of appeal (except for Scottish criminal 
cases) until 2009, when the Law Lords were abolished and the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom came into being.” See House of Lords | British government, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/House-of-Lords (last visited Jul 4, 2016). 
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company law Salomon v Salomon.2432 The House of Lords held that it is not 
contrary to the Companies Act of 18622433 for a trader [Salomon, the respondent] 
to sell his solvent business in order to limit his liability to a limited company.2434 
This registered company comprised only  himself and six members of his own 
family.2435 Over time, the company was wound up and there was not enough 
money to pay the creditors, but Salomon had been appointed as managing 
director.2436 Hence, the business belonged to the company and Salomon was its 
agent.2437 The House of Lords concluded that the proceeding of the sale met all the 
requirements of the Companies Act 1862.2438 Thus, the transfer was not fraudulent 
in respect of the creditors and Salomon was not liable to indemnify the company 
against the creditors’ claims.2439 This decision confirmed the legality of small 
registered companies as well as of large publicly registered companies and 
strengthened the ‘separate corporate entity’ principle.2440  
3. Current Legislation and Company Law Reform 
Since the 19th century, the Act has been reformed from time to time with 
several enhancements that have greatly increased its volume. Section 121 of the 
1908 Act comprised a first statutory definition of the meaning ‘private company.’2441 
This is a company, which by its articles: 
(a) restricts the right to transfer its shares; and  
(b) limits the number of its members to 50; and 
                                                     
2432 Salomon v Salomon [1896] UKHL 1, [1897] AC 22, [1897] A.C. 22-58 22 (1896); See in 
Gower, supra note 775 at 538. 
2433 COMPANIES ACT 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89 (1862) Sec. 6, 8, 30, 43. 
2434 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22, supra note 2430 at 22. 
2435 Id. at 22. 
2436 Id. at 22. 
2437 Gower, supra note 775 at 539. 
2438 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22, supra note 2430 at 23. 
2439 Id. at 23. 
2440 “The ‘separate entity’ principle was firstly established in R v Arnaud [1846] 9 QB 806 
case. It means that a company is a separate entity with distinct legal personality.” See The 
separate entity principle | Law Teacher, http://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-
essays/company-law/the-separate-entity-principle.php (last visited Jul 4, 2016). 
2441 Gower, supra note 775 at 540. 
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(c) prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for any shares or debentures of 
the company.2442 
The Act of 1908 states that a private company needs to have only two 
members instead of a minimum of seven.2443 The purpose of these provisions was 
to cover the concerns of small family run businesses.2444 In addition, the Act 
required the publication of a balance sheet.2445 Thus, the legislation attempted to 
improve the protection of shareholders, creditors, and potential investors. In 
accordance with the efforts of the legislator to impose further statutory 
restrictions and requirements on companies or their directors, the Companies Act 
was extended in its complexity and volume by formal measures of corporate 
control of directors and company management. The Act of 1948 comprised a total 
of 462 sections.2446 Government committees were set up with the purpose of 
facilitating reforms to Company Law.2447 For example, the Cohen Committee2448 
and the Jenkins Committee2449 developed proposals for reforms. In June 1962, the 
Jenkins Committee reported to the Parliament through the President of the Board 
of Trade upon the provisions and working of the Act of 1948.2450 Specifically, this 
Committee considered the duties of directors and the rights of shareholders.2451 
Nevertheless, the Jenkins Committee was not able to reduce the number of 
provisions of the Act because of the growing and changing challenges facing 
companies.2452 For example, the Jenkins Committee recommended the “inclusion of 
                                                     
2442 COMPANIES (CONSOLIDATION) ACT 1908, c. 69 (1908), § 121 (1) (a)-(c). 
2443 Id. § 115. 
2444 Gower, supra note 775 at 540. 
2445 COMPANIES (CONSOLIDATION) ACT 1908, supra note 2389, § 90. 
2446 COMPANIES ACT 1948, c. 38 (1948); REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE 1962, 
http://www.takeovers.gov.au/content/Resources/other_resources/downloads/jenkins_com
mittee_v2.pdf (last visited Jun 27, 2016). 
2447 SHEIKH, supra note 2369 at 14. 
2448 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW AMENDMENT (COHEN REPORT 1945), 
(1945), http://www.takeovers.gov.au/content/Resources/other_resources/ 
Cohen_Committee.aspx (last visited Jul 5, 2016). 
2449 In 1959, the President of the Board of Trade appointed persons to form a Committee to 
review and report upon the provisions and working of the Companies Act. See JENKINS 
COMMITTEE 1962, supra note 2444. 
2450 Id. 
2451 Id.; SHEIKH, supra note 2369 at 18. 
2452 JENKINS COMMITTEE 1962, supra note 2444. 
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a general statement of the director's fiduciary duties to his company in the Act” despite 
the rule in Percival v. Wright.2453 Furthermore, it encouraged an increased 
disclosure of company information.2454  
While UK corporate governance rules aim to increase shareholder value, 
traditionally, UK Company Law comprised the principle that directors owe a 
duty of loyalty to the company, not to individual shareholders.2455 In Percival v. 
Wright2456 the High Court established this principle concerning directors' 
duties.2457 The court held that directors of a company owe a duty of loyalty to the 
company, and that they were not in breach of duty in respect of the individual 
shareholders.2458 The House of Lords followed this principle in Johnson v. Gore 
Wood & Co.2459 However, nowadays this principle is beginning to change. For 
example, in Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) Ltd,2460 Browne-Wilkinson VC doubted that 
there was no legal requirement to disclose the circumstances of the acquisition to 
the shareholders. In addition, the Jenkins Commission concluded that the law 
should protect each person who suffers loss because a director breached a 
duty.2461 Regarding fiduciary duties, the Committee recommended that the duties 
of directors should be strengthened in the Act. Furthermore, there should be 
enforcement of the duties imposed upon companies and their directors and 
officers.2462 However, the legislator did not adopt all of the proposals put forward 
by the Jenkins Committee into law and overall, the Jenkins Committee did not 
result in any extensive reforms.2463 Today, as a result of the Committee and the 
                                                     
2453 Id. at 89.; Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 401, (1902). In this case, the court held that a 
company’s directors do not owe a fiduciary duty to individual shareholders “and may 
purchase their shares without disclosing pending negotiations for the sale of the 
company.” See in Kern, supra note 2347 at 1002. 
2454 JENKINS COMMITTEE 1962, supra note 2444; SHEIKH, supra note 2369 at 18. 
2455 Kern, supra note 2347 at 1001–1002. 
2456 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 401, (1902).  
2457 Id. at 425–426. 
2458 Kern, supra note 2347 at 1002. 
2459 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2000] UKHL 65; [2001] 1 All ER 481; [2001] 2 WLR 72 (14th 
December, 2000), (2000). 
2460 Re Chez Nico Ltd., [1992] BCLC 192 (1991). 
2461 JENKINS COMMITTEE 1962, supra note 2444 at 89. 
2462 Id. at 504. 
2463 JENKINS COMMITTEE 1962, supra note 2444; SHEIKH, supra note 2369 at 18. 
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Company Law Review Group (CLRG), the Companies Act 2006 has largely 
superseded the Companies Act 1985.2464 The CA 2006 has been fully in force since 
2009.2465 Nevertheless, some provisions in part 14, 15 and 18 of the CA 1985 
continue to apply.2466 Hence, the CA 2006 also comprises: 
(b) Part 2 of the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 
2004, and2467 
(c) the provisions of the Companies Act 1985 and the Companies Consolidation 
(Consequential Provisions) Act 1985 that remain in force.2468 
The Companies Acts as defined by this Act (see Section 2) also extends to 
Northern Ireland.2469 The companies which are concerned in this Act are called 
‘registered companies’. These companies are incorporated and have a legal 
personality.2470 The public markets in company shares are under legislative 
control of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FMSA) 2000.2471 
In conclusion, the development of English Company Law comprises the 
limitation of liability of company members of registered corporations. On the 
other hand, the most recent amendments to English Company Law again 
attempted to improve shareholders rights by strengthening the duties of company 
directors. Hence, the legislation on company law has grown into a complex and 
detailed code of rules.2472 The CA 2006 includes 1,300 Sections and 16 
                                                     
2464 See e.g. Company Law Reform Corporate Law and Governance Directorate and 
Department of Trade and Industry, supra note 2365; Modern Company Law COMPANY 
LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: 
DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK (2000); Jenkins Committee JENKINS COMMITTEE 1962, supra 
note 2444. See also footnote 2365, p. 356. 
2465 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 11. 
2466 Id. at 11. “These parts are concerned with investigations of a company.” 
2467 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 2 (1)(b). 
2468 Id.§ 2 (1)(c). 
2469 Id.§ 1284. 
2470 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 15 (1). 
2471 FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 805; See in FRENCH, MAYSON, 
AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 12. 
2472 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 15. 
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schedules.2473 Such comprehensive legislation runs of people acting in ignorance 
of some important provisions.2474 Even before the CA 2006 entered into force, 
solicitors with extensive experience wrongly advised their clients on the 
Companies Acts e.g. with respect to substantial property transactions.2475 Such 
erroneous advice could result in individuals being liable to pay more than £1 
million.2476 
The following section will examine in detail the enforcement of directors’ 
and officers’ duties and explore their liability with respect to compliance over the 
course of the development of company law. 
II. The Enforcement of Duties in the Area of Company Law 
Contrary to US State Corporation Law, English Company Law2477 is codified 
in detail. Unlike the separate State Corporation Law in the US, the UK has a 
centralized, uniform company law. English Company Law is based on legislation, 
common law and equitable principles. It is also affected by European Law and 
soft law, such as codes, rules and recommendations.2478 However, since the 
structure of the limited company was a creation of an Act of Parliament, the 
primary source of English company law is the legislation.2479  
                                                     
2473 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 554; FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 
15. 
2474 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 15. 
2475 British Racing Drivers Club Ltd v Hextall Erskine & Co, [1996] 3 All E.R. 667, [1996] B.C.C. 
727, [1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 182, [1996] P.N.L.R. 523, (1996); See in: FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, 
supra note 2371 at 15. 
2476 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 15. 
2477 The Companies Acts extend to the whole of Great Britain. The Act provides for a single 
company law regime applying to the whole of the UK, so that companies will be UK 
companies. See COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 554 Explanatory Notes, Territorial Extent 
and Devolution. 
2478 P. MÄNTYSAARI, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SHAREHOLDERS AS A RULE-
MAKER 82 (1. ed. 2006). 
2479 “These companies are the creature of statute” See Lord Macnaghten in Welton v Saffery 
(HL 1897) [1897}, 299 AC 66, 326 (1897); See in: FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 
2371 at 11. 
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Sometimes, company law is complex and difficult to navigate.2480 Therefore, 
over the years, various groups of legal experts, practitioners, and business people 
have tried to make the law more reliable, effective and indisputable.2481 In the 
course of this extensive revision and reform process one of the main points of 
focus has been directors’ duties.  
As in the US, directors’ duties originate from equitable principles.2482 They 
were based on the equitable principles of fiduciary duty and the common law of 
negligence.2483 In order to make the law in this area more accessible and 
transparent, the codification of directors’ duties under the common law was a 
major concern for the legislator.2484 In the CA 1985, the number of mandatory 
provisions applicable to duties of directors and officers increased markedly 
compared to its predecessor.2485 The Act comprised e.g. reporting duties,2486 
disclosure duties,2487 duties on serious loss of capital2488 and provisions on criminal 
liability for untrue statements.2489 The Law Commissions of England, Wales, and 
Scotland supported this important reform and reviewed the CA 1985 particularly 
with regard to the duties owed by directors in respect of their company.2490 Today, 
directors’ duties, which apply to all company directors, are set forth in seven 
provisions in the CA 2006.2491 The following sections provide a brief overview of 
these principles and introduce the codified provisions stating the seven general 
duties of directors in the Companies Act 2006.2492 
                                                     
2480 Company Law Reform Corporate Law and Governance Directorate and Department of 
Trade and Industry, supra note 2365 at 5; MÄNTYSAARI, supra note 2476 at 82. 
2481 See e.g. LAW COMMISSION & SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, COMPANY DIRECTORS: 
REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS AND FORMULATING A STATEMENT OF DUTIES (1998); 
Corporate Law and Governance Directorate and Department of Trade and Industry, supra 
note 2365. 
2482 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 478. 
2483 Id. at 477. 
2484 A. HUDSON, UNDERSTANDING COMPANY LAW 7 (2nd ed. 2013) para 6.1. 
2485 MÄNTYSAARI, supra note 2476 at 87. 
2486 COMPANIES ACT 1985, c. 6 (1985), § 234. 
2487 Id.§§ 314, 324. 
2488 Id.§ 142. 
2489 Id.§ 70. 
2490 LAW COMMISSION AND SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, supra note 2479. 
2491 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, §§ 171-177. 
2492 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, §§ 171-177. 
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1. Equitable Principles of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 
Section 154 of the CA 2006 requires that a private company must have one 
director, while a public company must have at least two directors.2493 Generally, a 
director is a person who is officially appointed according to the company’s 
articles.2494 Pursuant to this, a company’s director holds an office, not an 
employment.2495 The UK company is governed by the board of directors and the 
shareholders meeting.2496 Section 250 states that a ‘director’ includes any person 
occupying the position of director, by whatever name called.2497 However, a 
distinction is made between ‘de facto’ directors and ‘shadow’ directors.2498 A ‘de 
facto’ director is firstly a person who is validly appointed as a director; and 
secondly, a person who acts as director, although not validly appointed as such, 
may nevertheless be treated as a director ‘de facto’.2499 In the CA 2006 a ‘shadow’ 
director is defined as “a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the 
directors of the company are accustomed to act.”2500 
However, English courts have always regarded directors as being 
‘fiduciaries’.2501  
A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for, or on behalf of, another person 
in a relationship of trust and confidence, which equity protects by imposing on the 
fiduciary a duty of loyalty. A fiduciary must act in good faith.2502 
The equitable principles of directors’ duties are classified in various 
ways.2503 The most conventional approach is the classification of fiduciary duties 
                                                     
2493 Id.§ 154 (1) (2). 
2494 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 439. 
2495 Id. at 479. 
2496 “The company itself can only act through directors.” See in Ferguson v Wilson (LJJ 1866) 
LR 2 Ch App 77, 36 LJ Ch 67, 89–90 (1866).  
2497 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 250. 
2498 MÄNTYSAARI, supra note 2476 at 221. 
2499 See e.g. Holland v Revenue and Customs & Anor [2011] Bus LR 111, [2010] UKSC 51, 
[2011] 1 All ER 430, [2010] WLR 2793, [2010] 1 WLR 2793, [2011] BCC 1, [2010] STI 3074, 21 
(2010). 
2500 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 251 (1). 
2501 See e.g. Mothew (Stapley & Co) v Bristol & West Building Society [1996] 4 All ER 698, 
[1998] Ch 1, [1996] EWCA Civ 533, [1997] PNLR 11, [1997] 2 WLR 436, (1996). 
2502 Id. at 18. 
2503 LAW COMMISSION AND SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, supra note 2479 at 214 para 11.4. 
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of directors under the following topics: loyalty, good faith, proper purpose, the 
duty to act in accordance with the company's constitution, or the duty to deal 
fairly as between different classes of shareholders, etc.2504 All of these principles 
govern the relationship between directors and the company.  
Similar to the situation in the US, the UK director of a company owes a duty 
of good faith to the company, which means he is required to act in good faith and 
in the best interests of the company.2505 The general rule of equity means that the 
fiduciary duty precludes the individual from entering into engagements in which 
a personal conflict of interest could arise.2506 Generally, this rule applies to agents, 
as for example directors, when they act in a fiduciary capacity.2507 The rule was 
first applied in Aberdeen Railway Company v. Blakie to a director of a railway 
company.2508 The House of Lords stated that a director of a railway company is a 
trustee, “and, as such, is precluded from dealing, on behalf of the company, with 
himself, or with a firm of which he is a partner.”2509 Furthermore, Lord Cranworth 
pointed out that the duty to manage the general affairs of the company is 
delegated to directors.2510 A corporate body can act only through its agents and 
those agents have to act in the best interest of the company.2511  
Later, the House of Lords, Lord Porter, characterized the relationship 
between the company and the director as follows: 
Directors, no doubt, are not trustees, but they occupy a fiduciary position towards the 
company whose board they form.2512 
The directors as trustees were specified in the case Belmont Finance 
Corporation v Williams Furniture in 1988, in which the court concluded, “although 
company directors are not strictly speaking trustees, they are in a closely 
                                                     
2504 Id. at 214. para 11.4. 
2505 Kern, supra note 2347 at 1006. 
2506 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378, [1967] 2 AC 134, [1942] UKHL 1, 3 [3] 
(1942). 
2507 Id. at 3 [3]. 
2508 Aberdeen Railway Company v. Blakie, Brothers [1854] UKHL 1_Macqueen_461, 461, 461. 
2509 Id. at 461. 
2510 Id. at 471. 
2511 Id. at 471. 
2512 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378, [1967] 2 AC 134, [1942] UKHL 1, 2 
[22] (1942). 
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analogous position because of the fiduciary duties which they owe to the 
company.”2513 This principle was confirmed in Bairstow & Ors v Queens Moat 
Houses Plc.2514 The background of this appeal was a claim for payment to the 
company on account of unlawful dividends to directors.2515 The Court of Appeal 
considered the Flitcroft's case in which the court concluded that if the directors, 
who are quasi-trustees for the company, improperly pay away the assets, then 
they could be liable to replace them.2516 The Court ultimately dismissed the 
appellants' appeal for relief in that case.2517 The remedy of the fiduciary duty of 
directors is to confiscate the profit made by the breach and to transfer it to the 
company.2518 The breach of a fiduciary duty is described as fraud.2519 
Furthermore, a directors’ duty of skill and care has evolved under common 
law. This duty addresses the implications of the director’s position within the 
company.2520 Traditionally, the standard of this duty in the UK was not high and 
was not classified as a fiduciary duty.2521 Members of a company have no right to 
expect any reasonable standard of the company’s managing directors.2522 The duty 
does not depend on any contract, but a contract could determine the extent and 
                                                     
2513 Belmont Finance Corporation v Williams Furniture [1980] 1 AER, 393, 405. 
2514 Bairstow & Ors v Queens Moat Houses Plc. [2001] 2 BCLC 531, [2001] EWCA Civ 712, 
[2002] BCC 91, (2001). 
2515 Id. at 3. 
2516 In re Exchange Banking Company (1882) LR 21 Ch D 519, 534. 
2517 Bairstow & Ors v Queens Moat Houses Plc. [2001] 2 BCLC 531, [2001] EWCA CIV 712, 
[2002] BCC 91, supra note 2512 at 68. 
2518 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 479. 
2519 Armitage v Nurse & Ors [1997] 2 All ER 705, [1998] Ch 241, [1997] EWCA Civ 1279, 
[1997] Pens LR 51, [1997] 3 WLR 1046, (1997); See in FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra 
note 2371 at 479. 
2520 JOHN DAVIES, A GUIDE TO DIRECTORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 2006 
31 (2007) para 6.17. 
2521 Id. at 31. para 6.17; Mothew (t/a Stapley & Co) v Bristol & West Building Society [1996] 4 
ALL ER 698, [1998] CH 1, [1996] EWCA CIV 533, [1997] PNLR 11, [1997] 2 WLR 436, supra 
note 2517. 
2522 Re Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959, 994; See in FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 
2371 at 499. 
CHAPTER 5 | 373 
 
the nature of it.2523 In particular, the duty of care arises from the responsibility for 
the property or affairs of the company.2524  
The English Courts recognized that directors must rely on employees to 
inform them accurately of material information with respect to the company’s 
affairs.2525 The Earl of Halsbury states in Dovey v Cory  
I cannot think that it can be expected of a director that he should be watching either 
the inferior officers of the company or verifying the calculations of the auditors himself.2526 
In addition, similar to the US, company directors have a supervisory duty in 
the event of any delegation of their responsibilities. This is confirmed by the 
Court of Appeal in the case Re Barings plc with the statement 
… the exercise of power of delegation does not absolve a director from the duty to 
supervise the discharge of this function.2527 
However, the situation has changed in the last ten years. Section 174 of the 
CA 2006 expects a higher standard of directors’ duties of skill and care, as 
described in the next section.2528 For example, a director is now required to act in 
within the scope of the company’s constitution. Any decision made outside the 
constitution, will be void.2529 The director is also bound by contractual 
agreements. The most important directors' duties thus consist of two parts: the 
directors' duty of care and skill, and fiduciary duties. 
Overall, company directors in the UK are subject to similar duties as under 
the common law principle in the US. Under Delaware Corporation Law, directors 
and officers additionally owe a duty of oversight for implementing and 
maintaining an internal control system. Thus, the personal responsibilities of 
directors and officers for adequate monitoring were established under the 
                                                     
2523 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 499. 
2524 Id. at 499. 
2525 Id. at 500. 
2526 Dovey v. Cory [1901] AC 477, 70 LJ Ch 753, 486 (1901); See in FRENCH, MAYSON, AND 
RYAN, supra note 2371 at 500. 
2527 Re Barings plc (No. 5) [1999] 1 BCLC, [2000] 1 BCLC 523, 433; See in FRENCH, MAYSON, 
AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 500. 
2528 “A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence.” 
COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 174 (1) (2). 
2529 MÄNTYSAARI, supra note 2476 at 110. 
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Caremark standard.2530 Although English company directors have to carry out 
supervisory duties, a duty of oversight cannot is not found anywhere in the 
English Common Law or Company Law statutes. 
2. Statutory Directors Duties under Company Law 
The nature of the director’s role is central to the English Company Law.2531 
In a private company, the director can be both a substantial shareholder as well as 
the company’s manager.2532 This can potentially lead to conflicts of interest. In a 
public company, the directors usually hold fewer shares proportionate to the total 
shareholding.2533 The two main types of company, private and public companies, 
are defined in Section 4 of the Companies Act 2006.2534 Public companies are 
registered and “limited by shares” or “limited by guarantee and having a share 
capital.”2535 In contrast to a public company,  
A “private company” is any company that is not a public company.2536 
The Companies Act of 1985 provides a legal framework stipulating that 
companies are also managed in the interests of the shareholders.2537 Section 309 
states that directors are to have regard to the interests of employees, as well as the 
interests of its members. Nevertheless, the most important amendments to the CA 
1985 were effected in 1989, 2004, and 2006.2538 These developments of the law 
represented the attempt to reconsider the legal position of companies within the 
business and social environment.2539  
Simultaneously, in the last thirty years, the number of incorporated 
companies has grown from 785,688 in 1980 to 3,678,860 in May 2016.2540 Moreover, 
                                                     
2530 CHIU, supra note 2351 at 235. 
2531 HUDSON, supra note 2482 at 7. 
2532 Id. at 7. 
2533 Id. at 7. 
2534 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 4. 
2535 Id.§ 4 (2). 
2536 Id.§ 4 (1). 
2537 COMPANIES ACT 1985, c. 6 (1985), §§ 89, 90, 309. 
2538 COMPANIES ACT 1989, supra note 794; COMPANIES (AUDIT, INVESTIGATIONS AND 
COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE) ACT 2004, c. 27 (2004); COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 554. 
2539 DAVIES, supra note 2518 at 28 para 6.4. 
2540 COMPANIES HOUSE, INCORPORATED COMPANIES IN THE UK | MAY 2016 9 (2016) Chart 3. 
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the UK has introduced reforms to allow the Secretary of State to lodge 
disqualification proceedings against directors for breaches of duty and breaches 
of legislation.2541 The reason for this is that the disqualification of directors is 
rooted in public interest.2542Pursuant to Section 5 of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, the legislation has inserted Part 9 into the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 in order to protect businesses and 
society as a whole from unfit directors and to enhance confidence in the UK’s 
business environment.2543  
Furthermore, to bolster the competiveness of companies, the Company Law 
Review Steering Group proposed that the directors’ duty of loyalty should appear 
in a statutory provision.2544 The proposed formulation was: 
(1) Compliance and loyalty 
a) A director must exercise his powers honestly and for their proper purpose, and in 
accordance with the company’s constitution and decisions taken lawfully under it 
[or under the general law].2545 
Therefore, the Steering Group intended to extend the law to include a new 
compliance duty.2546 In its view, both compliance and proper purpose duties 
override the duty of loyalty.2547 Nevertheless, the legislator restricted the 
proposed formulation in Section 171 and codified the duty of loyalty as follows: 
Duty to act within powers 
A director of a company must— 
(a) act in accordance with the company's constitution, and  
                                                     
2541 CHIU, supra note 2351 at 235; Department for Business and Innovation & Skills, 
TRANSPARENCY & TRUST: ENHANCING THE TRANSPARENCY OF UK COMPANY OWNERSHIP 
AND INCREASING TRUST IN UK BUSINESS 55 (2014) para 223. 
2542 CHIU, supra note 2351 at 235. 
2543 Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] BCLC 325., Transparency & Trust Department 
for Business and Innovation & Skills, supra note 2477 at 52 para 203. 
2544 Sarah Worthington, Reforming Directors’ Duties, 64 MODERN LAW REVIEW 439–458, 6 
(2001). 
2545 COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, supra note 2462 at 29 para 3.40. 
2546 COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP Id. at 32. para 3.46. 
2547 COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP Id. at 33. para 3.48. 
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(b) only exercise powers for the purposes for which they are conferred.2548 
This provision is based on the equitable principle that a director has the 
duty to exercise the company’s powers for its purpose.2549 For example, in Howard 
Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd the Supreme Court of South Wales states that the 
directors’ power under an article of the constitution is a fiduciary power and 
must be exercised for the purpose for which it was conferred.2550 
The vast majority of statutory directors’ duties are based on the equitable 
principles of fiduciary duty.2551 Section 170 stipulates to whom the duties should 
apply: 
“(1) The general duties specified in sections 171 to 177 are owed by a director of a 
company to the company. 
Additionally, for an understanding of the application of the general 
statutory duties, Section 170 states that they have taken effect in place of those 
common law rules and equitable principles.2552 It could thus be assumed that they 
have replaced the pre-existing case law. However, Section 170 furthermore states 
that “the general duties shall be interpreted and applied in the same way as common law 
rules or equitable principles.”2553 Furthermore, the English Courts can develop and 
adjust equitable principles and common law of negligence through the rules of 
precedents.2554 Legal scholars view this approach as a new way of interpreting a 
statute and it will be interesting to see how the courts will apply Section 170 
(4).2555 
                                                     
2548 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 554§ 171. 
2549 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 481. 
2550 Howard Smith Limited v Ampol Petroleum Limited and Others [1974] 2 WLR 689, 118 SJLB 
330, [1974] AC 821, [1974] UKPC 3, [1974] 1 All ER 1126. 
2551 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555 §§ 171-173, §§ 175-177, Section 174 codifies the 
common law of negligence. See in; FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2371 at 478. 
2552 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 170 (3). 
2553 Id.§ 170 (4). 
2554 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 477. 
2555 Id. at 477. 
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Today, the Companies Act 2006 states seven general directors’ duties that 
need to be taken into account.2556 The CA 2006 codifies directors’ statutory duties 
as follows: 
§ 171.Duty to act within powers 
§ 172.Duty to promote the success of the company 
§ 173.Duty to exercise independent judgment 
§ 174.Duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence 
§ 175.Duty to avoid conflicts of interest 
§ 176.Duty not to accept benefits from third parties 
§ 177.Duty to declare interest in proposed transaction or arrangement.2557 
Therefore, the company is the proper plaintiff in relation to claims for any 
breach of such a duty to act within powers, to promote the success of the 
company, to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence, etc. by a director.2558 
In conclusion, today, the UK has a strong substantive company law.2559 
Following years of ongoing reforms, the Companies Act of 2006 for the first time 
clearly stipulated directors’ duties.2560 The scope and nature of general duties 
owed by a director of a company to the company are specifically stated in 
Sections 171 to 177 of the Companies Act 2006.2561 UK company directors inter alia 
have a duty of reasonable care and fiduciary duties.2562 The duties “are based on 
certain common law rules and equitable principles.”2563 However, the English Courts 
have not ruled on any explicit oversight duty or compliance duty of directors 
                                                     
2556 Id. at 477. 
2557 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 554§§ 171-177. 
2558 HUDSON, supra note 2482 at 7. 
2559 John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the 
United Kingdom and the United States: Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: United Kingdom 
vs. United States, 6 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 687–722, 721 (2009). 
2560 B. HORRIGAN, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DEBATES, 
MODELS AND PRACTICES ACROSS GOVERNMENT, LAW AND BUSINESS 229 (1. ed. 2010). 
2561 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 170 (1). 
2562 Id. § 170 (4). 
2563 Id. § 170 (3). 
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similar to that in the US. Contrary to US corporation law, the CA 2006 explicitly 
states that any provisions to exempt a director of a company from any liability are 
void.2564 
3. The Legal Definition and General Role of Company Officers 
Company officers are also subject to the common law and equitable rules 
and, hence, to rules regarding fiduciary duties.2565 The position of company 
officers is no different from that of directors. Thus, the question of who is a 
company officer in the UK is not easy to answer, since there is no clear distinction 
between directors and officers. Company directors and secretaries are referred to 
as ‘officers’.2566 Officers may be an employee while directors are appointed by 
members e.g. shareholders or the board. The articles of association of a company 
may allow directors to appoint one or more managing directors or executive 
officers and to delegate to them the day-to day management.2567 The CLRG made 
it clear that delegation is not the same as assignment.2568 This means that, even a 
“proper” act of delegation will not remove potential liability from those 
delegating.2569 The CLRG concluded that decisions on this legal matter “can only be 
decided on a case by case basis.”2570 
However, the control of the management should remain with the board.2571 
As mentioned before, this principle is held in the case Re Barings plc (No. 5) 
concerning directors' duties of care and skill.2572 So, while directors are entitled, in 
accordance with the articles of association of the company, to delegate particular 
functions to those below them in the management chain, and to trust in their 
competence and integrity to a reasonable extent, the exercise of the power of 
delegation does not absolve a director from the duty to supervise the discharge of 
                                                     
2564 Id. § 232 (1). 
2565 Worthington, supra note 2542 at 16. 
2566 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555 § 1121 - Commentary on Section 1121 - "An 
'officer' of a company is defined as including a director, manager or (company) secretary.” 
2567 MÄNTYSAARI, supra note 2476 at 99. 
2568 Company Law Reform Corporate Law and Governance Directorate and Department of 
Trade and Industry, supra note 2365 at 38 para 4.6. 
2569 COMPANY LAW REFORM Id. at 38. para 4.6. 
2570 COMPANY LAW REFORM Id. at 38. para 4.6. 
2571 MÄNTYSAARI, supra note 2476 at 99. 
2572 See supra A, II., 1., p. 370, footnote 2527. 
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the delegated functions.2573 Therefore, the directors have to monitor the 
functioning of the managing directors or executive officers.2574 However, the scope 
of function of the managing directors is not clear, since it is not stipulated 
anywhere in the law.2575 The House of Lords held that a person with a title 
‘managing director’ has no particular power, since these depend on the terms of his 
appointment.2576 
The main legislative provisions that refer to company officers are Sections 
270-280, 485-539, 589-604, 1121, 1132 and 1173 of the CA 2006. Section 1121 
includes any director, manager or secretary, and any person who is to be treated 
as an officer of the company to take all reasonable steps to prevent the 
contravention.2577 The auditor is absent from this list, but the Companies Act 
provides that the auditor is a person who “holds office in accordance with the terms of 
their appointment”.2578 The compliance officer and other officers’ titles are also 
absent, but the English Courts have decided on the liability of officers in each case 
of an individual who is considered to be an officer in default.2579 
Nevertheless, the list in Section 1121 does not mean that every person 
whose title includes the word ‘manager’ is covered. Section 1121 (2) of the CA 2006 
should be interpreted narrowly in the context of officers’ liability according to 
Section 1121. This was determined in the case R v Baol in which the court states 
that the provisions apply only to a person who has a position of real authority, 
the management of the company’s affairs and the power and responsibility to 
decide corporate policy and strategy.2580 However, in contrast to R v Boal, in the 
case Re a Company the court interpreted the application of the office relating to the 
officers of a body corporate in Section 1173 (1) in a wider sense.2581 The court held 
                                                     
2573 Re Barings plc (NO. 5) [1999] 1 BCLC, [2000] 1 BCLC 523, supra note 2525 at 489. 
2574 MÄNTYSAARI, supra note 2476 at 100. 
2575 Id. at 100. 
2576 Harold Holdsworth & Co (Wakefield) Ltd v Caddies [1955] 1 WLR 352. 
2577 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 1121 (2)(a)(b).  
2578 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 487 (1). 
2579 Id.§ 1121 (2)(a)(b).; See supra p. 435 
2580 R v Boal (CA 1992), [1992] QB 591, [1992] 2 WLR 890, (1992); See in FRENCH, MAYSON, 
AND RYAN, supra note 2371 at 529. 
2581 Re a Company [1980] Ch 138, [1980] 2 WLR 241; See in FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, 
supra note 2371 at 529. 
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that, in this context, the term means that every person in charge of supervisory 
control is a manager. Shaw L.J. points out for the purposes of Section 1132 
The expression manager should not too narrowly construed. It is not to be equated 
with a managing or other director or a general manager. As I see it, any person who in the 
affairs of the company exercises a supervisory control which reflects the general policy of 
the company for the time being or which is related to the general administration of the 
company is in the sphere of management. He need not be a member of the board of 
directors.2582 
This case has shown that there is reasonable cause to assume that the 
departmental manager, who committed an offence, was covered by Section 1132 
as an officer of the company.2583 In conclusion, these two example cases 
demonstrates that each case needs to be considered on its own individual merits 
and circumstances.2584 The courts have to look at what the persons’ role is within 
the company, as opposed to their job title, how this fits into the corporate 
structure and how it affects the enterprise.2585 Finally, there is no clear legal 
definition of the post of the company officer in English Company Law such as in 
the Delaware Corporation Law. Therefore, the UK has a detailed system of 
regulation and comprehensive provisions of Company Law, there is no clear 
distinction between a director and an officer, and their roles depend on the 
specific facts of their authority, power and responsibilities within a company.  
a.  Officers in Default  
The statutory provisions in the CA 2006 provide a legal framework to 
clarify when a company officer under specific circumstances could be liable for a 
breach of any provision of the Companies Act.2586 As discussed previously, it is 
interesting to note that:  
                                                     
2582 Re a Company [1980] CH 138, [1980] 2 WLR 241, supra note 2579 at 144; See in FRENCH, 
MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 529. 
2583 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 529. 
2584 TANIA CLENCH, BEING CONCERNED IN THE MANAGEMENT OF A COMPANY–WHAT DOES IT 
MEAN? 29–31 31 (2012). 
2585 Id. at 31. 
2586 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, §§ 1121-1123; COMPANY LAW REFORM Corporate 
Law and Governance Directorate and Department of Trade and Industry, supra note 2383 
at 37. 
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For this purpose, ‘officer’ includes— 
(a) any director, manager or secretary, and 
(b) any person who is to be treated as an officer of the company for the purposes of 
the provision in question.2587 
Therefore, all directors, managers, and the company secretary are 
considered to be ‘officers’ of their company.2588 However, there is a distinction 
between directors and officers particularly with regard to their liability. 
Generally, directors are liable when they authorize, participate in, or fail to take 
active preventative steps including monitoring failures.2589 Secretaries should be 
liable for the same default if directors have properly charged them with the 
relevant function.2590 
The Companies Act 2006 enumerates a great number of offences referring to 
directors and officers, which are derived from the CA 1985.2591 Annex A states 
every provision classified by certain types of offence e.g. (1) information relating 
to company constitution, (2) company names, (3) trading disclosures, etc., in 
which parties are liable.2592 In the majority of the offences, the liable parties are the 
company and every officer who is in default.2593 Thus, the company and every 
company officer can be prosecuted for the majority of these offences.2594 In the 
event of a breach of a statutory duty, the officers in default will face a fine and, in 
some cases, imprisonment.2595  
In Section 1121 (3) the CA 2006 states that 
                                                     
2587 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 1121 (2). 
2588 DAVIES, supra note 2518 at 11 para 2.5. 
2589 Company Law Reform Corporate Law and Governance Directorate and Department of 
Trade and Industry, supra note 2365 at 37. 
2590 COMPANY LAW REFORM Id. at 37. 
2591 ANNEX A COMPANIES ACT 2006 | SCHEDULE OF COMPANY OFFENCES. 
2592 Id. 
2593 Id. 
2594 DAVIES, supra note 2518 at 88 para 10.32. 
2595 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 26 (4). 
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 an officer is ‘in default’ for the purposes of the provision if he authorizes or permits, 
participates in, or fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent, the contravention.2596  
This is a broad definition and takes the opposite approach to that under the 
Companies Act 1985, which covered any officer of the company who "knowingly 
and willfully" authorized or permitted the contravention.2597 The expression “fails 
to take all reasonable steps to prevent the contravention“ in particular appears difficult 
to handle in daily practice. The coming years will show which impact this new 
legal definition will have in the English Courts. 
A search of the British and Irish Legal Information Institute case database 
from English and Welsh Courts with coding of the exact phrase ‘officers in default’ 
found eighteen cases from 2006 to 2016. These cases were selected relating to a 
criminal breach of the Companies Act 2006. In eight cases, an officer was in 
default for the purposes of a provision of the Companies Acts.2598 The other ten 
cases refer to financial services companies, such as broker-dealer, banks, and 
traders. These cases will not be taken into consideration here. However, only in 
one of these eight cases was a company charged with four offences under Section 
501(1) of the Companies Act 2006.2599 This provision refers to the auditor's rights 
to information: 
(1)A person commits an offence who knowingly or recklessly makes to an auditor of a 
company a statement (oral or written) that— 
(a)conveys or purports to convey any information or explanations which the auditor 
requires, or is entitled to require, under section 499, and 
(b)is misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular. 
                                                     
2596 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 1121 (3). 
2597 COMPANIES ACT 1985, supra note 2488, § 730 (5). 
2598 See AMG Global Nominees (Private) Ltd v SMM Holdings Ltd & Anor. [2008] EWHC 221 
(Ch), (2008); Id.; Anglo Petroleum Ltd & Anor v TFB (Mortgages) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 456, 
(2007); Cox v Cox & Anor [2006] EWHC 1077 (Ch), (2006); Estafnous v London & Leeds 
Business Centres Ltd. [2009] EWHC 1308 (Ch), (2009); Gyrus Group Ltd & Anor, R v [2014] 
EW Misc B57 (CC), (2014); Hamid (t/a Hamid Properties) v Francis Bradshaw Partnership 
[2013] EWCA Civ 470, (2013); Paros Plc v Worldlink Group Plc [2012] EWHC 394 (Comm), 
(2012). 
2599 Gyrus Group Ltd & Anor, R v [2014] EW MISC B57 (CC), supra note 2600; COMPANIES ACT 
2006, supra note 555, § 501 (1). 
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Section 499 (2)(a) of the CA 2006 states that  
(2)Those persons are— 
(a)any officer or employee of the company;… 
In this case judge Eder states 
Likewise, it is the company which is responsible for sending copies of its annual report 
and accounts to its members (see s423). Consequently, the company itself (as well as every 
officer in default) is explicitly criminally liable if this does not occur (see s425). On the 
other hand, it is the duty of the company’s directors – and not the duty of the company – 
to file the company’s annual accounts with the register (see s441). Consequently, criminal 
liability for failing to comply with this duty explicitly lies with the directors only and not 
with the company (see s451(1)).2600 
The company through its officers, made misleading statements to the 
auditors E&Y and KPMG during the 2009 and 2010 audit process.2601 However, 
this case has not been yet decided since the Crown Court in its judgment 
concluded that this proceeding “is inevitably doomed as a matter of law.”2602  
However, the other seven cases which were found deal with offences under 
Sections 151, 351 and 359 of the Companies Act 1985, as the full CA 2006 only 
entered into in force in 2009. In the vast majority of these cases, the officers were 
in default of provisions of Section 1512603 and Sections 348, 349 and 351 of the CA 
1985.2604 Nevertheless, this sample did not include any court cases in which a 
compliance officer was involved. The majority of directors and officers involved 
were the vice-president or executive officers. 
                                                     
2600 Gyrus Group Ltd & Anor, R v [2014] EW MISC B57 (CC), supra note 2596 at 23 iv). 
2601 Id. at 10. 
2602 Id. at 44. 
2603 See e.g. AMG Global Nominees (Private) Ltd v Africa Resources Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1262, 
(2008); AMG Global Nominees (Private) Ltd v SMM Holdings Ltd & Anor. [2008] EWHC 221 
(CH), supra note 2596; Cox v Cox & Anor [2006] EWHC 1077 (CH), supra note 2596; Estafnous 
v London & Leeds Business Centres Ltd. [2009] EWHC 1308 (CH), supra note 2596; Paros Plc v 
Worldlink Group Plc [2012] EWHC 394 (COMM), supra note 2596. Section 151 of the CA 1985 
provided as follows: “it is not lawful for the company or any of its subsidiaries to give 
financial assistance directly or indirectly for the purpose of that acquisition before or at 
the same time as the acquisition takes place.” 
2604 Hamid (t/a Hamid Properties) v Francis Bradshaw Partnership [2013] EWCA CIV 470, supra 
note 2596. 
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In conclusion, it remains to be seen how the English Courts will decide in 
practice on the issue of officers in default. This legislative approach to sanctioning 
is seen as an overarching ‘in default’ framework, but it is in line with the 
recommendation of the CLRG.2605 Ultimately, the compliance officer is likely to be 
viewed just like an officer in default according to Section 1121 of the CA 2006. 
b.  Company Managers 
The CA 2006 also lists the manager of a company.2606 A manager means a 
senior who is also in a fiduciary relationship with the company.2607 This could be a 
chief accountant,2608 president, vice-president or executive officer.2609 In the 
majority of cases, it was held that these managers owe the same fiduciary duties 
as directors.2610 Therefore, senior managers are subject to the same fiduciary 
duties as those upon which the statutory duties of directors are based.2611 
c.  Company Secretaries 
The CA 2006 also refers to the company secretary in the event of the 
contravention of an enactment in relation to a company as well as the director and 
officer.2612 Furthermore, Section 271 states that there is a need for public 
companies to have a secretary. 2613 In contrast, “private companies are not obliged 
                                                     
2605 Company Law Reform Corporate Law and Governance Directorate and Department of 
Trade and Industry, supra note 2365 at 37 para 4.6. 
2606 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 1121 (2)(a). 
2607 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 547. 
2608 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v Kingsley & Ors [1990] EWCA Civ 2 (1990), [1991] Ch 547, 24 (1990). 
The judge said: “There is no difficulty about that in the present case since Zdiri must have 
been in a fiduciary relationship with Agip. He was the Chief Accountant of Agip and was 
entrusted with the signed drafts or orders upon BdS.” 
2609 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 547. 
2610 See e.g. Green v Bestobell Industries Ltd 1982 WAR 1, See in FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, 
supra note 2371 at 547. “In this case the manager had the complete control of human, 
financial and contractual resources according to his letter of appointment.” 
2611 See supra II., 1., 2., p. 370 
2612 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 1121 (2)(a). 
2613 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 271. 
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to have a company secretary.”2614 In addition, the proposed officer for registration 
of a private and public company should be the director or the first secretary.2615 
The company’s directors have to ensure that the secretary of a public 
company has the requisite knowledge and experience to discharge the function. 
That means he or she should have the following qualifications e.g. a barrister, 
advocate or solicitor or a member of any of the bodies specified in Section 273 
(3).2616 In the view of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, this 
requirement to employ a qualified company secretary ensures that public 
companies have a “company officer who focuses on legal requirements, thus improving 
compliance and reducing risk of penalty.”2617 In addition, another provision provides 
that the appointment and the removal of the company secretary should be a 
matter for the board.2618 
There are also common law rules on the duties of company secretaries. 
Pursuant to the CA 2006 and the Combined Code, a company secretary is a: 
[.] mere servant; his position is that he is to do what he is told, and no person can 
assume that he has any authority to represent anything at all; [ ]2619 
For listed companies, the UK Corporate Code states the responsibilities as 
follows: 
The company secretary should be responsible for advising the board through the 
chairman on all governance matters. All directors should have access to the advice and 
services of the company secretary, who is responsible to the board for ensuring that board 
procedures are complied with.2620 
In recent years, the responsibilities and duties of company secretaries have 
increased in the legislation. A number of reporting duties of companies 
secretaries are enshrined in the CA 2006 e.g. they have to sign the directors’ 
                                                     
2614 DAVIES, supra note 2518 at 21 para 4.14. 
2615 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, §§ 12 (1)(a-c). 
2616 Id. § 273 (1)(2)(3). 
2617 Company Law Reform Corporate Law and Governance Directorate and Department of 
Trade and Industry, supra note 2365 at 279. 
2618 UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, CADBURY COMMITTEE, supra note 468 B.5.2. 
2619 Barnett, Hoares & Co v South London Tramways Co [1887] 18 QBD, 815, 817 (1887). 
2620 CADBURY COMMITTEE, supra note 467 B.5.2. 
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accounting report2621 and the directors’ remuneration report.2622 The company 
secretary is also responsible for a number of matters concerned with 
administration e.g. sending the registrar a copy of the articles as amended,2623 
providing constitutional documents to company members,2624 changing the 
company’s name if so required,2625 trading disclosures,2626 keeping a register of 
secretaries,2627 etc. These responsibilities apply to the company and every officer 
in default.2628 
In addition, in accordance with common law principles, the extent of 
authority and responsibilities of secretary were strengthened. A company 
secretary can represent the company in its dealing with third parties.2629 The 
power of the company’s secretary varies, depending on the size of the company, 
but is generally extensive.2630 In the case Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v 
Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd Lord Salmon LJ stated, “the company secretary had 
ostensible, or apparent, authority to enter in agreements” regarding 
administrative matters.2631 The company secretary hired a number of cars for the 
business in the absence of his managing director. The court held that the company 
was bound by the contract.2632 
The professional Institute for Chartered Secretaries (ICSA) views ensuring 
compliance with corporate law, regulations, and the company’s constitution as a 
key element of the role of company secretary.2633 The Cadbury Committee also 
evaluated the company secretary as a key role player “in ensuring that board 
                                                     
2621 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 419 (1). 
2622 Id.§ 422 (1). 
2623 Id.§ 26. 
2624 Id.§ 32. 
2625 Id.§§ 63, 64, 68, 75, 76. 
2626 Id.§§ 82, 113. 
2627 Id.§ 275. 
2628 See supra II, a, p. 429 
2629 MÄNTYSAARI, supra note 2476 at 102. 
2630 Id. at 102. 
2631 Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 711, 
[1971] 3 All ER 16. 
2632 Id. 
2633 Roger Dickinson (ICSA), THE COMPANY SECRETARY IN THE UK, 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/corporate/icsa.pdf (last visited Jul 24, 2016). 
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procedures are both followed and regularly reviewed.”2634 He is also referred to as “the 
chief administrative officer of the company.”2635 The duties of a company secretary are 
usually enshrined in an employment agreement.2636 The Company Law Review in 
its final report recommended “that the test for liability of secretaries should be the same 
as that for directors, where directors have properly charged the secretary with e.g. 
administrative function.”2637 
Finally, it appears that company secretaries are officers with extensive 
responsibilities and duties.2638 They have certain legal duties and responsibilities 
with respect to the administration of the company and compliance with company 
law and the company’s constitution. In public companies, they also have to 
ensure compliance with all rules concerning the listing of the shares. In addition, 
their task is to advise the board on governance matters. 
To understand and distinguish the concepts of a company’s liability and 
individual liability under company law, the next section analyzes the relevant 
theories of liability in the UK. 
4. Theories of Company Liability in the UK 
English Company Law addresses two case groups of company liability 
which are inherent parts of the structure of companies: firstly, the principle of 
limited corporate liability for the company’s shareholders, and secondly, the 
individual default rule.2639 The first principle is the liability that could arise 
between the company’s management and the shareholders as a class.  
Under common law, it has been recognized that a company has a dual 
nature. On the one hand, it is an association of its members and on the other, a 
person separate from its members.2640 In practice this means the company is 
considered as a separate person, which enters into contracts, conducts business 
                                                     
2634 The Cadbury Report (1992) CADBURY COMMITTEE, supra note 467 para 4.25. 
2635 Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 711, 
[1971] 3 ALL ER 16, supra note 2629. 
2636 MÄNTYSAARI, supra note 2476 at 111. 
2637 COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, supra note 2462 at 318 para 15.41. 
2638 MÄNTYSAARI, supra note 2476 at 103. 
2639 PAUL L. DAVIES, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: COMPOSITION, STRUCTURE, DUTIES AND 
POWERS 4 (2000). 
2640 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 126. 
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and owns the company’s property.2641 This fundamental principle was established 
in the leading case Salomon v Salomon.2642 In this case, Lord Halsbury said: 
.[.]once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other 
independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself,.[.]2643 
In addition, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)2644 defines a company “as a legal 
person, which could be prosecuted and should not be treated differently from 
individuals.”2645 In the event of a corporate criminal prosecution the SFO will first 
and foremost consider the provisions of the statute.2646 The difficult question in 
criminal law is then how a legal entity such as a company can actually be held 
responsible.2647 
Under common law, there are three theories referring to the criminal 
responsibility of companies. The first theory is the agency theory, as described 
previously in chapter 4.2648 In the US, this theory is referred to as the “respondeat 
superior“ doctrine.2649 Equally, under UK agency law, when an agent makes his or 
her principal party to a contract, the agent does not himself become party to that 
                                                     
2641 Id. at 126. 
2642 SALOMON V SALOMON [1897] AC 22, supra note 2430; See in: FRENCH, MAYSON, AND 
RYAN, supra note 2352 at 126. 
2643 SALOMON V SALOMON [1897] AC 22, supra note 2430 at 30–31; See in: FRENCH, MAYSON, 
AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 127. 
2644 See supra III., p. 398, The SFO “is part of the UK criminal justice system covering 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, but not Scotland, the Isle of Man or the Channel 
Islands.” The SFO can be seen as the English counterpart to the United States Department 
of Justice (DOJ). See SFO, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE | ABOUT US SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/ (last visited Jul 26, 2016). 
2645 SFO Guidance SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE SFO, GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS 1 
(2009), https://www.skadden.com/eimages/Guidance_on_Corporate_Prosecutions.pdf 
(last visited Jul 25, 2016) para 4. 
2646 SFO GUIDANCE Id. at 3. para 15. 
2647 Wells, Criminal Responsibility of Legal Persons in Common Law Jurisdictions, in PAPER 
PREPARED FOR OECD ANTI-CORRUPTION UNIT 10, 2 (2000). 
2648 See supra Chapter 4, A., I.a, p.204, See also Agency Theory Müller-Freienfels, supra note 
1315. 
2649 Michael Litvin, DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LII / LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE 
(2009), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/quotation/%5Bfield_short_title-raw%5D_123 
(last visited Jun 19, 2016); Respondeat Superior Definition, supra note 1315; WILSON V. 
UNITED STATES (8TH CIR. 1993), supra note 1145. 
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contract and, hence, is not liable for any breach of the contract by the principal.2650 
Therefore, as an agent of the company, the director or officer is not held liable for 
the breach of the contract.2651 This principle encompasses the rule that the 
company is liable for the wrongful acts of all its employees.2652 This basic principle 
was established in the case Said v Butt where the court held that the managing 
director was not personally liable, because he was acting within his authority as a 
director.2653 Contrary to this principle, for certain torts, such as fraudulent 
misrepresentation, for instance, a director, who fraudulently states that the 
company is creditworthy can be held personally liable.2654 Lord Hoffmann stated 
He is liable not because he was a director but because he committed a fraud.2655 
In addition, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry said 
[.] directors or employees acting as such will only be liable for tortious acts committed 
during the course of their employment. In the event that a director or an employee 
himself commits the tort he will be liable.2656 
It could be argued that a hallmark of common law is that courts examine the 
facts and circumstances of each case individually. Traditionally, the English 
common law limits the application of vicarious liability to certain kinds of 
torts.2657 That means, “when an employee commits a tort, the employer, whether 
an individual or a company, may be held vicariously liable.”2658 For example, 
                                                     
2650 See also in the UK FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 639 Immunity 
when acting for a company. 
2651 Id. at 639. 
2652 “Under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer is liable for the negligent acts 
or omissions of his employee which are committed within the scope of his employment.” 
“A principle of agency law, which holds that a principal, or employer is vicariously liable 
for the torts of his agent, or employee, which occur during the course of the agent's, or 
employee's actions on behalf of the principal, or employer.” See e.g. Litvin, supra note 2647; 
Respondeat Superior Definition, supra note 1315. 
2653 Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497; See in: FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2371 at 639. 
2654 Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp [2002] UKHL 43, [2003] 1 AC 
959, (2002); See in: FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 641. 
2655 Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp [2002] UKHL 43, [2003] 1 AC 
959, supra note 2652 at 22. 
2656 Id. at 34. 
2657 Wells, supra note 2645 at 3. 
2658 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 641. 
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companies may also be liable “for offences requiring mens rea2659 by application of the 
identification principle.”2660 However, in the event that a company is vicariously 
liable for the tort of an employee, notwithstanding this, the agent or employee can 
also be sued.2661 
The second theory of liability that has gained prevalence in recent years 
comprises the identification of a limited layer of senior officers within the 
company as its ‘brains’.2662 This theory is called the identification theory. The 
thoughts behind this theory are that “liability attaches only to persons who have 
requisite knowledge.”2663 The leading case for that theory is Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v 
Nattrass,2664 in which, Lord Reid stated 
Normally the board of directors, the managing director, and perhaps other superior 
officers of a company carry out the functions of management and speak and act as the 
company.2665 
Lord Pearson compared the vicarious liability with the identification 
principle as follows: 
The vicarious responsibility is very different from identification. There are some 
officers of a company who may for some purposes be identified with it, as being or having 
its directing mind and will, its centre and ego, and its brains.2666 
However, in this case, the House of Lords, Lord Reid, held  
But here the board never delegated any part of their functions. The acts or omissions of 
shop managers were not acts of the company itself.2667 
                                                     
2659 Mens rea is “an element of criminal responsibility, a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful 
purpose; a criminal intent. Guilty knowledge and willfulness.” See e.g., Mens Rea The 
Gale Group, Inc., MENS REA WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2. ed. 2008). 
2660 SFO Guidance SFO, supra note 2643 at 4 para 17. 
2661 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V PAKISTAN NATIONAL SHIPPING CORP [2002] UKHL 43, 
[2003] 1 AC 959, supra note 2652. 
2662 Wells, supra note 2645 at 3. 
2663 FRENCH, MAYSON, AND RYAN, supra note 2352 at 642. 
2664 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1971] 2 All ER 127, [1971] 2 WLR 1166, [1971] UKHL 
1, 69 LGR 403, [1972] AC 153, 1 (1971). 
2665 Id. at 4. 
2666 Id. at 19. 
2667 Id. at 7. 
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Therefore, this case restricts the application of the identification principle to 
the board of directors, the managing director, and other executive officers.2668 In 
essence, the identification theory qualifies “the acts and state of mind of those 
individuals who are part of the ‘directing mind and will’ of the company.”2669 Hence, this 
theory includes two steps. At first, it “identifies the perpetrator of the crime, and then 
asks whether he or she is a person who can be said to embody the company’s mind and 
will.”2670 
The third theory identifies the fault in the procedures, operating systems, or 
culture of a company by prosecuting corporate homicide offence.2671 The 
application of this third theory depends on the kind of offence. In addition, there 
are other conditions limitating of corporate liability e.g. the type of the offence and 
the sanction must be a fine.2672 Rape, for example, is excluded.2673  
However, legal scholars have held the distinction between these three 
theories to have less substance than it first appears.2674 For example, in both 
vicarious and identification liability, the individual employee can be prosecuted, 
and in each case, the company can only be liable if the fault is found in one 
individual.2675 However, the phrase ‘directing mind and will’ has been interpreted 
in various ways.2676 Hence, identification theory appears weak. Some argue that 
                                                     
2668 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1971] 2 ALL ER 127, [1971] 2 WLR 1166, [1971] UKHL 
1, 69 LGR 403, [1972] AC 153, supra note 2662; See in: SFO GUIDANCE SFO, supra note 2643 
at 4 para 18. 
2669 ARCHBOLD 2010: FULL TEXT AND SUPPLEMENTS: CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND 
PRACTICE, (James Richardson ed., Revised ed. 2009) para 30. 
2670 James Gobert, Corporate criminality: four models of fault, 14 LEGAL STUDIES 393–410, 395 
(1994). 
2671 Wells, supra note 2645 at 4. 
2672 SFO GUIDANCE SFO, supra note 2643 at 3 para 11, 12. 
2673 SFO GUIDANCE Id. at 3. para 12. 
2674 Wells, supra note 2645 at 6. 
2675 Id. at 6. 
2676 THE LAW COMMISSION, CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN REGULATORY CONTEXT 104 (2010) para 
5.81. 
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this theory is a restricted version of the vicarious liability theory.2677 Even today, a 
wide-ranging academic debate on principles of company liability continues.2678  
In practice, the SFO Guidance sets out the general principles for prosecuting 
companies, for corporate liability, and the identification principle.2679 In the 
understanding of the SFO, the prosecution of a company is not a substitute for the 
prosecution of criminally liable individuals such as directors, officers, or 
employees.2680 If individuals are prosecuted a possible liability of the company 
should also be considered.2681 In the view of the SFO, the best practice is to 
prosecute all offenders at the same time.2682 The prosecution practice can be 
important for companies and their employees because the Law Commission 
provides that there have been increasing numbers of criminal offences between 
1989 and 2008.2683 
In conclusion, the UK uses various theories for company liability for 
criminal offences. Ultimately, however, the general principle that a company can 
be prosecuted for a criminal offence has long been accepted and the courts have 
rarely applied the vicarious or identification doctrine.2684 Similar to the situation in 
the US, it is well established that a company may be held vicariously liable for the 
crimes committed by its employees within the scope of their employment. The US 
courts read criminal statutes to impose liability on corporations under a theory on 
                                                     
2677 G. R. Sullivan, The Attribution of Culpability to Limited Companies, 55 THE CAMBRIDGE 
LAW JOURNAL 515 (1996). 
2678 THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 2692 at Ch. 5 Appendices A, B, and C by Black, 
Cartwright, and Wells. 
2679 SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE (SFO), GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS (2009), 
[hereinafter SFO Guidance] https://www.skadden.com/eimages/Guidance_on_Corporate_ 
Prosecutions.pdf (last visited Jul 25, 2016). 
2680 SFO GUIDANCE Id. at 2. para 8. 
2681 SFO GUIDANCE Id. at 2. para 8. 
2682 SFO GUIDANCE Id. at 2. para 9. 
2683 THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 2674 at 5 para 1.17. The Law Commission states that 
“more than two and a half times as many pages were needed in Halsbury’s Statutes to 
cover offences created in the 19 years between 1989 and 2008 than were needed to cover 
the offences created in the 637 years prior to that.” 
2684 Wells, supra note 2645 at 10. 
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the doctrine of ‘respondeat superior’. However, nowadays, the DOJ announced the 
new approach of individual liability in matters of corporate wrongdoing.2685  
5. Factors to be considered when charging Companies 
In accordance with the approach of the Director of Public Prosecution 
(DPP), the guidance provides a defense of adequate corporate procedures and 
factors, which are viewed with benevolence by the prosecutors and the English 
Courts.2686 The DPP is a special agency that prosecutes corporate offenders.2687 In 
2009, the guidance of the DPP announced an enforcement of prosecution against 
corporate offenders in order to protect the public business practice and to increase 
the public confidence in the criminal justice system.2688 
The guidance defines the term company as follows: 
A legal person, capable of being prosecuted, and should not be treated differently from 
individual because of its artificial personality.2689 
Legally, it means a company formed and registered under the Companies 
Act 2006, or its predecessors.2690 In the UK, there are some public interest factors 
in charging companies, which the prosecutor needs to consider. Given the 
prospect of a company’s conviction, the prosecutor should balance the following 
factors: the loss of the company, the risk of harm to the public, the employees, the 
creditors, the shareholders and detrimental effects on the confidence and stability 
of the financial market and international trade.2691 Furthermore, “the offending in 
other countries should be taken into account.”2692 In conclusion, public interest factors 
                                                     
2685 REMARKS Yates and DOJ, supra note 1440. 
2686 “The office (DPP) was created by the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 and is 
appointed by the Attorney General.”Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions SFO, supra note 
2643; PROSECUTION OF OFFENCES ACT 1985, c. 23 (1985)§ 2 (1); The Director of Public 
Prosecutions, INBRIEF.CO.UK, http://www.inbrief.co.uk/legal-system/director-of-public-
prosecutions/ (last visited Sep 6, 2016). 
2687 GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTION, supra note 2661 at 1 para 3. 
2688 GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTION Id. at 2. para 7. 
2689 GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTION Id. at 1. para 4. 
2690 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555 § 1 (1). 
2691 GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTION, supra note 2661 at 6 para 30. 
2692 GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTION Id. at 7. para 30. 
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in the impact on the prosecutor’s decision on whether to prosecute a company.2693 
Here too, the decision depends on the specific facts of each case.2694  
Factors listed by the DPP as being taken into consideration against 
prosecution are enumerated as follows:2695 
a) a seriously proactive approach by the corporate management team, 
which involves self-reporting and remedial actions, 
b) a lack of previously offence in the company’s history, 
c) the existence of a seriously proactive and effective corporate compliance 
program, 
d) the availability of other civil or regulatory appropriate alternative 
remedies, 
e) it is an isolated offence by individuals like a director, 
f) the prosecutor should consider the commercial consequences also under 
European Law.2696 
These are the summarized factors against prosecution. However, the 
Guidance also lists factors in favor of prosecution, such as a history of similar 
conduct or an ineffective corporate compliance program at the relevant time.2697 
Therefore, the English Courts may take into account an effective corporate 
compliance program as a mitigating factor.2698 However, the Guidance on 
corporate prosecution does not define the meaning of a “proactive and effective” 
compliance program. It seems that the wording has been adopted from the US 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual.2699  
A search of criminal cases in the British and Irish Legal Information 
Institute case law database where individuals were convicted of fraudulent 
trading pursuant to Section 458 of the Companies Act 1985 Section or Section 993 
of the Companies Act 2006 found seventeen cases found between 2006 and 2016. 
In one case, Ravjani & Ors, R. v, the Court of Appeal considered the compliance 
                                                     
2693 GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTION Id. at 7. para 31. 
2694 GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTION Id. at 7. para 32. 
2695 GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTION Id. at 8 to 9. para 32 a. to h. 
2696 GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTION Id. at 8 to 9. para 32 a. to h. 
2697 GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTION Id. at 7 to 8. para 32 a. to f. 
2698 See supra III., 3., p. 409. 
2699 US SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 667 Ch. 8, § 8 B2.1. 
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procedure within a company.2700 The financial director and qualified accountant 
of the Ravjani group of companies, who had influence and importance in the 
companies was convicted of conspiracy to cheat the public revenue and was 
sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment.2701 The director concerned changed the 
compliance procedures, which deviated markedly from the lawful procedures in 
place before his arrival.2702 The court concluded that his role in authorizing many 
fictitious changes was pure “window dressing.”2703 However, this term also appears 
to have been adopted from the American literature.2704 In conclusion, the 
corporate compliance program needs to be more than a symbolic gesture or 
formal compliance structure; it should comprise a set of well-drafted supervisory 
procedures to ensure that the company and all its employees comply with the 
applicable law, rules and codes within UK companies. 
6. Compliance in English Company Law 
Following an examination of English Company Law, it is clear that one of 
the major results of the company law reform process was the codification of the 
principles underpinning directors’ duties under the common law.2705 Companies, 
their directors, and officers are subject to the diverse range of compliance 
obligations under Company Law and personal liability.2706 Hence, the reform 
considered responsible corporate behavior in the 21st century and recognized “the 
trend of the courts in recent years by expecting higher standards of skills and care from 
company directors.”2707 Nevertheless, the new Companies Act 2006 and the codified 
directors’ duties have not yet been the subject of any legal guidance from the 
English Courts.2708 
                                                     
2700 Ravjani & Ors, R. v [2012] EWCA Crim 2519, (2012). 
2701 Id. at 3. 
2702 Id. at 33. 
2703 Id. at 33. 
2704 See e.g. Baer, supra note 610 at 952; BEALE, supra note 1117 at 20; Erickson, supra note 
1969 at 1824; Weber and Wasieleski, supra note 515 at 610. 
2705 DAVIES, supra note 2518 at 28 para 6.1. 
2706 Id. at 104. para 12.11. 
2707 Id. at 8. para 1.3. 
2708 DAVID CHIVERS, THE COMPANIES ACT 2006:  DIRECTORS’ DUTIES GUIDANCE 4 (2007), 
http://corporate-responsibility.org/wp-
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Pursuant to English Company Law, compliance means ensuring adherence 
with the provisions on the administration of company affairs.2709 These provisions 
also include disclosure requirements, e.g. duty to prepare a directors report.2710 In 
essence, directors, company officers, managers, secretaries, and any person who is 
to be treated as an officer of the company, are liable when they authorize, 
participate in, permit, or fail to take active steps to prevent a default pursuant to 
the Companies Acts.2711 Section 1121 of the CA 2006 comprises a broad category of 
persons acting on behalf of the company, who are charged with compliance to the 
Act. They must ensure that all of their decisions are taken in accordance with the 
Act.2712 Therefore, they should have in place a proper procedure.2713 A directors’ 
guidance recommends submitting those procedures for review to the board on an 
annual basis and reporting immediately any departure from or failure in the 
agreed procedures.2714 On the other hand, the board should ensure that directors 
have a proper flow of information in order to comply with their statutory 
duties.2715 
Additionally, the CLRG argues 
that the requirement to employ a company secretary ensures that there is at least one 
company officer who focuses on legal requirements, thus improving compliance and 
reducing risk of penalty.2716  
However, there is no requirement to employ a compliance officer under 
English Company Law. It appears that the company secretary should carry out 
compliance tasks. The Guidance recommends that the company secretary, or 
other designated person, should report directly to the chief executive.2717 Finally, 
                                                                                                                                                  
content/uploads/2013/11/directors_guidance_final.pdf (last visited Sep 14, 2016). 
[hereinafter Directors’ Duties Guidance]; See also supra II., 3.a, p. 380. 
2709 DAVIES, supra note 2518 at 8 para 1.6. 
2710 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 418 - Disclosure to auditors. 
2711 Id.§ 1121 (2)(a)(b). 
2712 Directors’ Duties Guidance CHIVERS, supra note 2706 at 4. 
2713 DIRECTORS’ DUTIES GUIDANCE Id. at 16. 
2714 DIRECTORS’ DUTIES GUIDANCE Id. at 16. 
2715 DIRECTORS’ DUTIES GUIDANCE Id. at 18. 
2716 Company Law Reform Corporate Law and Governance Directorate and Department of 
Trade and Industry, supra note 2365 at 279. 
2717 Directors’ Duties Guidance CHIVERS, supra note 2706 at 16. 
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the Guidance argues that an appropriate reporting procedure should pass 
vertically through corporate structures.2718 
7. Comparison between UK and US Compliance under Corporation Law 
English Company Law is centralized and regulated in detail. The English 
Parliament implemented changes to substantive company law in England to 
strengthen the government’s ability to combat corporate crime and to institute 
corporate reforms.2719 In the US, the legislator passed various federal statutes, 
such as the FCPA and the SOX, to prosecute corporate offences.2720 Therefore, the 
evidence highlights that there is a need for a centralized legal framework to deal 
with corporate compliance. 
In the last ten years, the UK has introduced reforms to allow the Secretary 
of State to direct the company to comply with the provisions of the CA 2006. 
Failure to do so constitutes an offence, and failure on the part of the officers in 
default who have been implicated in breaches of duty and breaches of legislation. 
The English legislator codified directors’ duties and also applied the same duties 
to the company officers. Similar to the US, UK company directors are considered 
to be fiduciaries. Their fiduciary duties were developed by the courts through 
common law and equitable principles. The US State Courts, especially the 
Delaware Court, developed a compliance or oversight duty of directors. Under 
Delaware law, directors are duty bound to monitor delegated activities.2721 It must 
be considered that personal liability for a breach of such duty could arise if an 
internal corporate control system has not been put in place.2722 Hence, the 
responsibilities of directors and officers in terms of delegated oversight and 
monitoring could be seen as discharged if an internal control system is 
implemented under the Caremark standard.2723 In contrast to the UK, the common 
law and equitable principles with regard to directors’ duties have not hitherto 
been codified in US State Corporation Law. In the US, it appears that, nowadays, 
                                                     
2718 DIRECTORS’ DUTIES GUIDANCE Id. at 19. 
2719 See supra II, p. 368. 
2720 See supra ch. 4, p. 182 
2721 CHIU, supra note 2351 at 234. 
2722 Id. at 234. 
2723 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra 
note 22; See in: CHIU, supra note 2351 at 234. 
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compliance is influenced more by common law rules, federal law and by the 
efforts of prosecutors. In the UK, compliance is effected to a greater degree 
through legislation, with the support of prosecutors. Nevertheless, both US State 
Corporation Law and English Company Law do not explicitly require companies 
to employ a compliance officer or to establish a compliance program. 
Overall, it seems that there are no fundamental differences between the 
general legal framework of corporate liability culpability in both the US and the 
UK jurisdiction.2724 The US courts apply an expansive theory of corporate criminal 
liability according to current federal law; simultaneously, the English courts are 
hesitant to impose liability on companies for the acts of employees.2725 Although 
the two legal systems retain differences in the scope of liability e.g. various 
theories of company liability, over the last ten years, UK Parliament has passed 
new legislation broadening and codifying the scope of liability for companies and 
for directors’ duties.2726 In conclusion, it appears that English law attempts to 
restrict company criminal liability unless the highest level of management is 
involved and responsible for the wrongdoing. 
III. The Enforcement of Compliance in the UK - The Bribery Act 2010 
The introduction of the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010, an anti-
corruption legislation with significant jurisdictional reach, met with considerable 
international interest.2727 The Act applies to the entire United Kingdom of Great 
Britain, i.e. England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.2728 In addition, this 
Act has an “expansive jurisdictional reach” and is more far-reaching than the US 
                                                     
2724 Compare Chapter 4, A., II., pp. 280 et seq.; ch. 5, II, 4. pp. 387 et seq.; See also JESSICA DE 
GRAZIA, REVIEW OF THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE 2 (2008), 
http://library.college.police.uk/docs/JdeGrazia-Final-Review-of-SFO.pdf (last visited Jul 
29, 2016); Djilani, supra note 99 at 306. 
2725 Djilani, supra note 99 at 308. 
2726 Id. at 306. 
2727 Marcus Sohlberg, THE UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010 | LAW LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-bribery-act.php#introduction (last visited 
Sep 24, 2016); UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65. The Act received Royal 
Assent on 8 April 2010. 
2728 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67 Explanatory Notes, Territorial 
Extent. 
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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.2729 The UK Bribery Act 2010 entered into 
force on July 1, 2011.2730 
Although Lord Templeman stated that 
Bribery is an evil practice which threatens the foundations of any civilised society.2731 
the bribery legislation reform was not introduced to echo the US bribery 
legislation, but in response to criticism for failing to adequately implement the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International 
Business Transactions.2732 In 2005, the lead examiners of the Working Group on 
Bribery recommended that the UK should enact legislation on bribery that clearly 
included bribery of a foreign public official, because “the absence of specific case 
law on the bribery of foreign public officials makes it difficult to evaluate how 
effectively the current system works.”2733 Nevertheless, bribery before the UKBA 
was also subject to the pre-existing law, specifically the Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1906, which was repealed in 2010. As a result of the new Act, the Working 
Group, recognized that major English companies have taken important steps to 
adopt compliance programs to prevent bribery amongst their employees and 
agents abroad, but recommended that increased efforts to prevent bribery should 
be undertaken among SME’s.2734 
                                                     
2729 Id.§ 12 (5) "An offence is committed under section 7 irrespective of whether the acts or 
omissions which form part of the offence take place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere." 
See also Sohlberg, supra note 2723; ERNST & YOUNG, THE UK BRIBERY ACT: DEVELOPING AN 
ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE FRAMEWORK 16 1 (2011). 
2730 Djilani, supra note 99; Koehler, supra note 978 at 636; Sohlberg, supra note 2725. 
2731 AG for Hong Kong v Reid [1993] UKPC 2, Privy Council Appeal No. 44 of 1992 (1993). 
2732 OECD, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf (last visited Sep 25, 2016); See in: Sohlberg, supra 
note 2725. 
2733 DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS OECD, REPORT ON THE 
APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING 
BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 14 (2005) para 15 and 43; See in: 
Sohlberg, supra note 2725. 
2734 OECD, supra note 2731 at 15 para 43. 
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Currently, the new Bribery Act has two main objectives: Firstly, effectively 
to prevent the increasing use of bribery and secondly, to make it easier to 
prosecute bribery by individuals and companies.2735 Under the Criminal Justice 
Act 1987, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) was constituted for England and Wales 
and Northern Ireland.2736 The Attorney General appoints the Director of the 
SFO.2737 The Director has the power to investigate serious or complex fraud.2738 
The amendments of Schedule 1 of the Bribery Act state the pre-investigation 
powers in relation to bribery and corruption: foreign officers etc. of the Director of 
the SFO in terms of an offence under Sections 1 or 2 of the Act.2739 Hence, the SFO 
also enforces the Act internationally.2740 The SFO could be seen as the UK 
“counterpart” to the DOJ in the US.2741 In 2011, the SFO and the UK Crown 
Prosecution Service published final guidance on prosecuting under the Bribery 
Act, which English and foreign companies should consider seriously.2742 This 
Guidance provides procedures which companies can put into place to prevent 
bribery.2743 The following sections will examine these procedures alongside the six 
Guidance principles and the key provisions of the Bribery Act. 
1. The Key Provisions of the UKBA 2010 
The Act includes four main provisions in terms of criminal offences such as 
bribing another person (active bribery) or receiving a bribe (passive bribery); 
bribing foreign officials; and company liability for failing to prevent bribery.2744 
Section 1 clearly defines the criminal offence of bribery of another person as 
                                                     
2735 Sohlberg, supra note 2725. 
2736 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1987, c. 38 (1987), § 1 (1). 
2737 Id.§ 1 (2). 
2738 Id.§ 1 (3). 
2739 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67 Schedule 1, Consequential 
Amendments. 
2740 ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 881 at 1. 
2741 Djilani, supra note 99 at 303.  
2742 THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE, Ministry of Justice, supra note 883; Sohlberg, supra note 2723. 
2743 THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE, Ministry of Justice, supra note 883. 
2744 See UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65, §§ 1, 2, 6, 7. 
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“it applies to the person who offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to 
another.”2745 
The Commentary states that the meaning of “financial or other advantage” is 
left to be determined by the courts.2746 The Section distinguishes two cases: Case 
one concerns the situation when a person intends the advantage to induce or to 
reward a person to perform and for the performance of an improper relevant 
function or activity.2747 Case two applies where the person offering the bribe 
knows or believes that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the 
improper performance.2748 The term ‘improper performance’ is defined in Sections 3, 
4 and 5 of the Act.2749 In brief, it means performance which amounts to a breach of 
an expectation that a person will act in good faith.2750 The Guidance provides one 
example under Section 1 where e.g. hospitality is not intended as a bribe: 
An invitation to foreign clients to attend a Six Nations match at Twickenham as part of 
a public relations exercise designed to cement good relations or enhance knowledge in the 
organisation’s field is extremely unlikely to engage Section 1 as there is unlikely to be 
evidence of an intention to induce improper performance of a relevant function.2751 
However, it is irrelevant whether the advantage is offered, promised or 
given by the person directly or through a third party.2752  
In addition, Section 2 lists further instances, namely Case three to Case six, 
in which a person could be guilty of an offence, when receiving a bribe.2753 Cases 
three, four and five require that the person “requests, agrees to receive or accepts” 
an advantage, whether or not the person actually receives it.2754 Cases three, four, 
and five consider three forms of improper performance. The English Courts will 
have jurisdiction over offences set forth in Section 1 and 2 committed in any part 
of the UK, but they will also have jurisdiction over offences when the person 
                                                     
2745 Id. § 1 (2) (a), Commentary on Sections. 
2746 Id. Commentary on Section 1. 
2747 Id. § 1 (2) (a) (b) (i)(ii), Commentary on Section 1. 
2748 Id. § 1 (3) (a) (b), Commentary on Section 1. 
2749 Id. §§ 3, 4, 5. 
2750 See especially Id. § 4 (1) (a) (b). 
2751 The Bribery Guidance Ministry of Justice, supra note 880 at 10 para 20. 
2752 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67§ 1 (5). 
2753 Id. § 2 (1) - (5). 
2754 Id. § 2 (2) - (5), Commentary on Section 2. 
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commmitted the offence outside the United Kingdom and has a close connection 
with the United Kingdom. 2755  
Section 6 defines a specific, standalone, or separate criminal offence of 
bribery of a foreign public official, where the person intended to obtain or retain 
business, or an advantage in the conduct of business, and the person offers, 
promises or gives any financial or other advantage to another person.2756 The term 
‘foreign public official’ is defined in Subsection 5 as an individual who holds a 
legislative, administrative or judicial position of any kind of a country or territory 
outside the UK and “exercises a public function, or is an official or agent of a public 
international organization” such as the UN or the World Bank.2757 Legal scholars 
have criticized the far-reaching scope of this definition. They contend that the 
broad definition of the term results in uncertainty regarding interpretations.2758 In 
this broader definition, the senior management of private companies whose 
shares are owned primarily by foreign governments could also be included.2759 
Finally, the recommendation is that UK companies should be alert when dealing 
with companies in foreign countries.2760 
Section 6 contains two elements of the offence, a conduct element and a 
fault element.2761 The conduct is set forth in Subsection 3.2762 This Subsection states 
that this kind of bribery is committed when the person 
offers, promises or gives any advantage to a foreign public official, and the written law 
applicable to the foreign public official neither permits nor requires the foreign public 
official to be influenced in his or her capacity as a foreign public official.2763  
                                                     
2755 Id.§ 12 (1) (2) (a)-(c); The Bribery Guidance Ministry of Justice, supra note 880 at 9 para 
15. 
2756 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65, § 6 (1) (2) (3). 
2757 Id.§ 6 (5) (a)(b)(c), (6); The Bribery Guidance Ministry of Justice, supra note 880 at 11 
para 22. 
2758 GORDON BELCH, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICACY OF  THE BRIBERY ACT 2010 6 (2014), 
https://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/documents/An_Analysis_of_the_Efficacy_of_the_Bribery_A
ct_2010.pdf (last visited Oct 4, 2016). 
2759 Id. at 6. 
2760 Id. at 6. 
2761 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 § 6. 
2762 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 § 6, Commentary on Section 6. 
2763 Id.§ 6 (3), Commentary on Section 6. 
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The term ‘written law’ is defined as the law of the relevant part of the UK, or 
the law of the country or territory in terms of which the foreign public official is 
hold his office.2764 Subsections 1, 2 and 4 determine the fault element of the 
offence.2765 They describe what a person must intend in order to commit the 
offence.2766 In essence, the fault element includes influence on the performance of 
the foreign public official in order to obtain or retain business or an advantage in 
the conduct of business.2767 The term ‘business’ includes what is done in the course 
of a trade or profession.2768 In addition, the Guidance outlines that e.g. bona fide 
corporate hospitality and promotional activities intended to improve the image of 
the company or to present products and services of the company are recognized 
as a part of doing business.2769 However, there is another critical discussion on 
which hospitality may be considered as a bribe by the SFO.2770 The difficult 
question that arises in this context is where the SFO and the courts will draw the 
line between criminal and legitimate hospitality.2771  
However, companies are invited and able to prevent bribery. Section 7 
introduces a corporate defense, which entails proving that the company “had in 
place adequate procedures” designed to prevent bribery.2772 While the Act does not 
itself define these ‘adequate procedures’ the Bribery Guidance of the Secretary of 
State outlines which procedures will be recognized as adequate.2773 Section 7 
seems to be the most problematic section of the UKBA 2010 with regard to the 
definition of the terms ‘relevant commercial organization’ and ‘associated person’.2774 
Section 7 sets forth that  
                                                     
2764 Id. § 6 (7) (a) (c), Commentary on Section 6. 
2765 Id. § 6 (1) (2) (4). 
2766 Id. § 6 (1) (2) (4), Commentary on Section 6. 
2767 Id. § 6 (1) (2) (4), Commentary on Section 6. 
2768 Id. § 6 (8), Commentary on Section 6. 
2769 THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE Ministry of Justice, supra note 880 at 12 para 26. 
2770 BELCH, supra note 2756 at 7. 
2771 Id. at 7. 
2772 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65, § 7 (2). 
2773 See THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE Ministry of Justice, supra note 883 at 20, The Six Principles 
which will explain below. 
2774 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65, § 7 (1); BELCH, supra note 2753 at 8. 
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A ‘relevant commercial organization’ (“C”) is guilty of an offence under this section if 
a person (“A”) ‘associated’ with C bribes another person.2775 
A ‘relevant commercial organization’ is defined in Section 7(5) 
(a) a body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and 
which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere), or  
(b) any other body corporate (wherever incorporated) which carries on a business, or 
part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom.2776 
Therefore, a ‘relevant commercial organization’ also includes all international 
corporations within the private and financial services sector e.g. private and 
public companies, which are involved in business in the UK or when they have 
some business presence in the UK.2777 Hence, this definition and the UKBA 2010 
have a more far-reaching territorial application than the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977.2778 Belch sets out an example, “a Dutch business with retail 
outlets in the UK, which pays bribes in France could in theory face prosecution in the 
UK.”2779 In addition, the Guidance refers to the courts as the final arbiter.2780 They 
have to consider, based on the particular facts in each individual case whether an 
organization does indeed “carry on a business” in the UK.2781  
Furthermore, a commercial organization could be liable under Section 7 if a 
person ‘associated’ with it bribes another person.2782 The meaning of an ‘associated 
person’ is defined in Section 8.2783 It provides that a person is associated with the 
organization where the person performs services for, or on behalf of the 
organization. Accordingly, the person could be, for example, the organization’s 
employee, agent or subsidiary.2784 The concept of an ‘associated person’ is also 
                                                     
2775 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65, § 7 (1). 
2776 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65, § 7 (5) (a) (b). 
2777 BELCH, supra note 2756 at 8; Sohlberg, supra note 2725. 
2778 Sohlberg, supra note 2725. 
2779 BELCH, supra note 2756 at 8. 
2780 THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE Ministry of Justice, supra note 880 at 15 para 34. 
2781 THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE Id. at 15. para 34; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra 
note 65, § 7 (5) (a) (b). 
2782 THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE Ministry of Justice, supra note 880 at 16 para 37. 
2783 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65, § 8 (1). 
2784 Id.§ 8 (1) (3). 
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broad in scope because it includes the whole range of persons, even other 
contractual partners like contractors, consultants or suppliers, who are connected 
to an organization.2785 However, there is no guidance about the degree of this 
connection to the organization.2786 Hence the term ‘associated person’ appears 
somewhat of an imponderability for companies. In conclusion, it is essential for 
companies to initiate correct due diligence and keep records on any ‘associated 
persons’ who are engaged with the company.2787 
For this purpose, the Guidance sets out six principles on the required 
‘adequate procedures’, which are flexible and outcome-focused, to reflect the huge 
variety of circumstances and all kinds of sizes of companies.2788 First, the 
procedures should be ‘proportionate’ to the bribery risks that the organization 
faces.2789 The Guidance provides the meaning of the term ‘proportionate’. The 
company should first and foremost consider a risk assessment.2790 The identified 
risks will be linked to the size of the company, and the nature and complexity of 
its business.2791 The second principle requires a top-level commitment to the 
determination of bribery prevention procedures.2792 This commitment should 
include an internal and external communication of the company’s anti-bribery 
stance, and an appropriate degree of involvement of the top-level management in 
this matter.2793 Principle three sets out the nature of the company’s risk assessment 
in detail.2794 The assessment should be periodic, informed and documented.2795 It 
also includes the oversight of the risk assessment by top-level management.2796 
Furthermore, the risk assessment should include a due diligence by internal or 
external experts in order to prevent bribery.2797 Principle five provides that the 
                                                     
2785 THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE Ministry of Justice, supra note 880 at 16 para 38, 39. 
2786 BELCH, supra note 2756 at 8. 
2787 Id. at 8. 
2788 THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE Ministry of Justice, supra note 880 at 20. 
2789 THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE Id. at 21. Principle 1. 
2790 Id. at 21. Principle 1. 
2791 Id. at 21. Principle 1. 
2792 Id. at 23. Principle 2. 
2793 Id. at 23. Principle 2. 
2794 Id. at 25. Principle 3. 
2795 Id. at 25. Principle 3. 
2796 Id. at 25. Principle 3. 
2797 Id. at 27. Principle 4. 
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bribery prevention communication should pervade completely throughout the 
whole company including, training in the company’s bribery prevention policies 
and procedures for all employees, and associated persons.2798 Finally, the last 
Principle sets out that the company has to review and monitor periodically its 
bribery prevention procedures and adapt them where necessary under changed 
circumstances.2799 
The courts have serious concerns regarding the Bribery Act, although in a 
recently decided case, R v Innospec Ltd, Lord Justice Thomas stated: 
There can be no doubt that corruption of foreign government officials or foreign 
government ministers is at the top end of serious corporate offending both in terms of 
culpability and harm. It is deliberate and intentional wrongdoing. It causes serious 
harm.2800 
Innospec Ltd, a UK company and a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Delaware 
company, pleaded guilty to making corrupt payments to public officials of the 
Government of Indonesia in order to secure contracts.2801 The Crown Court at 
Southwark has to consider two issues: (1) the level of criminality in the offence of 
corruption of a foreign government, and (2) the way in which a prosecutor, the 
SFO, and a court should approach sentencing.2802 There is a draft agreement 
between Innospec and the SFO with respect to compliance, monitoring, and the 
appointment of a compliance monitor.2803 In the US, Innospec also made a plea 
agreement on compliance and monitoring.2804 The management of Innospec has 
changed and the company has put in place an enhanced compliance program.2805 
Ultimately, the Court approved this agreement, but simultaneously emphasized 
clearly that there will be no precedent for the future.2806 The company was fined 
$12.7m.2807  
                                                     
2798 Id. at 29. Principle 5. 
2799 Id. at 31. Principle 6. 
2800 R v Innospec Ltd [2010] EW Misc 7 (EWCC), 30 (2010); See in: Sohlberg, supra note 2723. 
2801 R v Innospec Ltd [2010] EW MISC 7 (EWCC), supra note 2767 at 1. 
2802 Id. at 2. 
2803 Id. at 17. 
2804 Id. at 20. 
2805 Id. at 40. 
2806 Id. at 48. 
2807 Id. at 47. 
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Overall, Section 7 of the new Act is especially important for compliance 
managers for two reasons. First, the legal scope is substantially different from the 
FCPA, meaning that companies subject to both the FCPA and the Bribery Act 
must adjust their anti-bribery and compliance programs accordingly.2808 Secondly, 
unlike the FCPA, the Bribery Act provides an affirmative defense for companies 
with adequate procedures designed to prevent bribery and a compliance 
program.2809 In conclusion, the UKBA 2010 established a far-reaching anti-bribery 
legislation not only in the UK, but also for the rest of the world. Despite the 
Guidance issued by the Ministry of Justice uncertainty regarding interpretation of 
some terms still remains. In response to these uncertainties, companies are 
required to establish stringent procedures such as a compliance policy and 
program to minimize their risk of incurring criminal liability for corrupt 
behaviors under the UKBA. 
2. Prosecution under the UKBA 2010 
Similar to the US, in the UK there are also specific agencies to investigate 
and prosecute e.g. serious or complex fraud, bribery, money laundering and 
corruption by corporate offenders under the statutory framework.2810 One such 
body is the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), which was constituted under the Criminal 
Justice Act (CJA) 1987 and established in 1988.2811 The SFO is a law enforcement 
agency, not a regulator, and deals with large economic crime cases.2812 A final 
review report by de Grazzia, an Assistant District Attorney in Manhattan in the 
US, revealed that the SFO does not work effectively measured by both its 
productivity (the number of defendants prosecuted) and its conviction rate.2813 As 
                                                     
2808 McGreal, supra note 518 at 147; Richard, supra note 68 at 421. 
2809 Id. at 147.; THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE Ministry of Justice, supra note 883 at 20–31; UNITED 
KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65, § 7 (2). 
2810 SFO, supra note 2642. 
2811 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1987, c. 38 (1987), § 1 (1). The SFO describes itself as a “small 
independent non-ministerial Government department under the superintendence of the 
Attorney General.” See in SFO, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2015-2016 (2016), 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/ (last visited Jul 27, 2016) [hereinafter SFO Report]. 
2812 Alun Milford, SPEECH TO COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONALS | SFO GENERAL COUNSEL (2016), 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/03/29/speech-compliance-professionals/ (last visited Jul 28, 
2016) [hereinafter SFO Speech]. 
2813 DE GRAZIA, supra note 2722 at 3 para 7; Djilani, supra note 99 at 316. 
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a result, since 2008 the SFO has undergone extensive structural changes and 
amendments to its procedures for dealing with corporate wrongdoers.2814 Further, 
introduced in 2008, Section 2A of the CJA 1987 enables the director of the SFO to 
exercise his powers “before a formal investigation has begun relating to overseas bribery 
and corruption cases.”2815 Therefore, the SFO is the lead agency in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland concerning the investigation and prosecution of 
corruption.2816 Prosecution under the Act in England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
can only be brought with the consent of the Director of the SFO.2817  
However, relief from the offence of bribery is on the balance of 
probabilities.2818 It is a matter for the courts, on a case by case basis, to decide 
whether a procedure is adequate within a relevant commercial organization.2819 
For example, a single offence does not necessarily mean that the anti-bribery 
procedure is inadequate.2820 The court and the prosecutor will consider when an 
employee acts willfully and knowingly contrary to a well-implemented procedure 
or instructions within the company.2821 
The penalties under Sections 1, 2 or 6 of the Bribery Act for an individual 
could be a fine or imprisonment for up to ten years, or both.2822 An offence under 
Sections 1, 2 or 6 committed by a person other than an individual is punishable by 
a fine up to the statutory maximum, currently £5,000 in England, Wales or 
Northern Ireland.2823 On indictment, the maximum penalty could be an unlimited 
                                                     
2814 Djilani, supra note 99 at 314. 
2815 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1987, supra note 2575, § 2 (1A); SFO, SFO HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND AND POWERS SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/corporate-information/sfo-historical-background-
powers/ (last visited Jul 29, 2016). 
2816 BELCH, supra note 2756 at 5. 
2817 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67§ 10 (1) (b), (2) (b), Commentary on 
Section 10. 
2818 BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE, supra note 2818 at 10. 
2819 BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE Id. at 10. 
2820 BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE Id. at 10. 
2821 BRIBERY ACT GUIDANCE Id. at 10. 
2822 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67§ 11 (1) (a) (b). 
2823 Id.§ 11 (2) (a) (b), Commentary on Section 11. 
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fine with collateral consequences, such as director disqualification and asset 
confiscation for companies.2824 
To summarize, there are two uncertainties in terms of the UKBA 2010, 
namely the interpretation of certain terms and, secondly the penalties that 
companies face when they have committed an offence under the Act. To clarify 
these points, the next section will examine the cases, including the SFO cases, 
which the courts have decided in relation to the UKBA 2010 to date. 
3. Bribery Cases and Actions against Companies under the UKBA 2010 
The Guidance of the SFO provides whether the defense of adequate 
procedures will be a matter for the courts to decide on a case by case basis.2825 The 
prosecutors also have to evaluate carefully all the circumstances, including the 
adequacy of any anti-bribery procedures.2826  
Since the enactment of the UKBA in 2011, there have been some cases in 
which an individual was found guilty of taking bribes2827 or was guilty of bribing 
another person.2828 The first prosecution and conviction of an individual under the 
Bribery Act 2010 was Munir Patel, a court clerk, who works at Redbridge 
Magistrates Court.2829 He was found guilty of taking bribes to systematically alter 
driving offence records.2830 This activity provided a lucrative second income.2831 
Two further cases involving British individuals attempting to bribe another 
person led to prison sentence.2832 In the course of the last five years, there were 
also some cases relating to corporate offences under the Bribery Act 2010 and its 
predecessor, the Corruption Act 1906.2833 Although the new Bribery Act entered 
                                                     
2824 Sohlberg, supra note 2725; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67§ 11 
Commentary on Section 11. 
2825 The Director of the SFO, supra note 2703 at 10 [hereinafter The SFO Guidance]. 
2826 THE SFO GUIDANCE Id. at 10. 
2827 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67§ 2. 
2828 Id.§ 1. 
2829 R v Patel (Munir Yakub) [2012] EWCA Crim 1243. 
2830 BELCH, supra note 2756 at 9. 
2831 Id. at 9. 
2832 Id. at 9–10.; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 § 1. 
2833 See e.g. McKenzie, R v Director of the SFO [2016] EWHC 102, CO/4888/2015 (2016); Soma 
Oil And Gas Ltd, R v Director of the SFO [2016] EWHC 2471, (2016); Tchenguiz & Anor v 
Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2014] EWHC 1315, (2014); UBS AG (London Branch) & 
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into force in 2011, there are still cases under the Corruption Act 1906 that have not 
yet been decided. One such case is the prosecution of suspected offences of 
bribery of foreign public officials and misconduct in the execution of 
administrative duties, corruption, false accounting and money laundering within 
the Alstom Group.2834 The investigation of bribery at the Alstom Group was 
considered in the case Burgin & Anor v Commission of Police in which the Alstom 
UK Holdings Ltd and the Director of the Serious Fraud Office took part as 
interested parties.2835 The Alstom Group has approximately 80,000 employees 
worldwide and about 30 trading locations in the UK employing more than 4,000 
people.2836 A great number of the Alstom companies are registered in the UK, in 
London.2837 It is expected that the payment of bribery involving Alstom has an 
excess of €90 million in the UK and the amount of approximately €1.7 million in 
Switzerland.2838 The investigation was focused on the activities of seven 
individuals, who are company executives, and two companies of the Alstom 
Group.2839 The offences relate to transport projects in India, Poland and Tunisia.2840 
While, the offences were already committed between August 2000 and August 
2006, the trial is only set to commence only at Southwark Crown Court in 2017.2841 
Solar Energy Savings Ltd is another company that has been under criminal 
                                                                                                                                                  
Anor v Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig GMBH [2014] EWHC 3615, 2010 Folio 505 (2014); 
West & Anor, R v [2016] EWCA Crim 742, 201500057 B5 (2016). 
2834 See in Burgin & Anor v Commission of Police for the Metropolis & Ors [2011] EWHC 1835, 
CO/5723/2010, CO/6227/2010, 4 (2011). 
2835 Burgin & Anor v Commission of Police for the Metropolis & Ors [2011] EWHC 1835, supra 
note 2832. 
2836 Id. at 6–7. 
2837 Id. at 7. 
2838 Id. at 100. 
2839 SFO, ALSTOM NETWORK UK LTD & ALSTOM POWER LTD SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE (2015), 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/alstom-network-uk-ltd-alstom-power-ltd/ (last visited Oct 
23, 2016). 
2840 Id. 
2841 Id. 
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investigation by the SFO since 2014.2842 It is clear that investigations into bribery 
take considerable time due to complex documentary evidence.2843 
Nevertheless, the first corporate prosecution under the UKBA 2010 was the 
conviction of fraudulent trading and bribery of three former directors of the 
Sustainable Growth Group following an investigation by the Serious Fraud Office 
in December 2014.2844 It was determined in the course of the investigation of the 
Sustainable Growth Group that the directors also committed criminal acts 
contrary to Section 2 (1) and (2) of the Bribery Act 2010.2845 Finally, in December 
2014, they were convicted of offences of bribery at the Crown Court at 
Southwark.2846 The defendants were sentenced to several years imprisonment, 
disqualified from being a company director, and were ordered to pay a 
confiscation order.2847 Their appeal against both conviction and sentence was 
dismissed in March 2016 at the Royal Courts of Justice.2848  
The practice of the SFO in the course of criminal prosecution was reviewed 
in the case McKenzie, R v Director of the Serious Fraud Office.2849 In June 2015, the 
director of MIB Facades Limited was arrested on suspicion of committing an 
offence contrary to Section 1 of the UKBA 2010.2850 A number of electronic devices, 
an USB stick, a mobile telephone, and a laptop were seized from him.2851 In this 
case, the director as the claimant submits the proposition that the approach of the 
SFO was unlawful in the course of the investigation because the SFO dealt with 
                                                     
2842 SFO, SFO OPENS INVESTIGATION INTO SOLAR ENERGY SAVINGS LIMITED SERIOUS FRAUD 
OFFICE (2014), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2014/12/05/sfo-opens-investigation-solar-energy-
savings-limited/ (last visited Oct 26, 2016). 
2843 BELCH, supra note 2756 at 10. 
2844 See COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555 § 993 Offence of fraudulent trading; UNITED 
KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 § 2; BELCH, supra note 2754 at 10; SFO, 
SUSTAINABLE AGROENERGY PLC AND SUSTAINABLE WEALTH INVESTMENTS UK LTD SERIOUS 
FRAUD OFFICE, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/sustainable-agroenergy-plc-sustainable-
wealth-investments-uk-ltd/ (last visited Oct 23, 2016). 
2845 SFO, supra note 2842; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67§ 2 (1) (2). 
2846 WEST & ANOR, R V [2016] EWCA CRIM 742, supra note 2831 at 1–3. 
2847 SFO, supra note 2842; WEST & ANOR, R V [2016] EWCA CRIM 742, supra note 2831 at 1–3. 
2848 WEST & ANOR, R V [2016] EWCA CRIM 742, supra note 2831 at 69. 
2849 MCKENZIE, R V DIRECTOR OF THE SFO [2016] EWHC 102, supra note 2831. 
2850 Id. at 5. 
2851 Id. at 5. 
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material potentially subject to legal professional privilege which was embedded 
in the seized electronic devices.2852 Hence, it could be that the defendant, the SFO, 
could use this material to the claimants’ disadvantage.2853 However, the Court 
decided to dismiss this proposition and thus, the claim that the preliminary 
review of electronic material must be conducted by third parties.2854 
One feature of the SFO is that it does not announce all of its criminal 
investigations, unless a company, for instance, is required to inform the 
market.2855 For example, in 2015, the SFO opened criminal investigations into 
bribery and corruption offences by Soma Oil and Gas Limited, which operates in 
Somalia.2856 It is an interesting and extraordinary fact that in August 2016 there 
was a claim submitted to require the SFO to bring the investigation of Soma Oil 
and Gas Limited to an end.2857 The SFO stated that Soma's involvement in making 
"capacity building" payments to Somali public officials could constitute criminal 
offences under Section 6 and 7 of the UKBA 2010.2858 However, Soma denied any 
criminal offence of its business because there was an agreement between Soma 
and the Somali Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and the capacity 
building payments were a contractual obligation.2859 Additionally, an internal 
investigation within Somalia concluded that there was no evidence of 
wrongdoing and that Soma acted in good faith.2860 The Court also considered the 
difficult market with competing commercial and political interests and the 
geographical context in Somalia.2861 In August 2016, the SFO concluded that there 
is “currently insufficient evidence of criminality on the part in relation to the capacity 
                                                     
2852 Id. at 1. 
2853 Id. at 3. 
2854 Id. at 40. 
2855 SFO, SFO OPENS INVESTIGATION INTO SOMA OIL & GAS SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE (2015), 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2015/07/31/sfo-opens-investigation-into-soma-oil-gas/ (last visited 
Oct 30, 2016). 
2856 Id. 
2857 Soma Oil And Gas Ltd, R v Director of the SFO [2016] EWHC 2471, supra note 2831 at 1. 
2858 Id. at 6. 
2859 Id. at 7–8. 
2860 Id. at 9. 
2861 Id. at 9. 
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building payments” of Soma.2862 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the SFO's 
decision to terminate this investigation was fair and responsible.2863 
Similar to the US, in 2015, a case was closed in a first landmark UK Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement (DPA)2864 between the SFO and the Standard Bank PLC 
resulting in a total penalty of £16.8m.2865 Under Section 45 and Schedule 17 of the 
Crime and Courts Act 2013, a designated prosecutor and a person such as a “body 
corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association” are enabled to enter into a 
DPA in England and Wales.2866 Hence, in the UK, the DPA is regulated by law. 
For example, paragraph 5 sets out that each agreement must include an expiry 
date.2867 This date is a mandatory requirement.2868 Nevertheless, the Schedule also 
provides an illustrative list of potential terms and conditions that may be 
included in a DPA, which are not prescriptive.2869 The list includes a range of 
issues that a DPA may impose e.g. from the payment of financial penalties to the 
implementation of a compliance program or the alteration of an existing 
compliance program.2870 It follows that the implementation of a corporate 
compliance program could be a mitigating factor in sentencing a company when 
the program is proportionate to the bribery risks.2871 Both the SFO and the Crown 
Court will consider the program in the course of an investigation, prosecution, 
                                                     
2862 Id. at 18. 
2863 Id. at 37. 
2864 The SFO defines the term UK DPA as follows: “A UK Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
(DPA) is an agreement reached between a prosecutor and an organisation which could be 
prosecuted, under the supervision of a judge. The agreement allows a prosecution to be 
suspended for a defined period provided the organisation meets certain specified 
conditions. DPAs can be used for fraud, bribery and other economic crime. They apply to 
organisations, never individuals.” See SFO, DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS SERIOUS 
FRAUD OFFICE, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-
protocols/deferred-prosecution-agreements/ (last visited Oct 27, 2016). 
2865 SFO REPORT Id. at 4.; DPA | SFO V STANDARD BANK PLC (now known as ICBC 
Standard Bank Plc), (2015). 
2866 CRIME AND COURTS ACT 2013, c. 22 (2013) § 45, Schedule 17 para 1 and 4. 
2867 Id.§ 45, Schedule 17 para 5 (2). 
2868 Id.§ 45, Commentary on Schedule 17 para 5 (2). 
2869 Id.§ 45, Commentary on Schedule 17 para 5 (3). 
2870 Id.§ 45, Schedule 17 para 5 (3). 
2871 Id.§ 45, para 5 (3) (e); UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 § 7; THE 
BRIBERY GUIDANCE Ministry of Justice, supra note 883 at 21 Principle 1. 
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and criminal proceeding conducted by the Court, particularly in an agreement 
between the SFO and the prosecuted company.2872 
Furthermore, the DPA has to approve by the Crown Court that  
(a) the DPA is in the interests of justice, and 
(b) the terms of the DPA are fair, reasonable and proportionate.2873 
Thus, the DPA takes effect only when the court has made its final 
declaration.2874 In the event that the company has failed to comply with the terms 
of the DPA, the Agreement could e.g. be terminated, at which point the 
prosecutor can proceed with the criminal prosecution.2875  
The Standard Bank PLC agrees that it failed to prevent bribery, contrary to 
Section 7 of the UKBA 2010, and also agreed to the payment of a financial penalty, 
and, additionally, agrees to an independent review of its existing internal anti-
bribery and corruption controls within the next three years.2876 Furthermore, the 
Bank is required to conduct a review including the implementation of its existing 
internal controls, policies, and procedures regarding compliance with the Bribery 
Act 2010.2877 The requirements of the DPA include the implementation of a 
corporate compliance program within six months and an independent report by 
PWC on the scope on its current anti-bribery and corruption policies and the 
effectiveness of the anti-bribery and corruption training which should be 
provided to the SFO.2878 However, the DPA requires that the ultimate 
responsibility for identifying, assessing, and addressing risks remains with the 
board of directors of the Bank.2879 In the event of any failure to meet a term of this 
                                                     
2872 CRIME AND COURTS ACT 2013, supra note 2843 § 45, Schedule para 5 (3) (e) . 
2873 Id. § 45, Schedule 17 para 8 (1) (a) (b). 
2874 Id. § 45, Commentary on Schedule 17 para 8 (3). 
2875 Id. § 45, Commentary on Schedule 17 para 9 (3) (b), 2 (3). 
2876 DPA | Standard Bank Plc DPA | SFO V STANDARD BANK PLC (NOW KNOWN AS ICBC 
STANDARD BANK PLC), supra note 2604 para 1, 6; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra 
note 65, § 7 (1). 
2877 DPA | Standard Bank Plc DPA | SFO V STANDARD BANK PLC (NOW KNOWN AS ICBC 
STANDARD BANK PLC), supra note 2863 para 27. 
2878 DPA | Standard Bank Plc Id. para 28 a. 
2879 DPA | Standard Bank Plc Id. para 31. 
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DPA by the Bank, the SFO will consider making an application to the court.2880 
This agreement requires judicial approval to become effective both as to the 
principle of the DPA and its precise terms.2881 
Overall, the number of criminal corporate prosecutions opened and 
investigated by the SFO appears to be lower than by the DOJ and SEC in the 
US.2882 In addition, the SFO stated that the number of cases concerning 
prosecutions under Section 993 of the Companies Act 2006 has increased from one 
case in 2011 to four cases in 2014.2883 Between 2015 and 2016, the SFO opened 12 
criminal investigations into individuals and companies and three civil 
investigations.2884 Table 13 presents enforced proceedings against seven companies 
and 51 individuals in eleven current criminal cases and one civil case, which were 
found on the SFO website. The number of individuals shows that the SFO 
prosecuted subsequently identified individuals for bribery, fraud, and corruption 
within companies. The titles of the prosecuted individuals vary from partner, 
director, CEO, and employee. Nevertheless, there is no case where a compliance 
officer was involved with respect to a criminal offence like bribery or fraud. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2880 DPA | Standard Bank Plc Id. para 34. 
2881 SFO Speech Milford, supra note 2810. 
2882 SFO Report SFO, supra note 2809 at 4. 
2883 SFO, SECTION 993 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2006 (2015), 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/ (last visited Jul 27, 2016). 
2884 SFO Report SFO, supra note 2809 at 4. 
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Table 13 - Current SFO Cases from 2015 until 20162885 
Case Companies Individuals 
Alstom 2 7 
Arck LLP   2 
Arboretum Sports (UK) Ltd   1 
EURIBOR   11 
F.H. Bertling Ltd   7 
Luis Michael Training Ltd   6 
Saunders Electrical Wholesalers Ltd   3 
Stirling Mortimer Global Property Fund 3   
R v Alexander and Others   6 
Solar Energy Savings Ltd 1 6 
Standard Bank PLC/ first SFO DPA 1   
Sustainable Agroenergy Plc   3 
Total 7 51 
Median 1,5  6 
Average 1,75 5,1 
 
As mentioned previously, criticism of the productivity of the SFO came 
from a comparison between its counterpart, the DOJ in the US based on the 
number of defendants prosecuted and its conviction rate.2886 According to the 
study by Grazia in 2008, the DOJ concluded 88 prosecutions with a conviction 
rate of 91 percent in 2006, the SFO concluded 166 prosecutions with a conviction 
rate of 61 percent from 2003 until 2007.2887 There are major differences between the 
length of time for investigation and conviction. The study compared one case in 
terms of time between the opening of the investigation and the indictment with 
                                                     
2885 SFO, OUR CASES SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/our-cases/ (last visited 
Oct 30, 2016). 
2886 DE GRAZIA, supra note 2722 at 3 para 6. 
2887 Id. at 5. Chart - Summary of comparative conviction rates. 
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the size of the prosecution team.2888 Although the UK team comprised 31 in 
contrast to eight in the US, the time period between the opening and indictment 
was 41 months in the UK and 11 months in the US.2889 As a result of the findings 
of this study, the SFO has undergone internal structural changes from improving 
the effectiveness of the SFO leadership to improvements in hiring, promoting, 
training, policy and standards of the SFO prosecutors.2890 Hence, it appears that 
the SFO has a “damaged reputation.”2891 After the enactment of the UKBA 2010 
there was great public pressure on the SFO to secure a first corporate conviction 
under the Act.2892 Lastly, it can be argued that there are still difficulties of proving 
criminal corporate liability under the current legislation. As discussed previously, 
the problems can be found in bribery and corruption investigation, where 
complex documentary evidence has to review, for instance thousands of pages, 
which necessitates significant time resources to secure a conviction. Another time 
resource is the hearing of witnesses and their testimony. 
In conclusion, the new bribery legislation in the UK was a response to 
international critism and the role model effect of the FCPA. Despite the enactment 
and wide extraterritorial reach of the UKBA 2010, there is still a lack of legal 
certainty surrounding the interpretation of several terms of the Act and the 
number of corporate convictions.2893 In essence, the UKBA 2010 holds companies 
without defining what an “associated person” is, guilty of an offence when a 
person associated with the company bribes another person.2894 This creates 
potential criminal liability for companies for the actions of officers and 
employees. Nevertheless, as has been examined, the Bribery Act sets out a 
corporate offence of failure to prevent bribery. The company has to prove that it 
has implemented adequate procedures to prevent bribery. Although the Bribery 
Act does not provide the requirement of implementing a compliance function, or 
                                                     
2888 See Both US Allied Deals Inc. and UK Allied Deals were based in London and New 
York. In the US and in the UK, the investigation began at the same time related to 
fraudulent trading involving a metals trading group of companies. Id. at 37. para 2. 
2889 Id. at 39. Chart I. 
2890 See DE GRAZIA, supra note 2722. 
2891 BELCH, supra note 2756 at 11. 
2892 Id. at 12. 
2893 Id. at 13. 
2894 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 § 7 (1) (a) (b). 
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other indications of any elements of what such adequate procedures would entail, 
a compliance program could be a bribery-preventing tool or adequate procedure 
for companies. Finally, the possibility of defense encourage an increase in 
corporate compliance with the UKBA 2010. As a result, it is important that 
domestic and foreign companies which carry on a business in the United 
Kingdom review their anti-corruption procedures to ensure compliance with all 
relevant provisions of this Act. In addition, as regards the first UK DPA, the 
number of cases investigated by the SFO is expected to increase and a DPA 
should be a more “resource-efficient prosecution tool” as compared with a case at 
trial.2895  
4. Comparison between the FCPA and UKBA 2010 Compliance Requirements 
As examined above, the UKBA 2010 makes bribery of foreign public 
officials an offence and extends beyond company employees to include those 
acting on behalf of a company. Furthermore, the Act comprises all bribery, not 
only bribery of foreign officials, but also giving or receiving a bribe from another 
person.2896 Unlike the FCPA, the Bribery Act covers both domestic and foreign 
companies that do business in the UK.2897 The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA 
focus on improper payments to “foreign officials”; the Bribery Act additionally 
prohibits improper payments to both domestic officials and foreign public 
officials as well as bribes in the conduct of business.2898 Under the UKBA 2010 
there is no exception relating to facilitating or expediting payments such as under 
the FCPA.2899 With such a wide-ranging scope, the statutory provisions of the 
UKBA 2010 are much broader than the provisions of the FCPA although the 
                                                     
2895 See DPA | SFO V STANDARD BANK PLC (NOW KNOWN AS ICBC STANDARD BANK PLC), 
supra note 2863; BELCH, supra note 2756 at 13. 
2896 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 §§ 1, 2. 
2897 Compare FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 464, 15 USC § 78dd-
1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 § 6. 
2898 Compare FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 464, 15 USC § 78dd-
1; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 §§ 1, 3, 6. 
2899 Compare FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 464, 15 USC 78dd-1 
(b) Exception for routine governmental action; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra 
note 65 § 6. 
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UKBA does not include any false accounting provision.2900 The Theft Act 
separately includes the offences of false accounting and false statements.2901 
Furthermore, unlike the FCPA, the UKBA 2010 provides a defense for 
companies able to prove that they have in place an adequate procedure such as a 
compliance program.2902 
However, both statutes apply to offers and payments and allow payments 
that are legal under the written law of a foreign country.2903 In addition to both 
statutes, the FCPA and the UKBA 2010, there is published Guidance in order to 
provide helpful information and recommendations to companies of all sizes, for 
example the hallmarks of an effective compliance program or the six Principles, 
which are not prescriptive.2904 While the Principles of the Bribery Act consider 
adequate bribery-prevention procedures, which is not explicitly called a 
compliance program, the FCPA Guide sets out hallmarks of an effective 
compliance program.2905 Consequently, every company that does business in the 
UK and every issuer listed on the exchange in the US has to adjust its anti-bribery 
procedure or compliance program to take account of the particular provisions of 
the Bribery Act and the FCPA. 
Table 14 below compares the FCPA Resource Guide’s hallmarks of an 
effective compliance program with the six Principles of the UK Bribery Act 
Guidance. 
 
 
 
                                                     
2900 See e.g. McGreal, supra note 518 at 147; Richard, supra note 68 at 438; FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463§ 102, 15 USC §§ 78m(b)(4)–(5) (2006). 
2901 THEFT ACT 1968, c. 60§§ 17, 19. 
2902 UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67§ 7 (2). 
2903 Compare FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463 § 104, 15 USC § 
78dd-2 (2006); UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67§ 6; See also McGreal, 
supra note 518 at 147. 
2904 Compare FCPA Resource Guidance DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1269 Ch. 5; The Bribery 
Guidance Ministry of Justice, supra note 881 at 20–31. 
2905 Compare FCPA Resource Guide DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1269 at 56–60 Ch. 5; The 
Bribery Guidance Ministry of Justice, supra note 881 at 20–31. 
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Table 14 - Comparison between FCPA and UKBA Guidance of Compliance 
UK Bribery Act Guidance Six 
Principles 
FCPA’s Hallmarks of Effective 
Compliance Programs 
Proportionate procedures Commitment from Senior Management 
Top-Level commitment Code of Conduct and Compliance 
Policies and Procedures 
Risk Assessment Oversight, Autonomy, and Resources 
Due diligence Risk Assessment 
Communication (including training) Training and Continuing Advice 
Monitoring and Review Incentives and Disciplinary Measures 
 Third-Party Due Diligence  
 
As this comparison shows, the hallmarks of the FCPA Guide comprise more 
requirements for companies to prevent bribery, e.g. to implement a code of 
conduct, oversight, autonomy, resources, incentives and disciplinary measures 
than the principles of the UKBA.2906 Nevertheless, the core elements of the 
requirements, like a commitment from the senior management, the risk 
assessment, a due diligence and communication and training in order to prevent 
bribery, are included in both Guides.2907 Therefore, a company, wherever 
incorporated, which is listed on a US exchange and carries on a business, or part 
of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom should implement both 
compliance requirements to prevent and detect agent misconduct.  
Similar to the DOJ in the US, the SFO is currently adopting DPAs in 
prosecuting criminal corporate conduct, for example any illegal payments.2908 
                                                     
2906 Compare FCPA Resource Guide DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1269 at 56–60 Ch. 5; The 
Bribery Guidance Ministry of Justice, supra note 881 at 20–31. 
2907 Compare FCPA Resource Guide DOJ AND SEC, supra note 1269 at 56–60 Ch. 5; The 
Bribery Guidance Ministry of Justice, supra note 881 at 20–31. 
2908 See e.g. DPA | SFO V STANDARD BANK PLC (NOW KNOWN AS ICBC STANDARD BANK 
PLC), supra note 2863. 
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However, contrary to the US DPA model, the UK DPA is set forth in law.2909 
Despite importing such American procedure, the SFO has also been successful in 
court in achieving corporate reform through the use of agreements between a 
prosecuted company and the government, like the DOJ.2910 These agreements can 
contribute as an incentive to companies to set up a self-reporting policy of 
wrongdoing to the government.2911  
One characteristic of an agreement in the UK was that the Crown Court at 
Southwark held that the SFO lacks the authority to set the penalty amount of such 
agreements.2912 In the case R v Innospec Ltd, where the prosecutor struck a plea 
agreement between a defendant and the government, Lord Justice Thomas said 
The Practice Direction reflects the constitutional principle that, save in minor matters 
such as motoring offences, the imposition of a sentence is a matter for the judiciary.2913 
Today, under the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the content of a DPA may 
provide “to pay to the prosecutor a financial penalty.”2914 However, the penalty must 
be  
comparable to the fine that a court would have imposed on conviction for the alleged 
offence following a guilty plea.2915 
Table 15 compares the terms found in US N/DPA, as discussed in chapter 4, 
with the content of an UK DPA as set out in Schedule 17 of the Crime and Court 
Act. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2909 CRIME AND COURTS ACT 2013, supra note 2859 § 45, Schedule 17. 
2910 Djilani, supra note 99 at 305. 
2911 Id. at 317. 
2912 R v Innospec Ltd [2010] EW MISC 7 (EWCC), supra note 2796 at 26. 
2913 Id. at 27. 
2914 CRIME AND COURTS ACT 2013, supra note 2859 § 45, Schedule 17 para 5 (3) (a). 
2915 Id.§ 45, Schedule 17 para 5 (4). 
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Table 15- Comparison between US and UK DPAs 
Terms of the US N/DPA2916 Terms of the UK DPA2917 
The company admits to wrongdoing. A DPA must contain a statement of 
facts relating to the alleged offence. 
The company waives the statute of 
limitations. 
A DPA must specify an expiry date. 
The company agrees that the agreement 
is admissible in court. 
A DPA may impose a cooperation 
requirement in any investigation 
related to the alleged offence. 
The company agrees that it will no 
longer violate the law. 
A DPA may impose the disgorgement 
of any profits made from the alleged 
offence. 
The company assists the government in 
prosecuting individuals associated with 
the crimes. 
A DPA may impose the requirement to 
donate money to a charity or other 
third party. 
The company pledges that employees 
will not violate the terms of the 
agreement. 
A DPA may impose the payment of 
compensation to victims of the alleged 
offence. 
The company pays restitution and 
fines. 
A DPA may impose the requirement to 
pay to the prosecutor a financial 
penalty. 
The company establishes or improves a 
corporate compliance program. 
A DPA may impose the 
implementation of a compliance 
program or make changes to an 
existing compliance program. 
The company establishes a compliance 
function.2918 
A DPA may impose training for the 
company’s employees. 
                                                     
2916 Djilani, supra note 99 at 319; Lawrence D. Finder, Ryan D. McConnell & Scott L. 
Mitchell, Betting the Corporation: Compliance or Defiance?, 28 CORP. COUNSEL REV. (2009). 
2917 CRIME AND COURTS ACT 2013, supra note 2864§ 45, Schedule 17 para 5 (1) (2) (3) (a)-(g). 
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Based on this comparison, it seems that the US N/DPAs include more 
specific binding content and requirements for the establishment of a compliance 
program and a corporate compliance function than the UK DPA, which merely 
recommends the implementation of a compliance program. Contrary to the DPAs 
in the US, in the UK there is no requirement to establish a corporate compliance 
function. Apart from that, these agreements enable the government to improve 
corporate structures and behavior.2919 One effect of these agreements is that the 
prosecutors are instructed to evaluate whether the company has adopted and 
implemented a compliance program.2920 Furthermore, the DPAs provide greater 
scope for the government to pursue individual wrongdoers.2921 
The comparison shows that the number of prosecuted companies in the US 
is much larger than in the UK.2922 According to English Company Law, companies 
should not be held criminally liable unless the entity, at its highest level of 
management, was responsible for the wrongdoing.2923 As a result, the SFO 
prosecuted a vast majority of individuals for fraud and bribery.2924 Nevertheless, 
with the English importation of American agreements (DPAs) between 
prosecuted companies and the government and the Guidance of the prosecutors 
like the DPP and SFO, the English Courts have begun to consider proactive and 
effective corporate compliance procedures within companies as a mitigating 
factor. When opening of an investigation, the prosecutors will take an effective 
compliance program into account against the prosecution.2925 
In conclusion, the FCPA, the Bribery Act, and the prosecutors, including 
their DPAs offer a powerful incentive for the companies affect to adopt an 
effective anti-bribery compliance program. Regardless of their characteristics and 
similarities, both Acts have received wide consideration by compliance officers 
around the globe. 
                                                                                                                                                  
2918 See also Ch. 4, A., I., 1.e, p. 229 - The seven minimum elements of a compliance 
program agreed in the examined US N/DPAs. 
2919 Djilani, supra note 97 at 319; See also Ch. 4, A., I., 1. p. 197. 
2920 Id. at 320; See also Ch. 4, A., I., 1. p. 197. 
2921 Id. at 320; See also Ch. 4, A., I., 1. p. 197. 
2922 See supra Ch. 4, A., I., Table 5, p. 266. 
2923 See supra A., II., 4., p. 387. 
2924 See supra Ch. 5, A., III., 2., Table 13, p. 416. 
2925 See supra Ch, A., II., 5., p. 393. 
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IV. The Concepts and Rules of English Employment Law 
This section provides a short overview of the main sources of English 
Employment Law in the UK, the key issues of the employment relationship, the 
nature of the employment contract, the duties of the employees and wrongful 
dismissal with respect to corporate officers, in particular the compliance officer. It 
also seeks to include and examine the relevant common law principles of binding 
precedents in terms of the duty of care and the possibility of protection against 
wrongful or unfair dismissal of the compliance officer. UK Employment Law 
covers the territory of England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland and 
has a number of specific institutions. For example, domestic courts, Employment 
Tribunals (ETs) and the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) are established to 
enforce employment rights or resolve employment disputes.2926 The EATs are 
located in London and Edinburgh and hear appeals from the ETs.2927 The ETs are 
staffed with one qualified lawyer and two laypersons.2928 The EATs are staffed 
with judges of the high courts in England and Scotland.2929 The lawyers and the 
judges must have experience in or an understanding of employment law.2930 
Similar to the US, the common law and statutes are the most important 
primary sources of employment law in the UK.2931 Nevertheless, the legal origins 
of employment law are based in the common law tradition.2932 The common law 
and its rules with regard to formation, obligations, or termination govern the 
contract of employment between the employee and the employer.2933 In addition, 
another important source of employment law is the legislation enacted by 
Parliament, particularly the employment protection legislation.2934 The majority of 
                                                     
2926 DAVID A CABRELLI, EMPLOYMENT LAW 5 (4th ed. 2015). 
2927 Id. at 5. 
2928 Id. at 5. 
2929 Id. at 5. 
2930 Id. at 5. 
2931 DAVID A. CABRELLI, EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND MATERIALS 24 (Second ed. 
2016). 
2932 Id. at 3. 
2933 Id. at 24. 
2934 See e.g. EMPLOYMENT ACT 2008, c. 28 (2009); EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 1996, c.18 (1996); 
EQUALITY ACT 2010, c. 15 (2010); NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE ACT 1998, c. 39 (1998); THE 
WORKING TIME REGULATIONS 1998, No. 1833 (SI 1998).  
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UK employment protection legislation, for example the Working Time 
Regulations 1998, is derived from European Directives.2935 The EU Directives 
provide employment rights directly into UK legislation and into UK courts.2936 
Thus, statutes regulate and control essential elements of the employment contract 
such as the wage-work bargain and the dismissal of employees.2937 As such, the 
parties to the employment contract are not entirely free to negotiate the terms.2938 
Terms and conditions that are set down in collective agreements also create an 
employment agreement.2939 However, in the UK, two-thirds of workplaces are not 
covered by such collective agreements.2940 Therefore, collective agreements and 
collective employment law are not included in this examination.  
Finally, under statutory authority it is permitted for a Minister or statutory 
body to issue Codes of Practice in the context of employment relationships.2941 
These Codes serve to educate managers and workers to promote good 
employment relationships, include procedures, and respond to current 
developments in the field of employment law.2942 The consequence of non-
compliance with a Code of Practice will be that courts consider the non-adherence 
unfavorably in the claim.  
1. The Nature of Employment Contracts  
The contract of employment is shaped by a variety of features. According to 
Cabrelli, it is characterized by its personal relational, mutual, consensual, 
                                                     
2935 DIRECTIVE 2003/88/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 4 
NOVEMBER 2003 CONCERNING CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE ORGANISATION OF WORKING TIME, OJ 
L 299, pp. 9–19 (2003); CABRELLI, supra note 2916 at 36. 
2936 CABRELLI, supra note 2924 at 27. 
2937 CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 24. 
2938 DAVID LEWIS & MALCOLM SARGEANT, EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 2 (13th ed. 
2015). 
2939 Id. at 13. 
2940 Id. at 13. 
2941 CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 32; LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2936 at 2. 
2942 See e.g. CODE OF PRACTICE ON DISCIPLINARY AND GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE - ACAS CODE 
OF PRACTICE (2015), http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/f/m/Acas-Code-of-Practice-1-on-
disciplinary-and-grievance-procedures.pdf (last visited Dec 7, 2016); CABRELLI, supra note 
2929 at 32; LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2936 at 2. 
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indefinite as well as authority and power relation features.2943 Personal means, for 
example, that the death or incapacity of the employee leads to the automatic 
termination at common law.2944 Typically, the employment contract is indefinite in 
duration. Additionally, the “unrestricted reasonable notice rule” has evolved.2945 
Therefore, the employer or the employee can terminate the employment contract 
on providing reasonable notice.2946 This rule is contrary to the “employment at-
will” doctrine in the US, which provides for lawful termination at any time, rather 
than with reasonable notice.2947 Turning to the final feature of the employment 
contract, there is an asymmetrical authority power relationship.2948 This 
relationship is based on the submission and subordination of the employee.2949 In 
general, it is recognized that the employment contract has an interconnected 
nature involving unequal powers.  
The English Courts have considered the distinction between questions of 
fact and questions of law as regard the employment contract. Under common law, 
the rule that the construction of documents is a question of law was well 
established.2950 However, there was also a contrary view in the old case of Moore v. 
Garwood, in which Lord Chief Baron stated: 
"the nature of the contract into which the parties had entered was rather a question of 
fact than of law, because it did not consist of one distinct contract between the parties, but 
of a series of acts and things done, from which the jury were to determine what was the 
                                                     
2943 CABRELLI, supra note 2916 at 146 Figure 5.1. 
2944 See e.g. Farrow v Wilson (1869) LR 4, CP 744, 766; Ranger v Brown [1978] ICR 603, 605; See 
in: CABRELLI, supra note 2916 at 146. 
2945 CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 147. 
2946 Id. at 147. 
2947 See Chapter 4, A. II. III., p. 304. 
2948 CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 148. 
2949 Id. at 149. 
2950 See in: Carmichael and Another v. National Power Plc [1999] UKHL 47; [1999] 1 WLR 2042; 
[1999] 4 All ER 897 (18th November, 1999), Lord Hoffmann said that “It was this rule 
upon which the majority in the Court of Appeal relied as entitling them to say that the 
construction of the exchange of letters between the C.E.G.B. and the respondents, together 
with any terms which could be implied be law into the contract which they created, was a 
question of law.” 
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real intention and meaning of the parties when they entered into the mutual relation in 
which they stood.”2951 
Although the majority in the Court of Appeal thought that the industrial 
tribunal should have decided this question as a matter of law because the 
exchange of letters constituted an offer and acceptance, the courts additionally 
apply a test of whether there is a “mutuality of obligation” between the employer 
and employee.2952 The next section examines which tests the English Courts and 
Tribunals will apply in order to determine when an individual has employee 
status.  
2. The “mixed or multiple” test for establishing a Contract of Employment 
English Courts and Tribunals apply the “mixed or multiple” test to 
determine when an individual is an employee.2953 Under common law, four tests 
have been established in key cases for ensuring whether an individual works as 
an employee: (1) the integration test, (2) the economic reality test, (3) the 
mutuality of obligation test and (4) the control test.2954 For example, in Ready 
Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, the 
judge considered what is meant by a “contract of service” by applying the control 
test.2955 The judge concluded that three conditions must be fulfilled in order for a 
“contract of service” to exist.  
(i) The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will 
provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master. 
(ii) He agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance of that service he will be 
subject to the other's control in a sufficient degree to make that other master. 
                                                     
2951 Moore v. Garwood (1849) 4 Exch. 681, 684–685 (1849). 
2952 Carmichael and Another v. National Power Plc [1999] UKHL 47; [1999] 1 WLR 2042; [1999] 
4 ALL ER 897, supra note 2935 See Lord Hoffmann. 
2953 CABRELLI, supra note 2924 at 31. 
2954 See for (1) Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison Ltd v MacDonald and Evans [1952] 1 TLR 101, 
(2) Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173; (3) Carmichael and 
Another v. National Power Plc [1999] UKHL 47; [1999] 1 WLR 2042; [1999] 4 ALL ER 897, supra 
note 2935; (4) Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National 
Insurance [1967] EWHC QB 3, (1967). 
2955 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1967] 
EWHC QB 3, supra note 2952. 
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(iii) The other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of 
service.2956 
The control test includes at least two important features: first, the employer 
has a sufficient degree of control and, second, the individual is required to 
provide the work on his own.2957 In addition, the English Courts and Tribunals 
apply the following three criteria as the basic ingredients of the employment 
contract: (1) control, (2) mutuality of obligation, and (3) a degree of personal 
service.2958 If any one of these criteria is absent, the individual will not be 
considered an employee.2959 
3. The Content of Employment Contracts 
This section focuses on the content of the employment contract and explores 
the various terms of contracts. Like any other contract, a contract of employment 
is a subject to the general principles of law.2960 The contracting parties can freely 
negotiate the terms and conditions under the current statutes and the common 
law.2961 The employment contract may be verbal or in writing.2962  
In the UK, the sources of employment contracts are individual express 
terms, imposed terms, common law implied terms, work rules, workforce 
agreements, collective agreements and statutes.2963 The most important sources 
are the written or oral express terms, the imposed and the implied terms, which 
will be explained briefly. Firstly, express terms are explicitly provided for the 
contract and are binding.2964 They can also differ from the description in a job 
offer.2965 Express terms can be set down in writing, agreed orally, or established 
                                                     
2956 Id. at 515–516. 
2957 Degree of control Troutbeck SA v White & Anor [2013] EWCA Civ 1171, (2013); See in: 
LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2923 at 47. 
2958 CABRELLI, supra note 2924 at 32. 
2959 Id. at 32. 
2960 LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2936 at 13. 
2961 See e.g. Damages for breach of contract Commerzbank AG v Keen [2006] EWCA Civ 1536, 
(2006); See in: LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2936 at 13. 
2962 LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2936 at 13. 
2963 Id. at 15. Figure 2.1. 
2964 Id. at 15. 
2965 Id. at 15. 
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by conduct and take precedence over all other sources of contractual terms.2966 If 
an express term establishes an obligation, any breach thereof may lead to an 
action in damages.2967 
According to Part I of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), the employer 
must provide for the employee “a written statement of particulars of employment.”2968 
Under Section 1, this statement “shall be given not later than two months after the 
beginning of the employment.”2969 The employer’s duty is to provide the employee a 
document in the form of a statement, a document in writing in the form of a 
contract of employment or letter of engagement where the particulars are 
contained as essential elements of the contract in accordance with Section 1 (3) 
and (4) of the ERA.2970 These provisions of the ERA have been implemented by the 
EU Directive 91/533/EC.2971 Thus, over time, both EU and domestic legislation 
have introduced terms directly into contracts.2972 Such terms are often referred to 
as imposed terms. They include, for example, restrictions on a contract of 
employment such as the maximum weekly working hours.2973 
Thirdly, under common law, implied terms ‘in fact’ and implied terms ‘in 
law’ are recognized.2974 An implied term in fact applies only to the contract 
between the employer and employee.2975 In the event that there is a gap in the 
employment contract, the court can imply a term to give efficacy to the 
contract.2976 Hence, it is suggested that the contracting parties explicitly agreed to 
                                                     
2966 CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 151; LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2936 at 15. 
2967 CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 151. 
2968 EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 1996, supra note 2919, § 1 (1). 
2969 Id.§ 1 (2). 
2970 Id.§ 7(A). 
2971 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 91/533/EEC OF 14 OCTOBER 1991 ON AN EMPLOYER’S OBLIGATION TO 
INFORM EMPLOYEES OF THE CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO THE CONTRACT OR EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP, L 288/32 (1991) Art. 2 and 3. 
2972 CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 165; LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2936 at 23. 
2973 See e.g. Restrictions under EQUALITY ACT 2010, supra note 2919 § 66; NATIONAL 
MINIMUM WAGE ACT 1998, supra note 2919 § 17 (1); THE WORKING TIME REGULATIONS 1998, 
supra note 2919 § 4 (1); See in: CABRELLI, supra note 2916 at 166; LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra 
note 2923 at 23. 
2974 CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 166. 
2975 Id. at 167. 
2976 LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2936 at 23. 
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and approved of this term.2977 In contrast, the implied term in law applies to all 
contracts of a particular type e.g. a contract of employment.2978 The courts consider 
the implied term as a “necessary incident” of the employment relationship.2979 
Therefore, this term is recognized and established as an implied term in law and 
will be imported into every employment contract.2980 These terms in law comprise 
inter alia (1) the duties of the employer, e.g. duty to provide work,2981 pay 
wages,2982 and (2) the obligations of the employee, e.g. duty to work and comply 
with instructions,2983 and the duty of care, loyalty, fidelity and confidence.2984 They 
are binding at a high level of generality.2985 The majority of these terms are long 
established common law principles.2986 For example, the duty of care arises from 
the performance of the employee’s work.2987 An employee is required to perform 
his or her work in a competent manner.2988 If an employee is in breach of this 
duty, the employer is entitled to recover damages.2989 On the basis of the scope of 
responsibilities and tasks incumbent upon the compliance officer’ within a 
company, the duty of care is liable to be important for the performance of his or 
her work.2990 However, a review of the English literature, the English legal 
                                                     
2977 CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 167. 
2978 Id. at 167. 
2979 Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co v Lister [1956] UKHL 6, (1956); See in: CABRELLI, supra 
note 2929 at 167. 
2980 CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 167. 
2981 See e.g. Collier v Sunday Referee Publishing Co Ltd [1940] 2 KB 647 [1940] 4 All ER 234; 
Exception in: William Hill Organisation Ltd v Tucker [1998] EWCA Civ 615, 18 (1998). 
2982 See e.g. Driver v Air India Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 830, 36 (2011) "The employer has to pay 
a reasonable sum.” 
2983 See e.g. Robertson v. Newcastle Breweries Ltd [2000] EAT 1373_99_1804, 6 (2000) The 
Court held that "at common law all employees are under a duty to work honestly, 
faithfully and loyally for their employer.” 
2984 See e.g. HM Attorney General v Blake [1997] EWCA Civ 3008 (16th December, 1997), 
(1997); See in: CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 178–216; LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2936 
at 29–41. 
2985 CABRELLI, supra note 2929 at 177. 
2986 LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2936 at 27. 
2987 CABRELLI, supra note 2924 at 40. 
2988 Id. at 40. 
2989 See e.g. Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage [1957] AC 555; See in: CABRELLI, supra note 
2921 at 40. 
2990 See supra Ch. 2, C., II., p. 112. 
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framework, (e.g. Company Law, the Bribery Act and Employment Law) did not 
reveal any special duty of care of the compliance officers.2991 In addition, an 
examination of the English court cases relating to breach of the duty of care did 
not reveal any cases involvingno corporate compliance officers.2992 For this reason, 
it is necessary to examine whether there are enhanced special regulatory duties 
for compliance officers in the financial services sector, for example a duty of 
reasonable care imposed on internal control personnel in banks and investment 
firms.2993 Therefore, the next section will explore whether the compliance officer 
owes a reasonable duty of care under the regulatory framework within banks and 
investment firms.  
a.  The reasonable Duty of Care imposed on Control Functions  
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, a new statutory and 
regulatory framework aimed at strengthening individual accountability has been 
established in the UK financial services sector. Compliance has been an important 
issue since the first Financial Services Act of 1986 in the UK.2994 The current 
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 requires significant changes to the 
FSMA 2000.2995 These changes include e.g. the introduction of retail ring-fencing 
requirements for banks and a new conduct framework for senior managers within 
banks.2996 
Furthermore, there are a number of regulatory bodies in the UK, which 
control the financial services activities of firms and individuals.2997 One of them is 
the FSA, which is split into two regulatory bodies, the Financial Conduct 
                                                     
2991 See supra Ch. 5, A., pp. 354 et seq. 
2992 By examining the case law in the UK Employment Appeal Tribunal (UKEAT) with the 
key words ‘duty of care’ and ‘compliance officer’ on the case database BAILII from 2010 to 
2016 in England and Wales no case has been found. 
2993 CHIU, supra note 2351 at 270. 
2994 FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986, supra note 549. This Act was repealed by the FSMA 2000 
in 2001. 
2995 FINANCIAL SERVICES (BANKING REFORM) ACT 2013, c. 33 (2013). This Act will come in to 
force on various dates until 2019.  
2996 Id.§§ 1 to 6, §§ 19 to 20. 
2997 LEE WERRELL, COMPLIANCE MANAGERS GUIDEBOOK & REFERENCE 12 (2. ed. 2014). 
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Authority (FCA)2998 and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)2999 in 2013.3000 
Since 2013, the FCA has pursued the following three objectives, (1) the protection 
of consumers (2) enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system and (3) the 
maintenance of competitive markets and the promotion of effective 
competition.3001 In the UK, an individual or a firm has to submit an application for 
authorization to the regulator in order to carry out any regulated activity.3002 Since 
2000, a regime of internal ‘control function’ has been in place under Section 59 of 
the FSMA 2000 as specified in rules such as a Code of Practice for Approved 
Persons (APER).3003 The APER takes the form of guidance containing, among 
other things, seven Statements of Principle for approved persons.3004 Principle 2 
and 6 state: 
"An approved person must act with due skill, care and diligence in carrying out his 
accountable functions."3005 
                                                     
2998 Since 2013 the FCA, The Financial Conduct Authority, supra note 939, formerly the 
FSA See The Financial Services Authority, supra note 803. The FCA is responsible for the 
conduct supervision of financial services firms, which are not supervised by the PRA. 
2999 “The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) was created as a part of the Bank of 
England by the Financial Services Act (2012) and is responsible for the prudential 
regulation and supervision of around 1,700 banks, building societies, credit unions, 
insurers and major investment firms.” See Prudential Regulation Authority | Bank of 
England, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec 19, 
2016). 
3000 WERRELL, supra note 2995 at 13. 
3001 FCA, ABOUT US FCA (2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/about (last visited Sep 6, 2016). 
3002 FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 805 Part IV, §§ 40 to 55 - 
Permission to carry on one or more regulated activities. 
3003 See supra footnote 2582 Re a Company [1980] CH 138, [1980] 2 WLR 241, p. 428 - a 
manager with supervisory control. Control functions are specific functions of internal 
control departments, e.g. compliance, legal or risk management within banks and 
investment firms. See COSO INTERNAL CONTROL—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, 128 (2011) 
para 435. See also FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 806, § 59 (3); 
FCA, STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE AND CODE OF PRACTICE FOR APPROVED PERSONS (APER) 
(2016), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/APER.pdf (last visited Dec 18, 2016) 
Rule 1.1A.2. 
3004 FCA, supra note 2987 APER 2.1A.3 R The Statements of Principle are issued under; 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 806, § 64A (1) (a). 
3005 FCA, supra note 3001 APER 4.2.1A. 
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"An approved person performing an accountable higher management function must 
exercise due skill, care and diligence in managing the business of the firm for which they 
are responsible in their accountable function." 
In the opinion of the FCA, the approved person does not comply with 
Principle 2 when he or she fails e.g. to inform a customer; or his firm about the 
risks of an investment, or provides inaccurate or inadequate information.3006 
Principle 6 means at first that an approved person performing a higher manager 
function needs to inform himself or herself about the affairs of the business for 
which he or she has responsibility.3007 Furthermore, Principle 6 refers to behavior 
such as permitting transactions without a sufficient understanding of the risks, 
inadequately monitoring highly profitable transactions, or accepting implausible 
or unsatisfactory explanations from subordinates.3008 By delegating the authority 
to an individual, the approved person has to ensure that the other person has the 
necessary capacity, competence, knowledge, seniority or skill.3009 
Additionally, the amendments of the FSMA 2000 as set out in Part Four of 
the Financial Services Act 2013, define, for example, the “senior management 
function” as a person who is “responsible for managing one or more aspects of 
the “authorised person’s” affairs.”3010 Specifically, the Consultation Paper of the 
FCA and the PRA qualifies the “key persons” or the senior management functions 
as the chief executive officer, the chief risk officer, the head of the internal audit 
and the head of key business areas.3011 The Paper defines these individuals as the 
key decision-makers within banks and investment firms who are approved by the 
FCA and, hence, are within the scope of and subject to enhanced accountability 
                                                     
3006 Id. APER 4.2.4. 
3007 Id. APER 4.6.3. 
3008 Id. APER 4.6.4. 
3009 Id. APER 4.6.5. 
3010 FINANCIAL SERVICES (BANKING REFORM) ACT 2013, supra note 2979 § 19 inserts after 
Section 59 of FSMA 2000. An “authorised person” means a a person who has the 
permission to carry on one or more regulated activities and is authorised for the purposes 
of the FSMA 2000. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 806 § 31 
(1) (2). 
3011 PRA & FCA, STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY IN  BANKING: A NEW REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK  FOR INDIVIDUALS 14 (2014), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/ 
Documents/publications/cp/2014/cp1414.pdf (last visited Dec 18, 2016) para 2.11. 
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requirements.3012 The English Courts also apply this meaning of the term ‘approved 
person’. For example, in Willford, R v Financial Services Authority Lord Justice Moore-
Bick states that  
An ‘approved person’ performing a significant influence function must exercise due 
skill, care and diligence in managing the business of the firm for which he is responsible 
in his controlled function.3013 
In order to define the responsibilities of these senior management functions, 
the FCA includes in its rules of conduct the oversight of compliance with 
conditions and time limits on approval, for example.3014 The Consultation Paper 
by the FCA and PRA organizes the current controlled functions in a new FCA 
senior management system.3015 The former compliance oversight function (CF10) 
is now the compliance oversight function (SMF16).3016 Therefore, the FCA also 
approves the compliance oversight function.3017 Generally, the FCA determines 
that this function “is a function of acting in the capacity of a director or senior 
manager.”3018  
Since 2004, EU legislation has required all financial institutes that conduct 
investment business to establish a permanent and effective compliance 
function.3019 However, the FCA applied this requirement to all regulated firms, or 
authorized persons, including banking and credit institutions.3020  
                                                     
3012 Id. at 25, para 2.57. 
3013 Willford, R (On the Application Of) v Financial Services Authority [2013] EWCA Civ 677, 2 
(2013). 
3014 PRA and FCA, supra note 3009 para 4.5.16, Annex C. 
3015 Id. at 59. para 8.5, Figure 11. 
3016 Id. at 59. para 8.5, Figure 11. The Abbreviation ‘CF# means “control function and the 
abbreviation ‘SMF’ means “senior management function.” 
3017 Id. at 26, para 2.60, Figure 6. 
3018 PRA and FCA, supra note 3009 para 10C.6.1, Annex C. 
3019 DIRECTIVE 2004/39/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON MARKETS 
IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AMENDING COUNCIL  DIRECTIVES 85/611/EEC AND 93/6/EEC AND 
DIRECTIVE 2000/12/EC (MIFID 2004), supra note 457; See also ESMA, CONSULTATION PAPER 
| GUIDELINES ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE MIFID COMPLIANCE FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS 
(2011), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2011_446.pdf (last 
visited Dec 7, 2016). 
3020 CHIU, supra note 2351 at 84; PRA and FCA, supra note 3009 para 6.1.4-C, Annex C. 
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Hence, the conduct rules of both regulators also refer to the compliance 
officer. The rules require that the compliance officer has to “act with due skill, care 
and diligence.”3021 In essence, this means that it is important that the compliance 
officer sufficiently understands the risks of the business activities.3022 He has to 
inform himself in order to obtain the necessary expertise of the firms’ business.3023 
As important as a manager, he or she has to ensure that the business of the firm is 
controlled effectively and complies with the relevant requirements and standards 
of the regulatory system.3024 Otherwise, the FCA can take disciplinary actions 
against senior managers of banks and investments firms and has the power to 
impose penalties on authorized persons.3025 In order to examine the reasons 
behind and the frequency of the imposition of penalties, the next section presents 
the FCA actions against compliance officers in the course of the last 14 years.  
b.  Actions against Compliance Officers between 2002  and 2016 
While the actions available to the FCA are wide-ranging, they are not court 
actions. Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), the FCA has 
an extensive range of disciplinary, criminal and civil powers to take action against 
firms and individuals who fail to meet the FCA standards.3026 This includes e.g. 
the withdrawal of a firm’s authorization, the prohibition of an individual from 
operating in financial services or the imposition of financial penalties.3027 For 
example, research on the website of the FCA revealed that the FSA imposed fines 
                                                     
3021 Id. at 42, para 5.20, Figure 7. 
3022 PRA and FCA, supra note 3009 para 4.1.4, Annex A. 
3023 Id. para 4.1.4, Annex A. 
3024 Id. para 4.1.8 (1) (a) (b), Annex A. 
3025 Id. para 6.2.4, Annex C. 
3026 See FCA, ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION GUIDE, 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/documents/enforcement-information-guide.pdf (last 
visited Dec 12, 2016). For instance, under Section 352 of the FSMA 2000 “A person who 
discloses information in contravention of section 348 or 350(5) is guilty of an offence.” See 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 806, § 352. The FCA can also use 
its statutory powers in criminal proceedings with regard to market abuse.  
3027 FCA, supra note 3024. 
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totaling £66,144,839 on 35 individuals and on 22 banks and investment firms in 
2011.3028 Among these actions, one compliance officer was fined.3029  
Table 16 shows the number of actions by the FCA between 2002 and 2016 
and the number of individuals and compliance officers involved.  
 
Table 16 - The Actions by the FCA between 2002 and 2016 
Year Actions Firms Individuals CO Indiv. Perc. 
2002 9 9 0 0 0,00% 
2003 17 14 3 0 17,65% 
2004 32 22 10 0 43,78% 
2005 20 17 3 0 15,00% 
2006 27 23 4 0 14,81% 
2007 23 21 2 0 8,70% 
2008 52 35 17 0 32,69% 
2009 42 30 12 0 28,57% 
2010 80 34 46 0 57,50% 
2011 57 22 35 1 61,40% 
2012 53 25 28 2 52,83% 
2013 61 37 24 2 39,34% 
2014 40 26 14 1 35,00% 
2015 40 18 22 3 55,00% 
2016 23 9 14 0 60,87% 
Average 38 23 16 1 34,88% 
Median 40 22 14 0 35,00% 
 
The table clearly shows increased enforcement of actions after the financial 
crisis in 2008 and 2009.3030 Just as the number of FCA actions have increased, since 
2010, the number of actions against individuals are generally higher than the 
                                                     
3028 FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 806 Schedule 1, Part III 
Penalties and Fees; FINANCIAL SERVICES (BANKING REFORM) ACT 2013, supra note 2979 §§ 73 
(1), 139 (1) to (8); See also FCA, ENFORCEMENT FCA (2016), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/about/enforcement (last visited Dec 16, 2016). 
3029 FSA v Dr Sandradee Josep, Action (2011); FSA, supra note 807. 
3030 See Table 16 - The Actions by the FCA between 2002 and 2016, p. 436. 
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number of actions against firms.3031 Nine of these individuals could be clearly 
identified as compliance officers.3032 However, it could be that another approved 
persons performed the compliance oversight (CF10)3033 function within authorised 
persons also work as compliance officers, but were not identified. 
Having examined the final notices of the actions by the FCA against the 
nine compliance officers, it should be noted that they all ended with a financial 
penalty and with prohibition from performing any significant influence function 
in relation to any regulated activity carried on by any authorized person.3034 In 
addition, the word frequency analysis of the nine actions revealed that the words 
‘authority’,3035 ‘financial’ and ‘penalty’ were used most frequently.3036 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3031 See Table 16 - The Actions by the FCA between 2002 and 2016, p. 436. 
3032 See Table 16 - The Actions by the FCA between 2002 and 2016, p. 436. 
3033 The abbreviation ‘CF’ means the control function.  
3034 See e.g. FCA v Alison Moran, Action (2013); FCA v Anthony Rendell Boyd Wills, (2015); 
FCA v Jeremy Kraft, (2015); FCA v John Douglas Leslie, Action (2013); FCA v Stephen Edward 
Bell, (2015). 
3035 The term ‘authority’ means the UK regulator previously known as the Financial 
Services Authority and renamed on 1 April 2013 as the Financial Conduct Authority. 
3036 See e.g. Figure 12, p. 438, Table 17, p. 438. 
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Figure 12 - Word Frequency of the nine FCA Actions against Compliance Officers 
Table 17 - Word Frequency of the nine FCA Actions against Compliance Officers 
 
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage (%) 
authority 9 601 1.61 
compliance 10 435 1.17 
financial 9 403 1.08 
person 6 303 0.81 
penalty 7 271 0.73 
relevant 8 247 0.66 
approved 8 221 0.59 
function 8 198 0.53 
principle 9 169 0.45 
conduct 7 158 0.42 
 
In seven actions against compliance officers, the FCA states that the 
compliance officer 
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failed to act with due skill, care and diligence in carrying out his CF103037 controlled 
function, in his role as the approved person responsible for compliance oversight.3038 
The FCA sets out the reasons for the actions as follows: During the 
investigations, the FCA has examined the business conduct of the compliance 
officers and has accused them of the breach of Statements of Principle 2 or 6.3039 
This means, specifically, that the approved person has “to take any steps to 
identify and address the risk, and recognise clear warning signs of market 
abuse.”3040 Furthermore, the compliance officers have failed to adequately keep 
record for investor certification, adequate oversight of investor certification, or 
failed to provide clear information to investors.3041 Therefore, in these actions, the 
FCA concluded that the compliance officers demonstrated a lack of competence 
and capability and are not fit and proper to perform any control function.3042 In 
the view of the FCA, compliance oversight means that the compliance officer 
“should be alert in order to protect both their firm and the integrity of the UK 
markets.”3043  
According to Section 66 of the FSMA 2000, an approved person is guilty 
when he has failed to comply with a Statement of Principle.3044 Under Section 69 
of the FSMA 2000, the FCA must prepare and issue a statement of its policy in 
terms of its sanctions.3045 Today, the authorities’ policy and process in this regard 
is contained in the Enforcement Guide.3046 Chapter 9 of this Guide provides the 
FCA's policy on prohibition and withdrawal of approval.3047 In accordance with 
Section 56 of the FSMA 2000, the FCA can prohibit the individual from 
                                                     
3037 The abbreviation ‘CF’ means controlled function.  
3038 See e.g. FSA v Alexander Ten-Holter, Action (2012) para 4.1. 
3039 FCA, supra note 3001 APER 2.1A.3. APER means the Statements of Principle and Code 
of Conduct for Approved Persons.  
3040 See e.g. FSA v Alexander Ten-Holter, supra note 3036 para 4.2., 4.6. 
3041 See e.g. FCA v John Douglas Leslie, supra note 3032 para 4.8., 4.9., 4.12. 
3042 See e.g. Id. para 5.8. 
3043 See e.g. FSA V ALEXANDER TEN-HOLTER, supra note 3036 para 4.6. 
3044 FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 806 § 66 (2) (a). 
3045 Id.§ 69 (1). 
3046 See FCA, THE ENFORCEMENT GUIDE (2016), 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/document/eg/EG_20160101.pdf (last visited 
Dec 15, 2016). 
3047 Id. Chapter 9. 
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performing a specified function.3048 In addition, under Section 63 of the Act. the 
FCA has the power to withdraw an approval if it considers that the approved 
person is not a fit and proper person to perform the function.3049 Furthermore, the 
FCA also has the power to carry out an investigation in order to require and 
gather information.3050 The investigation includes the requirement for firms and 
individuals to provide documents and reports to the FCA, or to attend interviews 
with the FCA and answer the questions.3051 
An examination of the nine actions against the compliance officers by the 
FCA, shows that six of them were prohibited from performing any controlled 
function in relation to any regulated activities carried on by any authorzsed 
persons.3052 In two of the six actions, the FCA withdrew the approval given to the 
compliance officer to perform the controlled function.3053 Furthermore, in all nine 
actions, the compliance officer was required to pay a financial penalty.3054 Five 
compliance officers agreed to settle at an early stage of the investigation by the 
FCA and in return were granted a reduction.3055 
In conclusion, the FCA has the power to take disciplinary action to fine, to 
suspend firms or individuals who have breached its and their requirements or to 
make a prohibition order. Therefore, it appears that under the regulatory 
framework in the financial services sector in the UK, the regulator determines 
whether an approved person has breached the duty of care and, hence, whether 
the individual is incapable of doing the job and of performing a control function. 
This matter is not decided by judges in the UK courts and Employment Tribunals. 
                                                     
3048 FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT (2000), supra note 806 § 56 (2). 
3049 Id.§ 63 (1). 
3050 Id.§§ 165 to 169. 
3051 FCA, supra note 3044 Chapter 3. 
3052 FCA V STEPHEN EDWARD BELL, supra note 3032; FSA V DR SANDRADEE JOSEP, supra note 
3027; FSA V ALEXANDER TEN-HOLTER, supra note 3036; FCA V JEREMY KRAFT, supra note 
3032; FCA V JOHN DOUGLAS LESLIE, supra note 3032; FSA v Nazia Bi, Action (2011). 
3053 FCA V JOHN DOUGLAS LESLIE, supra note 3032; FSA V NAZIA BI, supra note 3050. 
3054 See also FSA v Caspar Jonathan William Agnew, (2011); FCA V ALISON MORAN, supra 
note 3032; FCA V ANTHONY RENDELL BOYD WILLS, supra note 3032. 
3055 FCA V STEPHEN EDWARD BELL, supra note 3032; FCA V JEREMY KRAFT, supra note 3032; 
FCA V JOHN DOUGLAS LESLIE, supra note 3032; FSA V DR SANDRADEE JOSEP, supra note 3027; 
FCA V ANTHONY RENDELL BOYD WILLS, supra note 3032. 
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Therefore, it could be argued that the UK compliance officer remains an agent of 
regulation and the financial regulatory regime in the UK. 
c.  Specific Duties and Responsibilities  of  a Compliance Officer 
in the Regulatory Environment in the UK 
By examining the regulatory legal framework and the reasons given in the 
notices by the FCA against compliance officers in the UK, it can be argued that 
filling the position of a skilled, high-quality compliance officer entails far-
reaching duties and responsibilities:  
(1) dealing with increasing information published by regulators and 
exchanges, and the speed of regulatory changes, 
(2) a thorough understanding of the legal environment including the 
regulatory impact on the firms and the Guidance, 
(3) compliance with Rules, Codes of Practice, and Statements of Principles 
by the regulators, 
(4) to adequately inform oneself as an approved person about the affairs of 
the business for which he or she is responsible,  
(5) to monitor and assess the adequacy of the firm’s transactions including 
to supervise any agent,  
(6) to recognise the signs of possible risk of market abuse and then to take 
appropriate steps to ensure no such abuse was taking place, 
(7) to develop, implement and conduct a compliance monitoring plan, 
(8) to clearly document the appropriate policies, procedures, and bulletins 
within the day-to-day work and to conduct file reviews and internal 
audits, 
(9) to provide adequate, correct and consistent information to the senior 
management.3056 
The evidence has shown that the scope of responsibilities of the compliance 
function in the regulatory environment is broad and serious. Therefore, the 
compliance officer should have sufficiently broad knowledge and professional 
                                                     
3056 A summarized overview of the Final Notices given by the FCA’s actions against 
compliance officers – See e.g. FSA V ALEXANDER TEN-HOLTER, supra note 3036; FSA V 
NAZIA BI, supra note 3050. 
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experience and a high level of expertise.3057 The Statements of Principle and the 
Code of Conduct for Approved Persons (APER) sets out the fundamental 
obligations of approved persons and, hence, also for the compliance officer.3058 He 
or she could be guilty of misconduct for failing to comply with a Statement of 
Principle issued under Section 64 of the FSMA 2000.3059 However, the APER 
3.1.4G states that an approved person will only be in breach of a Statement of 
Principle when he is personally culpable.3060 Additionally, the FCA points out that  
Personal culpability arises where an approved person’s conduct was deliberate or 
where the approved person’s standard of conduct was below that which would be 
reasonable in all circumstances.3061 
In detail, the FCA will consider “the context in which a course of conduct was 
undertaken, the circumstances of the individual case, the characteristics of the particular 
controlled function and the behavior expected in that function.”3062 In the course of 
investigation, the FCA examined the conduct of the compliance officers in the 
context of the business. Specifically, they were in breach of the Statement of 
Principles 2 or 6, or failed to act with due skill, care and diligence, or failed to 
properly read a document, or failed to properly investigate and act on the 
information in order to prevent the misconduct of other employees. Hence, the 
FCA held them personally culpable in a situation where their conduct was 
deliberate and, then, the FCA imposed a sanction.3063 As a matter of fact, the FCA 
opined that a serious lack of competence in carrying out the compliance function 
would lead an individual to be banned from working in the financial service 
industry.3064 Although the UK regulator has increased enforcement against 
                                                     
3057 ESMA, supra note 3017 para 34. IV.I. Effectiveness of the compliance function. 
3058 FSA v Dr Sandradee Josep, supra note 3013 para 4.4. 
3059 FSA v Dr Sandradee Josep, supra note 3013 para 4.3; FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS 
ACT (2000), supra note 806 §§ 64, 66 (2) (a). 
3060 FCA, supra note 3001 APER 3.1.4G (1); See in: FSA V DR SANDRADEE JOSEP, supra note 
3027 para 4.6. 
3061 FCA, supra note 3001 APER 3.1.4G (1); See in: FSA V DR SANDRADEE JOSEP, supra note 
3027 para 4.6. 
3062 FCA, supra note 3001 APER 3.1.3G; See in: FSA V DR SANDRADEE JOSEP, supra note 3027 
para 4.8. 
3063 See e.g. FSA V DR SANDRADEE JOSEP, supra note 3027 Summary of reasons. 
3064 CHIU, supra note 2351 at 275. 
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internal control personnel, such liability is a so called ‘secondary liability’ to the 
firm’s ‘primary liability’.3065 The ‘secondary liability’ could detract from the firms 
’primary liability’.3066 
In conclusion, under the new senior management regime implemented by 
the FCA and PRA, the internal control functions and their conduct are subject to 
enhanced scrutiny and ‘secondary liability’. This approach could be seen critically 
since, apart from the regular jurisdiction, the regulators have established their 
own system in order to discipline and sanction the conduct of approved persons. 
However, as previously discussed, the regulators’ power is based on legislation. 
The basis for liability of compliance officers could arise from breaches of the 
Statements of Principle 2 or 6 of APER for failure to act with due skill, care and 
diligence. Finally, it can be argued that, contrary to the private sector, the 
compliance officer is covered by a specific duty of care in exercising and 
performing his job within the financial service sector. After examining the duty of 
care in the regulated environment, the next section will continue to examine 
whether the compliance officer has the “right not to be unfairly dismissed” by the 
employer and whether he or she enjoys a protection against wrongful or unfair 
dismissal. 
4. Wrongful and Unfair Dismissal 
As a result of legislation, other implied terms connected with unfair 
dismissal in the terms of breach or termination of the contract of employment 
have emerged.3067 This section examines the concept of wrongful and unfair 
dismissal of an employee under common law and legislation. This concept is 
important to understanding the circumstances in which an employee is dismissed 
and when an employee like a corporate officer or compliance officer has the “right 
not to be unfairly dismissed by the employer.”3068 The Employment Rights Act 1996 
includes both notice and unjust dismissal provisions.3069 According to Section 94, 
“the employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer.”3070 The 
                                                     
3065 Id. at 39. 
3066 Id. at 232. 
3067 LEWIS AND SARGEANT, supra note 2936 at 27. 
3068 EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 1996, supra note 2919, § 94 (1). 
3069 Id. Part IX Termination of employment, §§ 86 to 93. 
3070 Id.§ 94 (1). 
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definition of what is a fair or unfair dismissal is a major issue in termination 
discussions.3071 Generally, an unfair dismissal is defined as “a dismissal of an 
employee which amounts to a repudiatory breach of contract on the part of the 
employer.”3072 Hence, the individual who claims for unfair dismissal must be an 
employee and must have been employed for a period of no less than two years.3073 
In addition, the employer must provide a written explanation of the reason for the 
termination.3074 These claims must be enforced in Employment Tribunals.3075 The 
majority of cases involve an employee are dismissed without notice.3076 
Usually, in the event of breaches of a contract there is a claim. The vast 
majority of claims for wrongful dismissal are common law claims.3077 Judge David 
Richardson explained the nature of such claims in Cossington v C2C Rail Ltd: 
The wrongful dismissal claim is a claim for breach of contract by failing to give notice. 
The task of the Employment Judge in such a case is to decide whether the Claimant has 
committed a repudiatory breach of contract, often in employment terms called gross 
misconduct. For this purpose, he reaches his own findings and applies the law of contract 
to them. But the remedy is limited to an award of compensation for loss by reason of the 
failure to give notice.3078 
The claim for wrongful dismissal is enforced in court and it is not necessary 
that the claimant is an employee.3079 This claim cannot be brought where an 
employee has a fixed-term contract.3080 
Nevertheless, unfair and wrongful dismissal should not be considered in 
isolation and instead operate in tandem.3081 Under employment legislation, there 
are three types of remedies in the event an employee was unfairly dismissed, (1) 
reinstatement, (2) re-engagement or (3) compensation.3082 In the case that an 
                                                     
3071 Estreicher and Hirsch, supra note 2029 at 435. 
3072 See e.g. Key definition in: CABRELLI, supra note 2924 at 122. 
3073 EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 1996, supra note 2919, § 92 (3). 
3074 Id.§ 92 (4). 
3075 Id.§ 93. 
3076 CABRELLI, supra note 2924 at 122. 
3077 Id. at 123. 
3078 Cossington v C2C Rail Ltd [2013] UKEAT 0053_13_1209, 3 (2013). 
3079 CABRELLI, supra note 2924 at 124 Figure 8.1. 
3080 Id. at 124. Figure 8.1. 
3081 Id. at 125. 
3082 EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 1996, supra note 2924 §§ 114, 115 and 117. 
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employee suffers monetary or non-monetary losses as a result of an unfair or 
wrongful dismissal, the employee can be compensated with payment in lieu of 
notice or for the legally entitled notice.3083 The employee can also claim for 
contractual benefits such as e.g. pensions benefits, bonus payments or insurance 
payments to which he or she is entitled during the period of notice. In addition, 
the employee can claim for ‘stigma damages’ if he or she is incapable of obtaining 
alternative employment.3084 That means that in some cases the ‘stigma of dismissa’ 
will render an employee effectively unemployable.3085 
An examination of the employment cases between 2010 and 2016 for ‘unfair 
dismissal’ in Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal and for 
‘wrongful dismissal’ in domestic courts, found one case in which a compliance 
officer claimed for wrongful dismissal.3086 This case will be discussed in the next 
section.  
a.  Brandeaux Advisers (UK) Ltd & Ors v Chadwick  
Ms. Chadwick, a senior employee, was employed by Brandeaux Advisers 
(UK) Limited between 2008 and 2010 and performed her duties as the executive in 
overall charge of compliance in the Brandeaux group.3087 The claimant, Brandeaux 
Advisers (UK) Limited, is incorporated in England and provides investment 
advice to Brandeaux Managers Limited.3088 Since 2009, Ms. Chadwick had 
suffered a lot of health problems attributable to the high level of stress involved in 
her work-related issues.3089 She found it very difficult to deal with her huge 
responsibilities as a compliance officer and thus, wanted to find a new job.3090 
Over several months she transferred a huge volume of confidential material to 
her private e-mail address when she felt that her relationship with her employer 
                                                     
3083 CABRELLI, supra note 2924 at 125. 
3084 Id. at 125. 
3085 See e.g. This issue is discussed in: Mattu v The University Hospitals of Coventry and 
Warwickshire NHS Trust [2012] EWCA Civ 641, 98 (2012). 
3086 Brandeaux Advisers (UK) Ltd & Ors v Chadwick [2010] EWHC 3241 (QB), (2010). 
3087 Id. at 3. 
3088 Id. at 2. 
3089 Id. at 4. 
3090 Id. at 5. 
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was in jeopardy.3091 On 10 May, 2010 Ms. Chadwick was informed that she was to 
be dismissed on the grounds of redundancy with three months’ notice.3092 Four 
days later, however, her transfer of material was discovered by the IT-department 
and, on this basis, one month later she was dismissed without notice.3093 Ms. 
Chadwick also claimed for unfair dismissal in the Employment Tribunal. She 
pointed out that she did not plan to use the confidential information for 
competitive purposes, but thought that this material could support her case in 
any future employment disputes with Brandeaux.3094 However, the judge did not 
uphold these arguments and held that she had breached her implied duty of 
fidelity, which is an “implied term in a contract of employment that the employee will 
serve the employer with fidelity and in good faith.”3095 The court concluded that her 
conduct was in breach of her contract of employment and Ms Chadwick failed to 
recover salary pay and damages for wrongful dismissal. Hence, the basis in this 
case was not a wrongful dismissal due to a mistake in the performance of her job 
responsibilities as a compliance officer, but a breach of contractual duty as an 
employee like every other employee.  
In conclusion, it seems that to date, no corporate compliance officer has 
claimed for wrongful or unfair dismissal in the UK.  
b.  The Duties and Responsibilities placed on Corporate 
Compliance Officers 
This section summarizes the special duties and responsibilities placed 
incumbent upon the corporate compliance officer under employment law. As has 
been shown, the compliance officer, as an employee primarily, has the same 
duties as other employees. In the UK, there are different types of implied duties 
owed by an employee. As we have seen in the case outlined above, the duty of 
fidelity, loyalty and confidentiality extends to not disclosing confidential 
information about the employer’s business.3096 In this event, the employer can 
                                                     
3091 Id. at 8. 
3092 Id. at 10. 
3093 Id. at 12. 
3094 Id. at 18. 
3095 Id. at 15. 
3096 Brandeaux Advisers (UK) Ltd & Ors v Chadwick [2010] EWHC 3241 (QB), supra note 3084. 
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seek an injunction in order to prevent the disclosure of confidential information. 
However, the ERA 1996 covers “protected disclosures”, which defined in Sections 
43C to 43H.3097 These exemptions include, for example, disclosure to legal advisers 
or to prescribed persons such as the FCA.3098 In addition, the common law only 
recognizes this restriction as long as the non-disclosure is necessary to protect the 
interests of the employer.3099  
Another duty that the corporate compliance officer should be aware of is 
the duty of care. An employee has to exercise and perform his job with a normal 
degree of skill and care.3100 Nevertheless, the compliance officers may be subject to 
a higher degree to the requirement to perform their jobs competently and 
carefully. As has been noted in the examined final notices by the FCA, the 
regulator expected that the compliance officers should detect irregularities in e-
mails and attached documents, telephone conversations or correspondence of 
employees.3101 They should be aware of early warning signs or so-called ‘red 
flags’.3102 This is a higher standard of due skill and care. It could be argued, that in 
practice, there is a gap between a compliance officer’s assessment of the standard 
of due skill and care and the regulator’s expectation. In the event that a 
compliance officer is in breach of this standard and rules of conduct by the 
regulator, they may be subject to personal liability within the regulated sector. 
The FCA did not answer the question as to how the compliance officer may 
exercise reasonable professional conduct. Hence, the compliance officers have to 
deal with this uncertainty. According to a 2013 study by PWC, which compared a 
sample of US and UK-based companies from three diverse industries – financial 
services, manufacturing and technology - , the results have shown that less 
regulated industries have begun to adopt formal compliance structures from the 
financial sector.3103 This means, specifically, the establishment of a compliance 
committee, a compliance program and the appointment of a standalone 
                                                     
3097 EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 1996, supra note 2924 §§ 43C to 43H. 
3098 Id.§§ 43D and 43F. 
3099 CABRELLI, supra note 2924 at 49. 
3100 Id. at 40. 
3101 FSA V DR SANDRADEE JOSEP, supra note 3027; FSA V NAZIA BI, supra note 3050; FSA V 
ALEXANDER TEN-HOLTER, supra note 3036. 
3102 FSA V ALEXANDER TEN-HOLTER, supra note 3036. 
3103 PWC STUDY 2013, supra note 1656 at 8. 
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compliance officer in the private sector.3104 Although no case concerning a breach 
of a corporate compliance officer’s duty of care was found, this does not 
necessarily indicate that the higher standard of this duty could not also apply to 
corporate compliance officers. 
A search of current job advertisements for corporate compliance positions 
in the UK, the following ten key responsibilities were identified: 
(1) should have previous experience in a similar role and working in a 
governance structure, 
(2) should have excellent people, organizational and communication skills, 
(3) should be aware of any legislative proposals and changes, or of the 
Code of Practice together with actions required, 
(4) must ensure that employees are fully updated on these changes and 
ensure compliance to all procedures and legislation obligations, the 
UKBA and National Health Service (NHS) Employers, 
(5) should assist in standardizing all training materials and deliver 
trainings, 
(6) has to conduct interviews, 
(7) must identify and manage risk procedures and policies, 
(8) has to monitor controls and compliance effectively, 
(9) must work with the data selections team, data processing team, direct 
marketing teams and external suppliers to ensure compliance from 
collateral to database import on new campaigns, 
(10) has to manage relationships with both internal external service  
       functions.3105 
In addition, a 2015 study by the UCL’s Centre for Ethics and Law, which is 
based on interviews with 34 senior in-house lawyers and senior compliance staff 
                                                     
3104 PWC STUDY 2013 Id. at 8. 
3105 These findings of the key responsibilities are the result of the research on the 
recruitment website reed.co.uk by a sample of ten job advertisements which are looking 
for a compliance officer within UK companies in December 2016. See Compliance Officer 
jobs - reed.co.uk, , http://www.reed.co.uk/jobs/compliance-officer (last visited Dec 9, 
2016). 
CHAPTER 5 | 449 
 
in UK companies, examined the management of legal risk.3106 This study also 
analyzes the responsibilities of the compliance officers as regards legal risk 
management. The interviewees identified a more systematic approach to their 
companies’ risk processes: 
(1) to conduct exception and error monitoring, 
(2) to conduct audits, e.g. of contract processes or sales, or a verification to 
test sales processes; 
(3) receive customer feedback, 
(4) review of risk assessments.3107 
The interviewees described the compliance function as more procedural, 
risk and behavior-oriented than the legal function within companies.3108 This 
approach saw compliance as a “command-and-control model.”3109 Under the focus of 
regulators and prosecutors, companies have to meet regulatory and legal 
requirements. The term ‘command-and control model’ is defined as the “direct 
regulation of an industry or activity by legislation that states what is permitted and what 
is illegal.”3110 The term ‘command’ means the standards imposed by a government 
agency that must be complied with; the term ‘control’ means the sanctions against 
or prosecution of companies that may result from non-compliance.3111 Under this 
model, the legal function provides legal advice whereas the compliance function 
developed the detailed systems for explaining, monitoring, and enforcing those 
requirements.3112 However, the interviewees also saw the limits of the data 
gathered by means of such process.3113 In addition, they observed challenges like 
having adequate time and resources coping with being seen as a cost center for 
                                                     
3106 RICHARD MOORHEAD & STEVEN VAUGHAN, LEGAL RISK: DEFINITION, MANAGEMENT AND 
ETHICS 2 (2015). 
3107 Id. at 15. 
3108 Id. at 17. 
3109 Id. at 18. 
3110 P. McMagnus, Environmental Regulation, ELSEVIER LTD. (2009). 
3111 ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: 
THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 106 (2nd ed. 2012). 
3112 MOORHEAD AND VAUGHAN, supra note 3104 at 18. 
3113 Id. at 18. 
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the business as well as coping with changing business and regulatory 
environments.3114 
As has been shown above, the function of corporate compliance officer does 
not comprise primary responsibility for establishing and maintaining a 
compliance program within UK companies outside the regulated sector. 
Compared to the US corporate compliance officer, the UK compliance officer is 
more engaged in assessing risks, gathering and evaluating data. Finally, although 
there is legislative enforcement of directors’ duties in the area of company and 
bribery law, no legal requirement for the appointment of a separate compliance 
function is found for UK companies in the private sector. 
c.  Indemnity Agreements  –  Protection for Compliance Officers  
As has been outlined above, in the UK, the company directors, the senior 
management functions, the company secretary and the corporate compliance 
officers are also responsible for corporate compliance.3115 The compliance officer 
usually has a contract of employment and is considered to be an employee. 
Therefore, he is subject to the same protection of employment rights as the other 
employees. However, as we have seen, the compliance officer may also face 
regulatory action personally if they fail to meet their responsibilities and the 
higher degree of duty of care. This is why, compliance officers ought to carefully 
consider their personal liability. The Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) 
recommends that compliance officers should conclude an indemnity agreement 
with their employers.3116 Specifically, at first, they should identify and document 
their role, their duties and confirmation that they can access relevant business 
information within the company.3117 These clauses should be added to their 
contract of employment. Next, compliance officers should ensure that they have 
access to independent external legal advice for their personal use and should 
attempt to include an indemnity “from the practice for liabilities arising from their role 
                                                     
3114 Id. at 19. 
3115 See supra II., p. p. 368; III., p. 398; IV. p. 424. 
3116 SRA, COMPLIANCE OFFICERS - THE LAW SOCIETY COMPLIANCE OFFICERS (2016), 
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/practice-notes/compliance-
officers/#co6 (last visited Nov 7, 2016). 
3117 Id. 
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to the extent permissible by law.”3118 In addition, compliance officers should take out 
professional indemnity insurance or other insurance products which will protect 
themselves against fines and penalties.3119 However, compliance officers need to 
bear in mind that they will not receive “an indemnity against liability resulting 
from their own unlawful conduct.”3120 
5. Comparison of Employment Rights under UK and US Employment Law 
As stated previously, US employment law does not feature any form of 
protection against dismissal,3121 although American common law is pervaded by 
federal employment protection law such as anti-discrimination legislation.3122 
There are no dedicated employment courts or tribunals.3123 Therefore, the timeline 
for litigating an employment-related claim may take as long as 613 days.3124 The 
basic principle under American common law in the area of labor law is the 
employment at-will doctrine.3125 Every State in the US, except Montana, uses the 
employment at-will doctrine.3126 Only a few states require any explanation on the 
termination of a contract of employment.3127 In all other instances, the employer 
can terminate the contract of employment at any time without notice and 
cause.3128 However, as shown above, there are also common-law exceptions to the 
US at-will doctrine. Another characteristic of the American employment 
relationship is that a number of compliance officers do not have a written contract 
of employment.  
As regards the sources of employment law, it has been noted that UK 
common law is based on more than common law principle and domestic 
                                                     
3118 Id. 
3119 Id. 
3120 Id. 
3121 See supra Chapter 4, A., II., III., 1, p. 305. 
3122 See e.g. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 1964 (CRA), supra note 2041. 
3123 HAY, supra note 126 at 243. 
3124 Estreicher and Hirsch, supra note 2029 at 456. 
3125 HAY, supra note 126 at 245. 
3126 See Exception of Monatana: WRONGFUL DISCHARGE FROM EMPLOYMENT ACT 1987, Title 
39. Labor Ch. 641, (1987); See in: Estreicher and Hirsch, supra note 2029 at 465. 
3127 Estreicher and Hirsch, supra note 2036 at 479, Table 12. 
3128 See supra Chapter 4, A., II., III.1, p. 305. 
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legislation. Employment rights also derive from EU law.3129 Hence, in the UK, the 
employer is required to provide for the employee “a written statement of particulars 
of employment.”3130 Thus, the UK compliance officer will usually receive a written 
contract with legally stipulated terms. Under the Employment Rights Act 1996, 
the UK compliance officer, as an employee, has the right to claim for unfair 
dismissal when he or she has been employed for a period of not less than two 
years.3131 This claim must be enforced in an Employment Tribunal.  
In conclusion, the at-will doctrine under United States employment law 
differs significantly from the position in the United Kingdom. It also reflects 
differences in employee protection against wrongful termination. It appears that 
the corporate compliance officer is more efficient protected under employment 
rights in the UK than the US corporate compliance officer. However, it needs to 
be taken into account that the UK compliance officer in the financial services 
sector could be banned from performing the compliance oversight function by the 
UK regulator. In both the US and the UK, compliance officers may also face 
personal liability where they fail to meet their responsibilities and duties. They 
should therefore consider an indemnity agreement as an amendment to their 
employment contract.  
B. THE UK CODE AND THE NEED FOR GREATER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Having examined and compared the primary law, English Company Law 
and the Bribery Act with respect to compliance, the next part of this chapter deals 
with the soft law or secondary law, such as Codes and Rules relating to 
compliance and the compliance officer in the UK. As previously discussed, the 
question that arose in the course of various corporate scandals and a series of 
financial market crises attributable to governance failures, is how to provide an 
appropriate level of monitoring of management.3132 There was a lack of 
shareholder and investors control over corporate affairs. Since 1990, the answer 
                                                     
3129 See supra IV., p. 424. 
3130 EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 1996, supra note 2924 § 1 (1). 
3131 Id.§ 92 (3). 
3132 N.V. OKOYE, BEHAVIOURAL RISKS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: REGULATORY 
INTERVENTION AS A RISK MANAGEMENT MECHANISM 1 (2015). 
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has been the enactment of new legislation and the corporate governance reform 
over the last few decades in both the US and the UK, with corporate governance 
being recognized as a mechanism that could prevent corporate failures.3133 There 
is no single accepted definition of the meaning of corporate governance. A 
narrow UK definition of corporate governance can be found in the Cadbury 
Report (1992) as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled.”3134 For 
the purpose of the examination of the UK Code, it will be applied the following 
definition by Solomon: 
Corporate governance is the system of checks and balances, both internal and external 
to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their 
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity.3135 
The reason for this is that this broader definition also describes the internal 
and external relationships of a company. Today, one of the trademark of English 
corporate governance is “a separation of ownership and control.”3136 Therefore, 
nowadays, English Company Law and the corporate governance reform focus on 
increasing managerial accountability, especially for company directors and 
officers.3137 As previously discussed, contrary to the mandatory provisions of the 
US SOX, the UK response to corporate governance failure has been the “comply or 
explain” approach.3138 Until the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992, the 
governance of companies was regulated by custom together with stock exchange 
requirements and some basic rules laid down by company law.3139 In the EU 
Member States, ten Codes on corporate governance were issued between 1991 to 
1997.3140 Six of them were issued in the UK, e.g. the Cadbury Report (1992) and the 
                                                     
3133 DAVIES, supra note 2654 at 21; See also Corporate Governance Prabhakar, supra note 
1525; THE CADBURY REPORT (1992), supra note 817 para 1.9; OKOYE, supra note 2916 at 1. 
3134 THE CADBURY REPORT (1992), supra note 817 at 2. 
3135 J. SOLOMON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 14 (2nd ed. 2007). 
3136 B.R. Cheffins, The Undermining of UK Corporate Governance(?), 33 OXFORD JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 503–533, 503 (2013); B.R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: 
BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED (2010). 
3137 Cheffins, supra note 3134 at 503. 
3138 See Chapter 2, B., p. 92; Chapter 3, A., II., 1., p. 145. 
3139 AZIZAH ABDULLAH & MICHAEL PAGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE: UK FTSE 350 COMPANIES VI (2009). 
3140 WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 2385 at 8. 
454 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
Greenbury Report (1995) by committees which developed corporate governance 
issues and mechanisms in order to increase its effectiveness.3141 
Although the Cadbury Report of 1992, later the Combined Code and today 
the UK Corporate Governance Code influence the internal governance structure 
within companies, they are not legally binding through company law.3142 
Nevertheless, the reports which followed after the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 
found that the behavior of company directors is not appropriate in the application 
of governance processes.3143 The reason is that the directors failed to inform the 
shareholders sufficiently and the company risk management was not properly 
overseen, monitored and reviewed at the board.3144 
Pursuant to the Companies Act 2006, company directors are responsible for 
the management of the company’s business, for which purpose they may exercise 
all the powers of the company.3145 The first directors and the company secretary 
are appointed and their power is granted by the shareholders.3146 Similar to US 
State Corporation Law, directors are permitted to delegate any of the powers, e.g. 
their duties, to management executives such as officers or a committee.3147 
However, this delegation cannot eliminate the director’s primary responsibility 
for the company’s management.3148 All other corporate officers are required to act 
in accordance with instructions from the directors.3149 English Company Law 
                                                     
3141 See e.g. the Cadbury (1992), the Greenbury (1995), the Hampel (1998) and the Turnbull 
(1999 and 2005) committee and reports; See in ABDULLAH AND PAGE, supra note 3137 at 7 
Table 2.1 - Development of UK Corporate Governance; OKOYE, supra note 3130 at 2. 
3142 See THE CADBURY REPORT 1992 , supra note 817; THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE, supra note 468; DAVIES, supra note 2654 at 22. See also chronologically Chapter 3, A., 
II., 1., p. 145. 
3143 OKOYE, supra note 2916 at 2; DAVID WALKER, ICSA, BOARDROOM BEHAVIOURS 7 (2009) 
para 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. 
3144 WALKER AND ICSA, supra note 3141 at 7 para 3.1.1. 
3145 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 20; MODEL ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION FOR 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC COMPANIES, Table A SCHEDULE 1 (2014) Art. 3. 
3146 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, §§ 20, 156; MODEL ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION FOR 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC COMPANIES, supra note 2929 Art. 5; See in: OKOYE, supra note 2916 at 
214. 
3147 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 20; MODEL ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION FOR 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC COMPANIES, supra note 2929 Art. 5. 
3148 OKOYE, supra note 3130 at 109. 
3149 Id. at 109. 
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states that company directors are included in the group of company managers, 
who have duties in respect of the company.3150 
Therefore, the next sections introduce the most important provisions of the 
UK Corporate Governance Code 2016 and the UK Listing Rules in terms of the 
main principles, structures, approaches and processes which are developed in 
order to establish effective behavior of the members of board and compliance 
with rules. 
I. The UK Corporate Governance Code 2016 – The UK Code 
Generally, a code can be defined as a “non-binding set of principles, standards 
or best practices, issued by a collective body and relating to the internal governance of 
corporations.”3151 The UK Code was created to guide the board on an effective 
practice and it is part of a framework of best practice standards to improve high 
quality corporate governance.3152 It was issued by committees organized by the 
government.3153 It focuses on the principles of good governance, accountability, 
transparency, probity, and the relationship between the company and its 
shareholders.3154 The UK Code contains main and supporting principles as well as 
provisions. The version of 2016 applies after June 2016 and to all companies with 
a listing of shares, regardless of where they are incorporated.3155 The updated 
version of the UK Code was necessitated by consequential changes from the 
implementation of the European Union’s Audit Regulation and Directive in 
                                                     
3150 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, §§ 154 to 156, 171 to 177. 
3151 See e.g. Andrew Keay, Comply or explain in corporate governance codes: in need of greater 
regulatory oversight?: Comply or explain in corporate governance codes, 34 LEGAL STUDIES 279–
304, 279–280 (2014); WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 2385 at 1. 
3152 FRC, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), https://frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Final-Draft-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-
2016.pdf, Preface para 1 [hereinafter The UK Code]. 
3153 Chronologically, the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998) and Turnbull 
(1999) Committees; See e.g. The Cadbury Report (1992) , supra note 816. 
3154 FRC, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016) 5, https://frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Final-Draft-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-
2016.pdf para 5. 
3155 Id. at 5. para 6. 
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2016.3156 As a result, e.g. provision C.3 of the Code was reviewed and amended in 
accordance with the European legislation.3157  
1. The “Comply or Explain” Approach or Compliance Mechanism of the Code 
In most instances, the concept of such a Code is the’omply or explain’ 
approach.3158 This ‘comply or explain’ approach is referred to as the “trademark” or 
“the heart of the voluntary corporate governance code”.3159 This flexible approach 
allows listed companies to choose either to comply with the principles of the 
Codes or to explain why they do not, which means companies have the choice to 
opt out of the recommendations of the Code.3160 Therefore, listed companies need 
not implement the substantive Code provisions.3161 However, the stock exchange 
listing requirements impose admission and disclosure standards for listed 
companies based on the degree to which they comply with Code 
recommendations.3162 For example, listed companies on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) have to include in their annual financial reports a statement on 
how they have applied the main principles set out in the UK Code and, where 
they have not complied with the relevant provisions, they have to explain the 
reasons for non-compliance.3163 Hence, the disclosure statement of the UK Code 
                                                     
3156 DIRECTIVE 2014/56/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL AMENDING 
DIRECTIVE 2006/43/EC ON STATUTORY AUDITS OF ANNUAL ACCOUNTS AND CONSOLIDATED 
ACCOUNTS, L 158/196 (2014); REGULATION (EU) NO 537/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL ON  SPECIFIC  REQUIREMENTS REGARDING STATUTORY AUDIT OF PUBLIC-
INTEREST ENTITIES AND REPEALING COMMISSION DECISION 2005/909/EC, L 158/77 (2014); THE 
UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2924 Preface para 5. 
3157 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2924 Preface para 5, 
Provision C.3.1-C.3.8. 
3158 See e.g. Keay, supra note 3149 at 280; WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 2385 at 
2. 
3159 See e.g. Andrew Keay, Comply or explain in corporate governance codes: in need of greater 
regulatory oversight?: Comply or explain in corporate governance codes, 34 LEGAL STUDIES 279–
304, 279 (2014); THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2924 para 1. 
3160 See e.g. Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 469 at 193; THE UK CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2924 at 4 para 1. 
3161 WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 2385 at 2. 
3162 Id. at 2.; Admissions and Disclosure Standards LSE, supra note 2367 at 71 B8. 
3163 Admissions and Disclosure Standards LSE, supra note 2367 at 71 B8, 32.3.1 and 32.3.2. 
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are strengthened.3164 Finally, this disclosure requirement for listed companies 
could lead to pressure to comply with the Code provisions.3165 In addition, where 
the LSE considers that a listed company has breached its obligations under the 
exchange standards and Listing Rules, the LSE may take disciplinary action 
against this company.3166 Legal scholars are afraid that this pressure of compliance 
on companies could lead to a ‘compliance-driven box-ticking’ approach to 
monitoring.3167 The Hampel Committee has already reviewed this risk to help 
prevent companies from pursuing a ‘box-ticking’ approach.3168 
In conclusion, the ‘comply or explain’ approach of the UK Code encourages 
listed companies to comply with the Code in connection with the London Stock 
Exchange Standards and Listing Rules. This combination creates a voluntary 
mechanism and nature of the corporate governance principles and 
recommendations relating to disclosure requirements.3169 
2. The Main Provisions of UK Codes as regards Compliance 
This section analyzes three of the eighteen provisions of the UK Code 2016 
with respect to compliance. As already noted, the UK Code is based on principles 
and provisions. The principles comprise main and supporting principles, which 
are preceded by the provisions.3170 The UK Code contains five main principles. 
These are: leadership, effectiveness, accountability, remuneration and the 
director-shareholder relationship, which is the heart of the Code.3171 They are 
important for the board where they determine how the board should operate 
according to the Code.3172 
                                                     
3164 WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 2385 at 2. 
3165 Id. at 2. 
3166 Admissions and Disclosure Standards LSE, supra note 2367 at 73 B10, 36. 
3167 See e.g. Keay, supra note 3149 at 289, 297. 
3168 ABDULLAH AND PAGE, supra note 3137 at 7 Table 2.1. 
3169 OKOYE, supra note 3130 at 162; WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 2385 at 19 
Table C. 
3170 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2929 at 4 para 2. 
3171 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016) Id. at 4. para 2. 
3172 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016) Id. at 4. para 2. 
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At first, the provisions of the Code focus on the duties of the members of 
the board as a supervisory body that is distinct from senior management.3173 
Various corporate scandals led to the need for a distinction between the control 
and execution function within companies. Therefore, the UK Code emphasizes 
the composition of the board in order to establish the independence between the 
supervisory and managerial function.3174 For example, Code provision A.3.1 states 
that 
A chief executive should not go on to be chairman of the same company.3175 
Secondly, according to the UK Code, the effectiveness of a board is 
enhanced by its structure and procedures. Under the principle in Section B, the 
Code sets out the composition of the board.  
The board should include an appropriate combination of executive and non-executive 
directors.3176 
However, a 2002 survey of FTSE chairmen found that the structure of the 
board and its independent members are of secondary importance to the 
effectiveness.3177 In their view, an important issue is, for example, the international 
experience of the members of the board.3178 Today, the UK Code 2016 states that 
“the board and its committees should have the appropriate balance of skills, experience, 
independence and knowledge.”3179 The required board composition was already 
standard practice for larger companies with dominant shareholders listed on the 
London Stock Exchange.3180 A study by Abdullah and Page shows the typical UK 
board structure of FTSE 350 non-financial companies in 2004, which comprises 
                                                     
3173 WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 2385 at 77. 
3174 Id. at 77. 
3175 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2929 at 8 A.3.1. 
3176 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2016) Id. at 10. B.1 . 
3177 RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOCIATES, WHAT MAKES AN EFFECTIVE UK BOARD? VIEWS FROM 
FTSE CHAIRMEN. (2002); See in: ABDULLAH AND PAGE, supra note 3137 at 13. 
3178 RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOCIATES, supra note 3175; See in: ABDULLAH AND PAGE, supra 
note 3137 at 13. 
3179 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2931 at 5. 
3180 Cheffins, supra note 3134 at 522. 
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four executive directors and five non-executives of whom four were 
independent.3181 
In addition, the Code sets out provisions that refer to disclosure obligations, 
such as B.1.1.  
The board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director it considers 
to be independent.3182 
In detail, the Code includes specific requirements for disclosure in the 
annual report in order to comply with certain provisions, for example the names 
of the chairman, the deputy chairman, the chief executive, the senior independent 
director and the chairmen and members of the board committees and the names 
of the non-executive directors.3183 This information should be made available 
through placing on the company’s website.3184 
Finally, the last provision that will be examined refers directly to the 
compliance duties of the board: 
The board should monitor the company’s risk management and internal control 
systems and, at least annually, carry out a review of their effectiveness, and report on that 
review in the annual report. The monitoring and review should cover all material 
controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls.3185 
Therefore, the UK Code clearly points to the accountability of the board in 
terms of compliance. The board is responsible for determining and assessing the 
company’s risks and should maintain the internal control systems.3186  
It is clear from the foregoing that the main aim of the UK Code 2016 is to 
ensure that shareholders are empowered to make an informed evaluation of the 
company.3187 The provisions of the UK Code support and benefit of shareholders, 
                                                     
3181 FTSE 350 See supra footnote 867, p. 153; ABDULLAH AND PAGE, supra note 3137 at 8. 
3182 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2929 at 10 B.1.1. 
3183 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016) Id. at 28–29. See e.g. Schedule B - A.1.2., 
B.1.1, etc. 
3184 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016) Id. at 29.; See e.g. Card Factory, BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS, http://www.cardfactoryinvestors.com/about-us/board-of-directors.aspx 
(last visited Nov 15, 2016). 
3185 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2929 C.2.3. 
3186 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016) Id. at 17. Main Principle C.2. 
3187  Keay, supra note 3159 at 279. 
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helping them, for example, to hold directors to account.3188 Nevertheless, there has 
been more focus on the corporate structure and far less focus on the behavior of 
corporate directors or officers in the UK.3189 The UK Code guides in general terms 
and principles but cannot guarantee good corporate behavior of directors or 
officers.3190 For this reason, it is essential to assess the capacity of directors because 
there is a lack of evaluation of the relationship between the personality and 
behavior of the directors.3191 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the board has the power and the duty to 
monitor the management.3192 In addition, the distinction between the executive 
directors and non-executive directors could be a distinction between the 
supervisory role and the management role within the board.3193 Generally, non-
executive directors are regarded as directors with no contract of employment. 
They should manage and judge independently the company and its affairs free 
from business considerations. Finally, it has been noted that the UK Code does 
not include any provision referring to officers such as a compliance officer. 
3. The Effect of the UK Code on Compliance by FTSE 350 Companies 
Following the examination of the goal, approach and main provisions in 
terms of compliance, this section reviews the impact of the UK Code regarding 
compliance by the largest listed companies in the UK. As already defined in a 
narrow sense, compliance refers to the duty to obey the rules or law. In a broader 
sense, it also includes the board of directors making decisions lawfully and acting 
in good faith.3194 As has been noted, the structure of the senior or top management 
is not based on law.3195 Similar to US Corporation Law, the location of power is 
laid down in the articles of association.3196 Hence, the companies can structure 
                                                     
3188  COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, supra note 2462 at 9 para 2.7. 
3189  OKOYE, supra note 3130 at 35. 
3190  Id. at 35. 
3191 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2931 at 5; OKOYE, supra note 
2968 at 41. 
3192 Mäntysaari, supra note 2486 at 104 
3193  Davies, supra note 2647 at 8.. 
3194 COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, supra note 2462 at 29 para 3.40. 
3195 MÄNTYSAARI, supra note 2476 at 104. 
3196 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 554 § 18; Mäntysaari, supra note 2486 at 104. 
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their management in different ways and have the freedom to make their own 
rules about their internal affairs.3197 However, the UK Code recommends how 
they can govern the company in the best interests of shareholders and society. 
The board of directors should lead by example and ensure good standards of 
behavior throughout the company in order to prevent misconduct.3198 
The UK Code aims to improve the long-term success of companies by 
putting in place an appropriate corporate governance structure.3199 It has been 
established that, under the UK Code, there is increasing pressure for listed 
companies, like the FTSE 350, to separate the role of the chairman and the CEO, to 
structure the audit committee, to increase the number and role of non-executive 
directors (NEDs) and especially of independent NEDs in the UK.3200 The Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) states that 99 percent of the FTSE 350 companies and 99 
percent of smaller companies are in compliance with Provision A.2.1 of the Code, 
92 percent of the FTSE 350 companies and 88 percent of smaller companies are in 
compliance with Provision B.1.2 and 97 percent of the FTSE 350 companies and 94 
percent of smaller companies meet the Provision C.3.1 requirement for the audit 
committee structure.3201 In addition, listed companies or an issuer on the London 
Stock Exchange must be aware that there could be a binding force under stock 
exchange rules such as the UK Listing Rules.3202 Hence, listed companies have 
learned that, today, non-compliance with the provisions of the Code is not 
sustainable and they should not underestimate the importance of the Corporate 
                                                     
3197  Companies Act 2006, supra note 555, Commentary on Section 18. 
3198 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2932 at 2 para 4. 
3199 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016) Id. at 2. Preface, para 1. 
3200 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2932 A.2.1, B.1.2, C.3.1; FTSE 
350 London Stock Exchange, supra note 869. 
3201 The FRC maintains codes and standards. See FRC, supra note 831; FRC, DEVELOPMENTS 
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STEWARDSHIP 2015 5 (2016) Table - Compliance with 
selected provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
3202 Admissions and Disclosure Standards LSE, supra note 2367 at 73 B.8 Corporate 
Governance para 32. The term issuer in the UK is defined as follows: “Any company or 
other legal person or undertaking (including a public- sector issuer) any class of whose 
securities has been admitted, or is proposed to be, the subject of an application for 
admission to trading.” See in: Id. at 5. 
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Governance Code quite apart from the hard or primary law such as company law 
or the law on bribery.3203  
The current Grant Thornton 2016 Corporate Governance Review of FTSE 
350 companies revealed that full compliance with the UK Code has risen at 62 
percent.3204 This Review comprised an analysis of the annual report with a sample 
of 308 of these companies.3205 The fact is that regardless of this success, a 
significant challenge remains in applying the provisions of the Code to larger 
companies. The greatest gap between compliance and non-compliance remains 
the independence of directors and chairs.3206 The Review found that Code 
Provision B.1.2. has the greatest rate of non-compliance with 28.7 percent of FTSE 
350.3207 Only 7.8 percent of the FTSE 350 companies do not comply with the 
separation of the role of the chair and chief executive.3208 Finally, only 19 percent 
of these companies provide good or detailed explanations of how they review the 
effectiveness of their internal controls regarding UK Code Provision C.2.3.3209  
The Grant Thornton Review shows on the one hand that the UK Code 
improves transparency and the accountability of the boards of directors in 
particular regarding what information must be made available in- and outside the 
company.3210 The UK Code and the Listing Rules have enforced compliance for 
listed companies through disclosure.3211 However, it can hardly be said that 
corporate compliance has been strengthened given the non-conformity with 
provisions of the UK Code based on decisions of the company’s shareholders. If 
                                                     
3203 DAVIES, supra note 2637 at 23. 
3204 Grant Thornton, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 2016 3 (2016), 
http://www.grantthornton.co.uk/globalassets/1.-member-firms/united-
kingdom/pdf/publication/2016/2016-corporate-governance-review.pdf (last visited Nov 
20, 2016) [hereinafter Grant Thornton Review 2016]. 
3205 GRANT THORNTON REVIEW 2016, Id. at 1. 
3206 GRANT THORNTON REVIEW 2016, Id. at 3. 
3207 GRANT THORNTON REVIEW 2016, Id. at 26. Table- Areas companies list as non-
compliant. 
3208 GRANT THORNTON REVIEW 2016, Id. at 26.; THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
(2016), supra note 2931 at 8 Provision A.2.1. 
3209 GRANT THORNTON REVIEW 2016, supra note 2973 at 53; The UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2016), supra note 2931 at 17 Provision C.2.3. 
3210 GRANT THORNTON REVIEW 2016, supra note 2983. 
3211 See supra II. footnote 3217, p. 531 - The UK Listing Rules (DTR) and (LR) 
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the shareholders agree, the provision is ignored.3212 In accordance with the 
Thornton Review, the board structure and composition remains the most 
important issue for non-compliance with the Code.3213  
On the other hand, the UK Code 2016 and its predecessors have no 
statutory force. Listed companies are required by the Listing Rules to disclose in 
their annual report that they have governed the company in compliance with the 
provisions of the Code.3214 In the event of non-conformity or non-compliance, 
shareholders can take appropriate actions against the company.3215 Following the 
Grant Thornton Review and the studies by Arcot et al. and Abdullah and Page, it 
has been recognized, that since 1992, the main significance of the Code has been 
in developing an effective framework for compliance in the UK.3216 
II. The UK Listing Rules  
Corporate governance disclosure requirements are stipulated not only in 
the UK Code, but also in the FCA Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR), 
which set out certain mandatory provisions and in the FCA Listing Rules (LR) in 
the FCA Handbook, which includes the ‘comply or explain’ requirement.3217 The 
purpose of these requirements was to implement parts of the Accounting 
Directive.3218 This Directive requires both credit institutions and investment firms 
to publish a corporate governance statement “in order to strengthen legal 
compliance and corporate governance.”3219 Nevertheless, DTR 7.2 also applies to 
                                                     
3212 OKOYE, supra note 3130 at 83. 
3213 Id. at 84.; The Grant Thornton Review 2016 , supra note 3202 at 26. 
3214 COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, supra note 2462 at 61 para 3.117. 
3215 Id. at 61. para 3.117. 
3216 See e.g. Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 469; ABDULLAH AND PAGE, supra 
note 2923; GRANT THORNTON REVIEW 2016, supra note 2973. 
3217 FCA, DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE AND TRANSPARENCY RULES SOURCEBOOK (DTR) (2016), 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DTR.pdf (last visited Nov 26, 2016) Sub-Ch. 
7.1 and 7.2; LR 9.8.6 and 9.8.7 FCA, supra note 2390; See in: THE UK CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2931 Schedule B. 
3218 DTR 1B.1.4 FCA, supra note 3215; DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL (CRD IV DIRECTIVE), supra note 1073. 
3219 DTR 1B.1.4 FCA, supra note 3215; DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL (CRD IV DIRECTIVE), supra note 1073 at (61). 
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issuers, which are listed on the LSE and which are companies within the meaning 
of Section 1(1) of the Companies Act 2006.3220 As stated previously, pursuant to 
Section 1 of the CA 2006, a “company” is defined as a “company formed and 
registered under this Act”.3221 DTR 7.2 states that an issuer “must include a 
corporate governance statement in its directors’ report.”3222 However, there is an 
exemption to the DTR 7.2.8 AR for smaller and medium-sized companies as 
defined in the Companies Act 2006.3223 The other issuers must include a corporate 
governance statement in their directors’ report.3224 This report must comprise the 
following information: 
(1) the corporate governance code to which the issuer is subject; 
(2) the corporate governance code which the issuer may have voluntarily decided to 
apply; and 
(3) all relevant information about the corporate governance practices applied over and 
above the requirements of national law.3225 
In addition, the issuer must state where the code is publicly available, 
where it departs from that code and its reasons for doing so.3226 The issuer also 
has to describe the main features of its internal control and risk management 
systems.3227 Finally, the issuer has to state the composition and operation of its 
administrative, management and supervisory bodies and its committees.3228 
                                                     
3220 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 1(1); DTR 1B.1.5 FCA, supra note 2990. 
3221 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, § 1(1). 
3222 DTR 7.2.1 FCA, supra note 3215. 
3223 DTR 1B.1.7R, 7.2.8AR Id.; COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555, §§ 382 to 383, 465 to 
466. According to the CA 2006 a small company has not more than £6.5 million turnover, 
not more than £3.26 million balance sheet total and not more than 50 employees. 
Generally, a medium-sized company has not more than £25.9 million turnover, not more 
than £12.9 million balance sheet total and not more than 250 employees. 
3224 DTR 7.2.1 R FCA, supra note 3215. 
3225 DTR 7.2.2 R Id. 
3226 DTR 7.2.3 R Id. 
3227 DTR 7.2.5 R Id. 
3228 DTR 7.2.7 R Id. 
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The Listing Rules for the UK apply to issuers with a Premium listing of 
shares on the London Stock Exchange.3229 The requirements for these companies 
are set forth in LR 9.8.6. Their annual report must include a statement on how 
they have applied the five main principles set out in the UK Code.3230 This 
statement should enable the shareholders to evaluate how the issuer has applied 
the principles.3231 Furthermore, the Premium listed company must state that it has 
complied with all relevant provisions set out in the UK Code.3232 In the event that 
the issuer has not complied, it must disclose those provisions that it has not 
complied with and set out the reasons for non-compliance.3233 
Overall, it has been noted that there are some overlaps between certain 
mandatory disclosures required under the DTR and those provisions under the 
UK Code 2016.3234 Hence, compliance with certain provisions of the Code results 
in compliance with the relevant DTR.3235 It has been recognized that the present 
UK Code and the Listing Rules enhanced through disclosure transparency as to 
how companies govern their structure with which individuals. Based on this 
information, it is possible to identify potential risks for certain behavior in 
corporate governance. It has been shown that company directors are the primary 
                                                     
3229 “The Premium segment is only open to equity shares issued by trading companies and 
closed and open-ended investment entities. Issuers with a Premium Listing are required 
to meet the UK’s super-equivalent rules which are higher than the EU minimum 
requirements. As Premium Listed companies comply with the UK’s highest standards of 
regulation and corporate governance, as a consequence they may enjoy a lower cost of 
capital through greater transparency and through building investor confidence.” See LSE, 
ABOUT THE MAIN MARKET - LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-
market/main/market.htm (last visited Dec 1, 2016). 
3230 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2931 Main Principles, 
Schedule B. 
3231 Handbook FCA, supra note 863 LR 9.8.6; See in: THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE (2016), supra note 2931 Schedule B. 
3232 Handbook FCA, supra note 863 LR 9.8.6; See in: THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE (2016), supra note 2931 Schedule B. 
3233 Handbook FCA, supra note 863 LR 9.8.6; See in: THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE (2016), supra note 2931 Schedule B. 
3234 See e.g. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2016) THE UK CODE 2016, supra note 3150 
Provision A.1.1, A.1.2; DTR 7.2.7 R FCA, supra note 3215. 
3235 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2016), supra note 2932 at 25 Schedule B. 
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corporate managers and accountable for corporate performance. In conclusion, 
the evidence highlights that good corporate governance, both as principles and 
processes, can affect responsible corporate behavior and balance the interests of 
shareholders and internal stakeholders of the company.  
III. Comparison between the “mandatory” Approach of the SOX and the 
“comply or explain” Approach of the UK Code  
This section compares the ‘mandatory’ approach of the SOX and the ‘comply 
or explain’ approach of the UK Code by summarizing the most important findings 
in the foregoing chapters four and five regarding the content of disclosure 
requirements and the impact thereof on corporate governance and compliance. 
The table below presents an overview of mandatory and voluntary requirements 
placed on listed companies on the US and UK Stock Exchanges with regard to 
corporate governance and compliance. Both the Act and the Code apply to listed 
companies and to issuers or public companies on the exchanges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18 - Comparison between the mandatory and voluntary Requirements placed on 
Issuers on the US and UK Stock Exchanges 
Subject SOX 2002 UK Code 2016 
Source Federal Securities Law 
Primary Law 
Code – Set of Principles 
Secondary Law 
Regulator and its 
Rules 
SEC - Mandatory SEC Disclosure 
Rules. 
FCA - DTR and LR Admission and 
Disclosure Standards of the LSE 
Stock Exchanges NYSE, NASDAQ LSE 
Application Extraterritorial, Global Impact  All companies with a premium 
listing of shares, regardless of 
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where they are incorporated. 
Definition of 
Issuer 
A company that has registered 
securities on the U.S. Exchange (§ 2) 
Any company or other legal person 
or undertaking any class of whose 
securities has been admitted, or is 
proposed to be, the subject of an 
application for admission to 
trading. (DTR p.5) 
Disclosure of 
Accounting 
Each financial report that contains 
financial statements, and that is 
required to be pre-pared in 
accordance with (or reconciled to) 
generally accepted accounting 
principles under this title shall reflect 
all material correcting adjustments. (§ 
401) 
The directors should explain in the 
annual report their responsibility 
for preparing the annual report and 
accounts. Provision C.1.1 
Corporate 
Responsibility for 
financial Reports 
and Disclosure  
Required Certification by CEOs and 
CFOs (§ 302) 
 
The directors should confirm that 
they have carried out a robust 
assessment of the principal risks. 
Provision C.2.1 
Individual 
Accountability 
The financial statements of corporate 
officers shall certify that the periodic 
report containing the financial 
statement fully complies with the 
requirements. (§ 906) 
The annual report should identify 
members of the board and board 
committees. Provision A.1.2 
Auditor 
Independence 
Establishment of a Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board to 
oversee the audit of public 
companies, (§ 101) 
Establishment of an Audit 
Committee of independent non-
executive directors. Provision C.3.1. 
Disclosure of 
Compliance 
Mandatory (See Form 8-K and Form 
10-K) 
Statement of “comply or 
explain”concerning the relevant 
provisions of the Code. 
Corporate 
Governance 
The responsibility of management for 
establishing and maintaining an 
The board should monitor the 
company’s risk management and 
468 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
Structure adequate internal control structure. (§ 
401 (1)) 
internal control systems. Provision 
C.2.3 
Specific Duties Fiduciary Duty of Care, Professional 
Responsibility for Attorneys (§307 (1)) 
The board and its committees 
should have the appropriate 
balance of skills, experience, 
independence and knowledge. 
(Main Principle) 
Penalties Whoever knowingly alters or 
destroys any record or document 
shall be fined with imprisonment. 
(§§ 802, 807) 
Shareholders can bring an action 
against the company in the event of 
non-conformity or non-compliance 
with the Code. 
 
Although the SOX is primary or hard law and the UK Code secondary or 
soft law, the disclosure requirements incumbent upon companies are similar. 
While comparing the content of mandatory and voluntary requirements it could 
be argued that the SOX provisions are more detailed as regards to individual 
accountability and the enforcement thereof. Compared with the UK Code, the 
SOX requires additional professional responsibility: a duty of care. Non-
compliance with the law may result in criminal penalties. Furthermore, by 
reviewing the mandatory requirements of the SOX, it could be assumed that 
board and director independence and better board governance will be positively 
associated with greater mandatory disclosure completeness and timeless.3236 
However, the empirical evidence identified in the studies, shows that this link is 
not so clear cut.3237  
As mentioned previously, a trademark or hallmark of UK corporate 
governance has been “a separation of ownership and control.”3238 It includes inter alia 
the enhancement of managerial accountability, similar to the US.3239 UK corporate 
governance also involves the company’s risk management and monitoring of 
                                                     
3236 Choudhary, Schloetzer, and Sturgess, supra note 1589. 
3237 Id. 
3238 Cheffins, supra note 3134 at 503. 
3239 Id. at 503. 
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internal control systems through rules.3240 Such control can be described as a 
system of checks and balances that regulates the relationships both inside and 
outside the ﬁrm.  
The US system has attempted to enhance disclosure requirements for 
companies through a statute and mandatory provisions, as opposed to the 
concept of “comply or explain”, which is at the core of the voluntary Code in the 
UK.3241 This concept or approach means that, if a company does not comply with a 
certain provision, it has to clearly state this, along with an explanation of why it 
does not.3242 These company statements are not assessed by regulators.3243 The aim 
of the UK “comply or explain” approach is for the shareholders to evaluate the 
non-comply statements of the company and then decide whether they will take 
any action against the company.3244 In listed companies, shareholders are 
separated from the day-to-day operations of the company. Therefore, this 
evaluation increases monitoring of the directors and other employees in order to 
prevent misconduct. This is stimulated through the provisions of the Code and 
effective control structures of corporate governance. It can be argued that a high 
level of stakeholder engagement or stewardship by shareholders has developed a 
compliance culture within companies in the UK. In sum, the UK Code has 
focused more on the development of corporate governance structures and far less 
focus on the behavior of corporate directors or officers than the provisions of the 
SOX. 
However, the ‘comply or explain’ approach faces two major problems. On the 
one hand, the explanations concerning non-compliance by companies are very 
often brief and uninformative; on the other hand, the shareholders do not 
sufficiently pay attention that the board provides adequate explanations.3245 For 
this reason, there are considerations in the UK as to whether the establishment of 
a regulator could ensure the veracity of the statements and the quality of the 
                                                     
3240 The UK Corporate Governance Code THE UK CODE 2016, supra note 3150 at 17 
Provision C.2.3. 
3241 Keay, supra note 3149 at 279. 
3242 Id. at 279. 
3243 Id. at 279. 
3244 Id. at 279. 
3245 Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468 at 200; Keay, supra note 3149 at 303. 
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explanations provided by companies.3246 At present, these problems remain 
unsolved and are a matter for future debate. As such, in conclusion, it is difficult 
to say which approach works better and both the mandatory and the voluntary 
approach have a part to play in the development of corporate governance and 
disclosure requirements. 
C. THE MODEL OF THE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE OFFICER IN THE UK  
I. Development of Responsibilities and Duties of the Compliance Officer 
Having examined the legal framework governing compliance in the UK in 
the foregoing sections, it has been noted that an appropriate degree of protection 
for consumers and investors alongside the strengthening of shareholders’ rights 
have shaped the duties and responsibilities of company directors and officers, the 
corporate structure and the role of compliance within UK companies. This section 
now lays down the corner-stones for the model of the UK corporate compliance 
officer, as revealed in the examination of the primary and secondary legal 
framework, as well as the existing case law in the UK. First, it introduces the legal 
duties and responsibilities incumbent upon corporate compliance officers, before 
going on to point out the ‘command and control model’ of this position. Finally, 
Chapter Seven will outline the similarities and differences between the American, 
English and German corporate compliance officer. Here, the results are 
represented as follows: 
At first, unlike other professions, such as barristers, the post of a corporate 
compliance officer is not legally defined. UK Company, Law, the Bribery Act and 
the UK Code do not stipulate a standalone position of corporate compliance 
officer, while e.g. a director or a company secretary is required under company 
law. Within the private sector, the compliance duties and responsibilities are 
spread over several corporate positions. It could be argued that the 
responsibilities of the compliance officer are often delegated to the director or 
executive officer in the UK, and to the vice-president in the US.3247 Nevertheless, 
contrary to the combined US legal and compliance function, UK companies more 
                                                     
3246 See e.g. Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468 at 200; Keay, supra note 3149. 
3247 PWC Study 2013 , supra note 1634 at 18. 
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often favor a standalone compliance function.3248 As we have seen, the members 
of the board, the directors and the company secretary are involved in compliance 
monitoring or compliance controls. The title of ‘compliance officer’ is transferred 
from other regulated industries, such as the financial services sector, in which a 
control function is required under the regulatory senior management system. 
However, under primary and secondary law in the UK with the enforcement of 
prosecutors, the existence of a seriously proactive and effective corporate 
governance regime or adequate corporate procedures could serve as a basis for a 
defense against prosecution. However, the features and requirements of an 
effective corporate compliance program and procedures have not been defined 
neither by law nor by the courts. 
Secondly, in the UK, the responsibilities and duties of compliance are often 
carried by directors or the company secretary within companies. Directors are 
appointed by the board. They hold an office, not an employment. Under English 
common law, it has been established that the company director owes a duty of 
skill and care relating to the company’s business affairs. Traditionally, the 
standard applicable to this duty was fairly low. However, this standard has 
evolved with the development of company law so that now, pursuant to Section 
174 of the CA 2006, the company director owes a “duty to exercise reasonable 
care, skill and diligence”.3249 This means the care, skill and diligence that would be 
expected from a reasonably diligent person, exercising the performance of the 
daily business with general directors’ knowledge, skill and experience.3250 
Therefore, this duty was codified in the law with higher standard. In practice, the 
reasonable duty of care and skill includes an objective assessment of a director’s 
conduct. Additionally, in the event that they delegate their powers to a manager, 
executive officer or the company secretary, the director is under a duty to 
supervise the delegated function since the director is not discharged of these 
delegated functions. 
Thirdly, in accordance with the UK Code, the board of FTSE 350 companies 
should monitor the company’s risk management and internal control systems.3251 
                                                     
3248 PWC STUDY 2013 Id. at 16. 
3249 COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555 § 174. 
3250 Id.§ 174 (2) (a) (b). 
3251 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 3165 at 17 Provision C.2.3. 
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Thus, the board’s monitoring duty also applies to compliance controls.3252 The 
board and its committees should consist of an appropriate combination of 
executive and non-executive directors.3253 Overall, in large companies, the 
company director should monitor the company’s risk management, internal 
control systems and compliance controls. This means that the company director is 
primarily responsible for implementing and managing the corporate compliance 
program or adequate corporate procedures for the company. This also includes a 
duty to monitor the company’s activities and to investigate possible misconduct. 
In the event of delegating these responsibilities, the director has a duty to 
supervise. 
Fourthly, under company law in the UK, the company secretary has a 
specific position with extensive responsibilities in public companies. The 
company secretary’s responsibilities include ensuring good information flow 
within the board and its committees and advising the board, through the 
chairman, on all governance matters.3254 Thus, the Code affords the secretary a 
key governance role. In addition, the secretary shares legal responsibilities with 
the directors for certain tasks, e.g. filing documents required by the Companies 
Act. In listed companies, the company secretary has to ensure compliance with all 
rules concerning the listing of the shares, as well as compliance with company 
law and the company’s articles. Therefore, in listed companies, the company 
secretary performs important tasks and responsibilities with respect to 
compliance.  
Finally, under employment law, an employee is required to exercise and 
perform his job with a normal degree of skill and care. In the event that a 
company has a compliance officer position, then he or she is employed by the 
company. Therefore, he or she has the same duties and rights as other employees 
under UK employment law. Nevertheless, corporate compliance officers should 
be aware of their duties of care, since it has been shown that compliance officers 
may be subject to a higher degree to the requirement to perform their jobs 
competently and carefully such as in the financial services sector. In addition, 
they should also bear in mind that the prosecutor, the SFO, and the English 
                                                     
3252 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE Id. at 17. Provision C.2.3. 
3253 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE Id. at 10. Provision B.1.1. 
3254 THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE Id. at 13. Provision B.5. 
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Courts will apply the identification principle in the event of contravention of law 
when they are acting with ‘directing mind and will’ within companies. 
In addition, the post of corporate compliance officer comes with far-
reaching responsibilities. Some examples of the key responsibilities of UK 
compliance officers, as stated in job offers, are as follows: (1) they should be aware 
of any legislative proposals, changes and rules, (2) they must ensure that 
employees are fully updated on these changes, (3) they need to ensure compliance 
with all procedures and legislative requirements, (4) they should assist in 
standardizing all training materials and deliver trainings, (5) they have to conduct 
interviews, (6) they must identify and manage risk procedures and policies, (7) 
they have to monitor controls and compliance effectively, and (8) they have to 
manage relationships with both internal service functions and external 
prosecutors.3255 Hence, the compliance officer needs to consider how compliance 
should be run within his or her specific company. Thus, compliance officers need 
a wide range of specific attributes. They need to be assertive, communicative, 
meticulous, diplomatic and credible. Their post also encompasses the preparation 
of a compliance charter, which includes, for example, a definition of compliance 
risks, the scope and limitation of compliance responsibilities, a definition of 
exclusions such as legal compliance, financial reporting, a definition of the 
powers of oversight, and dealing with the prosecutor. Thus, compliance officers 
can mark their boundaries and define their role and responsibilities in order to 
ensure that the board and senior management are aware of the nature of the 
compliance activities. This is a key for the self-defense of compliance officers in 
the event of legal action.  
II. The UK Command-and-Control Model of Compliance 
As discussed in Chapter Five, in the UK, the term compliance is often 
described as adherence to statutes, rules and codes as well as identifying, 
assessing, and managing risk.3256 The evidence has highlighted that subsequent 
regulation has increased the importance and authority of the compliance function, 
                                                     
3255 See supra IV., 4. b, p. 446. 
3256 See e.g. Adams, supra note 609 at 282; MOORHEAD AND VAUGHAN, supra note 3104 at 18. 
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specifically within the financial service sector.3257 This process not only includes 
listing the relevant legislation and rules, but extends to identifying the risks 
involved in the relevant business processes within the company operates.  
In the UK, the position of compliance is viewed as a control function with a 
procedural approach.3258 This approach is described as the “command-and-control 
model”.3259 Risk controls can be imposed by external regulators or executed by the 
company itself.3260 Within companies, risk controls can be operated by managers 
or officers.3261 Therefore, the corporate compliance function should be seen as an 
improvement of the risk coordination, and quality of risk documents alongside 
the development of an effective compliance program.3262 Additionally, the 
enforcement of compliance under company law, bribery law and corporate rules 
has also strengthened the need for a compliance position in the private sector. In 
addition, the compliance officer has had to develop a detailed system for 
explaining or embedding legal requirements, monitoring and enforcing them.3263 
Thus, the compliance position is considered to improve the risk coordination and 
quality of risk documents and is said to help in the development of a proactive 
compliance program through effective process design.3264 A proactive and 
effective compliance program plays an important role in the event that a company 
faces prosecutorion for non-compliant behavior. As the first UK DPA has shown, 
the program can provide scope for negotiation with prosecutors with the aim of 
reducing any penalties imposed.3265 
In conclusion, the reasonable duty of skill and care together with 
professional responsibilities and liability provide considerable incentives for the 
                                                     
3257 See supra IV., 3.a,, p. 431. 
3258 MOORHEAD AND VAUGHAN, supra note 3104 at 18. 
3259 Id. at 18. See also footnote 2395, p. 359; IV., 4.b., p. 446. 
3260 ROBERT BALDWIN, BRIDGET HUTTER & HENRY ROTHSTEIN, RISK REGULATION, 
MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 2 (2011). See also supra ‘principles-based regulation’ A., p. 
354. 
3261 Id. at 23. para 2.5.1. 
3262 MOORHEAD AND VAUGHAN, supra note 3104 at 18. 
3263 Id. at 18. 
3264 Id. at 18. 
3265 DPA | SFO V STANDARD BANK PLC (NOW KNOWN AS ICBC STANDARD BANK PLC), supra 
note 2863. 
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compliance officer to improve the quality of UK corporate governance. Through 
the efforts of the UK legislator, prosecutors, and regulators, compliance 
responsibilities and compliance officers have stepped out of the shadows to 
become an important part of business practice. Driven by the regulatory 
‘command-and-control model’, compliance ofﬁcers play a key role in managing and 
controlling business risks and in ensuring that the company and its employees 
adhere to the law and regulations and have in place an effective compliance 
program for its defence. However, the ‘command-and-control model’ can not 
guarantee full compliance with the law and relevant rules, but it can reduce 
business risk and financial penalties for companies. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR GERMAN COMPLIANCE  
The following chapter provides a general overview of the German legal 
framework for compliance and the function of the compliance officer, as well as 
the German case -law concerning this post. As we have seen, the legal roots of 
corporate compliance originated at the beginning of the 19th century from several 
business sectors in the US.3266 In Germany, both terms -‘compliance’ and ‘corporate 
governance’ - originating from the Anglo-American legal terminology, were 
adopted into German law.3267 The American literature often describes compliance 
as “adherence with all the laws, regulations, rules, and policies governing an 
organization.”3268 Similar to the American scholars, legal German scholars view 
the narrow definition of compliance as “organized legal conformity” of the 
company.3269 Other legal scholars, meanwhile, define compliance as “the 
conformity of conduct and premise”.3270 Based on this, the term compliance means 
adherence to the law, which constitutes its legal basis.3271 As we have seen, 
compliance plays a key role within profit-oriented activities of companies and 
financial institutions that entail legal and, thus, financial risks.3272 For this reason, 
it is necessary to have a monitoring or control system to help corporations to 
avoid these legal risks.3273 Hence, compliance constitutes a tool within this 
                                                     
3266 See supra Ch. 3, A., I., p. 118. 
3267 See supra Ch. 3, A., I., p. 118, See also CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: HANDBUCH DER 
HAFTUNGSVERMEIDUNG IM UNTERNEHMEN, 2 (Christoph E. Hauschka, Klaus Moosmayer, 
& Thomas Lösler eds., 3., ed. 2016) § 1. 
3268 See supra Ch. 3, A.,I., 1., 133, See also supra footnote 685, p. 127. 
3269 Bürkle, supra note 971 at 2 § 1. 
3270 Rotsch, supra note 1097 at 7 § 1. 
3271 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3280 at 28 § 1. 
3272 Rotsch, supra note 1090 at 7§ 1. 
3273 HANDBUCH WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHT, 47 (Hans Achenbach, Andreas Ransiek, & 
Katharina Beckemper eds., 3. ed. 2012); Rotsch, supra note 1097 at 7 § 1. 
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corporate monitoring system.3274 The entire system is described as ‘corporate 
governance’ and represents the regulatory framework for the management and 
monitoring of corporations.3275 These entirety of these corporate measures 
intended to ensure the lawful conduct of corporations, of their management and 
employees, are referred to as ‘corporate compliance’. Hence, this term describes 
corporate strategies designed to prevent violations of law and policies through 
organizational measures.3276 As such, corporate compliance is also an interaction 
between internal policies, legislative activities and current case -law.3277 
Although the term compliance is not derived from the German terminology, 
the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK) qualifies compliance with a 
similar legal definition:3278 
4.1.3 The management board ensures that all provisions of the law and the enterprise’s 
internal policies are abided by and works to achieve their compliance by group companies 
(compliance).3279 
Thus, compliance comprises a guarantee of the observance of legal 
requirements, corporate policies and codes within companies, as well all 
activities, capable of identifying and monitoring business risks.3280 However, other 
legal scholars argue that this description is not a legal definition, since compliance 
is not a legal term such as Section 25a of the German Banking Act (KWG).3281 One 
reason for this is that the Codex -Commission is not mandated to define legal 
terms.3282  
                                                     
3274 HANDBUCH WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHT, supra note 3290 at 47; Rotsch, supra note 1097 at 
7 § 1. 
3275 HANDBUCH WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHT, supra note 3290 at 47; Rotsch, supra note 1097 at 
7 § 1. 
3276 Hölters in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, 91 (Hölters ed., 2 ed. 2014) § 93. 
3277 Peter Fissenewert in: COMPLIANCE KOMPAKT: BEST PRACTICE IM COMPLIANCE-
MANAGEMENT, (Stefan Behringer ed., 3. ed. 2013). 
3278 Bürkle, supra note 971 at 2 and 3 § 1. 
3279 THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 967 at 6. 
3280 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3284 at 4 § 1. 
3281 DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX: KODEX-KOMMENTAR, 815 (Thomas 
Kremer ed., 6. ed., 2016) para 4.1.3 . 
3282 DCGK Commentary Id. at 815. para 4.1.3. 
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The distinction between the meaning of corporate governance and 
compliance is viewed in prospect.3283 While corporate governance is considered 
from the perspective of the regulator, compliance encompasses the view of the 
companies affected.3284 In the US, corporate governance is seen as “the important 
legal relationship that exists between shareholders, management, auditors, and the board 
of directors.”3285 Under common law, corporate governance rules aim to increase 
shareholder value.3286 As a result of a number of high-profile instances of serious 
fraud and corruption at German companies such as Siemens and VW, and 
misconduct on the part of the management, corporate governance has also gained 
influence in Germany in the context of the discussion of “shareholder value”.3287 
Although similar to the UK, German corporate governance is guided by the 
‘comply and explain’ approach as set forth in the German Corporate Governance 
Code (DCGK) and requirements of regulation are likely to become increasingly 
stringent.3288  
In Germany, the legal framework applicable to compliance comprises 
certain provisions of various areas of law e.g. criminal law in Sections 266, 299 and 
300 of the German Criminal Code, Sections 9, 30, 130 of the Act of Regulatory 
Offences, or company law in Sections 91 (2) and 93 (1) of the German Stock 
Corporation Act.3289 As regards these provisions, one group of German legal 
scholars considers it to be the primary duty of the management board to establish 
a compliance organization and to liable vis-à-vis the members of the board within 
companies.3290 Pursuant to Section 76 (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act, 
                                                     
3283 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3284 at 4 § 1. 
3284 Id. at 4.§ 1. 
3285 See supra footnote 1504, p. 236. 
3286 See supra Ch. 5, A., I., 3. p. 364. 
3287 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3284 at 6 § 1. See also Chapter 4, A., I.,1.c, p. 238, d. 
p. 243 
3288 THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 967 at 2. 
3289 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 § 91 (2); 
ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, Federal Law 
Gazette (BGBl. I p. 602) (1987) §§ 9, 30, 130; STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL 
CODE, supra note 988 § 266. 
3290 Under German law there are two separate bodies that manage and supervise stock 
corporations: a board of executive directors and a supervisory board. For this reason the 
German board structure is named as a “two-tier board structure.” See e.g. MOOSMAYER, 
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the management board has the power of oversight of the stock corporation.3291 In 
Germany, the members of the management board are appointed by the 
supervisory board.3292 The supervisory board is charged with monitoring the 
management board.3293 Both the management board and the supervisory board 
have a duty of care towards their company.3294 These provisions are referred to as 
a general clause with a dual function.3295 On the one hand, the general clause 
includes a standard of care, while on the other hand, it encompasses additional 
obligations of the management board insofar these duties are not required under 
the Stock Corporation Act.3296 In addition, for the purposes of ensuring the legal 
duty of care, the German Corporate Control and Transparency Act (KonTraG) 
stipulates in Section 91 (2) of the Corporation Act that the management board 
must e.g. take appropriate and reasonable measures to implement, in particular, a 
monitoring system to recognize business risks at an early stage.3297 
However, other scholars critically argue that a legal duty on the part of the 
management to implement compliance procedures cannot be derived from these 
provisions.3298 Nevertheless, over the years, the German courts have provided 
guidance in terms of the supervisory and organizational duty to monitor and 
control the board with regard to risk analyses and the establishment of 
compliance procedures.3299 In addition, as examined in the foregoing chapters, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
supra note 1088 at 10 B. I.; Schneider, supra note 1021 at 645; Schulz and Renz, supra note 
45 at 2512. 
3291 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 § 76 (1). 
3292 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 § 84 (1). 
3293 Id.§ 111 (1). 
3294 Id.§§ 93 (1) 1 and 116 (1) 1. 
3295 UWE HÜFFER & JENS KOCH, AKTIENGESETZ: AKTG 3 a (12. ed. 2016) § 93. 
3296 JÜRGEN VAN KANN, VORSTAND DER AG: FÜHRUNGSAUFGABEN, RECHTSPFLICHTEN UND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 262 (2. ed. 2012) Buchta - Ch. 3, B. 
3297 GESETZ ZUR KONTROLLE UND TRANSPARENZ IM UNTERNEHMENSBEREICH (KONTRAG) | 
GERMAN CORPORATE CONTROL AND TRANSPARENCY ACT, Federal Law Gazette I, 1998, 786 
(1998); AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 § 91 (2). 
3298 See e.g. Werner Beulke & Klaus Moosmayer, Der Reformvorschlag des Bundesverbandes 
der Unternehmensjuristen zu den §§ OWIG § 30, OWIG § 130 OWiG– Plädoyer für ein 
modernes Unternehmenssanktionenrecht, CCZ 146–152, 147 (2014); CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, 
supra note 3284 at 31 § 1. 
3299 See e.g. OLG STUTTGART, 7. 9. 1976 - 3 SS 526/76 - ÜBERWACHUNGSPFLICHT DES 
BETRIEBSINHABERS, supra note 1085; OLG Hamm, 16.07.2003 - 4 Ss (OWi) 373/03 - wistra 
480 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
legal framework of compliance for German companies is not limited to German 
legal requirements, but must also take account of the legal peculiarities 
worldwide. Thus, the global legal framework of compliance is also relevant to 
German companies.  
To ensure the supervisory and organizational duty of the board to monitor 
and control compliance procedures across all corporate levels, German companies 
have created the specific position of the corporate compliance officer in the course 
of the implementation of compliance procedures.3300 The reason for this is that, by 
granting them responsibility for compliance, a clear accountability has been 
established vis-à-vis the company. However, such delegation is limited.3301 In the 
event of a single delegation, the responsibility of the management board will 
remain.3302 The following sections will examine this legal issue in detail. 
As previously examined, the term ‘corporate compliance officer’ is not 
defined under German Company Law.3303 Nevertheless, the legal framework also 
has an effect on the position of the compliance officer. In the following, the most 
important provisions of primary and secondary German law, such as company 
law, criminal and employment law, as they apply to compliance and the 
compliance officer within companies will be analyzed. For this reason, the most 
significant provisions of the German Stock Corporation Act, the Act of Regulatory 
Offences, the new draft of a corporate criminal law, the German Employment 
Law, and the German Corporate Governance Code in the context of the current 
jurisdiction will be examined in the course of this chapter. Finally, this chapter 
will present the dynamic model German corporate compliance officer. 
                                                                                                                                                  
2003, 469 - Organisationsverschulden des Betriebsinhabers, 469 (2003); LG MÜNCHEN I, 
NZG 2014, supra note 993. 
3300 Bürkle, supra note 971 at 6; GROß, supra note 47 at 60; CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra 
note 3284 at 7 § 36 . 
3301 Bürkle, supra note 32 at 5; Wolf, supra note 46 at 1356. 
3302 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3284 at 60 § 59. 
3303 See supra Table 2 – , p. 178 
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I. The Development of German Law with respect to Compliance 
The term ‘honorable businessman‘ has described the historical model of the 
accountable way of doing business in Germany since 1517.3304 The guidelines 
comprise honorable and proper performance of business activities.3305 Therefore, 
they focus on business ethics within companies.3306 The core elements of business 
ethics encompass e.g. responsibility for business and society and maintaining 
good faith.3307 These guidelines are considered a voluntary personal-commitment 
of the ‘honorable businessman’.3308 This model could be viewed as the first non-
regulatory predecessor of compliance prior to the advent of the term compliance 
in Germany.  
The initial point of the establishment of compliance measures refers to the 
entry into force of the German Corporate Control and Transparency Act 
(KonTraG) in German law in 1998.3309 The purpose of this legislation was to 
prevent the weaknesses of business control, which resulted in corporate 
scandals.3310 This Act was preceded by criticism from international investors of the 
absence of corporate governance standards in Germany.3311 On the other hand, the 
aim of the KonTraG Act was the implementation of preventative procedures or 
appropriate measures designed to avoid liability of the management board, the 
supervisory board and the auditors.3312 Thus, the main objective was the 
enhancement of the German corporate governance through a monitoring system 
and the improvement of corporate communication, transparency and disclosure 
for shareholders and investors.3313 The majority of reforms of the Act were 
implemented in the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) and the German 
                                                     
3304 VEEK e.V., UNSERE WERTE | VERSAMMLUNG EINES EHRBAREN KAUFMANNS ZU HAMBURG 
E.V., http://www.veek-hamburg.de/organisation/veek-leitbild/ (last visited Feb 7, 2017). 
3305 Id. 
3306 Id. 
3307 Id. 
3308 Id. 
3309 Peter Fissenewert in: COMPLIANCE KOMPAKT, supra note 3275. 
3310 Peter Fissenewert in: Id. 
3311 WHISTLE BLOWING UND CONCERN-MANAGEMENT, supra note 1198 at 51. 
3312 Peter Fissenewert in: COMPLIANCE KOMPAKT, supra note 3275. 
3313 WHISTLE BLOWING UND CONCERN-MANAGEMENT, supra note 1198 at 51. 
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Commercial Code (HGB).3314 Under the KonTraG, the duties of the management 
board and the supervisory board were extended and the duty of care clearly 
enshrined in law.3315 However, the term compliance was not used in German 
Company Law. 
Only in the intervening period since 1999, have the terms ‘compliance 
function’ and ‘compliance officer’ gradually been incorporated into German law in 
certain provisions in the financial service sector.3316 The initial point was the 
approved EC Investment Services Directive, in 1993, which required the English 
approach of compliance investment regulations and procedures throughout the 
European Union applicable to companies listed on stock exchanges.3317 Article 10 
of the Directive stipulates that e.g.  
Each investment firm has sound administrative and accounting procedures, control 
and safeguard arrangements for electronic data processing, and adequate internal control 
mechanisms including, in particular, rules for personal transactions by its employees.3318  
For this reason, the financial service sector required a supervisory and 
organizational obligation of adequate internal control mechanisms for credit 
                                                     
3314 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 § 91 
Subsection 2 was added; HANDELSGESETZBUCH (HGB) | GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE, 
(1900) § 317; GESETZ ZUR KONTROLLE UND TRANSPARENZ IM UNTERNEHMENSBEREICH 
(KONTRAG) | GERMAN CORPORATE CONTROL AND TRANSPARENCY ACT, supra note 3314; 
WHISTLE BLOWING UND CONCERN-MANAGEMENT, supra note 1214 at 51. 
3315 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 §§ 93, 116; 
GESETZ ZUR KONTROLLE UND TRANSPARENZ IM UNTERNEHMENSBEREICH (KONTRAG) | 
GERMAN CORPORATE CONTROL AND TRANSPARENCY ACT, supra note 3314; WHISTLE 
BLOWING UND CONCERN-MANAGEMENT, supra note 1214 at 51. 
3316 WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | GERMAN SECURITIES TRADING ACT, supra note 
974 § 33 (1) 1. as amended on July 16, 2007; last amendment on January 3, 2017, § 34d as 
amended on November 6, 2012. WERTPAPIERDIENSTLEISTUNGS-VERHALTENS- UND 
ORGANISATIONSVERORDNUNG (WPDVEROV) | SECURITIES TRADING IMPLEMENTING 
PROVISION, supra note 1039§ 12 as amended on July 20, 2007, last amendment on 
November 26, 2015. 
3317 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 93/22/EEC OF 10 MAY 1993 ON INVESTMENT SERVICES IN THE 
SECURITIES FIELD, L 141, p. 0027-0046 (1993); CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3284 at 10 
§ 48. 
3318 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 93/22/EEC OF 10 MAY 1993 ON INVESTMENT SERVICES IN THE 
SECURITIES FIELD, supra note 3315 Art. 10. 
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institutions and investment firms.3319 The EU Member State's authorities at least 
are to be authorized to monitor compliance.3320 In 1994, these provisions were 
enshrined in German legislation in Sections 31 , 33 of the German Securities 
Trading Act (WpHG).3321 Although the Act did not use the term ‘compliance’, the 
investment services enterprises, which are approved by the German Banking Act 
(KWG), were required to implement adequate internal control procedures.3322 In 
accordance with the report of the financial committee of the German Bundestag 
concerning the German Securities Trading Act (WpHG), the mere establishment 
of these measures and procedures is not sufficient for ensuring adherence to legal 
obligations of the investment services enterprises, but requires the periodic 
review through internal control systems.3323 In addition, the report outlines that 
the establishment and development of compliance departments within 
investment firms is the correct way of monitoring the investment business.3324 
Finally, since 1999, the term compliance has entered into German legal 
terminology.3325 The Regulation Concretizing the Organizational Obligations of 
Investment Services Enterprises pursuant to Section 33 of the German Securities 
Trading Act (WpHG) describes the control department as a compliance 
function.3326 The compliance function is responsible for periodic reporting on the 
                                                     
3319 Braun in: KWG, CRR-VO: COMMENTARY ON THE GERMAN BANKING ACT, VO (EU) NO. 
575/2013 (CRR) AND IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS, 9 (Karl-Heinz Boos, Reinfrid Fischer, & 
Hermann Schulte-Mattler eds., 5. ed. 2016) § 25a. 
3320 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 93/22/EEC OF 10 MAY 1993 ON INVESTMENT SERVICES IN THE 
SECURITIES FIELD, supra note 3315 Art. 10. 
3321 WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | GERMAN SECURITIES TRADING ACT, supra note 
974 § 33 as amended on July 26, 1994. 
3322 GESETZ ÜBER DAS KREDITWESEN (KWG) | GERMAN BANKING ACT, supra note 1037 § 32 
(1) ; CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3284 at 11 § 48. § 1 (1) (1a) of the German 
Banking Act (KWG) defines investment services enterprises as credit institutions and 
financial services institutes. They have also to comply with organizational obligations 
pursuant to § 25a (1), (2) and § 25e of the German Banking Act (KWG). See 
WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | GERMAN SECURITIES TRADING ACT, supra note 974 § 
33 (1) 1. 
3323 GERMAN BT-DRS. 12/7918, 105 (1994). 
3324 Id. at 105. 
3325 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3284 at 11 § 48. 
3326 Id. at 11.§ 48; REGULATION CONCRETIZING THE ORGANIZATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
INVESTMENT SERVICES ENTERPRISES PURSUANT TO SECTION 33 OF THE SECURITIES TRADING 
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adequacy and effectiveness of principles and preventing measures to avoid 
violations of the Act.3327  
Thus, since the beginning of the century, the importance of compliance has 
been extended into the financial servicse sector.3328 Under the Amendment of the 
German Banking Act (KWG) of Section 25a in 2002, the legislator required credit 
institutions and investment firms to manage, monitor and control risks through 
an adequate internal control system that has to improve compliance with the 
law.3329 A further key milestone for the development of the Banking Act was the 
consultation paper on the compliance function prepared by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision in April 2005.3330 This paper defines the compliance risk 
as follows: 
as the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss to reputation 
a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply with laws, regulations, rules, related 
self-regulatory organization standards, and codes of conduct applicable to its banking 
activities (together, “compliance laws, rules and standards”).3331 
The purpose of this paper was the global improvement of corporate 
governance within banking institutes.3332 The Basel Committee provides a 
framework of principles for banks to manage their compliance risk more 
effectively and guidance on the role of the compliance officer.3333 Finally, the 
German legislator enshrined the compliance function within banks and 
investment firms into law within the financial service sector. Since 2014, the 
internal controls system of investments firms is required additionally, to 
                                                                                                                                                  
ACT (WPHG) OF OCTOBER 25, 1999 | FEDERAL GAZETTE NO. 2010 OF NOVEMBER 6, 1999, 
18453 (1999), repealed on November 1, 2007. 
3327 WERTPAPIERDIENSTLEISTUNGS-VERHALTENS- UND ORGANISATIONSVERORDNUNG 
(WPDVEROV) | SECURITIES TRADING IMPLEMENTING PROVISION, supra note 1039 § 12 (3) 1 
No. 1; (4) 1 as amended on July 20, 2007. 
3328 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3265 at 13§ 48. 
3329 DIRECTIVE 2002/87/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 16 
DECEMBER 2002 ON THE SUPPLEMENTARY SUPERVISION OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS, INSURANCE 
UNDERTAKINGS AND INVESTMENT FIRMS, L 035, p. 0001-0027; (2003) Art. 9; GERMAN BT-DRS. 
15/3641, 48 (2004). 
3330 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 813 at 7 para 3 and 6. 
3331 Id. at 7. para 3. 
3332 Id. at 7. para 6. 
3333 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 813. 
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encompass a risk-control function and a compliance function.3334 Furthermore, 
Section 25d of the German Banking Act (KWG) stipulates that the management of 
the investment firm has to monitor the compliance function.3335 Thus, the 
management is in charge of legal organizational obligations within banks and 
investment firms. However, the specific design of these obligations is at the 
discretion of the management.3336 In conclusion, on account of this legal 
development with respect to compliance and the compliance function, German 
legislation in the financial service sector has increased over the last twenty years. 
Following this brief overview of the legal developments in the financial service 
sector, the next sections will explore in detail the development of German 
Company Law in terms of compliance and the enforcement of duties of the 
corporate management.  
II. The Enforcement of Duties in the Area of Company Law 
As we have seen, over the years, banks and investment firms have been 
required to operate in an increasingly regulated environment. Prior to the 
establishment of adequate internal control systems, there was no uniform 
standard of responsibility.3337 Guidance for the liability of managing directors 
took the form of the general duty of care.3338 In the private sector, the standard of 
care pursuant to Section 43 (1) of the German Act on Limited Liability Companies 
(GmbHG) is the level of culpability through a breach of duty as set forth in 
                                                     
3334 DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL (CRD IV 
DIRECTIVE), supra note 1079 Art. 92; GESETZ ÜBER DAS KREDITWESEN (KWG) | GERMAN 
BANKING ACT, supra note 1037 §§ 25a as amended on August 28, 2013; 25c as amended on 
August 7, 2013. 
3335 GESETZ ÜBER DAS KREDITWESEN (KWG) | GERMAN BANKING ACT, supra note 1037 § 25d 
as amended on August 28, 2013. 
3336 Braun in: KWG, CRR-VO, supra note 3336 at 12 § 25a. 
3337 Peter Fissenewert in: COMPLIANCE KOMPAKT, supra note 3275. 
3338 Peter Fissenewert in: Id.; GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRÄNKTER 
HAFTUNG (GMBHG) | LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES ACT, RGBl., 477 (1892) § 43 (1) as 
amended on January 1, 1964. This Act applies to companies, which are accompanied by 
the word "GmbH- Limited Liability Company”. Id.§§ 1, 4. 
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Subsections 2 and 3.3339 The German standard of care and loyalty of the managing 
director comprises the care of a proper businessman pursuant to Section 43 of the 
German Limited Liability Companies Act (GmbHG).3340 In accordance with the 
prevailing view, this is the same standard as that set forth in Section 93 (1) of the 
Stock Corporation Act.3341 Nevertheless, this standard is higher than the standard 
due care of a proper businessman pursuant to Section 347 of the German 
Commercial Code (HGB).3342 The managing director owes the care, which a 
proper businessman, who holds a management position, must take regarding 
shareholders' asset interests.3343 The basis of liability is the appointment for the 
office as managing director, but not the contract of employment.3344 In addition, 
the duty of care of the members of the board of stock corporations is set forth in 
Section 93 (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).3345 This provision 
stipulates that the members of the board owe the duty of care of a proper and 
diligent manager when doing their business.3346 Nevertheless, this standard is not 
                                                     
3339 Zöllner, Noack in: BAUMBACH, HUECK | COMMENTARY ON THE GMBHG, 20 8 (Baumbach 
& Hueck eds., 21 ed. 2017) § 43; Haas, Ziemons MICHALSKI | COMMENTARY ON THE 
GMBHG, 38 (Michalski ed., 2 ed. 2010) § 43. 
3340 GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG (GMBHG) | 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES ACT, RGBl., 477 (1892), last amended on May 10, 2016, § 43 
(1); Zöllner, Noack in: BAUMBACH, HUECK | COMMENTARY ON THE GMBHG, 20, 7 
(Baumbach & Hueck eds., 21 ed. 2017) § 43 . 
3341 Zöllner, Noack in: BAUMBACH, HUECK | COMMENTARY ON THE GMBHG, supra note 3356 
at 7 § 43 (1); Haas, Ziemons in: MICHALSKI | COMMENTARY ON THE GMBHG, supra note 
3356 at 189 § 43 (1); Koppensteiner, Gruber ROWEDDER, SCHMIDT-LEITHOFF | COMMENTARY 
ON THE GMBHG, 7 (Rowedder & Schmidt-Leithoff eds., 5 ed. 2013) § 43 (1); OLG Celle, 15. 
3. 2000 - 9 U 209/99 - GF bei nicht (wirksam) entrichteter Stammeinlage, 1178–1179, 1179 
(2000). 
3342 Altmeppen in: ROTH, ALTMEPPEN | COMMENTARY ON THE GMBHG, 3 (Roth & 
Altmeppen eds., 8 ed. 2015) § 43; BGH, 6. 12. 2001 - 1 StR 215/01 - Untreue durch 
Zuwendungen aus dem Vermögen einer Aktiengesellschaft, NJW 1585–1589, 1585 (2001). 
3343 Altmeppen in: ROTH, ALTMEPPEN | COMMENTARY ON THE GMBHG, supra note 3359 at 3 
§ 43. 
3344 Altmeppen in: ROTH, ALTMEPPEN | COMMENTARY ON THE GMBHG, supra note 3359 at 2 
§ 43. 
3345 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 § 93 (1) 1 as 
amended on September 6, 1965. 
3346 Hölters in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, 2 (Hölters ed., 2. ed. 2014) § 93. 
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legally defined in detail,3347 so that the literature and the courts are responsible for 
applying and interpreting precisely what the standard means.3348 
However, in the area of corporate compliance, the German legislator has 
also followed the development towards globalization.3349 As has been seen, as a 
result of increasing numbers of large international corporations, the risk inherent 
in ‘wrong’ corporate decisions has also grown more pronounced.3350 As 
previously discussed, under the KonTraG, corporate compliance measures have 
been introduced into company law.3351 The next section describes the effects and 
impacts of these compliance measures and procedures on stock corporations in 
accordance with the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), their boards and 
directors, and the compliance officer with regard to liability. 
1. Appropriate Measures for Risk Prevention pursuant to Section 91 (2) AktG 
As previously noted, the purpose of the (KonTraG) was to change the Stock 
Corporation Act, the Commercial Code and the law of the auditors.3352 According 
to the German Federal Government's reasons for the amendment bill, the main 
objectives were to enhance the activities of the supervisory board, to improve 
transparency, and to strengthen control of the annual general meeting.3353 Just like 
in the US and in the UK, under the previous control system weaknesses and 
misconduct by the board and supervisory board required a reform of the Act.3354 
Furthermore, German stock corporations are also listed on international and 
national stock exchanges such as LSE, NYSE or the DAX.3355 Thus, the importance 
of foreign investors has increased.3356 Therefore, German companies need to 
                                                     
3347 Hölters in: Id. at 2.§ 93. 
3348 Hölters in: Id. at 2.§ 93. 
3349 Peter Fissenewert in: COMPLIANCE KOMPAKT, supra note 3275. 
3350 Peter Fissenewert in: Id. 
3351 GESETZ ZUR KONTROLLE UND TRANSPARENZ IM UNTERNEHMENSBEREICH (KONTRAG) | 
GERMAN CORPORATE CONTROL AND TRANSPARENCY ACT, supra note 3295. 
3352 GERMAN BT-DRS. 13/9712, (1998). 
3353 Id. 
3354 Id. at 11. 
3355 Id. at 11. 
3356 Id. at 11. 
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consider shareholder value.3357 Enhanced communication and disclosure with 
investors are crucial.3358 
Under the KonTraG, Section 91 (2) of the German Stock Corporation Act 
(AktG) stipulates that the board must implement appropriate measures, in 
particular a monitoring system, which includes elements of an internal 
preventative and controlling system.3359 This provision highlights the 
management responsibility of the board pursuant to Section 76 of the Act in terms 
of early developments that could threaten the company.3360 The amended 
Subsection 2 describes the duties of the members of the board in concrete terms to 
inform themselves about pending developments and to ensure the continued 
existence of the stock corporation.3361 The fulfilment of this duty can be seen in 
context with Section 317 (4) of the German Commercial Code (HGB) and is also 
subject to the review of the auditor.3362 Subsection 2 focusses on two steps: First, 
the obligation of the board to implement appropriate measures to recognize, at an 
early stage, developments that could pose a threat to the continued existence of 
the company.3363 And, secondly, the establishment of a monitoring system to 
control these measures.3364 
                                                     
3357 Id. at 11. 
3358 Id. at 11. 
3359 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 § 91 (2) as 
amended on April 27, 1998. 
3360 GERMAN BT-DRS. 13/9712, supra note 3369 at 15; Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | 
COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 4 § 91; Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | 
COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 4 § 91. 
3361 Grigoleit, Tomasic in: GRIGOLEIT | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, 5 (Grigoleit ed., 1 ed. 
2013) § 91. 
3362 GERMAN BT-DRS. 13/9712, supra note 3369 at 15; HANDELSGESETZBUCH (HGB) | GERMAN 
COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note 3331 § 317 (4) as amended on April 27, 1998; Grigoleit, 
Tomasic in: GRIGOLEIT | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3378 at 5 § 91; Müller-
Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 4 § 91. 
3363 See Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 5 § 
91; Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 6-7 § 91 . 
3364 See Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 9 § 
91; Koch HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 8-10 § 91. 
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a.  The First Step - Appropriate Measures 
First, the board has to identify, analyze, and evaluate potential business 
risks within the corporation.3365 Based on this risk assessment, appropriate 
measures should then be derived.3366 These measures are used to recognize early 
any potentially dangerous developments within the corporation.3367 The measures 
are considered appropriate if the members of the board are informed on time in 
order that the continued existence of the corporation can be guaranteed.3368 
However, the specific requirements of the board’s obligation to provide an 
appropriate risk management system are qualified by the corporation’s size, type 
of business, structure and access to the stock exchange.3369 For this reason, the 
board can exercice discretion when considering the specifics of the corporation 
and any adverse effects on the corporation.3370 However, this discretion is not 
explicitly enacted into law.3371 Nevertheless, the obligation of the board to respond 
to the risks is implicit in Sections 76 and 93 of the German Stock Corporation Act 
(AktG).3372 
Finally, in the view of the German government, the requirement of 
appropriate measures will not be enshrined in the Limited Liability Companies 
                                                     
3365 Dauner-Lieb in: HENSSLER, STROHN | COMMENTARY ON BUSINESS LAW, 7 (Henssler & 
Strohn eds., 3 ed. 2016) § 91; Müller-Michaels HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, 
supra note 3363 at 6 § 91. 
3366 Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 6 § 91. 
3367 Müller-Michaels in: Id. at 6. § 91; Kochh in: HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE 
AKTG, supra note 3312 at 6 § 91. 
3368 GERMAN BT-DRS. 13/9712, supra note 3369 at 15; Dauner-Lieb in: HENSSLER, STROHN | 
COMMENTARY ON BUSINESS LAW, supra note 3382 at 8§ 91 ; Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | 
COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 6 § 91; Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | 
COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 7 § 91. 
3369 GERMAN BT-DRS. 13/9712, supra note 3350 at 15. 
3370 Grigoleit, Tomasic in: GRIGOLEIT | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3377 at 7§ 
91; Dauner-Lieb in: HENSSLER, STROHN | COMMENTARY ON BUSINESS LAW, supra note 3381 
at 8§ 91; Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3292 at 6§ 
91; Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3311 at 7 § 91; 
Spindler MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, 2  28 (Wulf Goette & Mathias Habersack 
eds., 4 ed. 2014) § 91; Fleischer SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, 1  33 
(Spindler & Stilz eds., 3 ed. 2015 )§ 91. 
3371 GERMAN BT-DRS. 13/9712, supra note 3350 at 15. 
3372 Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 6 § 91. 
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Act (GmbHG), but the reform of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) will 
also affect other business entities.3373 
b.  The Second Step –  The Risk Monitoring System 
The second step encompasses the implementation of a risk monitoring 
system to review the appropriate measures, i.e. whether the authorized 
departments, such as controlling or internal audits, have forwarded the 
information on time.3374 Specifically, there is a need to clearly define 
responsibilities, and a need for reasonable and closely reporting within 
corporations.3375 Such interpretation of the provision is not evident but pursuant 
to reasons cited by the German Federal Government, the legislator considered a 
risk monitoring system pursuant to Section 76 of the Act necessary.3376  
The extent of such a risk monitoring system has been the subject of 
controversial discussions between business administration and legal scholars.3377 
Finally, the prevailing view in the legal literature is the narrow interpretation of 
such a risk monitoring system.3378 This is based on the previous version of Section 
93 (1) 3 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) of 1996.3379 
                                                     
3373 GERMAN BT-DRS. 13/9712, supra note 3350 at 15. 
3374 Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3292 at 9§ 91; 
Spindler in: MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 at 29 § 91; Fleischer in: 
SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 at 34 § 91. 
3375 Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 9 § 91; 
Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 10 § 91. 
3376 GERMAN BT-DRS. 13/9712, supra note 3350 at 15; Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | 
COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3274 at 9§ 91. 
3377 Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 6 § 91. 
3378 Spindler in: MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 at 29 § 91; Fleischer 
in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 at 34 § 91. 
3379 Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 9 § 91; 
Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 9 § 91; Spindler 
in: MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 29 § 91; Fleischer in: SPINDLER, 
STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 34 § 91; Referentenentwurf zur 
Änderung des Aktiengesetzes („KonTraG“), ZIP 2129–2139, 2131 (1996). 
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The board is responsible for the implementation of a risk monitoring system, which 
shall review the appropriate measures.3380 
Therefore, the will of the legislator indicates that the implementation of a 
system to recognize early risk developments shall be provided.3381 Finally, the 
board can decide which risk monitoring system it shall implement, but there is no 
obligation of the board to implement an ‘encompassing’ or ‘specific’ risk monitoring 
system in accordance with Section 91 (2) of the Act.3382 Thus, in the view of the 
majority of legal scholars, the subject of the monitoring system is the adherence to 
the measures, which means internal control.3383 In conclusion, the board can 
decide to implement an internal risk monitoring system and must consider the 
specific needs of the corporation when doing so. Under Section 91 (2) of the Act, 
an assessment of the effectiveness of this system is not necessary.  
c.  Compliance Organization in a Broader Sense 
The German legislator also includes violations of legal requirements of the 
corporate management and employees as a development that poses a risk to the 
continued existence of the corporation.3384 However, the duty of the board of 
compliance is not explicitly enshrined in the Stock Corporation Act.3385 
Nevertheless, the Munich Court concluded in a recent Siemens case that it remains 
to be seen whether this duty derives from Section 91 (2) or Sections 76 (1), 93 (1) of 
the Act.3386 In that case, the Court determined that the overall responsibility of the 
board encompasses adherence to law and the establishment of an effective 
                                                     
3380 Referentenentwurf zur Änderung des Aktiengesetzes („KonTraG“), supra note 3377 at 
2131. 
3381 Id. at 2131. 
3382 Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 10 § 91; 
Dauner-Lieb in: HENSSLER, STROHN | COMMENTARY ON BUSINESS LAW, supra note 3382 at 9 
§ 91; Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 10 § 91; See 
also: GERMAN BT-DRS. 16/10067, ACCOUNTING LAW REFORM ACT (BILMOG). 76 (2008); 
HANDELSGESETZBUCH (HGB) | GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note 3331 § 289 (5). 
3383 Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 10 § 91. See 
also supra footnote 3382, p. Seite 13562 
3384 GERMAN BT-DRS. 13/9712, supra note 3350 at 15. 
3385 Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 49 § 91. 
3386 LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 995 at 346; Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | 
COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 at 49 § 91. 
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compliance system.3387 In the wake of the case, a controversial debate has flared 
up surrounding compliance as a management issue and whether the board is 
under a duty to implement an overarching compliance organization.3388 In 
contrast to the view of the Court, the majority of legal scholars oppose a general 
duty to implement a compliance organization and refer to the duty of care of the 
board pursuant to the Sections 76 (1) and 93 (1) of the Act.3389 However, in recent 
years a growing number of scholars view responsibility for compliance of the 
board within joint-stock corporations.3390 Both views emphasize the discretion of 
the board when designing the appropriate measures of the compliance 
organization.3391 
Furthermore, this section examines whether there are specific 
organizational requirements pursuant to other provisions. For example, the 
financial service sector requires e.g. for the regulated banks, investment firms and 
insurance companies detailed principles and mandatory organizational 
specifications for the implementation of a risk management system.3392 The 
                                                     
3387 LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 993 at 346. 
3388 See e.g. Hauschka, Galster, and Marschlich, supra note 489 at 244; Heuking, supra note 4 
at 327; Florian Modlinger, Anke Egelhof & Felicitas Berger, Die Rolle des Aufsichtsrats in der 
Compliance, ZRFC 254–258, 254 (2014); Patrick Ulrich, Einfluss des Aufsichtsrats auf das 
Compliance-Management, ZRFC 7–13, 7–8 (2017). 
3389 See e.g. Holger Fleischer, Aktienrechtliche Compliance-Pflichten im Praxistest: Das 
Siemens/Neubürger-Urteil des LG München I, NZG 321–329, 322 (2014); Hölters in: HÖLTERS 
| COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 92 § 93; Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | 
COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 14 § 91; Spindler in: MUNICH COMMENTARY 
ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 52 § 91; Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON 
THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 49 § 91. 
3390 Holger Fleischer, Corporate Compliance im aktienrechtlichen Unternehmensverbund,  CCZ 
1–6, 3 (2008); Fleischer, supra note 3405 at 323; Jochen Reichert & Nicolas Ott, Die 
Zuständigkeit von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat zur Aufklärung von Non Compliance in der AG,  
NZG 241–251, 242 (2014); Spindler in: MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 
3386 at 52§ 91; Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 
at 47 § 91. 
3391 Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 at 49 § 91. 
3392 See e.g. GESETZ ÜBER DAS KREDITWESEN (KWG) | GERMAN BANKING ACT, supra note 
1037§ 25 a (I) (3); VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHTSGESETZ | INSURANCE SUPERVISION ACT (VAG), 
VAG RGBl. S. 139 (1901) as amended on July 26, 2016; BGBl. I 2016 p. 1824 § 29 (I); 
WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | GERMAN SECURITIES TRADING ACT, supra note 974 § 
33 (I) 1. 
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specific organizational requirements for credit institutions comprise inter alia the 
definition of strategies, the procedures for identification, the assessment and the 
monitoring of business risks, a risk control function and a compliance function.3393 
These provisions are the result of EU legislation in the form of several Directives 
such as the CRD IV Directive or the MiFID II Directive implemented over the 
course of the last ten years.3394 These Directives have increased the establishment 
of the compliance function within banks and investment firms. Under the EU 
legislation, a specific legal requirement of the board’s responsibilities has been 
developed in Germany to the effect that credit institutions and investment firms 
are effectively managed.3395 In this context, the various risks of certain businesses, 
their protection requirements for consumers and, thus, their higher organizational 
duties should be considered.3396 For this reason, in the view of legal scholars these 
specific requirements are not sufficient to interpret Section 91 (2) of the German 
Stock Corporation Act (AktG) in this way.3397 As a result of the scholarly debate 
and legal requirements in the regulated sector, a duty of the board to implement a 
specific compliance organization with certain elements, such as a compliance 
function, appears not to be enshrined in the Section 91 (2) of the German Stock 
Corporation Act (AktG). Nevertheless, the members of the board ought to 
consider the recent court decisions on this legal matter. 
                                                     
3393 GESETZ ÜBER DAS KREDITWESEN (KWG) | GERMAN BANKING ACT, supra note 1037 § 25 a 
(I) (3) (c). 
3394 See e.g. DIRECTIVE 2011/61/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON 
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS AND AMENDING DIRECTIVES 2003/41/EC AND 
2009/65/EC AND REGULATIONS (EC) NO 1060/2009 AND (EU) NO 1095/201, supra note 491; 
DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL (CRD IV 
DIRECTIVE), supra note 1079; DIRECTIVE 2014/56/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL AMENDING DIRECTIVE 2006/43/EC ON STATUTORY AUDITS OF ANNUAL 
ACCOUNTS AND CONSOLIDATED ACCOUNTS, supra note 3173. 
3395 See e.g. GESETZ ÜBER DAS KREDITWESEN (KWG) | GERMAN BANKING ACT, supra note 
1037§ 25 a (I); VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHTSGESETZ | INSURANCE SUPERVISION ACT (VAG), 
supra note 3401 §§ 24, 26, 29; WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | SECURITIES TRADING 
ACT, supra note 974 § 33 (I). 
3396 Spindler in: MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 38 § 91; Fleischer 
in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 43 § 91. 
3397 Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 43 § 91; 
OLG Celle, 28. 5. 2008 - 9 U 184/07 - Pflichtverletzung des Vorstandes wegen unvertretbarem 
Risiko, NZG 2008, 669, 669 (2008). 
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d.  Penalties for  non-compliance with Section § 91 (2) AktG 
Irrespective of the scholarly debate, it has been recognized that the context 
of a corporate monitoring system comprises simple requirements with clear 
responsibilities, and a closely reporting system.3398 In the event that the 
documentation is missing, this could render the discharge of the management 
board contestable.3399 In 2007, Munich District Court stated that there is a legal 
duty of the board of a joint-stock company to document the monitoring system.3400 
Specifically, the Court pointed out that a monitoring system requires clearly-
defined responsibilities, a closely reporting system, and documentation in order 
to inform the relevant corporate functions about existing risks and to introduce 
appropriate measures to manage those risks.3401 For this reason, the monitoring 
system has to document in order to communicate this system internally.3402 The 
disclosure of organizational requirements will contribute to enhancing 
procedures within the monitoring system.3403 Thus, the Court concluded that the 
documentation of the monitoring system applies to the key tasks of the 
management board pursuant to the Section 91 (2) of the Act.3404 In conclusion, it 
follows that the scope of the management of the board includes inter alia two key 
tasks: the implementation of a risk monitoring system and responsibility for 
compliance.3405 Therefore, the board has to decide upon the implementation of 
compliance procedures and supervise the effectiveness of that system.3406 
                                                     
3398 Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3274 at 9§ 91; 
Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3293 at 10§ 91. 
3399 LG München I, 5. 4. 2007 - 5 HK O 15964/06 - Hohes Anfechtungsrisiko für 
Entlastungsbeschlüsse bei fehlender Dokumentation, NZG 2008, 319 70–73, 319 (2007); 
Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3311 at 10 § 91. 
3400 LG MÜNCHEN I, 5.4.2007 - 5 HK O 15964/06 - HOHES ANFECHTUNGSRISIKO FÜR 
ENTLASTUNGSBESCHLÜSSE BEI FEHLENDER DOKUMENTATION, supra note 3397 at 319. 
3401 Id. at 320. 
3402 Id. at 320. 
3403 Id. at 320. 
3404 Id. at 320. 
3405 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 §§ 76 (1), 91 
(2); Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 12 § 76; 
Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 63 § 91. 
3406 Fleischer, supra note 3405 at 323; Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE 
AKTG, supra note 3386 at 63 § 91. 
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In addition, Section 93 (2) 1 stipulates that all members of the board are 
jointly and severally liable in the event of a breach their duties under Section 91 
(2) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).3407 For instance, Section 91 (2) of 
the Act requires the implementation of measures that identify early risks of 
potentially dangerous developments in the corporation as a duty of the board 
according to civil law.3408 Non-compliance with Section 91 (2) can be a major cause 
for termination without notice or dismissal of the members of the board.3409  
Secondly, in the event that the board has not implemented any risk 
monitoring system or has introduced an inadequate system, the question that 
arises is whether the board will also be held criminally liable in the event of a 
breach of duty.3410 Under the German Criminal Code, criminal liability of the 
members of the board could arise from infidelity in accordance with Section 266 
or bankruptcy under Section 283.3411 However, the recent case law of the Federal 
Supreme Court (BGH) affirmed criminal liability under Section 266 of the German 
Criminal Code only in the case of a serious breach of duty.3412 In addition, the 
Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) follows a narrow interpretation of the term 
                                                     
3407 Hans Schaefer & Diethelm Baumann, Compliance-Organisation und Sanktionen bei 
Verstößen, NJW 3601–3605, 3604 (2011); Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON 
THE AKTG, supra note 3292 at 12 § 91; Spindler in: MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, 
supra note 3386 at 69 § 91. 
3408 Richter Jan Helmrich, Zur Strafbarkeit bei fehlenden oder unzureichenden 
Risikomanagementsystemen in Unternehmen am Beispiel der AG, NZG 1252–1256, 1253 (2011). 
3409 LG Berlin, 3. 7. 2002 - 2 O 358/01 - Zulässige fristlose Kündigung eines Bankvorstands bei 
mangelhaftem Risikomanagement, 969–972 (2002) was repealed from: KG, 27. 9. 2004 - 2 U 
191/02 - Formale Anforderungen an fristlose Kündigung des Bankvorstands, 1165–1168 (2004); 
Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 11§ 91; 
Spindler in: MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 69 § 91. 
3410 Helmrich, supra note 3406 at 1254. 
3411 BGH, 29. 8. 2008 - 2 StR 587/07 - Siemens Case, supra note 981; Richter Jan Helmrich, Zur 
Strafbarkeit bei fehlenden oder unzureichenden Risikomanagementsystemen in Unternehmen am 
Beispiel der AG, NZG 1252–1256, 1252 (2011); Müller-Michaels in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY 
ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 11 § 91; Spindler in: MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, 
supra note 3387 at 72 § 91. 
3412 See e.g. BGH, 15. 11. 2001 - 1 StR 185/01 - Anhaltspunkte für strafbare Untreue eines 
Sparkassenvorstands bei Verletzung der nach KWG normierten Pflicht zum Verlangen 
nach Offenlegung der wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse bei Kreditvergabe, 172–179 (2001); 
BGH, 6. 12. 2001 - 1 STR 215/01 - UNTREUE DURCH ZUWENDUNGEN AUS DEM VERMÖGEN 
EINER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, supra note 3340. 
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‘serious breach’.3413 In its view, a serious breach arises if the board has not 
introduced any measures to identify early risks of dangerous developments of the 
corporation, or has not introduced an adequate risk monitoring system.3414 
Thirdly, the members of the board who through negligence or willful intent, 
violate the duty of compliance could be criminally liable under Sections 9 and 130 
of the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG).3415 Section 130 of this Act requires 
prosecution of the owner of the company in the event of the failure to carry out 
their supervisory duty as an administrative offence.3416 Additionally, Section 9 of 
this Act also extends this responsibility to apply to the members of the board.3417 
This offence can be punished with a fine of up to one million Euros.3418 
Nevertheless, the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG) requires only a minimum 
of the supervisory duty.3419 However, criminal law and the case law, both of 
which also refer to the duty of compliance of the corporate management and the 
compliance officer, will be examined in the next part of this chapter.3420 
2. The Delegation of Responsibility to the Compliance Function 
As previously discussed, the scope of the management tasks of the board 
encompasses inter alia a duty of compliance, which includes compliance measures 
and a compliance organization pursuant to Sections 76 (1), 91 (2) and 93 (1) of the 
                                                     
3413 BVerfG, 23. 6. 2010 - 2 BvR 2559/08 - Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an den 
strafrechtlichen Untreuetatbestand, 1143–1156 (2010). 
3414 Helmrich, supra note 3406 at 1254. 
3415 ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3307 §§ 9, 130; Uwe H. Schneider, Compliance im Konzern, NZG 1321–1326, 1322 (2009); 
Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 75 § 91. 
3416 ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3305§ 130 (1); Schneider, supra note 3431 at 1323; Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | 
COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 at 75 § 91. 
3417 ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3305 § 9 (1) 1; Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 
at 75 § 91. 
3418 ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3305 § 130 (3). 
3419 Pelz in: CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3283 at 37 § 5. 
3420 See supra III., p. 578 
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German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).3421 In order to reduce the liability of the 
members of the board, compliance tasks have been transferred to subordinate 
employees, such a compliance officer.3422 When delegating compliance tasks, legal 
requirements must always be taken into account.3423 At first, it will be necessary to 
examine the extent of the delegation of the compliance task. There is, however, a 
limitation of the transfer of the compliance tasks in the course of the management 
tasks of the board.3424 Thus, compliance tasks encompass monitoring duties that 
cannot be delegated to subordinate employees.3425 For this reason, the members of 
the board cannot transfer the duty of compliance in full to other persons.3426 
Hence, ultimate responsibility for compliance remains with the management 
board.3427 Finally, the organizational and supervisory responsibilities remain with 
all members of the board.3428  
                                                     
3421 See also LG München I, 10.12.2013 - 5 HK O 1387/10 - Pflichten des Vorstands einer AG, 
supra note 996; Bürkle, supra note 32 at 5; Sünner, supra note 69 at 91; Martin Schulz & 
Wirnt Galster, § 4. Aufgaben im Unternehmen, in DER COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 80, 82 
(Jürgen Bürkle & Christoph E. Hauschka eds., 1. ed. 2015); Koch in: HÜFFER, KOCH | 
COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 11 § 91; Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | 
COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 63 § 91. 
3422 § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3419 at 82 at 23; Bürkle, supra note 32 at 5; 
Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 483 at 84. 
3423 Hüffer in: HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3312 at 11–12§ 76; 
Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3387 at 64–66§ 91; 
Ulrich Tödtmann & Marc Winstel, § 13 Compliance als Vorstandsaufgabe, in 
ARBEITSHANDBUCH FÜR VORSTANDSMITGLIEDER, 55–58 (Dietmar Kubis, Johannes Semler, & 
Michael Arnold eds., 2. ed. 2015). 
3424  BERND SCHMIDT, JÜRGEN TAEGER & BENEDIKT BUCHNER, COMPLIANCE IN 
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN 152 (1. ed. 2010); Schulz and Galster, supra note 3437 at 82 at 23; 
Bürkle, supra note 32 at 5; Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 484 at 84. 
3425 Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46 at 965; Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 483 at 
83; Wolf, supra note 46 at 1356; § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3419 at 82 at 23. 
3426 Bürkle, supra note 32 at 5; Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 483 at 83. 
3427 Tobias Brouwer, § 59 Compliance in Verbänden, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: HANDBUCH 
DER HAFTUNGSVERMEIDUNG IM UNTERNEHMEN, 60 (Christoph E. Hauschka, Klaus 
Moosmayer, & Thomas Lösler eds., 3. ed. 2016); Schulz and Galster, supra note 3437 at 83 
at 23. 
3428 LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 995 at 347; Fleischer, supra note 3405 at 323; 
Hölters in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3292 at 97 § 93; Koch in: 
HÜFFER, KOCH | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3311 at 12 § 76; Spindler in: 
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Secondly, the board members should carefully consider to whom they can 
actually transfer compliance tasks. The transfer requires a duty of care when 
choosing a well-qualified candidate as a compliance officer, for instance.3429 In the 
event of delegation, the board has to take into account the requirements of due 
care in the selection procedure, instructions, and supervisory duties.3430 
Thirdly, in practice, joint stock corporations often establish a compliance 
department within the board.3431 When doing so, it should be taken into account 
that the members of the board can appoint a compliance officer, but only the 
supervisory board can establish a compliance department within the board.3432 
In conclusion, it has been noted that the appointment of a compliance 
officer is not enshrined in German Company Law. In the event of any delegation 
of compliance tasks, only appropriately qualified persons should be charged with 
these. Furthermore, the delegation of compliance tasks from the board to an 
appropriate person is restricted. The board can transfer only certain controlling 
tasks to other persons. Following the delegation, the supervisory duty and the 
overall managing responsibility continue to rest with the board. 
a.  The Scope of Compliance Tasks derived from the Delegation  
It follows from the foregoing explanations that the board can transfer 
compliance tasks to subordinated employees, such as compliance officers. In 
general, the compliance officer has to monitor the employees as to their adherence 
to the law and company rules and must inform the members of the board of any 
deviations and specific events.3433 With the transfer of tasks, the compliance officer 
                                                                                                                                                  
MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 at 68 § 91; Fleischer in: SPINDLER, 
STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 at 64§  91. 
3429 Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46 at 965; Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 483 at 
84; § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3419 at 83 at 24; Tödtmann and Winstel, 
supra note 3421 at 62. 
3430 SCHMIDT, TAEGER, AND BUCHNER, supra note 3422 at 152; § 4 Aufgaben im 
Unternehmen, supra note 3419 at 83 at 24; Tödtmann and Winstel, supra note 3421 at 56. 
3431 Tödtmann and Winstel, supra note 3421 at 53. 
3432 Id. at 54. 
3433 Hölter in: HÖLTERS | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3363 at 98 § 93. 
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takes responsibility for the management of the compliance procedures within the 
corporation.3434  
The compliance officer thus takes on a wide range of tasks.3435 The scope of 
compliance tasks encompasses the identification, assessment, and analysis of legal 
and compliance risks.3436 Subsequently, it is necessary to develop steps to reduce 
and avoid such risks.3437 These results should be incorporated into a compliance 
concept, which comprises the compliance strategy, the enhancement of the 
corporate compliance culture, the development of a compliance policy, and also 
the further development of compliance measures.3438 In addition, the compliance 
officer gives advice to employees and to the management board on how to apply 
rules and provisions and how to avoid business risks.3439 In the capacity of an 
adviser, the compliance officer must also provide training for employees.3440 In the 
course of the compliance tasks, the compliance officer has to develop a reporting 
system in order to periodically inform the members of the board of compliance 
issues.3441 The function is referred to as a collection point of information.3442 
Although the supervisory duty remains with the board, certain control and 
monitoring tasks can be transferred to the compliance function.3443 Within the 
scope of the monitoring tasks, the compliance officer has to uncover and report to 
the members of the board on any violations.3444 However, the board is responsible 
for sanctioning any violations, as well as for the type and scope of the penalties to 
be imposed on the employee.3445 Finally, all activities of the compliance officer 
                                                     
3434 Tödtmann and Winstel, supra note 3421 at 59. 
3435 § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3419 at 84 at 26. 
3436 Id. at 85. at 27. 
3437 Id. at 85. at 27. 
3438 Id. at 30–44. 
3439 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2514; § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3419 
at 46. 
3440 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2514; § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3419 
at 47–49. 
3441 § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3419 at 57. 
3442 Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 483 at 85; Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2514. 
3443 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2514; § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3419 
at 50. 
3444 § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3419 at 53. 
3445 Id. at 55. 
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should be well documented in order to demonstrate the fulfilment of his duties, 
and on the other hand, to fulfil the burden of proof of the organizational duties of 
the board.3446 This list shows the broad scope of the work of the compliance 
function across all lines of business. In conclusion, it has been recognized that a 
separate assignment profile of the compliance function has been established.3447 
b.  The Position of the  German Compliance Officer  
As we have seen, the compliance officer is appointed by the board and is 
responsible for the compliance organization.3448 In this post, the compliance officer 
should for the most part work independently and without directions from the 
employer.3449 The reason for this is to guarantee the efficiency of the compliance 
organization.3450 In 2009, the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) pointed out that it is 
necessary to clearly govern the responsibilities and tasks of the compliance 
officer.3451 
In practice, this means that the board needs to document the current status 
of the responsibilities and tasks of the compliance function.3452 In addition, the 
board should require confirmation from the compliance officer that he has taken 
note of this current status.3453 In order to strengthen the position of the compliance 
officer, the board should clearly state his reporting duties.3454 The compliance 
                                                     
3446 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2515; § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3419 
at 61. 
3447 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2517. 
3448 See supra II., .2., p. 495; See also Tödtmann and Winstel, supra note 3421 at 59. 
3449 Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 481 at 16; Illing and Umnuß, supra note 487 at 1; Steffen 
Krieger & Jens Günther, Der Compliance-Officer, ZRFC 149–154, 150 (2011); Meier, supra 
note 46 at 781; Meier-Greve, supra note 487 at 218; Schulz and Renz, supra note 45 at 2513; 
Sünner, supra note 69 at 91; Tödtmann and Winstel, supra note 3438 at 59. 
3450 Tödtmann and Winstel, supra note 3421 at 62. 
3451 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 at 3174; Lackhoff and Schulz, supra 
note 483 at 88; Krieger and Günther, supra note 47 at 370; Wolf, supra note 46 at 1359; 
Tödtmann and Winstel, supra note 3421 at 60. 
3452 Tödtmann and Winstel, supra note 3421 at 61. 
3453 Id. at 61. 
3454 Krieger and Günther, supra note 3447 at 153; Tödtmann and Winstel, supra note 3421 at 
63. 
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officer should be required to assess and forward the relevant information to the 
board.3455  
However, as has been examined, the nature of the position of the 
compliance officer is not enshrined in German Corporation Law. As a 
consequence, this function is not comparable with the legal position of corporate 
officers such as those for water protection, data protection or immission controls 
within the private sector.3456 Contrary to the compliance function, those positions 
and their tasks are clearly defined in law.3457 Therefore, their scope and 
responsibilities are clearly stipulated in the law. The employment contracts of 
those specific corporate officers can only be terminated for good cause.3458 
In conclusion, just like the reporting duties and lines, it is necessary to 
clearly define the hierarchy of the compliance officer within the corporation. In 
the literature, there is an academic discussion concerning a right –respectively, a 
duty - of escalation for the compliance officer to report directly to the supervisory 
board in the event that the management board is personally involved in 
compliance issues.3459 Although this is an ongoing debate, one possible solution 
could be the specific definition of the reporting lines in the contract of 
employment or in the job description. The position of the compliance officer 
under employment law and criminal law will be explored in the following 
sections.3460 
                                                     
3455 Krieger and Günther, supra note 3447 at 153; Tödtmann and Winstel, supra note 3421 at 
63. 
3456 Giesen, supra note 484 at 104; Meier, supra note 47 at 780; Meier-Greve, supra note 486 
at 219; Wolf, supra note 46 at 1359. 
3457 See e.g. BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ | FEDERAL DATA PROTECTION ACT (BDSG), BDSG 
BGBl. I, 201 (1978) § 4 (f) (g); BUNDES-IMMISSIONSSCHUTZGESETZ (BIMSCHG) | FEDERAL 
IMMISSION CONTROL ACT, supra note 1036 §§ 53. 
3458 See e.g. BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ | FEDERAL DATA PROTECTION ACT (BDSG), supra 
note 3472 § 4 (f) (3) . 
3459 Johannes Sebastian Blassl, Vorstandsüberwachung auch durch die Compliance-Funktion,  
ZRFC 205–211, 209 (2016); Bürkle, supra note 32 at 9; Krieger and Günther, supra note 3447 
at 154; Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 483 at 87; Raus and Lützeler, supra note 485. 
3460 See supra III., p. 501. 
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III. The Enforcement of Criminal Law with Respect to Compliance 
In Germany, interest in the compliance officer function was sparked by the 
widely discussed Federal Supreme Court (BGH) decision on complicity in fraud 
caused by omission.3461 However, the Court only incidentally gave a view on the 
criminal liability of the compliance officer.3462 Since 2009, this decision has been 
variously discussed in the literature. In addition to the negative views, other 
scholars take the stance that the Court wanted to initiate a discussion on the 
position and liability of the compliance officer.3463 Yet other scholars see this 
decision as a consistent enforcement in terms of the principles of risk monitoring 
and the principal's liability under criminal law.3464 
As a result of this decision, the BGH referred to the personal criminal 
liability of the compliance officer with respect to his duty to avoid violations of 
the law that could arise in day-to-day business within corporations.3465 Thus, the 
compliance officer faces the risk that he could be held criminally liable for 
offences committed by other employees or managers.3466 For this reason, the next 
sections will explore the criminal law as it applies to infidelity, bribery and fraud 
in terms of compliance, which can apply to the members of the management 
board and the compliance officer. This examination encompasses the ‘duty as 
guarantor’ and the criminal liability thereof of the compliance officer, and the 
liability for administrative offences.3467 
                                                     
3461 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29. 
3462 See the obiter dictum on a compliance officers’ ‘duty as guarantor’ pursuant to Section 13 
of the German Criminal Code (StGB) Id. at 3175. 
3463 See e.g. contray view Markus Rübenstahl, Zur „regelmäßigen” Garantenstellung des 
Compliance Officers, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 1341–1344 (2009). 
Discussion on the subject See e.g. Blassl, supra note 3457; Bürkle, supra note 32; Campos 
Nave, supra note 482; Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480; Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486; 
Krieger and Günther, supra note 47; Rieble, supra note 483; Wybitul, supra note 32. 
3464 See e.g. Dann and Mengel, supra note 47. 
3465 Jürgen Wessing & Matthias Dann, § 9 Compliance Officer und Strafrecht, in DER 
COMPLIANCE OFFICER: EIN HANDBUCH IN EIGENER SACHE 191–240, 215 (Jürgen Bürkle & 
Christoph E. Hauschka eds., 1. ed. 2015) at 73. 
3466 Id. at 215. at 73. 
3467 ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3306 §§ 30, 130; STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 988 §§ 13, 
266. 
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1. The Criminal Offence of “Infidelity” 
The compliance officer as an offender has been widely discussed only in the 
context of the BGH decision of 2009.3468 However, according to the PwC 2015 
Global CEO Survey, the corporate compliance officer also faces the challenge of 
being involved in investigations of compliance-related risks to the business, i.e. 
fraud, bribery and corruption.3469 For example, according to the EY Study 2016, a 
high-profile case of fraud was committed in every one in seven German 
corporations.3470 In addition, the Study Compliance Manager 2013 shows that one 
important area of activity of compliance departments is the prevention of fraud 
and corruption.3471 In recent years, well-known German corporations, such as 
Siemens AG or Mannesmann have been involved in high-profile scandals where 
the courts also had to examine the serious misconduct of managers in terms of 
‘infidelity’.3472 Additionally, a recent KPMG Study states that the respondents 
named the offences fraud, infidelity, and corruption as the most frequently 
identified risks within companies.3473 The significance of compliance has increased 
in the context of infidelity pursuant to Section 266 of the German Criminal Code 
(StGB), since the principles of proper corporate management include effective 
compliance measures.3474 According to legal scholars, corporate management is in 
breach of its fiduciary duty when the members of the management board and the 
supervisory board have not established statutory compliance measures and this 
                                                     
3468 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29. See supra in detail III., 1., p. 579 
3469 PWC STUDY 2015, BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 1799 at 16. 
3470 STEFAN HEIßNER, GLOBAL FRAUD SURVEY – FINDINGS IN GERMANY 7 (2016). 
3471 COMPLIANCE MANAGER 2013, supra note 502 at 190 fig. 5.01. 
3472 See e.g. BGH, 21.12.2005 - 3 StR 470/04 - Mannesmann/Vodafone, NStZ 214–221 (2005); 
BGH, 29.8.2008 - 2 StR 587/07, NStZ 2009, 95, supra note 978.  
3473 In this Study 500 corporations were interviewed in terms of economic crime within 
companies. KPMG Study 2016; TATORT DEUTSCHLAND - WIRTSCHAFTSKRIMINALITÄT IN 
DEUTSCHLAND 2016, 10–11 (2016), 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/07/wirtschaftskriminalitaet-2016-2-
KPMG.pdf (last visited Jan 4, 2017) fig. 2 and 3. 
3474 Waßmer in: WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT | COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND 
TAX CRIMINAL LAW, 143e (Graf, Jäger, & Wittig eds., 2. ed. 2017) § 266. 
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omission has resulted in a financial loss.3475 Moreover, it should be noted that the 
compliance officer may have a fiduciary duty.3476 This is the reason why this 
section examines the offence of infidelity as it relates to compliance.  
‘Infidelity’ means the abuse of the disposal of assets belonging to third 
parties.3477 The abuse is the discrepancy between the legal ability outwards and 
the legal permission inwards.3478 As a result, the third party will suffer a serious 
disadvantage resulting from the causation of financial loss.3479  
The examination of the offence of infidelity follows a multistage structure. 
First, the object of the offence requires assets from third parties, such as items 
owned by another person or assets of a company.3480 In this case, the offender is 
not the owner or holder of the assets.3481 Secondly, in the view of the legal scholars 
and the courts, the offence requires a fiduciary duty between the offender and the 
trustor.3482 The necessary authority and status as guarantor for asset management 
services is based on law, at the request of the public authorities or contractual 
                                                     
3475 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 §§ 76, 93, 
116; Blassl, supra note 3474 at 208; Helmrich, supra note 3424 at 1252; Modlinger, Egelhof, 
and Berger, supra note 3404 at 256. 
3476 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29; Dann and Mengel, supra note 47 at 
3267; Wybitul, supra note 32 at 2592; Waßmer in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX 
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 49 § 266. 
3477 STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 988 § 266 (1). 
3478 Wittig in: STRAFRECHT | BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, 6 (v 
Heintschel-Heinegg ed., 33. ed. 2016) § 266. 
3479 Kindhäuser in: Id. at 28.§ 266. 
3480 Wittig in: Id. at 10. § 266; Kindhäuser in: STRAFRECHT | COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL 
LAW, 30 (Kindhäuser, Neumann, & Paeffgen eds., 4 ed. 2013) § 266; Heger in: 
STRAFGESETZBUCH | COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, 3 (Lackner & Kühl eds., 28 ed. 
2014) § 266. 
3481 Wittig in: Id. at 10. § 266; Kindhäuser in: STRAFRECHT | COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL 
LAW, 30 (Kindhäuser, Neumann, & Paeffgen eds., 4. ed. 2013) § 266; Heger in: 
STRAFGESETZBUCH | COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, 3 (Lackner & Kühl eds., 28. ed. 
2014) § 266. 
3482 BGHST 50, 331, NSTZ 2006, 214, supra note 3488 at 216; Wittig in: BECK ONLINE 
COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 12§ 266; Kindhäuser in: COMMENTARY 
ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 33§ 266; Heger in: COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 3496 at 8§ 266. 
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agreement.3483 Therefore, the authority is established by either public or civil 
law.3484 Traditionally, the guarantor for asset management services encompasses, 
e.g. the supervisory board or the managing director of a private limited 
company.3485 
Thirdly, the actual crime, particularly the abuse and the breach of the 
fiduciary duty, will be examined.3486 As previously discussed, the abuse is the 
discrepancy between the legal ability outwards and the legal permission 
inwards.3487 In practice, the question of when an action is qualified as an abuse is 
difficult to answer. For instance, the following cases of the BGH provide guidance 
as to the circumstances in which an abuse could occur: (a) the permission of 
appreciation bonus by the supervisory board of a joint-stock corporation3488 or (b) 
the engagement of unqualified personnel for management positions.3489 
Additionally, the breach of the fiduciary duty requires a disadvantage in terms of 
the asset interests of the trustor.3490 Furthermore, the breach of the duty must be 
serious.3491 However, the courts will balance the circumstances of seriousness in 
                                                     
3483 Wittig in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 8§ 266; 
Kindhäuser in: COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 37 § 266; Heger in: 
COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 5a § 266. 
3484 Wittig in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 8§ 266; 
Kindhäuser in: COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 37 § 266; Heger in: 
COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 5a § 266. 
3485 Kindhäuser in: COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 58 § 266; Wessing 
and Dann, supra note 3481 at 196 at 9. 
3486 Wittig in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 13–24 § 
266; Kindhäuser in: COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 59–93 § 266; 
Heger in: COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 5–15 § 266. 
3487 See supra p. 578 
3488 BGHST 50, 331, NSTZ 2006, 214, supra note 3488 at 214. 
3489 BGH, 26.04.2006 - 2 StR 515/05 - Verurteilung eines Landrats wegen Untreue, NStZ-RR 307 
(2006). 
3490 Wittig in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 25 § 266; 
Kindhäuser in: COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 94 § 266; Heger in: 
COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 16 § 266. 
3491 Dierlamm in: MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUM STGB | MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE 
STGB, 5 , 175 (Joecks & Miebach eds., 2. ed. 2014) § 266; Wessing and Dann, supra note 
3480 at 198 at 14. 
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each individual case.3492 Legal scholars have identified four key aspects of a 
serious breach of duty: (1) inadequacy in terms of the assets and earnings position 
of the corporation, (2) the violation of information duties, (3) the presence of 
inappropriate motives, and (4) overstepping the decision-making authority.3493 
Finally, the offence of infidelity requires at least conditional intent, but the courts 
apply stringent requirements for the offender’s intent.3494  
In the BGH case Mannesmann/Vodafone, the court concluded that 
appreciation bonuses which are not provided for in the employment contract, are 
not included as special remuneration, and which do not provide any benefits to 
the company could constitute a waste of corporate assets and, therefore, a breach 
of this duty.3495 In this constellation, there is no discretion on the part of the 
supervisory board.3496 Finally, the court stated that the members of the 
supervisory board recognized the futility of the appreciation bonus and, 
therefore, cannot cite the absence of intent.3497 It is at this point that the 
compliance officer will come into focus. In such cases, it could be that he has a 
duty requiring action to reasonably inform the management board in order to 
prevent a violation of law.3498 However, under German Law there is no general 
duty to notify specific criminal offences by employees or third parties to the 
competent authorities.3499 This is contrary to US and UK Bribery Law, pursuant to 
which the compliance officer can have a duty to notify the relevant law 
enforcement agency.3500 Nevertheless, in individual cases, as listed in accordance 
with Section 138 of the German Criminal Code (StGB), the compliance officer 
could be required to notify the relevant law enforcement agency about the 
                                                     
3492 See e.g. The breach of duty must not be additional serious in: BGHST 50, 331, NSTZ 
2006, 214, supra note 3488 at 214. 
3493 See in detail: Dierlamm: MÜKOSTGB, supra note 3500 at 176–180 § 266. 
3494 Wittig in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 47 § 266; 
Kindhäuser in: COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 122 § 266; Heger in: 
COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 19 § 266. 
3495 BGHST 50, 331, NSTZ 2006, 214, supra note 3488 at 217–218. 
3496 Id. at 216. 
3497 Rönnau in: Id. at 221. 
3498 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 221 at 93. 
3499 STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 987 § 138 (1) (2); 
Bürkle, supra note 32 at 10; Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 222 at 98. 
3500 See supra Ch. 4 and 5. 
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suspicious facts and the internal investigation.3501 This obligation to notify in 
order to prevent damages to the company could also arise from the compliance 
officer’s employment obligations, as will be examined later in this chapter.3502  
However, in 2005, in the case Mannesmann/Vodafone the court did not ask, 
nor examine whether there were compliance measures or whether the function of 
the compliance officer in the corporation with his duties to inform other 
authorities applied to decisions of the supervisory board to pay appreciation 
bonus to certain members of the board. However, in recent times, it could be 
argued that the courts are likely to examine more comprehensively the corporate 
structures with respect to effective compliance measures and will also consider 
the position of the corporate compliance officer with regard to criminal offences. 
2. Bribery and Corruption in the Course of Business 
As opposed to US and UK Law with the FCPA and the UKBA 2010, 
Germany has no separate bribery statute.3503 Furthermore, the German legislator 
has not established any special regulatory body or law enforcement agency with 
respect to the prosecution of corporate bribery and fraud.3504 In Germany, the 
public prosecutor will open an investigation when it receives knowledge of facts 
indicating the commission of a criminal offence.3505 Unlike in the US and in the 
UK, bribery and corruption have not hitherto been in the public focus in 
Germany. The acceptance and granting of personal gifts and hospitalities or 
offering entertainment are part of daily business in several industries.3506 On the 
other hand, over the years, the German legislator has amended the German 
Criminal Code, adding certain provisions with respect to bribery and corruption 
within e.g. the private sector, the health sector and civil service sector.3507 This 
                                                     
3501 Heuchemer in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 4 § 
138; Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 222 at 98. 
3502 See supra IV., p. 535. 
3503 See supra Ch.4, A., I.,1.a-e, p. 197 and chap 5, A., III., 1. p. 400. 
3504 Compare DOJ, supra note 1252; SFO, supra note 2660. 
3505 STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG (STPO) | GERMAN GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
(RGBl. p. 253) (1879) §§ 152 (1)(2), 155 (2). 
3506 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 200 at 19. 
3507 STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 987 §§ 299 as amended 
on November 20, 2015 (BGBl. I S. 2025), 299 (a), 299 (b), 300, 331, 332, 333, 334. 
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section will examine Section 299 - bribery and corruption connected with 
commercial practice. Similar to the provisions of the UK Bribery Act, Section 299 
of the German Criminal Code legally defines bribery as follows: 
Sec. 299 (1) Anyone will be punished with imprisonment for a term up to three years, 
or to a fine when any activity connected with a business and any activity performed in the 
course of a person's employment: 
1. He or she requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage to 
another person within the purchase of the goods and/or the services and takes 
unfair advantage in terms of domestic and foreign competition… 3508  
That is to say, where the donors grant an advantage to another person 
(bribery, active)3509 and the bribed person accepts an advantage from another 
person (corruption, passive).3510 Just like under the Bribery Act, both bribery and 
corruption are criminal offences under the Criminal Code.  
In 1997, Section 299 was enacted the first anti-corruption statute.3511 The 
implementation of this provision into the German Criminal Code (StGB) was 
intended to increase public awareness of the harmfulness of bribery conduct and 
its adverse impacts on the economy, society and the environment.3512 Since 2015, 
the criminal liability of this offence has been broadly extended as a result of the 
second anti-corruption statute and now also comprises bribery in the course of a 
person's employment.3513 Specifically, the first subsection of Section 299 
(corruption) describes a special crime that can be committed only by employees 
                                                     
3508 Compare Id.§ 299 (1) (2); UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67 §§ 1, 2, 11. 
3509 Compare STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 987 § 299 (2) 
1; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67§ 1 (2). 
3510 Compare STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 988 § 299 (1) 
1; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 § 2 (2). 
3511 Statute against Corruption, FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE I, P. 2038 (1997); Momsen, Laudien 
BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 1 § 299. 
3512 Momsen, Laudien in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 
1§ 299. 
3513 Statute against Corruption, FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE I, P. 2025 (2015); Momsen, Laudien 
in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 2 § 299. 
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or authorized representatives of a company.3514 The bribed person has a special 
relationship – a contractual relationship- to the company.3515 In the Siemens case, 
the BGH concluded that the contractual relationship as an employee also includes 
members of the supervisory board.3516 In conclusion, every person in the course of 
an employment relationship or of an assignment of the company and bound by 
instructions could be a bribed person.3517 Only the principal or the sole 
shareholder and manager of a company who are not under instructions could be 
excluded as an offender under Section 299 (1) of the German Criminal Code 
(StGB).3518 Therefore, the compliance officer must define and qualify every person 
connected with the company.  
The result of the corruption is an advantage. The advantage in a broad 
sense is defined as each benefit or everything that improves the economic and 
legal situation of the beneficiary or bribed person.3519 The advantage could take 
the form of material benefits, such as cash, additional incomes, interest free loans 
or invitations to trips, and immaterial benefits such as the awarding of honorary 
office.3520 However, the bribed person has no entitlement to this advantage.3521 
                                                     
3514 Sahan in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 6 § 
299; Momsen, Laudien in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 
at 12§ 299; Heger in: COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 2 § 299. 
3515 Sahan in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 12§ 
299. 
3516 See e.g. BGH, 29. 8.2008 - 2 STR 587/07, NSTZ 2009, 95, supra note 980 at 95; Dannecker 
in: COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 21 § 299. 
3517 Sahan in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 11 § 
299. 
3518 LG Frankfurt a. M., 22.4.2015 - 5/12 Qs 1/15 - Angestellter oder Beauftragter, 2015 
NStZ-RR 215–216, 215 (2015); Sahan in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 3490 at 11 § 299. 
3519 Sahan in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 18 § 
299; Momsen, Laudien in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 
at 15 § 299; Dannecker in: COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 35 § 299. 
3520 Sahan in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 19–
20 § 299; Momsen, Laudien in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 
3494 at 15 § 299; Dannecker in: COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 37–38 § 
299. 
3521 Sahan in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 18§ 
299. 
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Similar to the UKBA 2010, Section 299 requires all activities connected with 
a business or trade to be for business purposes.3522 Accordingly, these are business 
dealings of a company.3523 Therefore, private activities and activities by employees 
within public agencies are excluded.3524 In addition, the awarding that provides 
an advantage must constitute preferential treatment within the context of trading 
competition.3525 
Active bribery is qualified as offering, promising or giving an advantage to 
another person, to an employee or to an authorized party of a company in the 
course of business.3526 The offender acts in the course of business trading.3527 
Finally, the offender intends the advantage to induce a person to perform 
improper activity. As is the case with infidelity, criminal liability requires intent 
on the part of the offender.3528 Such intent is not excluded through the offender’s 
“best intentions”.3529  
However, in the coming years, the German government is set to sharply 
focus on bribery and corruption in line with the objectives outlined in the “2017-
2018 G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan”. For example; one priority of the G20 is: 
the G20 countries will lead by example in combating bribery, including: criminalizing 
the bribery of domestic and foreign public officials and enforcing those laws, public 
                                                     
3522 Compare STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 987 § 299 (1), 
(2); UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 67 § 3 (7). 
3523 Sahan in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 17 § 
299; Momsen, Laudien in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 
at 18 § 299. 
3524 Sahan in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 17 § 
299; Momsen, Laudien in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 
at 18 § 299. 
3525 Sahan in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 31 § 
299; Momsen, Laudien in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 
at 14, 22 § 299. 
3526 STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 987 § 299 (2) 1. 
3527 Momsen, Laudien in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 
29 § 299. 
3528 Sahan in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 57 § 
299; Momsen, Laudien in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 
at 33 § 299. 
3529 BGH, 29. 8.2008 - 2 STR 587/07, NSTZ 2009, 95, supra note 980 at 99. 
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officials and enforcing those laws; and establishing and, where appropriate, strengthening 
the liability of legal persons for corruption offences.3530 
Most recently, on March 29, 2017, the German Federal Cabinet decided to 
establish a central federal competition database to be run by the Federal Cartel 
Office in order to combat bribery and corruption.3531 This database will list all 
registered corporations that have committed of offences such as corruption or 
money laundering.3532 Through this public disclosure, the legislator will ensure 
that such corporations can win contracts from public contracting entities only 
when they comply with the law.3533 Despite this draft bill, legal scholars have 
criticized that the idea is not a new one.3534 De facto, there have already been such 
databases or information points in several federal states like Baden-Wurttemberg, 
Berlin or Hamburg. In the past, proposed bills to regulate a federal database 
failed.3535 Moreover, under certain provisions of other statutes such as the Act 
Against Restraints of Competition (GWB) and the Act on Regulatory Offences 
(OWiG), corporations could be excluded from the award of public service 
contracts.3536 The bill has to pass the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. Nevertheless, 
due to global enforcement trends to combat the financing of terrorism, pressure 
on the German legislator to act and on German companies to identify and 
mitigate bribery and corruption issues have increased. The recent activities of the 
German legislator show that legal enforcement to combat bribery and corruption 
is likely to increase significantly in future. For this reason, board members and 
                                                     
3530 G20 COUNTRIES, G20 ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN 2017 - 2018, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000185882.pdf (last visited Apr 6, 2017). The members of the 
G20 encompass 19 individual countries and the EU among them, for example Australia, 
Germany, UK and the US. 
3531 ENTWURF EINES GESETZES ZUR EINFÜHRUNG EINES WETTBEWERBSREGISTERS | A BILL FOR 
ESTABLISHING A COMPETITION DATABASE, 18 (2017). 
3532 Id. at 17. 
3533 Id. at 16. 
3534 Sascha Süße, Bundesweites Wettbewerbsregister – kommt es diesmal?, NEWSDIENST 
COMPLIANCE 71001. 
3535 Id. 
3536 GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRÄNKUNGEN (GWB) | ACT AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF 
COMPETITION, FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE I, p. 1081 (1958) as amended on March 29, 2017, 
(BGBl. I S. 626, 642) §§ 123, 124; ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON 
REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3306 §§ 30, 130. 
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compliance officers should be aware that law enforcement agencies, such as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, are focusing on these behaviors and will be keen 
to hold individuals accountable over the next few years. 
3. Comparison between American and German Bribery Case Law 
A search of German cases shows that in the course of the last ten years, the 
number of court cases involving bribery and corruption pursuant to Section 299 
of the German Criminal Code (StGB) is fairly reasonable.3537 In 23 cases, the courts 
imposed financial penalties for convictions of e.g. public officials, physicians, 
employees or members of the supervisory board for bribery or corruption.3538 The 
highest profile case was the Siemens case decided in 2008.3539 In October 2007, the 
Munich Public Prosecutor brought an action against a member of the divisional 
management board of the Siemens’ business division “Power Generation”, who 
was responsible for controlling, economics and auditing for the European 
region.3540 This case was related to the action by the SEC against Siemens in the 
US.3541  
Both the SEC and the BGH actions against Siemens AG will be compared in 
terms of their scope and results. According to the complaint, between 2001 and 
2007, Siemens AG made thousands of separate payments to third parties in return 
for business around the world.3542 Approximately, $1.4 billion were used to bribe 
foreign government officials to obtain contracts in order e.g. to build metro transit 
lines in Venezuela or signaling devices in China.3543 At this time, Siemens AG was 
listed on the NSYE as a foreign issuer and, as such, was required to adhere to US 
Securities Law and the FCPA.3544 Therefore, by engaging in a widespread and 
systematic practice of paying bribes to foreign government officials in return for 
                                                     
3537 These are the findings of the German case research regarding bribery in the beck-
online database between 2004 and 2017.  
3538 See e.g. BGH, 29. 8.2008 - 2 STR 587/07, NSTZ 2009, 95, supra note 980; LAG Rheinland-
Pfalz, 26.02.2016 - Aktenzeichen 1 Sa 358/15, 2016 FD-ArbR 378175 (Ls.) (2016). 
3539 BGH, 29. 8.2008 - 2 StR 587/07, NSTZ 2009, 95 
3540 BGH, 29. 8.2008 - 2 StR 587/07, NSTZ 2009, 95, supra note 980 at 96. 
3541 United States v Siemens AG (2008), supra note 1406. 
3542 Id. 
3543 Id. 
3544 See supra Ch. 4, A., I., 1.c., p. 220. 
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business, Siemens violated inter alia Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.3545 In the US, the examination of this case revealed an inadequate system of 
internal corporate controls and misconduct by employees at all levels of Siemens 
AG and its former senior management.3546 In the US, Siemens AG ultimately 
settled the case and agreed to pay a huge fine based on its failure to supervise its 
officers and employees for paying illegal or corrupt payments, such as 
kickbacks.3547  
Simultaneously, in Germany, the Munich Public Prosecutor brought an 
action against a member of the divisional management board of the Siemens AG 
pursuant to Sections 266 and 299 of the German Criminal Code (StGB).3548 The 
management board member was responsible for controlling, economics and 
auditing for the European region and, additionally, was responsible for the 
proper implementation of compliance policies.3549 Under these policies, doing 
business by means of bribery or corruption is prohibited.3550 Nevertheless, within 
the Siemens “Power Generation” business division, there was an established 
system for illegal payments.3551 The manager was aware of that improper system, 
which included e.g. several slush funds used to pay bribes to third parties to win 
orders and contracts.3552 The court concluded that through the management of 
these slush funds, Siemens AG sustained a disadvantage pursuant to Section 266 
(1) of the German Criminal Code (StGB).3553 However, the BGH concluded that 
the manager has not committed the offence of bribery pursuant Section 299 (2) of 
the German Criminal Code (StGB), since illegal payments within foreign 
competition that have not disadvantaged domestic companies, were not included 
                                                     
3545 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 464, 15 USC. § 78dd-I. United 
States v Siemens AG (2008), supra note 1420. The system is explained in the German case: 
LG München I, 04.10.2007 - 5 Kls 563 Js EGMR Aktenzeichen 45994/07, 2008 Beck RS 1235 
(2007). 
3546 United States v Siemens AG (2008), supra note 1406. 
3547 Id. 
3548 BGH, 29. 8.2008 - 2 STR 587/07, NSTZ 2009, 95, supra note 980. 
3549 Id. at 96. 
3550 Id. at 96. 
3551 Id. at 98. 
3552 Id. at 98. 
3553 Id. at 98. 
514 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
in the applicable version of the German Criminal Code (StGB) on August 29, 
2002.3554  
As we have seen, the results of both actions against Siemens AG varied 
markedly. In the US, Siemens AG as a corporation has to plead guilty of 
violations of the internal controls, books and records of the FCPA.3555 Pursuant to 
USSC § 8 C4.l, Siemens agreed, settled and paid a criminal fine in the amount of 
$448,500,000.3556 In addition, the Siemens AG had to agree that in the event of the 
sale, merger or transfer of its business operations, it shall include in any such 
contract a provision binding the purchaser(s) in full to the obligations agreed in 
the plea agreement.3557 Furthermore, all Siemens AG officers, directors, 
employees, agents and consultants are required to cooperate fully with the US 
authorities and law enforcement agencies in any investigation or prosecution.3558 
Moreover, Siemens and its subsidiaries have to implement an effective system of 
corporate governance under corporate monitoring by a lawyer over the course of 
four years and have to maintain a compliance program that includes, at a 
minimum, the basic components set forth in Attachment 1.3559 Finally, Siemens 
AG was required to waive knowingly and voluntarily its right to appeal the 
conviction in this case.3560 For this reason, since 2008, Siemens has undergone a 
full corporate reorganization of its governance structure, officers, directors, and 
members of the management board were replaced and a new compliance 
structure and compliance officers with relevant areas of responsibilities have been 
established.3561 
In Germany, the former members of the Siemens management board were 
accused of bribery, but settled out of court with an amount of up to 5 million 
                                                     
3554 Id. at 99. 
3555 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 (FCPA), supra note 463, 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2)(A), 
78m(b)(2)(B), 78m(b)(5) and 78ff(a); United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, Plea 
Agreement; DOJ AND UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 1444. 
3556 UNITED STATES V. SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, PLEA AGREEMENT, supra note 1430. 
3557 Id. 
3558 Id. 
3559 Id. 
3560 Id. 
3561 MOOSMAYER AND WINTER, supra note 1434 at 1. 
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Euros.3562 As discussed previously, only one member former CFO Neuburger, did 
not settle and, five years later, was prosecuted for failure to implement effective 
compliance measures pursuant to Sections 76, 93 (1) (2) of the German Stock 
Corporation Act (AktG) in order to prevent the criminal offence of bribery. He 
was ordered to pay Siemens AG compensation of 15 million Euros in a civil case 
Siemens v. Neuburger heard by Munich District Court.3563  
In conclusion, it can be stated that in the case of bribery in the US, the 
corporation will be prosecuted and can be held guilty pursuant to the provisions 
of the FCPA. The criminal fine is a high financial penalty payable to the DOJ and 
SEC. For this reason, the corporation will enter bankruptcy or be required to 
establish a corporate reorganization enforced by the law enforcement agencies. In 
Germany, the public prosecutor or the corporation has to prosecute the individual 
responsible for the misconduct. These court proceedings are more lengthy and 
complex. The individual offender will not pay such a high fine as a corporation. 
Lastly, the German courts do not have the authority to require fundamental 
changes to the corporate structures, unlike the prosecutors in the US. 
4. Duty as Guarantor of the Compliance Officer 
The vast majority of criminal offences, such as theft or rape, are described in 
such a manner that they can be committed only by active doing.3564 Only, a 
handful of provisions of the German Criminal Code (StGB) stipulate genuine 
offences committed through inactivity.3565 In the context of criminal offences 
committed by a compliance officer, this essentially means false offences 
committed due to inactivity pursuant to Section 13 (1) of the German Criminal 
Code (StGB).3566 A false offence can occur in the event that the offender with a 
special status of obligation, e.g. within a ‘guarantor status’, is required to prevent 
the success of the criminal offence committed by another person.3567 In this 
                                                     
3562 Ex-Siemens-Finanzchef soll Millionen zahlen, Handelsblatt, supra note 996. 
3563 LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 995 at 346. 
3564 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 215 at 74. 
3565 See e.g. STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 988 § 323 c - 
Neglected Support. 
3566 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 215 at 74. 
3567 Merz in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 24 § 
13. 
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context, the guarantor is required legally to ensure, that the result is not 
achieved.3568 In addition, specific attention is focused on the criminal liability of 
the guarantor in the course of the delegation of tasks.3569  
The false offences committed by inactivity require two conditions: the 
violation and the ‘guarantor status’ pursuant to Section 13 of the German 
Criminal Code (StGB).3570 The case- law and literature describe the requirements 
of the duty as guarantor as the ‘guarantor status’.3571 Here, the duty as guarantor 
means “the legal obligation that the success will not occur.”3572 In detail, the ‘guarantor 
status’ requires a specific status of duties, which are more stringent than for other 
individuals.3573 This specific status can arise by virtue of statute, of voluntary 
adoption, between immediate family members and on account of previous 
behavior.3574 In addition, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) has decided on the 
basis of the nature of the specific status of duties, which can arise out of the 
guarantor status.3575 Within the corporation, the activities of the compliance officer 
involve particular risks and require comprehensive analysis of legal matters and 
complex situations.3576 An effective protection against criminal activities involves 
control and precaution.3577 Thus, the compliance officer first has to recognize the 
circumstances when a violation of law occurs e.g. a criminal offence committed by 
                                                     
3568 STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 987 § 13 (1). 
3569 Gerhard Dannecker, § 5 Strafrechtliche Verantwortung nach Delegation, in CRIMINAL 
COMPLIANCE: HANDBUCH, 21 (Katharina Beckemper & Thomas Rotsch eds., 1. ed. 2015). 
3570 STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 988 § 13 (1); Wessing 
and Dann, supra note 3480 at 215 at 74. 
3571 Merz in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 24 § 
13. 
3572 Merz in: Id. at 24.§ 13. 
3573 Kühl in: COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 7 § 13; Merz in: 
COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 24 § 13. 
3574 Kühl in: COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3496 at 8–11 § 13; Heuchemer 
in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3494 at 38–59a § 13; Stree, 
Bosch in: STRAFRECHT | COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, 17–42 (Adolf Schönke & Horst 
Schröder eds., 29 ed. 2014) § 13. 
3575 See e.g. BGH, 31.1.2002 - 4 StR 289/01 - Wuppertaler Schwebebahn, NJW 1887–1889 (2002); 
BGH, 6.3.2008 - 4 StR 669/07 - Werkstattleiters einer Transportbetonspedition, NJW 1897–1899 
(2008). 
3576 Dann and Mengel, supra note 47 at 3265. 
3577 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 194 at 1. 
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employees or managers, within the corporation and, secondly, must recognize 
when he has a duty to act.3578 In the case of doubt, the compliance officer should 
cooperate with the legal department.3579 Otherwise, the compliance officer could 
be held criminally liable due to inactivity pursuant to Section 13 (1) of the German 
Criminal Code (StGB).3580 For this purpose, the next section provides the German 
BGH case law in terms of the guarantor status of the compliance officer. 
a.  The Criminal Case Law of the BGH with respect to the 
Compliance Officer  
The most notable and the most discussed decision of the BGH with respect 
to the compliance officer is the obiter dictum issued on July 17, 2009.3581 While this 
concerned, a decision on the criminal liability of the head of legal and internal 
control department at Berliner Stadtreinigungsbetriebe, a public agency, the Court 
also commented on the criminal liability of the compliance officer.3582 In this case, 
the Court pointed that the tasks of the compliance officer encompass the 
prevention of violations of the law, particularly the prevention of criminal 
offences within corporations.3583 Furthermore, the Court stated that such agents 
regularly have a duty as guarantor pursuant to Section 13 (1) of the German 
Criminal Code (StGB) in order to prevent offences by employees and managers in 
the course of doing business on behalf of the corporation.3584 Finally, the Court 
concluded that this is the necessary flipside in discharge of the compliance 
officers‘ duty adopted by the corporate management to prevent violations of law, 
particularly the prevention of criminal offences.3585 
The BGH continued this line of case- law in its decision on the status of the 
entrepreneur3586 or the executive officers on October 20, 2011.3587 Nevertheless, in 
                                                     
3578 Id. at 194. at 1. 
3579 Id. at 194. at 2. 
3580 STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 987 § 13 (1). 
3581 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29. 
3582 Id. at 3175. at 27. 
3583 Id. at 3175. at 27. 
3584 Id. at 3175. at 27. 
3585 Id. at 3173. at 27. 
3586 In this context, the term entrepreneur describes a person who is the owner of a 
company. 
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this case the Court also defines the limits of the duty as guarantor, as the Court 
has to examine the circumstances in each individual case.3588 For instance, the 
duty as guarantor is limited to the prevention of corporate criminal offences.3589 
This duty does not comprise offences committed by employees only in addition to 
their work.3590  
Finally, the Court qualified the context and scope of the duty as guarantor 
through the specific responsibilities, which were transferred to the responsible 
officer.3591 As a result, the objective of the assignment is decisive.3592 Despite 
numerous critical voices among the legal scholars with respect to the liability of 
the principal, these two Federal Supreme Court decisions are in force.3593 
Summing up, the BGH has consistently applied the principles of liability of the 
principal. By contrast with the Delaware Caremark case, the German Federal 
Supreme Court applied the duty as guarantor to a corporate officer similar as the 
US Delaware Court to the Caremark directors the compliance duty.3594 In the 
event that the loss eventuated from a ‘sustained or systematic failure’ or in the event 
of ‘unconsidered inaction’ the US Delaware Court does not apply the business 
judgement rule to the corporate director.3595 Notwithstanding this risk of liability, 
the compliance officer should be aware that he can govern options for limitation. 
For this reason, the next section explores the scope and limitations of the liability 
of the principal.  
                                                                                                                                                  
3587 BGH, 20. 10. 2011 - 4 StR 71/11 - BGH: Garantenstellung des Geschäftsherrn; 
Betriebsbezogenheit einer Straftat, 2012 NJW 157–160 (2011). 
3588 Id. at 1238. at 13. 
3589 Id. at 1238. at 13. 
3590 Id. at 1238. at 13. 
3591 Stoffers in: BGHSt 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 at 3176 Comment on the 
decision. 
3592 Stoffers in: Id. at 3176. Comment on the decision. 
3593 Stoffers in: Id. at 3176. Comment on the decision; Rübenstahl, supra note 3478; Stree, 
Bosch in: COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3491 at 53 § 13. 
3594 Compare ch. 4, A., II, pp. 290 et seq., ch. 6, III., 4., pp. 514 et.seq. 
3595 Compare ch. 4, A., II, pp. 290 et seq., ch. 6, III., 4., pp. 514 et.seq. 
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b.  The Scope and Limitations of the Liability of the Principal  
As previously discussed, the management board has a duty of loyalty and 
must ensure the adherence to the law by employees and managers within and 
outside the company.3596 This duty comprises the criminal liability of the 
principal, which requires the principal to prevent offences by subordinates.3597 
The employees are considered as a source of risk for the legal assets of the 
company.3598 It follows that the principal is responsible for monitoring and 
supervising his subordinates through instructions and regular controls within the 
company.3599 Since 2011, this legal concept has been incorporated into the BGH 
case law.3600 Specifically, the issue that arises from this legal concept is the 
distribution of personnel responsibility for criminal offences committed in the 
course of doing business within corporations.3601 The findings have shown a new 
direction in German criminal case- law.3602 As a result, misconduct is not only 
considered as an offence committed by an individual, but rather in the course of 
the organizational context.3603 
In the event of criminal offences committed by the company, it is first 
necessary to examine whether a duty as guarantor can apply then, the scope and 
limitations thereof can be determined.3604 It has been recognized that two grounds 
can establish a guarantor status: (1) the right of employers to give instructions and 
(2) the company as a source of risk.3605 As we have seen, before the transfer of 
compliance responsibility to the compliance officer, the principal or the board 
members were in charge of the supervisory duty or the duty of compliance and, 
                                                     
3596 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 217 at 80. 
3597 Waßmer in: COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3488 at 
143c § 266. 
3598 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 217 at 80. 
3599 COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC AND TAX CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 217 at 80. 
3600 BGH, 20. 10. 2011 - 4 STR 71/11, NJW 2012, 1237, supra note 3603. 
3601 Jan Schlösser, Die Anerkennung der Geschäftsherrenhaftung durch den BGH, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT 281–286, 281 
(2012). 
3602 Id. at 281. 
3603 Id. at 281. 
3604 Michael Lindemann & Janita Sommer, Die strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung und ihre 
Bedeutung für den Bereich der Criminal Compliance, JUS 1057–1062, 1058 (2015). 
3605 Id. at 1058.; Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 217 at 80. 
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therefore, the duty to prevent criminal offences by employees.3606 A different 
situation occurs in the course of the transfer of such duties to the compliance 
officer. Following the transfer of the supervisory duty to the compliance officer, 
the BGH takes into consideration the guarantor status of the compliance officer on 
the basis of the delegation of duties.3607 In addition to the academic discussion on 
the scope of the guarantor status of the compliance officer, several limitations 
have been established, such as: (1) the specific scope of duty transferred to the 
compliance officer, (2) under reservation of the necessity and the reasonableness 
of legal behavior, (3) adequate resources, (4) the separate authority, (5) the 
connection with the company, (6) the further delegation to subordinates, (7) the 
individual responsibility of the subordinates, (8) the specific job description 
contains such limitation of specific areas of law or tasks, and (9) protection 
through external experts.3608 
These nine aspects of limitations range from employment law issues3609 to 
criminal law3610 and organizational subjects.3611 Since the scope of the duty as 
guarantor arises out of the employment contract, the next part will examine the 
subjects associated with employment law.3612 Under the criminal law aspect e.g. 
the reservation of necessity and the reasonableness of legal behavior provide 
limitations to the guarantor status.3613 The factors considered in the context of the 
reasonableness, are the skills of the guarantor, the seriousness of the risk, and the 
                                                     
3606 See supra II., 2., p. 495. 
3607 Stoffers in: BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 at 3176; Wessing and 
Dann, supra note 3481 at 218 at 81. 
3608 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 218–220; Bürkle, supra note 32; Campos Nave, 
supra note 482; Dann and Mengel, supra note 47; Fleischer, supra note 3406; Rübenstahl, 
supra note 3479; Wolf, supra note 46; Wybitul, supra note 32. 
3609 See aspects (1), (4), (6), (7) and (8). 
3610 See aspects (2) and (5). 
3611 See aspects (3) and (9). 
3612 See supra IV., p. 536. 
3613 BGH, 16.07.1993 - 2 StR 294/93 - Zumutbarkeit bei Erfolgsabwendungspflicht, NStZ 29 
(1993); BGHSt 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 at 3175; Heuchemer in: BECK 
ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3491 at 73 § 13; Wohlers, Gaede in: 
STRAFRECHT | COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, 17–18 (Kindhäuser, Neumann, & Paeffgen 
eds., 4. ed. 2013) § 13; Kühl in: COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3490 at 5 § 
13. 
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significance of the legal asset.3614 In the event that the conduct is unreasonable, the 
liability will not apply.3615 The court weighs the vulnerable interests of the 
guarantor against the success in the course of the individual case.3616 For instance, 
when the defendant can prevent the risk through sufficient information to be 
given to members of the board, the court can conclude that such reporting 
constitutes reasonable conduct.3617 For this reason, the compliance officer should 
be aware of his duty to provide relevant information to the appropriate corporate 
functions. Other cases require the taking of appropriate measures in order to 
prevent risks.3618 In the context of the examination of the reasonableness of the 
conduct, the court will also refer to the manageable size of the working area.3619 
Therefore, the compliance officer can decide with reasonable discretion. In 
addition, his activities and decisions are limited when the management does not 
provide adequate resources for the compliance function.3620 
Another limitation of the guarantor status under criminal law could be the 
corrective to the offence in the context of the company. Generally, a guarantor is 
responsible for certain sources of risk situated within his own area of 
responsibility.3621 As previously discussed, therefore, the guarantor status is 
derived from the position as principal or supervisor within the company.3622 From 
these positions arise a supervisory duty to prevent risks, but only within the own 
area of responsibility.3623 In addition, the BGH stated that the area of 
                                                     
3614 Heuchemer in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3491 at 73 § 
13. 
3615 Heuchemer in: Id. at 73.§ 13. 
3616 Heuchemer in: Id. at 73.§ 13. 
3617 BGHSt 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 at 3175 at [31] (3). 
3618 BGH, 15.7.1986 - 4 StR 301/86 - Garantenstellung eines Ordnungsamtsleiters, NJW 199, 199 
(1986); BGH, 6.7.1990 - 2 StR 549/89 - Strafrechtliche Produkthaftung - Lederspray-
Entscheidung, NJW 2560–2569 (1990). 
3619 BGH, 31.1.2002 - 4 STR 289/01, NJW 2002, 1887, supra note 3591 at 1888. 
3620 See e.g. Bürkle, supra note 32 at 7; Hauschka, Galster, and Marschlich, supra note 488 at 
244; Heuking, supra note 4 at 330; Meier-Greve, supra note 486 at 218; Sünner, supra note 71 
at 91, 93. 
3621 Heuchemer in: BECK ONLINE COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3491 at 60 § 
13. 
3622 Heuchemer in: Id. at 65 a.§ 13. 
3623 Stree, Bosch in: COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3491 at 43 § 13. 
522 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
responsibility of the compliance officer is the prevention of criminal offences by 
employees committed through the company.3624 Later in 2011, the BGH 
concretized the aspect that the offence requires a definite connection with 
business activity.3625 For example, in the case of harassment in the workplace or 
injuries between employees, the connection could be weak.3626 In practice, it can 
be difficult to clearly define the offence committed by employees in connection 
with business activity.  
In conclusion, in the German legal literature and BGH criminal case law, it 
has been recognized that the status and duty of the guarantor can be limited 
under criminal law. As such, the scope of the guarantor status of the compliance 
officer cannot be overarching. In his capacity as supervisor, a status as guarantor 
can be established to prevent criminal offences committed by the subordinates. 
Generally, however, this duty can also arise and be required for other corporate 
functions, such as the heads of departments, the regional managers or the 
authorized officers of companies. This means that, in Germany, the discussion of 
criminal liability with respect to the compliance officer appears excessive. It 
seems that the BGH obiter dictum merely referred to that fact since the post of 
corporate compliance officer function is relatively new. 
c.  Protection against  Loss, Damages or Liability  
Compared to the US and the UK, German law does not include 
indemnification clauses, which are contractual terms and expressly applicable to 
officers, directors, employees, consultants, professional advisers or agents.3627 For 
example, in the US, a director may also apply for court-ordered indemnification 
or an advance for expenses payable to the court.3628 An indemnity clause is a 
component of a contract that gives the party who is legally responsible for a loss 
                                                     
3624 BGHSt 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 at 3175. 
3625 BGH, 20. 10. 2011 - 4 STR 71/11, NJW 2012, 1237, supra note 3603 at 1238. 
3626 Id. at 1238.; Contrary view Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 219 at 88. 
3627 Compare tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24, § 145. 
3628 Compare CHEW, supra note 1814 at 235–236; tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24 § 145 
(e); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, supra note 1818 § 8.51 (a). 
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under the law, the right to contractually shift that loss to another party.3629 As a 
result,  
a party promises to reimburse another in relation to specified loss or damage or, in 
some cases, to absolve them of liability.3630 
Under common law, the parties should ensure that the indemnity clause 
includes a duty to mitigate losses and should survive the termination of the 
agreement.3631 Hence, the compliance officer can negotiate an indemnity clause. 
Contrary to the common law, German civil law does not contain such 
contractual indemnity terms. However, in the event that the compliance officer is 
commissioned by the management board to compliance tasks it should consider 
that the contract of employment of the compliance officer can include an 
insurance clause in favor of third parties.3632 In practice, the corporation agrees to 
pay D&O insurance for members of its management and supervisory board. This 
insurance can serve as indemnification against or reimbursement for losses and 
damages in the event of civil and criminal actions brought against members of the 
management and supervisory board. It is important to consider whether the 
compliance officer is also covered and protected by such insurance coverage. 
However, wrongful acting with intent is typically not covered under D&O 
insurance. 
5. The Liability of the Compliance Officer pursuant to Sections 9, 30,130 OWiG 
In recent years, Section 130 of the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG) has 
been in the focus of the academic legal debate on compliance.3633 However, its 
                                                     
3629 Anna Wang, INDEMNITY CLAUSES: UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS SHAKE BY LEGALSHIELD, 
http://www.shakelaw.com/blog/indemnity-clauses-understanding-basics/ (last visited 
May 1, 2017). 
3630 Melanie Ashworth, DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING AN INDEMNITY CLAUSE LEXISNEXIS 
COMET, http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/comet/indemnity-checklist/ (last visited May 1, 2017). 
3631 Id. 
3632 Fabian, Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, in DER COMPLIANCE 
OFFICER: EIN HANDBUCH IN EIGENER SACHE, 175 (Jürgen Bürkle & Christoph E. Hauschka 
eds., 2015) at 46. 
3633 Beck in: BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON 
REGULATORY OFFENCES, 125 (Peter Graf ed., 14. ed. 2017) § 130. 
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roots, the sanctioning of the supervisory duty, originate from the 19th century.3634 
In general, Section 130 of this Act punished the owner of a business since he is 
responsible for the supervisory duty within the company.3635 The company is 
considered as an organizational entity with a work purpose by means of 
personnel, objective and immaterial resources.3636 It is the owner, who is actually 
responsible for the supervisory duty.3637 
In 1974, the sanctioning of the supervisory duty was enshrined into Section 
130 of the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG).3638 Since then, the scope of liability 
has continually expanded, for example to include the negligent breach of duty.3639 
Moreover, today Section 130 also applies to Section 9 of the Act on Regulatory 
Offences (OWiG).3640  
a.  The Application of Section 9 to the Compliance Officer  
As previously discussed, within the scope of organizational duties, the 
owner of a business can transfer the performance of the supervisory duty to 
another corporate officer, for instance to the compliance officer.3641 Therefore, the 
compliance officer in particular has to consider Section 9 (2) 1 No. 2, which states 
that: 
Sec. 9 (2) If the owner of a business or someone otherwise so authorized 
1. commissions a person to manage a business, in whole or in part, or 
                                                     
3634 Beck in: Id. at 1.§ 130; PREUßISCHE GEWERBEORDNUNG (PRGWO), (1845 )§ 188. 
3635 Beck in: BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON 
REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3647 at 26, 34 § 130; Rogall in: KARLSRUHER 
KOMMENTAR ZUM OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, 22 
(Lothar Senge ed., 4. ed. 2014) § 130. 
3636 Beck in: BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON 
REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3647 at 27 § 130. 
3637 Beck in: Id. at 34. § 130; Rogall in: KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUM OWIG | 
COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3649 at 25 § 130; Wessing 
and Dann, supra note 3481 at 226 at 115. 
3638 Beck in: BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON 
REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3647 at 3 § 130. 
3639 Beck in: Id. at 3. § 130. 
3640 Beck in: Id. at 3. § 130. 
3641 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 227 at 116; Zimmermann, supra note 32 at 635. 
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2. expressly commissions a person to perform on his own responsibility duties which 
are incumbent on the owner of the business, 
and if this person acts on the basis of this commission, then a statute pursuant to which 
special personal characteristics are the basis of sanctioning shall also be applicable to the 
person commissioned if these characteristics do not indeed pertain to him, but to the 
owner of the business.3642 
German legal scholars argue that the key tasks of the compliance officer 
encompass the implementation and maintenance of corporate compliance 
measures and the appropriate responses to violations of the law.3643 Based on the 
view taken by the legal scholars and based on the legal requirements that today 
corporate governance also comprises compliance as a genuine management task, 
the compliance officer can be charged with the supervisory duty pursuant to 
Section 9 (2) 1 No. 2 of the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG).3644 The reasons are 
as follows: The purpose of the role as the owner of a business and the 
responsibility for compliance are two different things.3645 There could be a conflict 
between the objective of sales and the compliance tasks. Furthermore, within day-
to-day business, the corporate management does not have sufficient time or 
capacity to fulfill the responsibility of compliance.3646 
                                                     
3642 ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3306 § 9 (2) 1 No. 2. 
3643 See e.g. Dann and Mengel, supra note 46 at 3265; Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 45 
at 964; Heuking, supra note 4 at 328–329; Krieger and Günther, supra note 46 at 367; 
Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 484 at 85; Renz and Wybitul, supra note 1101 at 2512; 
Wolf, supra note 45 at 1356; Wessing and Dann, supra note 3480 at 227 at 116; Wessing, 
Dann in: § 4 Compliance, in MÜNCHENER ANWALTSHANDBUCH: VERTEIDIGUNG IN 
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFSACHEN , 224 (Klaus Volk & Heiko Ahlbrecht eds., 2. ed. 
2014). 
3644 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 998 § 91 (2); 
ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3305 
§ 9 (2) 1 No. 2; Bürkle, supra note 32 at 5; Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46 at 964; 
Krieger and Günther, supra note 47 at 368; Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 483 at 85; Wolf, 
supra note 46 at 1356; Wessing, Dann in: Münchener Anwaltshandbuch, supra note 3657 at 
152. 
3645 Wessing, Dann in: Münchener Anwaltshandbuch, supra note 3657 at 150–151. 
3646 Wessing, Dann in: Id. at 150–151. 
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However, Section 9 (2) 1 No. 2 of the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG) 
requires two conditions for the delegation of compliance tasks: first, an express 
commissioning of the compliance officer by the owner of a business to perform 
certain tasks and, second, on the basis of this commissioning, the compliance 
officer should independently handle the delegated tasks.3647 The legal 
effectiveness is not a required condition.3648 Therefore, the compliance officer can 
take appropriate measures as and when necessary.3649 
Finally, in the event that the compliance officer can handle the delegated 
area of tasks independently pursuant to Section 9 (2) 1 No. 2 of the Act on 
Regulatory Offences (OWiG), the relevant offence of the Act on Regulatory 
Offences (OWiG) will apply to the compliance officer.3650 Nevertheless, the 
liability of the commissioning body, the owner of a business, will remain 
simultaneously, since the delegation does not include the transfer of liability.3651 
b.  The Application of Section 130 to the Compliance Officer  
In the event that the compliance officer does not implement and maintain 
appropriate measures to prevent criminal activities by employees and managers 
through willful intent and negligence, he may be guilty of an administrative 
offence pursuant to Section 130 of the Act within the scope of delegation.3652 
Although under the principles of German criminal law, the company cannot be 
                                                     
3647 Valerius in: BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON 
REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3647 at 33 § 9; Rogall in: KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUM 
OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3649 at 79–81 § 9. 
3648 Rogall in: KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUM OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON 
REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3649 at 81 § 9. 
3649 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 227 at 117. 
3650 Valerius in: BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON 
REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3647 at 54 § 9; Rogall in: KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUM 
OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3649 at 97 § 9. 
3651 See “shall also be applicable to the representative” ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ 
(OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3305 § 9 (1); Rogall in: KARLSRUHER 
KOMMENTAR ZUM OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra 
note 3649 at 98 § 9. 
3652 Schaefer and Baumann, supra note 3423 at 3604; Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 
228 at 119. 
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criminally liable,3653 the provisions of the administrative offence law, Sections 9, 30 
and 130 of the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG) state that the company can be 
guilty of an administrative offence and can impose a regulatory fine.3654 The 
significance of the company’s liability has increased as a result of the amendment 
of the scope of the regulatory fine; in the case of an intentionally committed 
criminal offence, fines can be up to 10 million Euros.3655 
There are three instances in which the compliance officer could act 
improperly with respect to preventing violations of the law. First, if a criminal 
offence has been actually committed within the company.3656 Then, the criminal 
offence is committed by a person other than the compliance officer.3657 Moreover, 
the offence must be a violation committed within the context of business.3658 In 
detail, that means the breach of duties incumbent upon the owner of a business, 
for instance the supervisory duty.3659 Therefore, finally, the compliance officer can 
be guilty pursuant to Sections 9 (2) 1 No. 2 and 130 of the Act on Regulatory 
Offences (OWiG) in the event that he has breached his or her supervisory duty 
and, thus, he can face a regulatory fine up to 1 million Euros.3660  
Legal scholars criticize that the management and supervisory board attempt 
to pass on their liability through the implementation of compliance measures and 
compliance departments.3661 Discussions are currently underway on whether 
                                                     
3653 This principle is based on the personal responsibility of the individual. See Meyberg in: 
BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON REGULATORY 
OFFENCES, supra note 3647 at 1 § 30. 
3654 Beck in: Id. at 126. § 130. 
3655 ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3305 § 30 (2) No. 1 as amended on June 30, 2013; Eighth Statute of the Amendment of the 
Act Against Restraints of Competition, FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE I, P. 1738, 1748 (2013). 
3656 Beck in: BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON 
REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3647 at 80 § 130. 
3657 Beck in: Id. at 80. § 130. 
3658 Beck in: Id. at 86. § 130. 
3659 Rogall in: KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUM OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON 
REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3649 at 81 § 130. 
3660 ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3305§§9 9 (2) 1 No. 2, 130 (3) 1. 
3661 Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46 at 966; Beck in: BECK’SCHER ONLINE-
KOMMENTAR OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3647 at 127 § 130. 
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appropriate compliance measures could prevent violations across the board 
within a company.3662 It has been recognized that full compliance is not 
possible.3663 In addition, the compliance officer function can be established as a 
separate “corporate police authority”.3664 An examination of the case law with 
respect to regulatory offence law as regards the compliance officer did not turn 
up any cases at all. It is likely that, over time, the German case- law will lay out 
the relevant supervisory duties in concrete terms. 
c.  The Drafts of a German Statute of Company Liability  
As we have seen, contrary to the US and UK, to the present-day Germany 
still has no statute governing corporate liability. Due to international criticism of 
this German approach, the coalition agreement of the German Federal 
Government on December 17, 2013 provided for the examination of a statute 
governing company liability for multinational corporations by the government in 
order to combat crime across all areas of society.3665 At that time, the federal state 
government of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) introduced a draft criminal code 
of organizations (VerbStrG).3666 This draft defines the term organization as forms 
and structures which produce goods, services, education and research activities 
                                                     
3662 Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46 at 966; Beck in: BECK’SCHER ONLINE-
KOMMENTAR OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3647 at 127 § 130. 
3663 Gößwein and Hohmann, supra note 46 at 966; Beck in: BECK’SCHER ONLINE-
KOMMENTAR OWIG | COMMENTARY ON THE ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3647 at 127 § 130. 
3664 See e.g. Hauschka, supra note 4 at 169; Sünner, supra note 71 at 91. 
3665 Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Die Diskussion um die Einführung eines 
Unternehmensstrafrechts in Deutschland – Gesetzgebungsvorschlag des Bundesverbandes der 
Unternehmensjuristen, NEWSDIENST COMPLIANCE 11002; German Federal Government, THE 
COALITION AGREEMENT OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 145 (2013), 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2013/2013-12-17-
koalitionsvertrag.pdf; (last visited Apr 15, 2017). 
3666 Sascha Süße & Schneider, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung der strafrechtlichen 
Verantwortlichkeit von Unternehmen und sonstigen Verbänden aus Nordrhein-Westfalen,  
NEWSDIENST COMPLIANCE 71002; GESETZESENTWURF ZUM UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT - 
VERBANDSSTRAFGESETZBUCH (VERBSTRG-E) | DRAFT OF A CRIMINAL CODE OF 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 39. 
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within the modern industrial and knowledge society.3667 Therefore, this definition 
encompasses all companies, institutions and corporations of all sizes in every 
legal form.  
This bill considers the most recent compliance developments over the last 
few years. The purpose of the draft is to strengthen small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) in particular in implementing internal control systems, such as 
compliance programs.3668 The authors see a gap in corporate compliance measures 
in the Act on Regulatory Offence (OWiG).3669 For this reason, the draft requires an 
approach of company liability similar that under Anglo-American Common 
Law.3670 In the course of the last twenty years, the criminal liability of companies 
was introduced into law in the majority of the European countries e.g. Portugal 
(1984), Sweden (1986), Norway (1991), France (1994), Italy, (2001), Austria (2006), 
Romania (2006), Luxembourg (2010), and Spain (2010).3671 Initial results are 
positive: For example, the annual report 2011 by the Institution of Law and 
Criminal Sociology in Vienna, a study of 528 criminal cases involving individuals 
and corporations from 2006 to 2010 found that the new Austrian statute on 
responsibility of legal entities (VbVG) has changed and strengthened the 
structures to prevent violations of the law within large corporations in Austria.3672 
Until today, in Germany there are two drafts of a statute of company 
liability.3673 However, thus far, neither has passed the hurdles of approval in both 
the German Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The German Draft of a Criminal Code 
                                                     
3667 GESETZESENTWURF ZUM UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT - VERBANDSSTRAFGESETZBUCH 
(VERBSTRG-E) | DRAFT OF A CRIMINAL CODE OF ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 39 at 1. 
3668 Id. at 4. 
3669 Id. at 2. 
3670 Id. at 2. 
3671 Id. at 26. 
3672 IRKS, JAHRESBERICHT 2010/2011 UND FORSCHUNGSPLAN 2011 43 (2011), 
http://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Jahresberichte/IRKS_JB_2010-11.pdf (last 
visited Apr 15, 2017); VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZ (VBVG) | AUSTRIAN 
STATUTE ON RESPONSIBILITY OF LEGAL ENTITIES, BGBl. I Nr. 151/2005 (2006). 
3673 GESETZESENTWURF ZUM UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT - VERBANDSSTRAFGESETZBUCH 
(VERBSTRG-E) | DRAFT OF A CRIMINAL CODE OF ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 39; BUJ, 
GESETZGEBUNGSVORSCHLAG  FÜR EINE ÄNDERUNG DER §§ 30, 130 DES 
ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZES (OWIG) | A DRAFT OF AMENDMENT OF THE SECTIONS 30, 
130 ON THE ACT OF REGULATORY OFFENCES (2014). 
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of Organizations (VerbStrG-E) highlighted certain control functions within 
companies.3674 In addition to the supervisory board, as the BGH has already held, 
there are other corporate positions within a company that are responsible for a 
defined and limited area of business, such as the data protection officer, the head 
of the audit, the business director, or the compliance officer, all of whom also 
have a monitoring and supervisory function.3675  
However, as previously examined, the German Draft of a Criminal Code of 
Organizations of the (VerbStrG-E) stated that individual criminal liability is often 
limited contrary to the damages.3676 For this reason, the legislation should 
strengthen the focus on company liability.3677 According to the draft Sections 2 
and 3 of the German Draft of a Criminal Code of Organizations (VerbStrG-E), the 
organizations that commit a crime will be punished with sanctions pursuant to 
the German Criminal Code (StGB).3678 The sanction take the form of a fine, a 
caution, or a public announcement.3679 In addition, disciplinary measures for the 
organization could involve the loss of subsidies, the loss of public orders, and the 
dissolution of the organization.3680 Nevertheless, it is particularly interesting to 
note that Section 5 states that the court can prevent organizations from imposing 
sanctions in the event that they have implemented adequate organizational and 
personnel measures in order to avoid criminal offences in the future.3681 Even 
subsequently implemented compliance measures should be considered when 
sentencing organizations.3682 Thus, this provision of the draft and this proposed 
approach provide a similar wording and a similar approach to the US Sentencing 
                                                     
3674 GESETZESENTWURF ZUM UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT - VERBANDSSTRAFGESETZBUCH 
(VERBSTRG-E) | DRAFT OF A CRIMINAL CODE OF ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 39 at 42. 
3675 See e.g. BGH, 29. 8.2008 - 2 STR 587/07, NSTZ 2009, 95, supra note 980; BGHST 54, 44; 
BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29. 
3676 GESETZESENTWURF ZUM UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT - VERBANDSSTRAFGESETZBUCH 
(VERBSTRG-E) | DRAFT OF A CRIMINAL CODE OF ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 39 at 1. 
3677 Id. at 2. 
3678 Id. at 8 .§§ 2 (1), 3 (1). 
3679 GESETZESENTWURF ZUM UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT - VERBANDSSTRAFGESETZBUCH 
(VERBSTRG-E) | DRAFT OF A CRIMINAL CODE OF ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 39 § 4 (1). 
3680 Id.§ 4 (2). 
3681 Id.§ 5 (1). 
3682 Id.§ 5 (1). 
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Guidelines and the UK Bribery Act 2010.3683 Similar to the requirements of the US 
and UK law enforcement agencies and prosecutors DOJ, SEC and SFO, the draft 
states that the prosecuted company should cooperate with the prosecutor and 
disclose and submit the evidence to the investigating authority.3684 In this context, 
the courts can mitigate a sentence pursuant to Section 5 (2) of the German Draft of 
a Criminal Code of Organizations (VerbStrG-E).3685 Finally, pursuant to the draft 
Section 8 (2) No. 3 of the German Draft of a Criminal Code of Organizations 
(VerbStrG-E), the court can mandate that the sentenced company implement 
compliance measures and to report thereon to the court.3686 This provision is also 
similar to the US and UK approach and terms that are held in the deferred 
prosecution agreements between the law enforcement agencies and companies.3687 
It is clear from the foregoing that this draft has been adopted from the 
American and English approach with little adjustment to reflect existing German 
provisions. Legal academics criticize, for instance, that this draft violates the 
principle of liability, the principle of equality and the principle of ownership of an 
established business in accordance with German constitutional law.3688 
Furthermore, they argue that the obligation to implement a compliance program 
within all organizations is contrary to the principle of entrepreneurial freedom. 
Particularly, the paradigm shift between the principle of the presumption of 
innocence of the individual and the principle of the presumption of a source of 
danger in the individual continues to be viewed with skepticism.3689 For this 
reason, the German Federal Association of Corporate Counsels (BUJ) in 
                                                     
3683 Compare with US SENTENCING GUIDELINES USSC, supra note 667 §8 B2.1 ; UNITED 
KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 § 7 (2). 
3684 GESETZESENTWURF ZUM UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT - VERBANDSSTRAFGESETZBUCH 
(VERBSTRG-E) | DRAFT OF A CRIMINAL CODE OF ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 39§ 5 (2). 
3685 Id.§ 5 (2). 
3686 Id.§ 8 (2) No. 3. 
3687 Compare with DPA United States v Montana DOJ, supra note 1382; CRIME AND COURTS 
ACT 2013, supra note 2882 § 45, Schedule 17. 
3688 See e.g. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (GG), supra note 390 Art. 1, 
3, 14, 20; ZUR FRAGE DER VERFASSUNGSWIDRIGKEIT UND DER FOLGEN EINES STRAFRECHTS FÜR 
UNTERNEHMEN: RECHTSGUTACHTEN ZUM GESETZESANTRAG DES LANDES NORDRHEIN-
WESTFALEN, 34 (2013). 
3689 ZUR FRAGE DER VERFASSUNGSWIDRIGKEIT UND DER FOLGEN EINES STRAFRECHTS FÜR 
UNTERNEHMEN, supra note 3702 at 30. 
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collaboration with several legal scholars submitted a counterproposal in April 
2014.3690 This legislative proposal does not provide a separate statute governing 
company liability, but will amend Sections 30 (7) and (8) and 130 of the Act on 
Regulatory Offences (OWiG).3691 For instance, with the new subsection 7, the 
authors of the proposal intend to introduce a mandatory mitigating factor for the 
company in the event that it has implemented adequate compliance measures.3692 
In addition, they provide an amended Section 130 that comprises the obligation of 
the owner of a business to implement mandatory adequate measures in order to 
prevent violations of law.3693 Section 130 (1) will enumerate five elements of these 
adequate measures, which depend on the size and the risks of the business.3694 
Although this proposal does not provide a new statute, the amendments of the 
Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG), again, are similar to the US and UK 
approach. Particularly the drafted amendment with the five elements of adequate 
measures is reminiscent of the UK Governments recommended Guidance 
Principles of proportionate procedures to prevent bribery for organizations.3695 
However, the UK Principles are not prescriptive. They are intended to be flexible 
and allow a huge variety of proportionate procedures for all sizes of 
companies.3696  
In conclusion, although the approach of the German Draft of a Criminal 
Code of Organizations (VerbStrG-E) and the legislative proposal of the (BUJ) 
differ considerably, both will induce organizations to implement adequate 
compliance measures as a mitigating factor. Nevertheless, the response to the 
                                                     
3690 BUJ, BUNDESVERBAND DER UNTERNEHMENSJURISTEN E.V. (BUJ) | GERMAN FEDERAL 
ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSELS, http://www.buj.net/index.php/de/home-buj (last 
visited Apr 16, 2017); GESETZGEBUNGSVORSCHLAG  FÜR EINE ÄNDERUNG DER §§ 30, 130 DES 
ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZES (OWIG) | A DRAFT OF AMENDMENT OF THE SECTIONS 30, 
130 ON THE ACT OF REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3679. 
3691 GESETZGEBUNGSVORSCHLAG  FÜR EINE ÄNDERUNG DER §§ 30, 130 DES 
ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZES (OWIG) | A DRAFT OF AMENDMENT OF THE SECTIONS 30, 
130 ON THE ACT OF REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 3679 at 8, 18. 
3692 Id. at 8. § 30 (7) in a new version. 
3693 Id. at 9. § 130 (1) in a new version. 
3694 Id. at 9. § 130 (1) in a new version. 
3695 Compare Id. at 9. § 130 (1) in a new version; THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE, Ministry of Justice, 
supra note 883 at 21, 22 The six principles. 
3696 THE BRIBERY GUIDANCE Ministry of Justice, supra note 881 at 20 The six principles. 
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question of which measures are adequate remains absent, just like the 
establishment of a corporate compliance officer function. With a view to an 
increasing trend towards extraterritorial law, such as the FCPA, SOX or the 
UKBA, it will be necessary for internationally operating companies to adjust their 
internal control measures.3697 It has been noted that the drafts have reopened the 
debate on the legal requirement to implement corporate compliance measures, 
but on the other hand, considerable concerns still remain about possible 
violations of the constitutional principles. It remains to be seen whether the 
traditional principle of the rule of law will change in Germany. Ultimately, the 
German legislator will have to decide on this legal matter. 
6. Conclusion - Recommendations for Compliance Officers in Practice  
The question that arises from the above is: How can the compliance officer 
recognize and reveal criminal misconduct by employees and managers within the 
company? The answer to this question could be important, since, as previously 
examined, outside the financial service sector until today there are no legal 
requirements for companies to implement compliance measures and a 
compliance function.3698 On the other hand, due to international legal 
developments over the past twenty years, large German corporations operating 
internationally have implemented compliance structures, such as compliance 
programs and compliance departments.3699 In addition to banks and insurance 
companies, other sectors, such as the automotive industry, technology industry, 
chemical industry or energy supply companies have established the position of a 
compliance officer.3700 Corporations in these industries, with more than 2,000 
employees, have commissioned a compliance officer.3701 
                                                     
3697 Süße and Püschel, supra note 3679. 
3698 See supra A., II., III. p. 501. 
3699 See supra Ch. 4., p. 182, Ch. 5, p. 354; See also A study by PWC and the Martin Luther 
University found that 74 percent of the surveyed German companies have implemented a 
compliance program in 2013. ECONOMIC CRIME AND CORPORATE CULTURE 2013, 25 and 26 
(2013). 
3700 STUDY COMPLIANCE MANAGER 2013, HERZOG AND STEPHAN, supra note 502 at 17 fig. 
2.03. 
3701 ECONOMIC CRIME AND CORPORATE CULTURE 2013, supra note 3705 at 25; STUDY 
COMPLIANCE MANAGER 2013, HERZOG AND STEPHAN, supra note 502 at 19 fig. 2.05. 
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A good corporate compliance culture and the implementation of an 
adequate compliance program may mitigate the risk of criminal liability of the 
compliance officer. Nevertheless, the compliance officer should take preventative 
measures to ensure the prevention of criminal offences within the company. To 
answer the crucial question as to what these preventative measures are, it has 
been recognized that companies need to structure their compliance functions 
strategically for success.3702 Firstly, as we have seen, since compliance is a task of 
the management board, the compliance officer has been assigned to the high-level 
employees.3703 According to the Study Compliance Manager 2013, 8.44 percent of 
compliance officers are members of the board; 38.89 percent of them are assigned 
to a staff position and 22.02 percent of compliance officers work under the 
executive level with responsibility for decentralized compliance departments.  
Secondly, adequate resources are necessary to fulfill the scope of 
compliance tasks. The personnel and financial resources should be oriented 
towards the size, scope and risks of the company’s business.3704 The Study 
Compliance Manager 2013 affirmed this connection and found a correlation 
between the size of the company and the numbers of employees in the 
compliance departments.3705 Up to 2,000 employees, a compliance team of 
between two and six individuals on average are employed and up to 50,000 
employees, 171 individuals on average are employed in the compliance 
department.3706 
Thirdly, the basis of effective prevention is the management of control.3707 
However, this is not a unique procedure, but an ongoing process of identification, 
assessment, and monitoring of the business risks within the day-to-day business 
                                                     
3702 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46. 
3703 Id. at 2513.; STUDY COMPLIANCE MANAGER 2013, HERZOG AND STEPHAN, supra note 502 
at 135. 
3704 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2515. 
3705 STUDY COMPLIANCE MANAGER 2013, HERZOG AND STEPHAN, supra note 502 at 143 fig. 
4.06. 
3706 STUDY COMPLIANCE MANAGER 2013, HERZOG AND STEPHAN, supra note 502 at 143 fig. 
4.06. 
3707 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2512; Wybitul, supra note 32 at 2590; Wessing and 
Dann, supra note 3481 at 230 at 129. 
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of the compliance officer.3708 This process also depends on the size and structure 
of the company. The company should have a clear organizational structure, as 
well as clear responsibilities.3709 The compliance officer must have direct access to 
the reporting of the other business units.3710 In addition, the compliance officer has 
to carry out internal audits, conduct interviews with employees within certain 
business units, and to monitor business processes.3711 Only then can he effectively 
monitor and supervise the business activities of other employees and 
managers.3712 
Fourthly, the compliance officer should protect himself by comprehensive 
and careful written documentation of the established compliance measures and 
his work.3713 A few legal scholars demand the implementation of a central 
database in order to record all violations of compliance.3714 The compliance officer 
has to ensure the complete documentation confirming the procedure and the 
further development of compliance measures and, in the event of an offence, to 
verify the circumstances, the assessment and the initial measures for the 
defense.3715 In addition, as previously noted, it is important to document the 
responsibilities and reporting lines within the company.3716 The compliance officer 
can discharge himself of liability when he can prove that he fulfilled his reporting 
and information duties, for example, but other corporate functions or the 
management remained inactive.3717 
                                                     
3708 Renz and Wybitul, supra note 1096 at VII; Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2513; 
Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 230 at 129. 
3709 Wybitul, supra note 32 at 2592; Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 231 at 129. 
3710 § 36. Compliance-Beauftragten-System, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: HANDBUCH DER 
HAFTUNGSVERMEIDUNG IM UNTERNEHMEN , 49 (Christoph E. Hauschka, Klaus Moosmayer, 
& Thomas Lösler eds., 3. ed. 2016). 
3711 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 231 at 131. 
3712 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3480 at 231 at 131. 
3713 Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480 at 16–17; Sünner, supra note 71 at 91; Wybitul, supra 
note 32 at 2593; Zimmermann, supra note 32 at 636; Critical view: Hauschka, supra note 4 
at 170. 
3714 Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 232 at 135. 
3715 Dann and Mengel, supra note 47 at 3268; Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480 at 16–17; 
Wybitul, supra note 32 at 2593; Zimmermann, supra note 32 at 636. 
3716 See e.g. By means of a compliance charter: See supra Ch. 5., C., p. 469. 
3717 Raus and Lützeler, supra note 485 at 98–100; Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 232 
at 136. 
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Finally, for his own protection, the compliance officer must ensure that the 
managers, employees, agents and business partners are provided with 
information, skills and training relevant to the compliance policies, measures and 
legal requirements.3718 The participation in these periodical and appropriate 
training sessions should be confirmed and also documented by the compliance 
officer.3719 The aim of these training courses is to provide information about the 
compliance measures, policies and legal requirements to the managers, 
employees, agents and business partners enable them to act accordingly when 
doing business.3720 The compliance officer is responsible for the organization and 
supervision of the training, but the company is responsible for the individual 
structure of the training sessions.3721 Furthermore, the compliance officer himself 
has to participate in periodic further training, to inform himself about recent legal 
developments, to regularly examine current statutory developments and, based 
on this, to adapt training accordingly.3722 
This list is only a small selection of preventative measures that the 
compliance officer should carry out. In fact, even with the performance of all 
preventative measures, it is excluded that the compliance officer could avoid all 
violations of the law by employees or managers.3723 His activities can also be 
limited if he receives insufficient resources from the management.3724 However, in 
conclusion, the compliance officer has to verifiably demonstrate that he has taken 
adequate preventative measures before and after the occurrence of a criminal 
offence.  
                                                     
3718 Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486 at 4; Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2513; Sünner, 
supra note 71 at 93; von Busekist and Hein, supra note 1041 at 187–188. 
3719 Heuking, supra note 4 at 328; von Busekist and Hein, supra note 1041 at 187–188. 
3720 Schulz and Renz, supra note 46 at 2513; Sünner, supra note 71 at 93; Wessing and Dann, 
supra note 3481 at 231 at 133. 
3721 Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486 at 4; Wessing and Dann, supra note 3481 at 231 at 134. 
3722 Bürkle, supra note 32 at 8; Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480 at 17; Illing and Umnuß, 
supra note 486 at 6. 
3723 Bürkle, supra note 32 at 7. 
3724 Bürkle, supra note 32 at 7. 
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IV. The Civil Liability of the Compliance Officer under German 
Employment Law 
In addition to criminal liability, the compliance officer could also face civil 
liability under employment law. For this reason, the next sections provide the key 
aspects of the German Employment Law and the German court cases with respect 
to compliance and the compliance officer and the risks of his civil liability. The 
examination of German Employment Law and the employment case- law is 
essential, since the majority of German compliance officers have a contract of 
employment. According to the 2013 PwC Study, the compliance departments of 
German companies with between 1,000 and 4,999 employees include an average 
of two full-time compliance jobs and three part-time jobs.3725 The German 
compliance officer is subject to German Employment Law. Therefore, the most 
interesting key aspects, which will be examined in the following sections, are the 
position of the compliance officer under employment law, the scope of the 
compliance tasks and duties under employment law, the risks of civil liability and 
whether he enjoys protection against dismissal.  
1. The Position of the Compliance Officer under Employment Law 
In Germany, employment law is defined as a set of rules of the contracts 
governing employment and other similar employment legal relationships.3726 The 
individual employment law governs the relationship between the employer and 
the employee.3727 Therefore, it applies to the employed compliance officer as well. 
The German individual employment law is divided into employment contractual 
law3728 and employment protection law.3729 As has been noted, similar to the US 
                                                     
3725 ECONOMIC CRIME AND CORPORATE CULTURE 2013, supra note 3713 at 29 fig. 16. 
3726 WOLFGANG HROMADKA, FRANK MASCHMANN & WOLFGANG HROMADKA, INDIVIDUAL 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 17 (6. ed. 2015) at 1; RAINER WÖRLEN & AXEL KOKEMOOR, EMPLOYMENT 
LAW 1 (11. ed. 2014) at 1. 
3727 HROMADKA, MASCHMANN, AND HROMADKA, supra note 3740 at 1 at 1; WÖRLEN AND 
KOKEMOOR, supra note 3740 at 1 at 1. 
3728 HROMADKA, MASCHMANN, AND HROMADKA, supra note 3740 at 1 at 2; WÖRLEN AND 
KOKEMOOR, supra note 3740 at 4 at 9; See e.g. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB) | GERMAN 
CIVIL CODE, supra note 93§§ 611-630; BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
(GG), supra note 390 Art. 1 (I), 2 (I), 3, 12; HANDELSGESETZBUCH (HGB) | GERMAN 
COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note 3330 §§ 59 . 
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and UK Employment Law, there is no unique statute of employment law but a 
variety of special statutes. In addition to the legislation, the employment case- law 
of the German Federal Labor Court (BAG) can contribute to further legal 
development.3730 Just like UK employment law, the development of German 
employment law has been influenced by EU law in particular over the last twenty 
years.3731 Important European Directives were implemented into German law, 
such as the German Anti-Discrimination Act (AGG) in 2006 and the Law of Proof 
of Substantial Conditions Applicable to the Employment Relationship in 1995 
(NachwG).3732  
In order to categorize the position of the compliance officer, it is necessary 
to define his status within German employment law. As previously discussed, in 
practice and in the academic debate, the compliance officer is referred to as an 
employee.3733 The term ‘employee’ is defined in German law as: 
                                                                                                                                                  
3729 HROMADKA, MASCHMANN, AND HROMADKA, supra note 3740 at 1 at 2; WÖRLEN AND 
KOKEMOOR, supra note 3740 at 4 at 9; See e.g. ALLGEMEINES GLEICHBEHANDLUNGSGESETZ 
(AGG) | GERMAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT, Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1897, 1910 (2006); 
ARBEITSSCHUTZGESETZ (ARBSCHG) | ACT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES OF 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH TO ENCOURAGE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SAFETY AND 
HEALTH PROTECTION OF WORKERS AT WORK, Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1246 (1996). 
3730 ARBEITSGERICHTSGESETZ (ARBGG) | EMPLOYMENT COURT ACT, supra note 470§ 45 (4). 
3731 HROMADKA, MASCHMANN, AND HROMADKA, supra note 3740 at 21–34; WÖRLEN AND 
KOKEMOOR, supra note 3740 at 10–11. 
3732 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 91/533/EEC OF 14 OCTOBER 1991 ON AN EMPLOYER’S OBLIGATION TO 
INFORM EMPLOYEES OF THE CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO THE CONTRACT OR EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP, supra note 2988; NACHWEISGESETZ (NACHWG) | LAW OF PROOF OF 
SUBSTANTIAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, BGBl. I p. 946 
(1995); DIRECTIVE 2006/54/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 5 
JULY 2006 ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND EQUAL 
TREATMENT OF MEN AND WOMEN IN MATTERS OF EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION (RECAST), OJ 
L 204 23–36 (2006); ALLGEMEINES GLEICHBEHANDLUNGSGESETZ (AGG) | GERMAN ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION ACT, supra note 3735. 
3733 See e.g. Giesen, supra note 484; Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486; Rebecca Julia Koch, 
Der Compliance-Officer und die D&O-Versicherung,  ZRFC 135–139 (2016); Raus and 
Lützeler, supra note 485; Zimmermann, supra note 32. 
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Generally, an employee is a person, who is obligated to perform paid work, bound by 
instructions, other-directed or dependently, for another person (employer) on the basis of 
a contract under civil law.3734 
In accordance with the BAG case- law, the way in which the person is  
integrated into the company’s business will additionally be examined.3735 In the 
event that, following an examination of the five aspects of the definition of 
employee, differentiation remains difficult, the BAG will review further aspects 
such as e.g. the kind of remuneration.3736  
In comparison to the US and UK Employment Law, the status of the 
German compliance officer as an employee needs to be identified specifically. 
Similar to the US and the UK, the contracting parties can freely negotiate the 
terms and conditions under the current statutes and pursuant to the BAG case- 
law. However, in Germany just like in the UK, the employer must provide for the 
employee “a written statement of particulars of employment” within one month of 
commencing work.3737 According to Section 2 (1) No. 6 of the (NachwG) the 
contract of employment must encompass the structure and the amount of the 
remuneration.3738 Furthermore, the compliance officer is well integrated in the 
compliance department or other departments within the company.3739 However, 
in the event that the compliance officer is not bound by instructions of his 
supervisor or the member of the board within his professional area, it could be 
                                                     
3734 Weidenkaff in: COMMENTARY ON THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 310 at 7§ 611. See 
also established case law e.g.: BAG, 15.02.2012 - 10 AZR 301/10 - Arbeitnehmereigenschaft bei 
ergänzendem Aufbauunterricht in einer Justizvollzugsanstalt, 2012 NZA 731 (2012); BAG, 
17.04.2013 - 10 AZR 272/12 - Arbeitnehmerstatus - Cutterin, 2013 NZA 903 (2013). 
3735 BAG, 17.04.2013 - 10 AZR 272/12 - ARBEITNEHMERSTATUS - CUTTERIN, supra note 3748. 
3736 WÖRLEN AND KOKEMOOR, supra note 3740 at 23 at 51. 
3737 Compare EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 1996, supra note 2951§ 1 (1); NACHWEISGESETZ 
(NACHWG) | LAW OF PROOF OF SUBSTANTIAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP, supra note 3738 § 2 (1); Preis in: § 2 Law of Proof of Substantial Conditions 
Applicable to the Employment Relationship, 51 in ERFURTER COMMENTARY ON THE 
EMPLOYMENT LAW , 5 (Preis, Müller-Glöge, & Schmidt eds., 17 ed. 2017) § 2. However, the 
written form is not a constitutive formal requirement.  
3738 NACHWEISGESETZ (NACHWG) | LAW OF PROOF OF SUBSTANTIAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE 
TO THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 3746 § 2 (1) No. 6. 
3739 STUDY COMPLIANCE MANAGER 2013, HERZOG AND STEPHAN, supra note 502 at 137 fig. 
4.02; ECONOMIC CRIME AND CORPORATE CULTURE 2013, supra note 3705 at 31 fig. 18. 
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questionable that he is an employee.3740 According to Section 106 of the German 
Industrial Code (GewO) and the BAG case law, the employer‘s right of 
instruction comprises the context, the implementation, the time, the duration and 
the location of the work performance.3741 The BAG Court also stated that services 
of employees at a higher level are not always bound by professional instructions 
by the employer.3742 This nature of work could comprise a high degree of design, 
individual initiative and professional independence.3743 Therefore, legal scholars 
and the BAG take the view that a certain professional independence of the 
compliance officer function is not contrary to the status of an employee.3744 The 
personnel subordination as an employee results from the local and functional 
integration within the corporate organizational context.  
As a result, the compliance officer is considered as an employee with all the 
rights and duties that arise from this position.3745 Specifically, the compliance 
officer owes a key statutory duty to perform his work to the employer.3746 Similar 
to the US and UK, the main sub-duties, which have been recognized under 
German Employment Law are the duty of loyalty and the duty of 
confidentiality.3747 These duties apply to all internally employed compliance 
officers, as well as the head of the compliance department, but not to the 
externally commissioned compliance officer.3748 As such, the employer can 
determine and regulate the tasks and duties of the employed compliance officer 
and the delegation of compliance tasks e.g. in the contract of employment.  
                                                     
3740 Giesen, supra note 484 at 105. 
3741 GEWERBEORDNUNG (GEWO) | GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CODE, § 106 GEWERBEORDNUNG 
Federal Law Gazette I,. p. 3412 (2003) § 106; BAG, 09.06.1993 - 5 AZR 123/92 - 
Arbeitsrechtlicher Status eines Fernsehmitarbeiters, 1994 NZA 169–171, 169 (1993). 
3742 BAG NZA 1994, 169, supra note 3755 at 169. 
3743 BAG, 13.11.1991 - 7 AZR 31/91 - Dozentin in Schulabschlußkursen, 1992 NZA 1125–
1129, 1128 (1991); BAG NZA 1994, 169, supra note 3755 at 169. 
3744 Giesen, supra note 484 at 105; Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486 at 4; Fabian, Mengel in: 
§ 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3647 at 158 at 5. 
3745 See e.g. The right auf contractual vacation entitlement and the duty of work: Weidenkaff in: 
COMMENTARY ON THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 310 at 24, 126§ 611. 
3746 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB) | GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 93 § 611 (1). 
3747 Id. §§ 241 (2), 242. 
3748 Fabian, Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3646 at 158 
at 5. 
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2. The Sources of the Compliance Duties of the Compliance Officer 
As we have seen above, from the position as an employee follows the duty 
of work performance based on the contract of employment. In addition to this 
contractual duty, legal requirements, the employer’s right to issue instructions 
and corporate policies can further specify the terms of the employment agreement 
of the compliance officer.3749 The view of Krieger and Günter that the compliance 
officer is completely free from professional instructions by the employer cannot 
be accepted, since the tasks and duties of compliance are delegated by the 
members of the management board to the compliance officer.3750 Therefore, these 
compliance duties transferred will remain alterable (dispositive).3751 However, 
there are no legal requirements as to the design of the contract of employment of 
the corporate compliance officer or of his area of activities.3752  
In addition to the key duty of work, the compliance officer is responsible for 
a certain defined area of compliance responsibilities.3753 What are the sources of 
the compliance duties? At first, as examined above, the contract of employment 
and the employer’s authority to issue directives can define certain areas of tasks 
and duties, as well as the compliance tasks and duties. Secondly, in addition to 
the employment contract, the BGH viewed the actual acceptance of the extent and 
context of such an area of compliance duties as a source.3754 This source of duties 
requires a commissioning of certain duties. As previously discussed, the 
delegation of duties by the employer to the employee is permitted.3755 
                                                     
3749 See e.g. ARBEITSZEITGESETZ (ARBZG) | WORKING TIME ACT, § 3 ARBEITSZEITGESETZ 
Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1170, 1171 (1994); § 106 GEWO, supra note 3747. 
3750 Krieger and Günther, supra note 47 at 370; Fabian, Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche 
Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3646 at 158 at 6. 
3751 Fabian, Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3646 at 158 
at 6. 
3752 Fabian, Mengel in: Id. at 158. at 6; GROß, supra note 48 at 69; See the exception in the 
financial service sector: WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | GERMAN SECURITIES 
TRADING ACT, supra note 973 § 33 (1) 1. 
3753 Campos Nave, supra note 482 at 2059; Raus and Lützeler, supra note 485 at 96; Wolf, 
supra note 46 at 1360; Wybitul, supra note 32 at 2592; § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und 
Haftung, supra note 3646 at 157 at 2. 
3754 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 at 3174. 
3755 See supra II., 2. p. 495 ; Pelz in: § 20. Personalorganisation und Arbeitsstrafrecht 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3283 at 4. 
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Nevertheless, compliance is a key managing task that applies to all members of 
the management board as a general responsibility.3756 Since the corporate 
compliance officer is not legally assigned, he can be commissioned by the 
management board in order to perform certain compliance tasks within a specific 
relationship of trust.3757 Although such delegation leads to a limitation of the 
compliance responsibility of the management board, the ultimate responsibility 
for compliance remains with the management board, since it is a key task of the 
corporate management.3758 This commissioning must include the purpose and the 
particular circumstances of the company.3759 This is important for the activities of 
the corporate compliance officer in practice as well as for his job description since 
there is no legally defined scope of tasks and duties.3760 
Thirdly, a standardized job description could provide a defined scope of 
compliance tasks and duties. Despite the extensive German academic debate on 
the profession of the compliance officer and initial approaches of various 
professional associations to establish a recognized clearly defined job description 
and guidance on his activities, until today this has not been implemented 
uniformly within the private sector.3761 The compliance officer function is 
recognized as an element of the compliance system, but the requirements of the 
compliance measures give no indication of the tasks and duties involved in this 
position.3762 The Study Compliance Manager 2013 shows the variety of tasks and 
duties within compliance departments and found that the scope of these duties 
varies depending on the business sector concerned.3763 
                                                     
3756 LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 995 at 348; Bürkle, supra note 32 at 5. 
3757 Bürkle, supra note 32 at 5; Fabian, Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und 
Haftung, supra note 3646 at 159 at 8; BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 at 
3174. 
3758 LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 995 at 348. 
3759 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29 at 3174. 
3760 Id. at 3174–3175. 
3761 Profession of the Compliance Officer BDCO, supra note 496; Fecker and Kinzl, supra 
note 481; Guidance on the Activities of the Compliance Officer, Hauschka, Galster, and 
Marschlich, supra note 489; Schulz and Renz, supra note 45; Sünner, supra note 69. 
3762 ECONOMIC CRIME AND CORPORATE CULTURE 2013, supra note 3713 at 57 fig. 33; Fabian, 
Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3646 at 159 at 7. 
3763 STUDY COMPLIANCE MANAGER 2013 HERZOG AND STEPHAN, supra note 501 at 190–194 
fig. 5.01, 5.02., 5.04. 
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In conclusion, just as there are no standardized compliance measures, there 
is no standardized profession of the compliance officer function. The sources of 
the compliance officer’s duties are a specific description in the contract of 
employment, the professional or organizational instructions issued by the 
employer or the specific tasks transferred from the management board to the 
compliance officer. Overall, it has been mentioned that the scope of the 
compliance duties of the compliance officer are not standardized, but alterable. 
3. A Comparison of the Scope and the Importance of the Activities of the 
Compliance Officer in Practice and in the Literature 
A comparison of the scope and the importance of the key activities of the 
compliance officer between the required key tasks and responsibilities in job 
offers and the articles written by legal scholars found certain similarities, but also 
major differences.3764 For the purposes of this thesis, only sixteen articles and 
sixteen job offers for corporate compliance officers have been evaluated outside 
the regulated sectors, such as the financial service sector or the health sector.3765 
The job offers were published in online job markets in April 2017.3766 At first, the 
key tasks and responsibilites were summarized and coded and then, the number 
of mentions captured. Table 19 shows the results of the key tasks and 
responsibilities for the compliance officers that are presented in the articles and 
job offers.3767 Chart 13, below, shows the comparison and, in particular, the 
differences between the requirements placed by corporations on the position of 
                                                     
3764 See supra Figure 13, p.543. 
3765 The comparison included following articles: Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480; Gößwein and 
Hohmann, supra note 46; Hauschka, Galster, and Marschlich, supra note 488; Hemeling, 
supra note 1046; Heuking, supra note 4; Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486; Krieger and 
Günther, supra note 47; Krieger and Günther, supra note 3465; Lackhoff and Schulz, supra 
note 483; Meier, supra note 47; Meier-Greve, supra note 486; Raus and Lützeler, supra note 
485; Renz and Wybitul, supra note 1096; Schulz and Renz, supra note 46; Wolf, supra note 
46; Zimmermann, supra note 32.  
3766 Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA), JOB MARKET - RESULTS 56 (2017), 
http://jobboerse.arbeitsagentur.de/vamJB/stellenangebote.html (last visited Apr 19, 2017); 
Stepstone, YOUR RESEARCH OF COMPLIANCE OFFICER REVEALED 738 RESULTS STEPSTONE 
DEUTSCHLAND GMBH (2017), https://www.stepstone.de/5/ergebnisliste.html (last visited 
Apr 19, 2017). 
3767 See supra Table 19, p. 543. 
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the compliance officer and the key tasks and responsibilities described by legal 
scholars.3768 
 
Table 19 - Key Tasks and Responsibilities of the Compliance Officer 
Key Tasks of the German Compliance Officer 
Numbers in 
German 
Journals 
Numbers in 
German Job 
Offers 
Average 
Access to relevant information 10 0 5 
Activities within internal investigations 9 3 6 
Advisory function 8 16 12 
Compliance bylaws 1 0 0.5 
Conducting internal audits/Due Diligence 4 7 5.5 
Continuing education 2 0 1 
Coordination of communication 0 1 0.5 
Cooperation with other corporate departments 2 4 3 
Development and implementation of a legal database 0 1 0.5 
Documentation 4 0 2 
Establishing of policies 2 5 3.5 
Identification of compliance risks and risk assessment 3 5 4 
Identification of any changes in the regulatory environment 0 3 1.5 
Implementation and conducting of pre-employment-screenings 0 1 0.5 
Implementation and maintain of a compliance program 5 9 7 
Monitoring and supervising activities 8 4 6 
Prevention of violations of the law 8 3 5.5 
Professional independence 8 0 4 
Reporting duties 18 5 11.5 
Training 8 9 8.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3768 See supra Figure 13, p. 544. 
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Figure 13 - Comparison of the Key Tasks and Responsibilities of the Compliance Officer as 
set forth in the Articles and Job Offers 
 
The major differences in terms of the importance between the key tasks in 
the literature and in practice concern the reporting duties, access to relevant 
information, the advisory function and professional independence.3769 In the job 
offers, corporations do not emphasize the professional independence of the 
compliance officer function, reporting duties in day-to-day business or the access 
to relevant information.3770 In corporations, the advisory function of the 
compliance officer, the conducting of internal audits, carrying out employee 
training and implementing and maintaining of a compliance program are 
afforded highest priority.3771 Legal scholars consider access to relevant 
information, the activities within internal investigations, monitoring and 
                                                     
3769 See supra Figure 13, p. 544. 
3770 See supra Table 19, p. 543. 
3771 See supra Table 19, p. 543. 
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supervisory activities, the prevention of violations of the law, professional 
independence and the reporting duties as essential to the performance of the job 
of compliance officer.3772 It is noteworthy that e.g. the coordination of 
communication within the corporation or the identification of any changes in the 
regulatory environment are not mentioned separately in the literature.3773 The 
correct governance of communication should also be an important responsibility 
of the compliance officer in order to ensure that the relevant information reaches 
the right recipient at the right time. In the event of a crime, this could be necessary 
for the compliance officer’s release from liability.  
In conclusion, this comparison has shown that the corporations give a clear 
picture of priorities of the required key tasks and responsibilities for the 
compliance officer. They emphasize the internal services that the compliance 
officer has to carry out for other departments, such as training, advice, internal 
audits, the risk assessment and the implementation of a compliance program as a 
key duty. Legal scholars focus mainly on the reporting duties, access to relevant 
information and activities in internal investigations. Both corporations and legal 
scholars see the importance of the compliance officer as an advisory function. 
Finally, the scope and the importance of the tasks and responsibilities are broad 
and varied between the literature and the practice. 
4. The Risks of Civil Liability of the Compliance Officer under Employment Law 
Just like under common law, the general principle is that the party who 
holds duties could be liable under civil law. As previously examined, the 
compliance officer is considered as an employee and, as a rule, receives a written 
contract of employment. His responsibilities could be derived from this 
contractual agreement, from employer’s instructions or from the delegation of 
certain compliance tasks. The scope of his tasks and responsibilities is broad and 
varied. How could he be liable under civil law within the internal employment 
relationship? The examination of tortious liability of the compliance officer and 
claims for damages pursuant to Section 823 (1) and (2) of the German Civil Code 
(BGB) within the external relationship will be excluded in the course of this 
consideration of the civil liability. 
                                                     
3772 See supra Table 19, p.543. 
3773 See supra Table 19, p.543. 
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Firstly, under German employment law, the compliance officer as employee 
is liable in the event that (a) he violates his contractual obligations, (b) the 
employer suffers a loss, and (c) there is a causal relationship between (a) and (b). 
Finally, (d) the employee is responsible for the violation.3774 Generally, under 
German civil law, Section 280 (1) of the German Civil Code (BGB) is the basis for 
the claim based on breach of contractual duties.3775 Conversely, in the event of the 
liability of an employee, the burden of proof pursuant to Section 619a of the 
German Civil Code (BGB), which overrules Section 280 (1) 2 of the German Civil 
Code (BGB) must be considered.3776 In detail, that means the employer has to 
provide evidence of the employee’s culpability and breach of duty.3777 
Secondly, over the years, the BAG has established principles of the limited 
liability of employees. Since the decision of principle of the Eighth Senate of the 
Federal Labor Court (BAG) on the removal of the requirement of high- risk work, 
these principles apply to all activities on the basis of an employment relationship 
within companies.3778 The principle states that the amount of damage depends on 
the degree of liability.3779 In the event of intent, the employee must bear the 
compensation costs, in the event of gross negligence, he usually has to bear the 
costs.3780 In the case of moderate negligence, the court will consider the 
circumstances and calculates the compensation payable proportionately to the 
                                                     
3774 Linck in: § 19 Employment Law-Manual, in EMPLOYMENT LAW-MANUAL , 1 (Günter 
Schaub ed., 16. ed. 2015). 
3775 See The claim for compensation due to breach of contractual duty: BÜRGERLICHES 
GESETZBUCH (BGB) | GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 93 § 280 (1). 
3776 Id.§ 619 (a); Weidenkaff in: COMMENTARY ON THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 310 
at 6§ 619a; Linck in: ArbR-HdB, supra note 3788 at 1. 
3777 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB) | GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 93 §§ 276, 619 (a); 
Weidenkaff in: COMMENTARY ON THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 310 at 7 § 619 (a). 
3778 BAG GS, 27.09.1994 - GS 1/89 (A) - Haftung des Arbeitnehmers - Abkehr von der 
gefahrgeneigten Arbeit, 1994 NZA 1083–1086 (1994); Preis in: § 619a (BGB) | Liability of the 
Employee | Erfurter Commentary on the Employment Law, in ERFURTER COMMENTARY 
ON THE EMPLOYMENT LAW , 10 (Preis, Müller-Glöge, & Schmidt eds., 17. ed. 2017)§ 619 (a). 
3779 Preis in: ErfK, supra note 3782 at 13 § 619 (a); Grüneberg in: COMMENTARY ON THE 
GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 311 at 10 intent, 12 negligence § 276. 
3780 BAG, 15.11.2012 - 8 AZR 705/11 - BGB § 611 Haftung des Arbeitnehmers No. 137, 137 
AP AP BGB § 611 Haftung des Arbeitnehmers No. 137 (2012); Preis in: ErfK, supra note 
3792 at 13 § 619 (a). 
548 | KATRIN KANZENBACH 
 
employer and to the employee.3781 Where the employee is liable in the case of 
slight negligence, the employer has to bear the full amount of the damage.3782 
However, the BAG has not introduced maximum limits of liability. Nevertheless, 
thus far, in the event of gross negligence, the BAG has not yet decided that an 
employee has to pay compensation that is higher than his annual income.3783 
Thirdly, these principles of limitation of liability also apply to the employed 
compliance officer, for example in the case that he performs his duties without the 
requisite care and diligence.3784 The following examples could arise in day-to-day 
business practice: A compliance officer has an employment contract with the 
agreed term that he has to conduct periodic trainings for all employees on the 
corporate anti-corruption and/or anti-bribery policies. The compliance officer has 
received all relevant information about the specific business activities of the 
departments in the company, but did not deliver training courses on the anti-
corruption and/or anti-bribery policies for sales employees, then he could be 
liable in the event that a sales employee bribes a foreign public official in order to 
obtain or retain business in the conduct of business in the US under the FCPA. 
This may apply when the damage has been caused ‘for’ the company. Another 
case of the liability of the compliance officer could arise if the company was 
sentenced to a fine for the violation of the supervisory duty pursuant to Section 
30, 130 of the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG).3785 Under his contract of 
employment, the compliance officer was commissioned with the implementation 
of the adopted compliance measures from the management board. The 
compliance officer failed to establish these measures and thereby breached his 
contractual obligations.3786 For this reason, it could be that the company attempts 
to impose compensation on the compliance officer.3787 Finally, the compliance 
                                                     
3781 BAG, 24.11.1987 - 8 AZR 524/82 - Haftung des Arbeitnehmers, 1988 NZA 579–584 
(1987); Preis in: ErfK, supra note 3792 at 13 § 619 (a). 
3782 Preis in: ErfK, supra note 3792 at 13 § 619 (a). 
3783 Preis in: Id. at 18. § 619 (a). 
3784 Lackhoff and Schulz, supra note 483 at 88. 
3785 ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITENGESETZ (OWIG) | ACT ON REGULATORY OFFENCES, supra note 
3305§§ 30, 130. 
3786 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB) | GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 93 §§ 276, 280 (1), 
619a. 
3787 It should be noted the BAG principles of the limited liability of employees. 
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officer’s contract will be terminated for cause without notice.3788 However, to date, 
there has not been any German landmark case in which a corporate compliance 
officer failed to perform his contractual obligations under German employment 
law.  
In conclusion, civil liability within the internal employment relationship 
follows different principles from criminal liability. Under employment law, the 
compliance officer has limited civil liability, but he could face the risk of dismissal 
from employment. 
5. The Compliance Officer’s Protection against Dismissal 
As previously discussed, the compliance officer is not legally assigned, 
unlike the data protection officer or the immission protection officer.3789 Therefore, 
although he is also commissioned with certain tasks and should perform his 
compliance tasks without professional instructions by the employer, he has no 
specific statutory protection against dismissal in his position as corporate 
compliance officer. In Germany, the Protection against Unfair Dismissal Act 
(KSchG) applies to all employees, in companies with more than ten employees 
and an employment agreement lasting more than six months.3790 The compliance 
officer does not occupy a special position, although he is responsible for 
confidential information and his relationship to the management board may be 
conflicted in the event of misconduct by the management.3791 The compliance 
tasks and duties are caught in a conflict field between disclosure duties and the 
duty of loyalty.3792 For this reason, a few legal scholars consider analogously 
applying these specific legal provisions to the commissioned compliance 
                                                     
3788 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB) | GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 93 § 626 (1) (2). 
3789 See supra II., 2., p. 499; See e.g. The ordinary termination of the employment contract is 
illegal. BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ | FEDERAL DATA PROTECTION ACT (BDSG), supra note 
3473 § 4 (f) (3). 
3790 KÜNDIGUNGSSCHUTZGESETZ (KSCHG) | EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LAW, § 1 
KÜNDIGUNGSSCHUTZGESETZ Federal Law Gazette I, p. 499 (1951) §§ 1 (1), 23 (1); Vossen in: 
§ 1 Commentary on the Employment Protection Law, in KÜNDIGUNGSRECHT , 21 (Reiner 
Ascheid, Ulrich Preis, & Ingrid Schmidt eds., 5. ed. 2017) § 1. 
3791 Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486 at 6. 
3792 Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480 at 19; Krieger and Günther, supra note 47 at 152; 
Fabian, Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3646 at 169 at 
30. 
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officer.3793 However, there is no explicit legal requirement to implement a 
corporate compliance system and no statutory basis for the commissioning of a 
corporate compliance officer, meaning that there is also no legal basis for a 
specific protection against dismissal.3794 In addition, as previously examined, 
within the financial service sector, the legislator has defined the compliance 
function for banks and investment service firms in Section 33 (1) 1 of the German 
Securities Trading Act (WpHG) and Section 12 (4) of the (WpDVerOV).3795 Even 
these provisions show that the German legislator does not require a specific 
statutory specific protection against dismissal for the compliance officer.  
Furthermore, the German Employment Courts do not view any need for 
such dismissal protection. In a case involving the termination of a compliance 
officer in 2010, the Berlin Employment Court did not hold that there was any 
specific protection against dismissal for compliance officers, but it examined the 
legitimacy of the termination for reasons of conduct under the Unfair Dismissal 
Act.3796 The Court held that the contract of employment of a compliance officer, 
like other employees, could be terminated only in the event that the employee has 
culpably breached his contractual duties.3797 Thus, the court does not see any need 
for a separate legal statutory protection against dismissal for the compliance 
officer. 
In comparison with the US and the UK, the German compliance officer is 
protected under the Unfair Dismissal Act and has the right to review the legality 
                                                     
3793 Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480 at 19; Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486 at 6; Meier, 
supra note 47 at 781; But critically: Dann and Mengel, supra note 47 at 3269. 
3794 Fabian, Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3646 at 171 
at 33. 
3795 WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (WPHG) | SECURITIES TRADING ACT, supra note 973 § 33 (1) 
1; WERTPAPIERDIENSTLEISTUNGS-VERHALTENS- UND ORGANISATIONSVERORDNUNG 
(WPDVEROV) | SECURITIES TRADING IMPLEMENTING PROVISION, supra note 1037 § 12 (4); 
Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486 at 6. 
3796 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB) | GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 93 § 626; 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LAW (KSCHG), supra note 3804§ 1; ArbG Berlin, 18. 2. 2010 - 38 
Ca 12879/09 - Kündigung einer leitenden Compliance-Mitarbeiterin, 2010 CCZ 158–160 
(2010). 
3797 ARBG BERLIN, 18. 2. 2010 - 38 CA 12879/09 - KÜNDIGUNG EINER LEITENDEN COMPLIANCE-
MITARBEITERIN, supra note 3810 at 158. 
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of the termination in the employment courts.3798 Contrary to the US common law 
at-will doctrine, under German protection against unfair dismissal law, Section 1 
limits the employer’s freedom to dismiss.3799 An ordinary termination of the 
contract of employment will be possible only when there are reasons pursuant to 
Section 1 (2) of the Protection against Unfair Dismissal Act (KSchG).3800 The 
German protection against unfair dismissal is based on the constitution, namely 
on the freedom of choice of workplace pursuant to Article 12 (1) of the Basic Law 
(GG).3801 However, in practice, the real situation in terms of the law shows another 
picture. According to studies by the Max Planck Institute and by the Legal 
Faculty of the Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, only 1.7 percent of 
plaintiffs return to their workplace after being involved in an action against 
dismissal.3802 The majority of these cases have dissolved the work relationship in 
return for payment of compensation.3803 
Finally, as we have seen, since the compliance officer enjoys general 
protection against dismissal pursuant to Sections 1 and 23 of the Protection 
against Unfair Dismissal Act (KSchG), there is no need for special legal provisions 
governing protection against dismissal for the commissioned compliance 
officer.3804 Compliance officers occupy a specific qualified position of trust with 
the collaboration of the management, with a certain degree of flexibility in terms 
of their tasks.3805 In conclusion, the right of the compliance officer to negotiate 
terms of contractually agreed protection against dismissal with his employer 
remains unaffected by the absence of a legally defined protection against 
dismissal.  
                                                     
3798 Compare In Germany, the protection against dismissal is mandatory law: Vossen in: 
Employment Protection Law, supra note 3804 at 5 § 1. 
3799 Compare supra Ch. 4, A., II., III., p. 304; Vossen in: Id. at 1.§ 1. 
3800 Vossen in: Id. at 1.§ 1. 
3801 BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (GG), supra note 390 Art. 12 (1); 
Vossen in: Employment Protection Law, supra note 3804 at 2 § 1. 
3802 Vossen in: Employment Protection Law, supra note 3804 at 3 § 1. 
3803 Vossen in: Id. at 4.§ 1. 
3804 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LAW (KSCHG), supra note 3804 § 1 (1), 23 (1); Fabian, Mengel 
in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3646 at 172 at 38. 
3805 Fabian, Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3646 at 172 
at 38. 
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6. Conclusion – The relevant Content of the Contract of Employment 
After examining the civil liability of the employed compliance officer under 
German Employment Law, it is clear that on the one hand, he faces the same 
liability as other employees in the event of a breach of his contractual duties. He 
does not gain any exclusion from the ordinary dismissal, unlike e.g. the legally 
appointed data protection officer. The evidence presented has shown that there 
are no any regulatory requirements governing the legal position of the corporate 
compliance officer in Germany. The provisions of the German Securities Trading 
Act (WpHG) and the (WpDVerOV), which require the assignment of the 
compliance officer function in banks and investment firms, were not be adopted 
from the legislator into the private sector. They may merely serve as a measure of 
orientation for the corporate compliance officer function. 
On the other hand, legal scholars have recognized that the contract of 
employment could govern the scope of tasks and liability regulation of the 
compliance officer and, additionally, that a clearly defined job description should 
be developed.3806 In addition, the comparison of the scope and the importance of 
the activities and responsibilities of the compliance officer between practice and 
the literature has shown that the scope and importance of the tasks are 
comprehensive and varied. For this reason, it has been established that the 
contract of employment in particular should state clearly the tasks, the 
responsibilities, the powers and the possible protection of the compliance 
officer.3807 Additionally, a clearly defined job description should be developed.3808 
The contract of the compliance officer can include e.g. the following subjects: (1) 
the professional independence of the employer in terms of monitoring the 
compliance measures, (2) his integration into the corporate structures and his 
powers relating to other departments or obtaining relevant reports and 
                                                     
3806 Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480 at 20; Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486 at 6; Meier, 
supra note 47 at 782; Fabian, Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, supra 
note 3646 at 173 at 41. 
3807 Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480 at 20; Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486 at 6; § 7. 
Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3646 at 173 at 41. 
3808 Fecker and Kinzl, supra note 480 at 20; Meier, supra note 47 at 782. 
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information, (3) his reporting lines and duties, (4) his further education, and (5) 
his resources.3809 
A few scholars critically view clearly agreed tasks in the contract of 
employment of the compliance officer, since these terms are inflexible  and could , 
in practice, be alterable by the employer.3810 In addition, the case law of the BGH 
in terms of criminal liability should be considered as regards the status as 
guarantor in the event of a clearly agreed area of tasks and responsibilities 
specifically for the compliance officer in his contract of employment.3811 Through 
the definition in the employment contract, the breach of duties may be more 
precisely evidenced. Therefore, in practice, the detailed and specific description 
should be balanced between the employer and the compliance officer.3812 
Furthermore, as previously examined, the scope of the compliance tasks 
depends on the size, the business sector or the nature and scope of the corporate 
business.3813 It is therefore to be recommended that, similar to the IDW Auditing 
Standard, a typical area of compliance tasks should be summarized in general 
and described as follows: (1) the compliance culture, (2) the compliance 
objectives, (3) the risk analysis of the business, (4) the compliance program, (5) 
organizational compliance with the reporting, (6) compliance communication 
with training, and (7) compliance monitoring and compliance improvement with 
documentation.3814 
In conclusion, from the above, the position and civil liability of the 
compliance officer under employment law is no different from other employees in 
Germany. Compared to the US and the UK, German Law does not include any 
indemnification clauses expressly applicable to officers, directors, employees, and 
                                                     
3809 See e.g. Illing and Umnuß, supra note 486 at 7–8; Meier, supra note 47 at 782. 
3810 Fabian, Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3646 at 174 
at 42. 
3811 See supra III., 4.a., p. 596; Fabian, Mengel in: Id. at 174. at 43. 
3812 Fabian, Mengel in: Id. at 175. at 44. 
3813 See supra III., 4.a., p. 516. 
3814 These are the basic elements of an appropriate compliance management system 
recommended by the Institute of Public Auditors (IDW) in Germany: See IDW, IDW 
PRÜFUNGSSTANDARD: GRUNDSÄTZE ORDNUNGSMÄßIGER PRÜFUNG VON COMPLIANCE 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMEN (IDW PS 980) 23 (2011); Fabian, Mengel in: § 7. Arbeitsrechtliche 
Stellung und Haftung, supra note 3646 at 175 at 45. 
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agents. However, German Employment Law comprises other protective 
measures. The Protection against Unfair Dismissal Act (KSchG) and the BAG 
case- law principles of the limited liability of employees also apply to the 
employed compliance officer. The compliance officer should therefore carefully 
negotiate his contract of employment with respect to his area of tasks and 
responsibilities and a possible exclusion of ordinary termination for a certain 
period. Thus, a specific statutory regulation of this corporate position does not 
appear to be necessary at present.  
B. THE GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
Since the era of the major corporate failures in Germany and abroad, 
including in the US and in the UK, efforts have been made by governments and 
committees to improve corporate governance mechanisms in order to help 
prevent corporate failures.3815 Since 1990, several codes, guidelines, principles, 
reports und statements have been established internationally, which comprise 
standards of good and responsible corporate governance.3816 These efforts have 
also resulted in the introduction of principles of best practice in the UK and in 
Germany in the form of a Corporate Governance Code, which encompasses 
mechanisms geared towards increasing the effectiveness of corporate 
governance.3817  
                                                     
3815 See supra Ch. 4, 5, 6. 
3816 See e.g. Belgium: Cardon Report (December 1998), The 2009 Belgian Code on Corporate 
Governance 12 March 2009, Brazil: Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (5th 
edition) 2016, France: Viénot I Report (July 1995), Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (5th edition) 2016, Italy: Preda Report (October 1999), Codice di 
autodisciplina (“Codice”) 15 July 2015, Netherlands: Peters Report (June 1997), Spain: 
Olivencia Report (February 1998), Código de buen gobierno de las sociedades cotizadas 
February 2015, in: Comparative Study of Corporate Governance WEIL, GOTSHAL & 
MANGES LLP, supra note 2403 at 14–15.; v. Werder in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra 
note 1052 at 3.; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), INDEX OF ALL CODES 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES, PRINCIPLES & RECOMMENDATIONS (2017), 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php (last visited Apr 23, 2017). 
3817 THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 969 [hereinafter: The German Code 2015]; THE UK 
CODE 2016, supra note 3168 [hereinafter: The UK Code 2016]. 
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The Codes were issued by a committee or commission, best categorized as 
organized by government, with the objective of providing guidance in general 
terms as to principles, structures and processes.3818 Compared with the 
development of corporate governance codes in other countries, in Germany, the 
German Government Commission was charged by the German Federal Minister 
of Justice fairly late in the game, in September 2001.3819 The first version of the 
German Code was published on February 26, 2002.3820 Since 2009, the Commission 
has been required to publish the Code pursuant to Section 161 of the German 
Stock Corporation Act (AktG) in the official section of the electronic Federal 
Gazette.3821 
Both the UK Code and the German Code define the term ‘corporate 
governance’ similarly, as follows:  
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.3822 
Corporate governance is the legal and effective regulatory framework for governing 
and monitoring of the company.3823 
In addition, the term ‘corporate governance code’ excludes statutes, regulations 
on corporate governance, and codes which are created by companies.3824 The 
Corporate Governance Codes are referred to as ‘soft law’ or ‘secondary law’, since 
they include recommendations, which a company is not, however, always obliged 
to follow.3825 The provisions of these Codes should supplement the companies' 
self-imposed rules with regulatory requirements.3826 Nevertheless, these Codes do 
not have the status of ‘primary law’.  
                                                     
3818 OKOYE, supra note 3148 at 83. 
3819 The German Code 2015, The legislative Commission, supra note 1051. 
3820 The German Code 2015, The legislative Commission, supra note 1051. 
3821 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 998 § 161 (1) 1; 
Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 79. 
3822 See The Cadbury Report (1992) , supra note 816 para 2.5. 
3823 See v. Werder in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 1. 
3824 Comparative Study of Corporate Governance WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra 
note 2403 at 11. 
3825 v. Werder in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 5. 
3826 v. Werder in: Id. at 5. 
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For this reason, both the UK Code and the German Code have been subject 
to criticism from the outset. In the UK, there is an academic debate on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance since legal scholars critically view the issue 
of compliance.3827 In Germany, the legal policy debate concerning the Code 
revolves around the content and the work of the German Government 
Commission.3828 Criticism has grown with the case- law since the Munich District 
Court decided on the contestability of the management and supervisory board in 
the context of the non-compliance with their obligations pursuant to the Section 
161 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).3829 In 2011, the debate 
concerning the Code reached a temporary climax with the introduction of 
provisions of the increase of the percentage of women in the management and 
supervisory boards of German corporations.3830 A few voices of scholars even 
require the repeal of the German Code.3831 However, in 2012, the Association of 
German Jurists decided to continue the regulatory framework of the German 
Code.3832 Since then, the German Code has been periodically reviewed and 
developed further by the German Government Commission.3833 The abolition of 
the Code appears unlikely due to international business practice. 
The major objectives of the UK Code and the German Code are similar: first 
and foremost, to improve the quality of the board governance and, then, to 
improve the quality of governance-related information available to equity 
markets, shareholders and investors. In particular, one major aim of the German 
Government Commission of the 2015 Code is to explain the German dual system 
for foreign investors.3834 In 2014, the Commission stated: 
                                                     
3827 See supra Ch. 5., A., I., 3., p. 460; Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-Grimaud, supra note 468; 
GRANT THORNTON, supra note 3220; OKOYE, supra note 3148. 
3828 Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 85. 
3829 Bachmann in: Id. at 85.; OLG München, 23. 1. 2008 - 7 U 3668/07 - Folgen der Nichtabgabe 
einer Entsprechenserklärung nach § 161 AktG, 2008 NZG 337–339 (2008) The case has not yet 
been settled. 
3830 Bachmann in: Id. at 85. 
3831 Bachmann in: Id. at 85. 
3832 Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 86. 
3833 Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1054 at 86 
3834 Press Release dated on June 25, 2014 The German Government Commission, supra note 
1051; Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1054 at 33. The code defines 
the dual system of German Stock Corporations as follows: “The management board is 
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The German Corporate Governance Code is intended to make the rules applicable in 
Germany for company management and supervision transparent to national and 
international investors in order to strengthen trust in the management of German 
companies.3835 
Secondly, the German Code 2015 aims to guide companies in the 
establishment of standards of corporate governance, with concrete 
recommendations.3836 The German Code 2015 comprises three components: on the 
one hand, the part of the applicable law and, on the other hand, international and 
nationally recognized standards, such as recommendations and suggestions for 
good corporate governance.3837 The recommendations extend the parts of the 
Codes that describe the applicable law for management and supervision of 
German listed companies, which refers mainly to the German Stock Corporation 
Act (AktG).3838 The legal part of 91 described provisions has an informative nature 
for foreign investors, but the listed companies to which these provisions apply, 
must also comply with them.3839 The recommendations and suggestions do not 
have force of law and cannot guarantee effective board behavior.3840 Therefore, the 
German Code 2015 is not primary law.3841 
However, it should be noted that, pursuant to Section 161 of the German 
Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the members of the management board and the 
supervisory board of listed corporations are required to declare annually: 
that the recommendations of the “Government Commission on the German Corporate 
Governance Code” published by the Federal Ministry of Justice in the official section of 
the electronic Federal Gazette have been and are being complied with or which of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
responsible for managing the enterprise. The supervisory board appoints, supervises and 
advises the members of the management board and is directly involved in decisions of 
fundamental importance to the enterprise.” See in: THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 969 
at 1 Foreword. 
3835 Press release dated on June 25, 2014 The German Government Commission, supra note 
1049; Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 33. 
3836 Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 35. 
3837 The German Code 2015 The German Government Commission, supra note 1049. 
3838 Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 81; The German Code 
2015 The German Government Commission, supra note 1049. 
3839 Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 81; v. Werder Id. at 143. 
3840 Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 39. 
3841 Bachmann in: Id. at 80. 
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Code’s recommendations are not being applied. The declaration shall be made 
permanently accessible to stockholders.”3842 
The German Government Commission states on its website that:  
through the declaration of conformity pursuant to § 161 (AktG) (German Stock 
Corporation Act), the Code has a legal basis. Accordingly, the recommendations and 
suggestions are not mandatory.3843 
Finally, the German Code 2015 applies to all listed companies that issue 
shares on the stock exchanges, and which are subject to the German Stock 
Corporation Act (AktG) including the KGaA3844 and the European joint-stock 
company (SE).3845 The declarations of the German companies listed on the DAX 
and MDAX are published on the website of the German Government 
Commission.3846 Nevertheless, it is recommended that all companies comply with 
the Code.3847 
I. The ‘Comply or Explain’ Approach or Compliance Mechanism of the 
German Code 2015 
Similar to the UK Code, the German Corporate Governance Code also 
includes a voluntary disclosure ‘comply or explain’ concept. The German Code 
2015 governs this approach through recommendations and suggestions. These 
rules additionally amend the described legal provisions.3848 The recommendations 
are described with the term ‘shall’ and the suggestions with the term ‘should’.3849 
Thus, in the first instance, the recommendations and suggestions are voluntary. 
                                                     
3842 Transparency and disclosure law The German Government Commission, supra note 
1051, It entered into force on July 26, 2002 and was published in the Federal Gazette Part I 
No. 50 on July 29, 2002 . 
3843 The German Code 2015 Id. 
3844 See KGaA’s are defined as partnership limited by shares. 
3845 Lutter in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 1801. 
3846 Declarations of Conformity pursuant to Section 161 (AktG) The German Government 
Commission, supra note 1049. 
3847 THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 969 at 2. 
3848 v. Werder Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1054 at 144.  
3849 The German Code 2015 The German Government Commission, supra note 1049; See 
e.g. THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 969 at 4“shall” - para 2.3.2, “should” - para 2.3.3. 
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However, non-compliance with the recommendations has to be explained and 
disclosed with the annual declaration of conformity ‘comply or explain’.3850 
Pursuant to Section 161 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the 
members of the management board and supervisory board of the listed company 
shall declare annually whether or not the company has complied with the 
recommendation.3851 In the event that the company has not complied with the 
recommendations, it must explain the reasons for its non-compliance.3852 This 
explanation of non-compliance with a recommendation has to be well justified.3853 
The justification has to be true.3854 It has to be published jointly by the members of 
the management board and supervisory board on a permanent basis and annually 
in the current signed version.3855 In addition, the company also has to publish this 
declaration on its website.3856 In the event that the members of the board do not 
provide the declaration, they will be in breach of their duties pursuant to Sections 
93 (1) 1 and 116 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) and will be liable 
to pay compensation.3857 As a result, on the one hand, this approach is intended to 
enable companies to reflect specific business requirements and to act flexibly with 
greater self-regulation, but on the other hand, this kind of explanation for listed 
companies is not voluntary.3858 Contrary to the recommendations, non-compliance 
with the suggestions does not need to be disclosed or explained.3859 
                                                     
3850 The German Code 2015 The German Government Commission, supra note 1049. 
3851 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 998§ 161 (1); The 
German Code 2015 The German Government Commission, supra note 1049. 
3852 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 998§ 161 (1); The 
German Code 2015 The German Government Commission, supra note 1049. 
3853 THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 969 at 2; v. Werder Commentary on the DCGK, 
supra note 1052 at 148. 
3854 Lutter in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 1861. 
3855 v. Werder Id. at 151–153. 
3856 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 998§ 161 (2); The 
German Code 2015 The German Government Commission, supra note 1049. 
3857 BGH, 7. 12. 2009 - II ZR 63/08 - Beschränkung der Revisionszulassung auf 
aktienrechtlichen Beschlussanfechtungsgrund, 2009 NZG 618–619, 9 (2009); Lutter in: 
Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 1905. 
3858 THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 969 at 2; v. Werder Commentary on the DCGK, 
supra note 1052 at 146. 
3859 THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 969 at 2. 
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Finally, just like under the UK Code 2016 in the context of UK exchange 
standards and Listing Rules, the disclosure requirement for German listed 
companies could lead to pressure to comply with the provisions of the Code. In 
conclusion, the “comply or explain” approach of the German Code 2015 
encourages listed companies to comply with the Code in connection with Section 
161 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). This combination creates a 
voluntary mechanism of suggestions and recommendations relating to disclosure 
requirements.  
II. The Main Provisions of the German Code with respect to Compliance 
The German Code 2015 contains three provisions3860 with regard to 
compliance. As previously mentioned, the most relevant provision refers to the 
definition of compliance - i.e. adherence to the law - as the compliance task of the 
management board as follows:3861 
4.1.3 The management board ensures that all provisions of law and the enterprise’s 
internal policies are abided by and works to achieve their compliance by group companies 
(compliance).3862 
Section 4.1.3 thus points out that the management board is responsible for 
compliance, as derived from legal requirements of Section 130 of the Act on 
Regulatory Offences (OWiG), Section 13 of the German Criminal Code (StGB) or 
the duty of care in accordance with Sections 76 (1) and 93 (1) of the German Stock 
Corporation Act (AktG).3863 Therefore, Section 4.1.3 emphasizes applicable law.3864 
However, para 4.1.3 does not include any legal definition of compliance, but 
merely a description of the term.3865 The companies are not required to refer to 
Section 4.1.3 in the declaration pursuant to Section 161 of the German Stock 
                                                     
3860 See THE GERMAN CODE 2015 Id. at 4. para 3.4 Informing the supervisory board is the 
responsibility of the management board; Id. at 9. para 5.2. 
3861 See supra Ch. 3. A., III., 1. footnote 1043; Ch. 6 A., p. 548.  
3862 THE GERMAN CODE 2015, supra note 969 at 6 para 4.1.3. 
3863 See supra Ch. 6, A., II. p.484, III. p.501; Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra 
note 1052 at 821–825. 
3864 Bachmann in: Id. at 811. 
3865 Bachmann in: Id. at 815. 
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Corporation Act (AktG).3866 In addition, the definition of compliance and the BGH 
decision in the Siemens/Neubürger case do not require the management board to 
prevent violations of the law in all cases.3867 The Munich District Court stated that, 
notwithstanding the term compliance, the management board has to ensure that 
the company and the employees comply with the legal requirements.3868 
The problem is that the content of the compliance tasks is neither defined 
under the German Stock Corporation Act nor under Section 130 of the Act on 
Regulatory Offences (OWiG).3869 Additionally, the German Code 2015 does not 
describe specific features, measures or tools in order to give the companies 
flexibility in the course of implementation.3870 It has been recognized that there are 
no uniform compliance measures or procedures fit for all companies across the 
board.3871 Although there is no uniform recognized compliance system, over the 
years, academics, business practice and court decisions have established 
standards relating to basic elements of an effective compliance organization.3872 
Based on these, an effective compliance organization should include the following 
basic elements: (1) a legal and risk assessment, (2) the commitment of the 
management board, a mission statement, or tone from the top, (3) the 
management of information such as reporting lines, (4) training and advice, (5) 
documentation and (6) monitoring and adherence.3873 These elements could serve 
as a plan of measures and guidelines for companies.  
In conclusion, on the one hand, the German Code 2015 emphasizes the 
compliance duty of the management board, while, on the other side, this duty is 
subject to approval of necessity and reasonableness.3874 Finally, the German Code 
                                                     
3866 Bachmann in: Id. at 811. 
3867 Bachmann in: Id. at 813.; LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 995. 
3868 LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 995 at 345. 
3869 Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 827. 
3870 Bachmann in: Id. at 827. 
3871 Bachmann in: Id. at 828.; The Bribery Guidance Ministry of Justice, supra note 881 at 21 
Principle 1 - Proportionate procedures. 
3872 See e.g. CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 3283; Bachmann in: Commentary on the 
DCGK, supra note 1052 at 829; IDW Auditing Standard PS 980 IDW, supra note 3828; LG 
MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 995. 
3873 Summarized by Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 830–836. 
3874 Fleischer in: SPINDLER, STILZ | COMMENTARY ON THE AKTG, supra note 3386 at 53§ 91; 
Bachmann in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 837. 
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2015 has also recognized that the management board has a broad discretion in the 
implementation of compliance measures.  
III. Amendment to the German Code 2017 in order to enhance 
Transparency and Compliance 
In the course of writing this section of the thesis, the amended version of the 
Code 2015 was published by the German Federal Law Gazette on April 24, 2017. 
On 7 February 2017, the German Government Commission decided on 
amendments to the German Code 2015 in order to enhance transparency as the 
basis for stakeholders to assess corporate governance and to concretize the 
compliance duties of the management board with regard to the compliance 
measures.3875 At first, the Commission refers to the principle of an 'honorable 
businessperson' in the context of the Preamble to the Code.3876 Secondly, as a result 
of approximately 80 statements of national and international Code users, 
academics and advisers, one significant amendment is the enhancement of 
Section 4.1.3 in the German Code 2017 as follows:3877 
4.1.3 The Management Board ensures that all provisions of law and the enterprise’s 
internal policies are abided by and works to achieve their compliance by group companies 
(compliance). Therefore, the Management Board provides for a proportionate Compliance 
Management System corresponding to the level of risk that the company is exposed to and shall 
publish the basic features of this system in the annual corporate governance report. Employees as 
well as third parties shall be given the opportunity of anonymously reporting misconduct within 
the company in a protected manner.3878 
The companies shall publish the basic features of their compliance measures, 
which is described as compliance management system and the opportunity for 
employees to anonymously report misconduct.3879 Therefore, it is a 
recommendation that the listed companies have to explain and disclose with the 
                                                     
3875 Press Release on February 14, 2017 The German Government Commission, supra note 
1049. 
3876 PRESS RELEASE ON FEBRUARY 14, 2017 Id. 
3877 PRESS RELEASE ON FEBRUARY 14, 2017 Id. 
3878 The German Code 2017 THE GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (DCGK), 6 (2002) 
para 4.1.3. 
3879 Press Release on February 14, 2017 The German Government Commission, supra note 
1049. 
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annual declaration of conformity pursuant to Section 161 (1) of the German Stock 
Corporation Act (AktG). In detail, the listed companies have to provide and 
publish their proportionate compliance measures in the Federal Gazette and on 
their websites e.g. for investors. The term ‘proportionate’ is again reminiscent of the 
UK Bribery Guidance, which comprises the business risks of the company, and 
the nature, scale and complexity of the company’s activities. 3880 
In their current declarations of conformity pertaining to the German Code 
pursuant to Section 161 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) at the end of 
2016, the companies simply state whether they have fulfilled the provisions of the 
Code.3881 For example, Allianz SE stated on December 15, 2016 that the company 
complied with all recommendations of the German Code 2015 without further 
explanation.3882 However, there is no transparency or disclosure for investors as to 
how Allianz SE fulfilled the requirements set forth in the recommendations. 
Nevertheless, additionally, by examining the annual report of Allianz SE, we see 
that the company has published the structure and the development of its 
compliance program, which also includes the structure of the central compliance 
function.3883 In addition, the report states that Allianz SE has implemented 
interactive training programs around the world, as well as a code of conduct, an 
anti-corruption program, and “a whistleblower system that allows employees to 
alert the relevant compliance department confidentially about irregularities.”3884  
Consequently, the amended German Code 2017 introduces the obligation 
for listed companies to disclose and provide proportionate compliance features 
and measures through the amended recommendation of Section 4.1.3 and 
                                                     
3880 The Bribery Guidance Ministry of Justice, supra note 881 at 21 Principle 1. 
3881 See e.g. ALLIANZ SE, THE MANAGEMENT BOARD & THE SUPERVISORY BOARD, GERMAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE AT ALLIANZ SE: CONFORMITY WITH THE CODE REGULATIONS 
IN DETAIL (2016), https://www.allianz.com/v_1481877271000/media/investor_relations/en/ 
corporate_governance/declaration_of_conformity/161215-Synopsis-Allianz.pdf (last 
visited Apr 29, 2017). 
3882 See e.g. DECLARATION OF CONFORMITY 2016 Id. 
3883 See e.g. ALLIANZ SE & THE MANAGEMENT BOARD, ALLIANZ GROUP ANNUAL REPORT 2016 
19 (2017), https://www.allianz.com/v_1489492630000/media/investor_relations/en/results/ 
2016_fy/ar-2016-annual-report-allianz-group.pdf (last visited Apr 29, 2017). 
3884 ALLIANZ GROUP ANNUAL REPORT 2016 Id. at 20. 
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disclosure in accordance with the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).3885 Thus, 
it is expected that the declarations of conformity pursuant to Section 4.1.3 will be 
extended in future. The objective is that investors, as well as the interested public, 
can assess the company's compliance efforts.3886 Overall, the German Code 2017 
requires that the listed company inform all shareholders and investors about the 
relevant facts with respect to compliance and financial aspects in the same and 
fair way.3887  
IV. Conclusion – A Review of the UK and the German Code 
This section has presented a conceptual framework for the German Code 
2015 and 2017 in terms of corporate governance and compliance. As noted, the 
German Code and the UK Code apply to listed companies on the stock 
exchanges. Both the German and the UK Code provide provisions in terms of 
compliance as a task of the members of the board. The following section discusses 
the aims of the ‘comply or explain’ approach. As we have seen, both Codes proceed 
with the ‘comply or explain’ approach. In the UK, companies are required through 
the Listing Rules to disclose whether they have complied with the provisions of 
the UK Code. In Germany, companies are required to disclose whether they have 
complied with the provisions of the Code through the declaration of conformity 
pursuant to Section 161 (1) (2) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). 
However, the monitoring of the explanation is different. In the UK, the investors 
assess these statements and the FRC will continue to monitor compliance with the 
provisions of the Code. In Germany, in 2017, the Code Commission takes the next 
step through statutory regulation in the Section 161 (1) (2) of the German Stock 
Corporation Act (AktG) and the amended Section 4.1.3 in the 2017 Code, to the 
effect that the companies have to provide the basic features of their compliance 
measures, which can also include the compliance function. Thus, both the UK and 
the German Code encourage greater corporate governance disclosure by listed 
companies for shareholders and investors by indirectly taking into account the 
                                                     
3885 THE GERMAN CODE 2017, supra note 3892 at 6 para 4.1.3. 
3886 Press Release on February 14, 2017 The German Government Commission, supra note 
1049. 
3887 THE GERMAN CODE 2017, supra note 3892 at 13 para 6.1-6.3; v. Werder in: Commentary 
on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 1602–1612. 
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legal requirements for joint-stock corporations. However, the result of the ‘comply 
or explain’ approach and the absence of any legal penalty mechanism in the Codes 
are a considerable risk that certain provisions in the Codes may not be observed 
despite the explanation or declaration of conformity.  
For this reason, in practice, academics have raised the question of the 
response to the provisions of the Codes and their actual implementation.3888 
Studies examining the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ approach found for 
example, that only 62 percent of all FTSE 350 companies complied in full with the 
UK Code.3889 The Corporate Governance Report 2015 shows a different picture.3890 
Based on 535 listed companies on the German stock exchanges, such as DAX, 
MDAX, TecDAX and SDAX, 109 listed companies were involved in the Corporate 
Governance Report 2015.3891 One result of this Report was that 83.6 percent of 
these respondents comply with all recommendations of the German Code.3892 
Another result shows that the rate of compliance depends on the size of the 
company. The larger a company, the higher the probability that the company 
complies with the recommendations of the Code.3893 
Overall, it has been revealed that the acceptance of the ‘comply or explain’ 
approach of the Codes as secondary law depends on the size of the company and 
the commitment of the provision. In conclusion, where the provision has been 
accompanied by higher legal obligations for companies, such as in the context of 
the German Corporation Law, e.g. the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the 
rate of compliance will be higher. Finally, while the aim of corporate governance 
codes is to support companies in the form of guidance, in general terms, as to 
principles, structures and processes for reasonable corporate governance, is 
generally accepted, the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ approach remains 
questionable.  
 
                                                     
3888 v. Werder in: Commentary on the DCGK, supra note 1052 at 1929. 
3889 The Grant Thornton Review 2016 , supra note 3220 at 3. 
3890 Axel v. Werder & Julia Turkali, Corporate Governance Report 2015: Kodexakzeptanz und 
Kodexanwendung, DER BETRIEB 1357–1367 (2015). 
3891 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT 2015 Id. at 1358. 
3892 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT 2015 Id. at 1359. Table 1. 
3893 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT 2015 Id. at 1359. 
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C. THE MODEL OF THE GERMAN COMPLIANCE OFFICER 
I. Development of Responsibilities and Duties of the Compliance Officer 
Thus, as has been shown, in response to high-profile criminal and bribery 
cases, increased regulatory pressure, the first court cases concerning compliance 
and a trend towards greater corporate governance with disclosure and 
transparency efforts in respect of to shareholders and investors, companies listed 
on the stock exchanges are now required to consider adequate and proportionate 
compliance measures, which may also include a corporate compliance function. 
This development is similar to that in the US and the UK, the difference being that 
the enhanced implementation of the compliance officer took place a decade later 
in Germany. German companies have in the meantime developed a variety of 
organizational models for compliance measures and compliance departments 
based on the model of the US and the UK in accordance with the nature, size, and 
risk profile of their business.3894 Within these compliance measures, it is favorable 
to establish a compliance function as a basic feature and to consider how the 
compliance officer communicates, interacts and collaborates with other business 
units. The role and responsibilities of the compliance function are not structured 
in the same way in all companies.3895 Furthermore, the German corporate 
compliance officer is a young profession, which is still in the process of shaping 
its job tasks and responsibilities. As a result, it is challenging to present a model of 
the corporate compliance officer that fits all corporations. However, the much- 
discussed obiter dictum of the BGH has brought a major advance in the 
development of a more precise job profile in the literature, as well as in 
practice.3896 Thus, new regulations in criminal law, guidance and 
recommendations in secondary law as well as the criminal case law concerning 
                                                     
3894 See e.g. Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC COMMISSIONER’S SPEECH: SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE 
IDEA OF “GOOD” GOVERNANCE (2002), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch586.htm (last 
visited May 6, 2017); Study Compliance Mananger 2013 HERZOG AND STEPHAN, supra note 
501; ECONOMIC CRIME AND CORPORATE CULTURE 2013, supra note 3713. 
3895 See supra A., IV., 3., p. 542. 
3896 BGHST 54, 44; BGH NJW 2009, 3173, supra note 29. 
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compliance breaches have led to the commissioning of corporate officers to 
support the management board in compliance matters.3897 
This section now attempts to set out the corner-stones for a model of the 
German corporate compliance officer. First, it presents the findings from the 
development of the duties and responsibilities incumbent upon corporate 
compliance officers, before going on to describe the position and the integration 
within companies and the recommended standards for this profession using a 
dynamic model. 
First and foremost, corporate compliance and the compliance function have 
been enhanced and developed within listed companies in Germany over the 
course of the last ten years. In light of the examination in Chapter 6, it is evident 
that German companies listed on stock exchanges are governed mainly by the 
provisions of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the German Criminal 
Code (StGB), German Employment Law, the German Corporate Governance 
Code 2017, and German case- law, as well as by EU Directives and international 
law. It has been shown that this legal framework has had an increasingly large 
influence on day-to-day business within companies. Just as the legal framework 
has developed, corporate compliance and the compliance function have emerged, 
although there is no specific corporate law governing corporate compliance. In 
Germany, in the course of this development, there were many waves of corporate 
compliance issues in accordance with German Company Law, Criminal Law the 
German Code 2017, and German case- law concerning the increased compliance 
tasks and responsibilities of the management board. Considering Sections 91 (2), 
76 (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) and the recent Munich District 
Court cases, such as the Siemens case, there is an overall responsibility for the 
management board to establish an effective monitoring system to prevent 
criminal conduct by the company.3898 This key task of the management board 
encompasses the legal duty to document this system, to define clear 
responsibilities within this system, to specifically determine reporting lines within 
this system, to define appropriate measures, to implement these measures and to 
                                                     
3897 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 998 § 91 (2); 
STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 987 § 299 (1) (2); THE 
GERMAN CODE 2017, supra note 3892. 
3898 See supra A., II. 1. p. 486. 
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supervise their implementation.3899 In order to limit their liability, the members of 
the management board can transfer certain compliance tasks to another corporate 
function without surrendering their ultimate supervisory responsibility.3900 
Hence, without explicit legal regulation relating to the commissioning of or the 
tasks of the compliance officer, this corporate position has evolved to take account 
of the competencies in the context of the tasks resulting from the response to the 
requirements of shareholders and investors. Furthermore, owing to the obiter 
dictum of the BGH and the subsequent academic focus on the liability of the 
compliance officer, the profile of this profession has changed from that of a 
watchdog to an adviser to an active contributor within compliance measures. As 
previously examined, the scope of the compliance officer’s tasks can be broad, but 
he should limit his own areas of responsibility.3901 The compliance officer should 
be a central corporate interface for compliance with an involvement in reporting 
lines, access to information and the cooperation with other business units. 
However, the priority of the compliance officer’s tasks depends on the risk 
assessment of the corporate business. Thus, this position requires high-profile 
experts with excellent professional and interpersonal skills. 
Secondly, on the other hand, the German debate on this corporate function 
has been limited and focused mainly on e.g. the compliance officer’s liability. As a 
result, the academic discussion and perspective has been more limited than in the 
US.3902 There is a need for a more comprehensive and forward-thinking of the 
compliance officer function in the context of the specific circumstances of the 
company. The emphasis in the US and in the UK focused more on the integration 
of the compliance officer’s function as a business partner; on his sufficient 
seniority, authority, time and adequate resources; on cooperation with other 
functions to ensure greater awareness of business risks; on the consideration of 
strategic and operational issues that affect the business the compliance officer 
                                                     
3899 See supra A., II. 1. p. 486. 
3900 See supra A., II. 2. p. 495; Compare In the US, the “CEO cannot delegate his or her 
ultimate responsibility, to fully carry out the mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Commission's rules.” See in: SEC Commissioner’s  Speech, Glassman, supra note 3905. 
3901 See supra A., IV.3., p. 542. 
3902 See supra A., III., p. 501, IV. p. 536.  
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serves, and on the further development of this function.3903 In Germany, the focus 
was on the area of responsibilities of this function and whether there is any 
protection against liability. Recently, the debate has shifted to the compliance 
officer as a recognized complex profession and as an executive manager, who is 
involved in the development of the compliance strategy and business 
processes.3904 Since then, it has been recognized that the compliance officer has 
significant responsibility for preventing misconduct by managers and employees 
on the basis of adequate resources and powers.3905 In order to properly fulfil this 
responsibility, the compliance officer should be aware of the extent of the tasks 
delegated from the management board. He should set his focus on a clear job 
description or a specified area of compliance tasks in the employment contract.3906 
Only in this way can he properly assess his risks and liability. 
Thirdly, the position of the corporate compliance officer was discussed in 
Chapter 6.3907 It general, we can state that, in Germany, the compliance officer as a 
rule is a full-time or part-time employee. As a result, he is first of all an ordinary 
employee under employment law, but relating to the compliance tasks 
transferred from the management board, it could be argued that he is an 
employee with a higher risk assumption than other ordinary employees. Thus, 
the compliance officer has a special position within companies. Additionally, it 
has been noted that, unlike other corporate functions, such as the data protection 
officer, the post of corporate compliance officer is not legally defined. For this 
reason, he does not enjoy any separate protection against dismissal. However, as 
an employer, he is covered under employment protection law.3908 In addition, in 
recent years, in addition to directors or members of the boards, D & O insurance 
                                                     
3903 See e.g. Study PwC 2015 BERNSTEIN AND FALCIONE, supra note 52 at 4; TRENDS IN 
COMPLIANCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 3 (2016). 
3904 See e.g. STUDY COMPLIANCE MANAGER 2013, supra note 502 at 1; Dann and Mengel, 
supra note 46 at 3266; Georg Gösswein, Gösswein: Die Führungskräfte im Zentrum eines 
funktionierenden Compliance Management Systems, CCZ 43–45 (2017); Moosmayer, supra 
note 499 at 3015; Schulz and Renz, supra note 45 at 2514; Schulz, Galster in: Schulz and 
Galster, supra note 3437 at 88–90 at 36-40. 
3905 See supra A., IV., 3. p. 542. 
3906 See supra A., IV., 6. p. 551. 
3907 See generally the discussions in A., IV., p. 536. 
3908 See supra A., IV., 5., p. 548. 
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policies can also cover the following groups of persons, such as employees with 
specific risk exposure.3909 However, the conditions of insurance should be 
examined carefully to establish whether the policy covers financial losses from 
compliance risks.3910 It is recommended that the function of the compliance officer 
should be expressly included in the insured corporate persons.3911 The 
requirements of the insurance cover for the compliance officer should be 
stipulated in the contract of employment.3912  
In conclusion, in line with the increased importance of compliant behavior 
of companies, the management board is now more involved in compliance tasks 
and, thus, employees commissioned exclusively with compliance tasks have 
emerged. These employees, e.g. compliance officers, have developed their own 
self-conception of compliance. Through the enhanced legal environment with 
respect to compliance and the statements of the courts concerning corporate 
practice, the compliance officer has evolved into an established profession with a 
number of special characteristics. As we have seen, compliance measures need to 
be effective. For this reason, the compliance officer’s work relies on cooperation 
and access to relevant information from other business units. Only with a well-
founded understanding of the business can the compliance officer conduct a risk 
analysis and advise on the specific business risks. In the meantime, professional 
associations and professional networks have been also established in Germany, 
such as the Compliance Network e.V. with experts groups, the German Federal 
Association of Compliance Officers (BDCO) and the Professional Association of 
Compliance Managers (BCM).3913 Hence, the first attempts to develop guidelines 
for this profession are already underway. 
                                                     
3909 Koch in: § 14 Versicherungsschutz für Compliance Officer, in DER COMPLIANCE 
OFFICER: EIN HANDBUCH IN EIGENER SACHE 343–364, 354 (Jürgen Bürkle & Christoph E. 
Hauschka eds., 1. ed. 2015) at 55. 
3910 Koch in: Id. at 353. at 52. 
3911 Koch in: Id. at 355. at 55. 
3912 Koch in: Id. at 356. at 58. 
3913 See e.g. BCM | Professional Association of Compliance Manager, 
https://www.bvdcm.de/ (last visited May 8, 2017); BDCO | German Federal Association of 
Compliance Officers, 3GRC, https://www.3grc.de/ (last visited May 8, 2017); Compliance 
Network e.V., http://www.netzwerk-compliance.de/netzwerk-compliance-ev.html (last 
visited May 8, 2017). 
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II. The Model of the Corporate Compliance Officer in Germany 
Owing to the importance of compliant behavior by companies and the 
specific characteristics of the compliance officer, the compliance function has a 
special significance within the organizational structure. Firstly, in practice, this 
function is often connected with the management board, for example as a staff 
function, which reports directly to the board.3914 As confirmed by the Study 
Compliance Manager 2013, compliance is a high-level function.3915 According to 
the findings of that study, approximately 8 percent of compliance is allocated to 
the management board, 39 percent is assigned as a staff function, 22 percent is 
integrated as decentralized compliance departments under the top level line, 10 
percent is allocated to other business units on the same level and only 6 percent is 
integrated into other business units.3916  
This chapter also examined the corporate line of compliance responsibility 
from the management board to the compliance function.3917 According to the 
findings, Bürkle presents an organizational model of the establishment of the 
compliance officer in the context of the commissioning by the management board 
within medium-sized companies, which is also applicable to small or large 
companies.3918 He shows three corporate levels as components of a commissioned 
compliance system: (a) level 1: the management board, (b) level 2: the central 
commissioned compliance function and (c) level 3: the decentralized 
commissioned compliance function.3919 According to this organizational model, 
the first level comprises the management board as the top corporate level 
responsible for the implementation of compliance measures, for example by 
means of a commissioned system.3920 Thus, the board performs its legal duty or 
compliance task.3921 Nevertheless, the board remains responsible for the 
                                                     
3914 MOOSMAYER, supra note 1084 at 107. 
3915 COMPLIANCE MANAGER STUDY 2013 HERZOG AND STEPHAN, supra note 501 at 135. 
3916 COMPLIANCE MANAGER STUDY 2013 Id. at 136. fig. 4.01. 
3917 See supra A., II., p. 484, III., p. 501, p. IV., p. 536. 
3918 Bürkle in: § 36. Compliance-Beauftragten-System, supra note 3724 at 7–9. 
3919 Bürkle in: Id. at 11–65. 
3920 Bürkle in: Id. at 11. 
3921 AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 998 § 76 (1), 91 
(2); THE GERMAN CODE 2017, supra note 3892 para 4.1.3. 
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supervision, monitoring and further development of this system.3922 In addition, 
as previously examined, the board can exercise its duties within organizational 
powers of discretion.3923 However, this discretion is limited by recognized 
standards or the recommendations of the German Code 2017.3924 Since April 2017, 
the amended Code Section 4.1.3 has provided that the management board has to 
“publish the basic features of the proportionate compliance management system in the 
annual corporate governance report.”3925 Therefore, the German academic debate is 
set to continue on the questions of which are the ‘basic features’ and what the 
term ‘proportionate’ means? In the course of this debate further standards for the 
board’s discretion are likely to develop. The organizational model of a 
commissioned compliance system as put forward by Bürkle placed the centrally 
commissioned compliance officer on the second corporate level; his task is to act 
as an interface or a switching point with his reporting, advising, monitoring tasks 
and documentation duties.3926 The third corporate level encompasses the 
decentralized compliance officers who are responsible within the relevant legal 
provisions and within cross-disciplinary areas such as data protection.3927 For 
example, the head of this business department could be involved in compliance 
tasks.3928 The main key tasks of these compliance officers include the risk analysis 
of the business by means of due diligence.3929 Finally, in the context of this model, 
the commissioned compliance function can operate within cross-disciplinary 
areas, as well in business departments.  
This commissioned compliance system by Bürkle can be summarized into 
two corporate tiers: (a) the top level – the management board, and (b) the 
corporate high level – the compliance department with a compliance officer. In 
practice, a compliance department is often commissioned by members of the 
                                                     
3922 Bürkle in: § 36. Compliance-Beauftragten-System, supra note 3724 at 11. 
3923 Bürkle in: Id. at 11. 
3924 Bürkle in: Id. at 18.; IDW, supra note 3828; THE GERMAN CODE 2017, supra note 3892 
para 4.1.3. 
3925 THE GERMAN CODE 2017, supra note 3892 para 4.1.3. 
3926 Bürkle in: § 36. Compliance-Beauftragten-System, supra note 3724 at 33–44. 
3927 Bürkle in: Id. at 58. 
3928 Bürkle in: Id. at 59–61. 
3929 Bürkle in: Id. at 62. 
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management board to carry out the compliance tasks.3930 The compliance 
department is headed by a chief compliance officer, who delegates certain 
compliance tasks to another compliance function, such as a compliance officer in 
other business units.3931 In conclusion, there are various different organizational 
models in corporate practice due to the organizational discretion of the 
management board and the specific needs of individual companies.3932 The 
compliance organization chart below presents a dynamic model of the German 
corporate compliance officer that can flexibly integrated into large or small-
medium sized companies since the management board can be replaced through 
the principal, the owner of a company.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3930 Schulz, Galster in: § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3437 at 2; GROß, supra 
note 48 at 61; MOOSMAYER, supra note 1084 at 106–107. 
3931 Schulz, Galster in: § 4 Aufgaben im Unternehmen, supra note 3437 at 2. 
3932 Schulz, Galster in: Id. at 2.; Bürkle in: § 36. Compliance-Beauftragten-System, supra 
note 3724; MOOSMAYER, supra note 1084 at 106–107. 
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Figure 14 - Compliance Organization Chart – The Model of the German Compliance Officer
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 CHAPTER 7 
A. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE AMERICAN, ENGLISH AND GERMAN LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK PERTAINING TO COMPLIANCE AND THE CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE OFFICER 
The overall findings of this thesis have provided consistent confirmation 
that recent legal developments have led to the emergence of the position of 
corporate compliance officer. Despite this fact, the post of corporate compliance 
officer is not enshrined in either American Corporation Law, or in English and 
German Company Law. In the course of the thesis, the results have shown that 
the original sources of compliance originated in the financial-services sector in the 
context of the first Act in the UK in 1697 to limit the unfair practices of brokers 
and stock-jobbers. In response to the English industrial revolution in the 19th 
century, preventative measures in the form of compliance measures gradually 
developed and were incorporated into English Company Law. Furthermore, 
another source of compliance provisions was developed as a system of self-
regulation within companies. This concept of compliance emerged in the private 
sector at the beginning of the 19th century as a key element of self-regulation 
within firms in America. In contrast to the development of compliance in the US 
and UK, the initial starting point for German compliance emerged late as an side 
to the debate on corporate governance in the 1990s. Since then, a number of high-
profile corporate scandals have focused attention on corporate compliance in 
Germany. In consequence, it can be argued that corporate compliance has no 
original source in Germany, and is instead a result of the globalization of 
economic transactions, growing economic pressure, and increasingly complex 
international legal norms and regulations, which led to growing public awareness 
of compliant corporate behavior in Germany.  
Following this, it is clear that the German compliance function was only 
established comparatively late compared with American and English corporate 
compliance officer. Financial services sector legislation first required the 
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appointment of a compliance officer as a permanent and independent compliance 
function in 1994. The establishment of the post of corporate compliance officer 
followed in the aftermath of a number of high-profile corporate scandals in the 
context of the enhancement of the regulatory reform of company law. Similar to 
the way the compliance officer’s functions developed in Germany, in the UK, the 
compliance function originated from the Financial Services Act. However, the 
emergence of the compliance function in the English private sector has no legal 
origins. As a result of the bankruptcy of Maxwell Communication and its massive 
financial irregularities in 1991, the focus on corporate governance, reforms of 
English Company Law, and the growing influence of investors, in particular on 
listed companies, English companies began to appoint key personnel or high-
level personnel to perform a compliance function and oversee business risks. The 
very first ethics and compliance officers can be traced back to the Watergate 
scandal in the US. In the early period of this function, responsibility for 
compliance was incumbent upon legal departments, more recently it has been 
recognized that an effective compliance officer works independently and as a 
separate function. While, even in the US, there are no legal requirements in 
primary law to establish a corporate function with the overall authority 
concerning compliance, the American SEC and DOJ, for example, provide 
guidance on compliance functions within corporations in their Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations by means of DPAs. The following 
timeline outlines in chronological order the enhanced emergence of the 
compliance function within the legal framework:  
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Figure 15 - Timeline of enhanced emergence of the Compliance Officer 
This timeline illustrates that the emergence of the corporate compliance 
officer is connected to corporate failures and the subsequent enhanced regulatory 
framework, enhanced prosecution of corporate crimes and greater focus on 
investors’ needs. Despite the absence of specific provisions governing the 
compliance officer in the company law and bribery legislation in the US, UK and 
Germany, the findings of this thesis have demonstrated that in order to ensure 
compliant behavior of companies, the regulatory framework has introduced more 
stringent requirements for companies, which have been reflected in the 
development of corporate compliance and the compliance function.  
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I. A Comparison of the Duties of Compliance Officers under Company 
Law 
This thesis examined the duties of directors and compliance officers within 
listed companies under US, English and German company law.3933 One major 
difference lies in the structure of company law. American State Corporation Law 
is decentralized and has been significantly influenced by common law principles 
and the provisions governing the legal duties of directors and officers as 
enshrined in Delaware State Corporation Law. By contrast, English and German 
Company Law takes the form of a uniform codified body of law that includes the 
duties of directors and officers or the management and supervisory board. 
Secondly, as we have seen, board structures in the US and UK differ from the 
German board structure.3934 The US and UK board structure is referred to as ‘one-
tier’ or ‘unitary’ board, while the German board comprises the members of both 
the management and the supervisory board and, hence, is referred to as the ‘two-
tier model’.3935 The one-tier board consists of a chief executive officer (CEO), a 
chairman, the executive directors, and the independent directors. Under 
Delaware Corporation Law, the shareholders have the right to elect the 
directors.3936 A director is a natural person who is officially appointed in 
accordance with the company’s articles or bylaws. The directors must govern and 
oversee the business and affairs of the corporation.3937 In Germany, the members 
of the management board are appointed by the supervisory board.3938 The 
management board comprises executive directors, who are responsible for the 
objectives of the company and the implementation of appropriate compliance 
measures, for instance; the supervisory board consists of non-executive directors, 
who are required to monitor the decisions of the management board.3939 
                                                     
3933 See generally Ch. 4, A., I. p.187, II., p. 280, B. p. 319; Ch. 5, A., II., p. 368; Ch. 6 A., II., p. 
484.  
3934 See supra Ch. 4, A., II., p. 280, Ch. 5, B., I., p. 454, Ch. 6, A., footnote 3290, p. 477. 
3935 See supra Ch. 4, A., I.,1.c., footnotes 1411, 1412, p. 221. 
3936 See supra Ch. 4, B., footnote 2108, p. 361; tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24 § 211 (b). 
3937 See supra Ch. 4, B., C., II., p. 394; tit. 8 Id. § 141 (a). 
3938 See supra Ch. 6, A., p. 475. 
3939 See supra Ch. 6, A., p. 475; AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, 
supra note 998 §§ 76 (1), 91 (2), 111 (1). 
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The nature of the director’s role is central to Corporation Law in the US and 
in the UK. Under common law, directors are considered as fiduciaries, who owe 
certain duties to the company. These duties encompass three major fiduciary 
duties: (1) the duty of due care, (2) good faith, and (3) loyalty. Since 1996, it has 
been recognized that the landmark Caremark case developed a new duty of 
oversight or compliance duty for directors.3940 In the UK and in Germany, the 
general duties of company directors or members of the management board are 
enshrined in law.3941 Overall, the findings have shown that over the last thirty 
years, the duties of directors have been enforced through case- law in the US, 
through codification of common law and equitable principles into company law 
in the UK, and through the amendment of existing provisions of company law in 
Germany.3942 
Under both common law and civil law, directors are authorized to delegate 
certain tasks, e.g. compliance tasks, to committees or corporate officers. The 
directors must exercise due care during the selection and transfer process.3943 
However, the ultimate responsibility and the task the board is required by statute 
or bylaws to perform, must remain with the members of the board.3944 
Nevertheless, in practice, responsibility for the company’s compliant behavior is a 
comprehensive task. For this reason, the executive directors attempt to divide 
their responsibility for compliance by commissioning corporate officers. 
Corporate officers are appointed by the board of directors in accordance with the 
bylaws. The corporate officers include a president, vice-president, a secretary or a 
treasurer as well as other officers. Thus, corporate officers also include the 
compliance officer. In the US, the courts tend to refer to “key employees.” US State 
                                                     
3940 See supra Ch. 4, A., II., 2. a.-c., p. 292. 
3941 Compare Ch. 5, A., II., 2., p. 374; Ch. 6, A., II., p. 484; AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN 
STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 §§ 76 (1), 91 (2), 93 (1); COMPANIES ACT 2006, 
supra note 555 §§ 171-177. 
3942 Compare Ch. 4, A., II., 2. a.-c., p. 292; Ch. 5, A., II., 2., p. 374; Ch. 6, A., II., p. 484; In re 
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2D 959 (DEL. CH. 1996), supra note 22; 
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2D 362 (DEL. 2006), supra note 240; AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG) | GERMAN 
STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 999 § 91 (2); COMPANIES ACT 2006, supra note 555 §§ 
171-177. 
3943 See e.g. tit. 8 DELAWARE CODE, supra note 24 § 141 (e). 
3944 Compare Ch. 6; C., I., p. 654; IN RE WALT DISNEY CO. DERIVATIVE LITIG., (DEL. CH. 2004), 
supra note 1832; LG MÜNCHEN I, NZG 2014, supra note 995 at 347–348. 
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Corporation Law does not make any clear distinction between the fiduciary 
duties of corporate directors and those of corporate officers. However, US case- 
law clearly states that the “fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of 
directors.”3945 The English legislator also applies the directors’ duties to company 
officers.3946 Hence, in general, the legal duties of directors also apply to corporate 
officers. In Germany, the duties of corporate officers are not stipulated in 
company law. The compliance officer is assigned duties by means of the 
delegation of tasks e.g. certain compliance tasks, by the management board. Thus, 
the compliance officer assumes a limited area of responsibility for the 
management of compliance procedures within the corporation.3947 The following 
table provides a comparative overview of the duties of directors and compliance 
officers under company law in the US, UK and Germany: 
 
Table 20 - Comparative Overview of the Duties of Compliance Officers under Company Law 
 
 US State Corporation 
Law, Case- Law 
UK Company Act 
2006 
German Stock 
Corporation Act (AktG) 
Structure of the 
Board 
One-tier board One-tier board Two-tiers – the 
management board and 
the supervisory board 
Members of the 
Board 
Executive and 
independent directors 
Executive and 
independent directors 
Executive and non-
executive directors 
Duties of 
directors 
enshrined in law 
Duties are conferred 
and provided in the 
certificate of 
incorporation, good 
faith requirement 
General duties such as 
to act within powers, 
to exercise reasonable 
care, skill and 
diligence 
To take appriopriate 
measures for risk 
prevention, duty of 
reasonable care of a 
diligent manager 
Statutory 
provisions 
Tit. 8 Delaware Code § 
141 (a) (e) 
CA 2006 §§ 171-177; § 
1121 (2) 
AktG §§ 76 (1), 91 (2), 93 
(1) 
                                                     
3945 See supra Ch. 4, A., II., 4., p. 299. 
3946 See supra Ch. 5, A., II., 3.a., p. 380. 
3947 See supra Ch. 6, A., II., 2., p. 495. 
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Common law 
principles and 
civil case law 
Fiduciary duties owed 
to the corporation and 
its shareholders, (1) 
duty of good faith, (2) 
duty of loyalty, (3) 
duty of care, (4) duty 
of oversight 
Fiduciary duties owed 
to the corporation and 
its shareholders, (1) 
duty of good faith, (2) 
duty of loyalty, (3) 
duty to act in 
accordance with the 
company's 
constitution 
Ultimate responsibility 
for compliance, e.g. the 
organizational and 
supervisory 
responsibilities of the 
management board 
Cases Caremark, Stone v 
Ritter, Gantler v 
Stephen 
Mothew v Bristol & 
West Building Society 
Respondent 
Siemens v NeuburgerU, LG 
München I, NZG 2014 
Corporate 
Officers 
Directors’ duties also 
apply to officers and 
thus, to the 
compliance officer 
Directors’ duties also 
apply to officers and 
thus, to the 
compliance officer 
The compliance officer is 
assigned a limited area of 
compliance responsibility 
through delegation. 
 
In conclusion, it can be argued that English company law clearly stipulates 
that a corporate officer in default is considered and treated like a director for the 
purposes of the Companies Act. By contrast US State Corporation Law does not 
clearly determine who is an officer and what his duties are. However, the case 
law has stated that the corporate officers owe the same duties to the company as 
the directors. In Germany, the officer’s area of responsibility is limited through 
the scope of delegation by the members of the board and case law. The officer’s 
duties are not enshrined into law. It follows that the scope of the German 
compliance officer’s responsibility is limited compared to the US and UK 
compliance officer, who have the same duties as directors. Overall, the legal 
framework of US, UK and German company law provides for the enforcement of 
compliance duties vis-à-vis directors and officers through a mixture of legislation, 
case law, and bylaws.  
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II. The Compliance Officer compared under Bribery and Criminal Law 
Taking account of the anti-corruption and criminal law as analyzed in 
chapters four to six, it can be argued that bribery legislation and provisions in 
criminal law have strongly developed to protect investors in response to 
corporate bribery and misleading corporate disclosure. This thesis has identified 
continuous legal enforcement with a global impact regarding compliance at the 
beginning of the 19(th) century through the enhancement of the US Federal Law 
on bribery and fraud, in particular the FCPA legislation in 1977; a series of UK 
fraud and bribery legislation preceding the enactment of the UK Bribery Act in 
2010; and certain provisions pertaining to bribery in German criminal law.3948 
While this thesis has presented only a small selection and excerpt of regulations 
and criminal statutes that are relevant to the corporate compliance officer, this 
section attempts to show the impact of this global regulatory framework on the 
position of compliance officer. 
The first obvious difference between the US, UK and German bribery and 
criminal law is the control of the corporate adherence to the law through 
regulators or prosecutors in the US and in the UK. US regulators, like the DOJ and 
SEC, and UK law enforcement agencies such as the SFO and the financial 
regulator, FCA, which controls the regulated institutions relating to bribery, have 
been developed as regulators and prosecutors in order to combat corporate 
bribery and fraud. For example, the SFO is authorized to bring actions against 
companies and individuals like compliance officers concerning fraudulent trading 
or bribery under the UKBA 2010. The authority of these regulators and 
prosecutors is far-reaching. Beyond the courtrooms, they are involved in rule-
making, are authorized to bring enforcement actions against companies, executive 
directors or officers, to conduct corporate internal investigations, to compel 
disclosure of information and documents, and even to obtain evidence abroad, as 
well as to resolve cases through deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) with the 
prosecuted company. In view of the regulator’s activities in the context of DPAs 
concerning the implementation of compliance structures or a compliance function 
within the prosecuted company, it is clear that these have the power to change 
corporate structures. Although such a regulator or prosecutor regime is absent 
                                                     
3948 See generally Ch. 4, A., I., 1.- 4.; Ch. 5, A., III., 1.- 4.; Ch. 6. A., III., 1.- 6. 
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from the private sector in Germany, German companies listed on the US and UK 
stock exchanges or trading in the UK are required to comply with certain 
provisions of the FCPA, SOX, and the UKBA. Chapters four to six revealed that 
German companies or officers were also prosecuted in the US and in the UK, 
leading German companies to adapt their corporate structures. This evidence 
suggests that the enhanced emergence and the increase in numbers of corporate 
compliance officers were the result of the enforcement of bribery and criminal 
statutory regulations and requirements of the regulators and prosecutors.  
The second distinct difference between the US, UK and German bribery and 
criminal law is its scope of application. The common law principles contain two 
kinds of corporate criminal liability, as discussed in chapter four and five:3949 It is 
possible to prosecute (1) the company and (2) the individual who committed an 
offence. In the first instance, a company is held liable for strict liability offences, 
vicarious liability, imposed by statutes in the areas of criminal law. Secondly, 
however, as regards serious offences the identification principle applies to the 
individual who was the ‘directing mind and will’ of the company.3950 Generally, this 
will be the senior officers of a company. However, over the years, these two 
common law principles have gradually altered. For example, several statutes 
governing business crime law, such as the Fraud Act 2006 or the UKBA 2010, 
provide an exception to the common law principles since the individual guilty of 
a bribery offence can be convicted separately without the company.3951 In the US, 
the DOJ has recently shifted a new direction and now refers to individual 
accountability in matters of corporate wrongdoing, because the threshold for 
prosecuting corporate criminal liability is higher than for prosecuting an 
individual.3952 German bribery and criminal law generally applies to individuals 
with individuals held liable due to breaches of their legal duties.3953 As examined 
in chapter six, under German criminal law the individual is even viewed as a 
                                                     
3949 See generally Ch. 4, A. I., p. 187; Ch. 5., A., II., 4., p. 387. 
3950 See supra Ch. 5, A., II., 4., p. 387. 
3951 See supra Ch. 5, A., III., p. 398; FRAUD ACT 2006, c. 35 (2006) §§ 1, 2, 3, 4; THEFT ACT 
1968, supra note 2919 §§ 17, 18, 19; UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 65 §§ 1, 
2, 6, 11. 
3952 See supra Ch. 4, A., I.d., p. 225. 
3953 See generally Ch. 6, A., III., 4., p. 514. 
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guarantor in the event of any failure to act.3954 Individuals convicted of bribery 
offences can be imprisoned or receive a fine. There is one exception: Under 
Section 30, 130 of the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG), the owner of a 
company could be fined for intentional or negligent failure to carry out the 
supervisory measures required to prevent contraventions.3955 
Another major difference between the US, UK and German bribery and 
criminal law lies in extra-territorial jurisdiction. Bribery law in the UK has a more 
wide-ranging scope than the FCPA since its extra-territorial jurisdiction for a 
commercial organization is clearly enshrined in the law.3956 This legislation now 
covers every company that does business in the UK. Conversely, US extra-
territorial jurisdiction is not explicitly enshrined in federal law and, thus, depends 
in particular on the wording of the legislative intent and the competence of the US 
Courts. In Germany, the principle of territoriality is recognized under criminal 
law.3957 As a result, German criminal law will apply to all crimes committed by all 
individuals within the national territory, regardless of their citizenship. In 
contrast, its application to non-German companies is not explicitly defined, but 
Section 30 of the Act on Regulatory Offences (OWiG) could also apply to foreign 
companies in the event of criminal offence. 
The next difference lies in the structure of the US, UK and German bribery 
and criminal law. Compared with American and English bribery law, German 
bribery law appears small and insignificant. Unlike the US and the UK, Germany 
has no separate bribery statute, and currently governs this issue by means of 
amended provisions in the German Criminal Code and in the Act on Regulatory 
Offences.3958 As mentioned previously, another inadequacy is the absence of 
German bribery guidelines for companies. For this reason, companies and 
particularly the compliance officer primarily have to refer to the court decisions 
that deal with compliance issues in individual cases. Consequently, it is difficult 
for the German compliance officer to assess which appropriate measure should be 
taken in order to prevent corporate misconduct. Despite this lean German bribery 
                                                     
3954 See supra Ch. 6, A., III., 4., p. 514.  
3955 See supra Ch. 6, A., III., 5., p. 522. 
3956 See supra Ch. 5, A., III., 1., p. 400. 
3957 Compare STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) | GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 988 § 3. 
3958 See generally Ch. 6, A., III.,1., 2., 5. 
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law, in an obiter dictum, the BGH considered the issue of when a corporate 
compliance officer faces criminal liability.3959 
The possibilities for corporate defense also differ. In contrast to the FCPA 
and to German bribery law, the UKBA 2010 provides a defense pursuant to 
Section 7 for companies able to prove that they have in place an adequate 
procedure such as a compliance program.3960 This adequate procedure is 
described in the UK Bribery Guidance. As previously examined, similar to the 
FCPA Resource Guide, the UK Bribery Guidance contains helpful information 
and recommendations to companies in the form of six principles, such as a 
commitment from the senior management, the risk assessment, a due diligence 
and communication and training, as well as other principles designed to prevent 
bribery.3961 For example, the FCPA Resource Guide suggests the following 
measures: a clearly articulated policy against corruption from the management by 
means of a code of conduct and compliance policies and procedures; conducting a 
risk assessment of relevant business risks; carrying out training and continuing 
advice on anti-bribery regulations; implementing a compliance program with 
incentives and disciplinary measures; conducting third-party due diligence and 
payments; designing anti-bribery contract terms; and the ongoing monitoring and 
review of business risks.3962 Therefore, in the US and in the UK, companies are 
guided by recommendations relating to the relevant legislation and its 
application. Additionally, in the US, the FSGO, considered to be an advisory 
guideline system, requires that high-level personnel of the organization must 
ensure that the organization has an effective compliance program. By having an 
effective compliance program in place, companies may be able to mitigate 
criminal penalties in the event of prosecution for bribery or fraud. In line with this 
program, the FSGO require that “specific individual(s) within the organization shall be 
delegated day-to-day operational responsibility for the compliance program.”3963 This 
need demonstrates the importance of the compliance function and illustrates the 
key role of the compliance officer, who is responsible for the implementation and 
                                                     
3959 See supra Ch. 6, A., III., 4.a., p. 516. 
3960 See supra Ch. 5, A., III., 1., p. 400.  
3961 See supra Ch. 5, A., III., 1., p. 400.  
3962 See generally Ch. 4, A., I., 1.a., p. 204; Ch. 5, A., III., 4., Table 14, p.420. 
3963 See supra Ch. 4, A., I., 3.b., p. 262. 
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maintaining of the compliance program and other preventative measures to 
ensure adherence with the law by managers and employees. The German 
counterpart is a provision in the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). Section 
91 (2) comprises the duty of the management board to implement appropriate 
measures regarding the early prevention of risks.3964 However, Germany has no 
helpful guidance or advisory system on the implementation of appropriate 
measures in accordance with the legal requirements. The German legislator and 
legal scholars emphasize the size, nature, scale and complexity of the business 
risks in which a company operates.3965 
The regulatory environment presented in this thesis has shown that new 
bribery and criminal laws place new legal responsibilities upon companies and 
their directors and officers. On the basis of the strong regulation and enforcement 
actions by regulators and prosecutors, companies are continuing to develop their 
compliance procedures. In view of the legal requirements of the SOX, directors 
and officers should periodically review compliance policies and procedures; 
maintain disclosure controls and procedures, ensure internal control over 
financial reporting; file an annual report, increase the legal, accounting, financial 
and communication skills of the compliance officer; and oversee reporting 
deadlines.3966 The compliance officer should provide information on compliance 
issues to the board via a clearly defined reporting line and maintain a good 
relationship to the regulators. Due to the required shift and enforced 
responsibilities of executive officers in accordance with the SOX, there ought to be 
a separation of the legal and compliance department within corporations.3967  
Although the scope of application, the structure and the enforcement of US, 
UK and German bribery and criminal law differ, the responsibilities and duties of 
the corporate compliance officers in all three systems are similar. The key 
compliance tasks and responsibilities first and foremost encompasses, the 
assement of business risks and, next, the implementation and maintenance of 
appropriate measures or proportionate procedures, such as a compliance 
program, commensurate to the bribery and business risks facing the company. 
                                                     
3964 See supra Ch. 6., A., II., 1., p. 486. 
3965 See supra Ch. 6., A., II., p. 484. 
3966 See supra Ch. 4, A., I., 2., p. 235.  
3967 See supra Ch. 4, A., I., 2. d., p. 247. 
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Secondly, the tasks also encompass the provision of employee training and advice 
on these measures and procedures, as well as the periodic review and monitoring 
of those measures and procedures. Thirdly, under US and UK bribery law, the 
required compliance officer’s due diligence analysis of third parties - such as 
contracting parties, agents and employees - plays a greater role than under 
German bribery and criminal law. There are also some differences between the 
US, UK and German compliance officers as regards the scope of their tasks. In the 
US and in the UK, the compliance officer has to diplomatically deal with the 
regulator or prosecutor. The next major difference which has been examined is 
the limited area of responsibility of the German compliance officer. In practice, it 
could be that the German compliance officer is responsible only for a specific area 
of law. In contrast to this limited responsibility, the US or UK corporate 
compliance officer can have the same duties as the director. In detail that means 
that the entire duty of oversight could apply to the compliance officer as an 
executive officer. However, an examination of the relevant case law with respect 
to the compliance officer in the US, UK and in Germany, as discussed in chapter 
four to six, has revealed that, thus far, there has not been any case against a 
corporate compliance officer for breach of a legal duty under bribery and criminal 
law either in the US, in the UK or in Germany, despite the SEC actions against 
compliance officers in the financial services sector and the obiter dictum of the 
BGH. As a result, it can be argued that even with the differences between the US, 
UK, and German bribery and criminal law and some differences in their scope of 
responsibilities, the key tasks and duties remain similar.  
The chart presented at the end of this section, provides an overview of the 
selected global regulatory influence on the corporate compliance officer’s position 
and his responsibility under US, UK and German bribery and criminal law as 
examined in this thesis. The regulatory overview shown in this section applies to 
corporate compliance officers within companies that do business in the US, the 
UK or in Germany, or are listed on the US, UK or German stock exchanges. In 
conclusion, the legal framework of bribery and criminal statutes or specific 
provisions thereof, the guidance on the law, the regulators, prosecutors and their 
actions against companies or individuals, agreements with prosecuted companies, 
and the case law demonstrate the importance of the function of the compliance 
officers in the US, UK, and Germany and illustrate the key role of this position 
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US courts and regulators can have 
extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
Section 7 of the UKBA 2010  
every commercial organisation, who 
does business, or is part of a business 
in the UK - enables UK Courts and 
prosecutors to exercice extra-
territorial  jurisdiction.   
The Criminal Code applies to 
individuals.  - Section 13 (1) StGB 
establishes the guarantor status. 
Under Section 30, 130 of the OWiG, 
companies can be fined.   
Corporate compliance officers 
in companies, which does 
business in the US, the UK or 
Germany or listed on the US, 
the UK or German stock 
exchanges 
and its responsibility for the success or failure of corporate adherence to law 
when compliance tasks are delegated to it by the members of the board.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 - The Compliance Officer compared under US, UK and German Bribery and 
Criminal Law 
III. The Employment Status of the Compliance Officer compared 
This section addresses whether those differences in the US, UK and German 
Individual Employment Law also reflect differences in compliance officers’ 
protection against wrongful dismissal. In comprehensively analyzing the unfair 
The FCPA applies  
also to non-US citizens 
and companies who act 
in the US. 
The SOX applies also 
to foreign issuers on 
the US stock-
exchanges.  The FSGO applies 
to corporations 
convicted of federal 
offences. 
The FCPA Resource 
Guide provides the 
hallmarks  of an  
effective  
compliance program. 
The primary US  
authority DOJ 
 responsible for 
 investigating and 
prosecuting bribery. 
The Bribery Guidance 
provides six principles  of 
proportionate 
procedures. 
The SFO is responsible  
for investigating and 
prosecuting serious or 
complex fraud and bribery. 
N-DPAs/ 
DPAs 
DPAs 
The SEC is responsible  
for investigating and 
prosecuting corporate 
or business fraud  
N-DPAs/ 
DPAs 
The Public Prosecutor's 
Office is responsible  
for investigating and 
prosecuting all crimes 
including business crimes. 
Section 266 (StGB) 
Infidelity, 
Section 299 (StGB) 
commercial bribery. 
Developed into a standalone 
function, to which 
compliance tasks are 
delegated by the members of 
the board. 
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dismissal regimes of the US, UK, and Germany in chapter four to six, this section 
summarizes the relevant provisions of employment legislation, the common law 
principles and concepts and the relevant cases, as well as the employment 
agreements applicable to the compliance officer.3968 The employment status and 
the position of the compliance officer within companies are derived from these 
findings. The findings will be summarized as follows: 
First of all, chapters four to six examined whether the compliance officer has 
an employment status. Whether an individual is considered an employee must be 
determined by taking into account several characteristics developed by the courts 
since the term ‘employee’ has not always been clearly legally defined. One major 
difference between the US and the UK and German compliance officer is that the 
US written employment agreement is an exception in most cases for executive 
officers.3969 In practice, it could be that the chief compliance officer is provided a 
written employment contract, but the vast majority of compliance officers do not 
receive any written agreement. In the US, under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) the term ‘employee’ means any individual employed by an employer.3970 
The US Supreme Court has distinguished between ‘employees’ and ‘independent 
contractors’ and has determined that “employees are those who as a matter of 
economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render service.”3971 
Generally, in the US, the UK and in Germany, an employee is someone who 
performs services under an employment agreement, is bound by instructions 
under the supervision of the employer, and integrated within the company’s 
organization.3972 In 2017, the German legislator enshrined the German 
characteristics of an employment contract as set out by the BAG Court into the 
amended Section 611a of the German Civil Code (BGB).3973 The UK and German 
Employment Courts and now the German Civil Code (BGB) state that the 
assessment of employment status is determined not by how the parties refer to 
                                                     
3968 See generally Ch. 4, A., II.; Ch. 5, A., IV.; Ch. 6, A., IV. 
3969 See supra Ch. 4., A., II., III., 2, p. 308.  
3970 FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 (FSLA), 29 U.S.C. Chapter 8 (1938) § 203 (e) (1). 
3971 See e.g. Secretary of Labor United States Department of Labor v. Lauritzen, F2d 1529 (1987). 
3972 Compare Ch. 4, A., II., III., 1., p. 305; Ch. 5, A., IV., 1.and 2., p.427; Ch. 6, A., IV., 1., p. 
536. 
3973 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB) | GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 93 § 611 (a), 
amended on April 1, 2017. 
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the relationship, but is instead a matter of fact. The English courts and 
Employment Tribunals have developed the ‘mixed or multiple’ test to identify 
whether an individual is to be categorized as an employee.3974 The key tests are 
the integration test, the economic reality test, the mutuality of obligation test and 
the control test.3975 In contrast to the US, in the UK and in Germany, the employer 
must provide for the employee “a written statement of particulars of employment.”3976 
Thus, in the UK and in Germany an employee is an individual who enters into a 
contract of employment and his employment status is determined by the courts 
taking into account certain characteristics. Only then do the courts apply to the 
individual the right to a statutory minimum notice period and protection against 
unfair dismissal, for instance. Therefore, the English and German compliance 
officer who is categorized as an employee is entitled to the full scope of statutory 
employment rights discussed and is protected against unfair dismissal as 
described in chapters five and six.  
Secondly, as we have seen, there is a marked contrast between the unfair 
dismissal regimes of the United States on the one hand and the UK and Germany 
regimes on the other. An US constitutional, statutory, or ruling limiting the 
grounds for termination is absent in comparison to the UK Employment Rights 
Act 1996 and German Protection Against Unfair Dismissal Act.3977 In the US, with 
the exception of Montana, the employment at-will doctrine has been established 
under common law due to greater labor-market flexibility. Generally, the US 
Courts apply the employment at-will doctrine with some exceptions to improve 
the protection of the employee.3978 However, the US Courts did not apply to other 
cases concerning a compliance officer the exception for the legal profession and 
this special relationship to a law firm, such as in the case Wieder v. Skala.3979 Both 
cases Sullivan v. Harnisch and Mayers v. Stone have shown that there is no specific 
protection against dismissal for the compliance officer in the US. In contrast to the 
US legal framework, under EU Directives such as 91/533/EEC, 2003/88/EC or 
                                                     
3974 See generally Ch. 5, A., IV., 2., p. 427. 
3975 See supra Ch. 5, A., IV., 2., p. 427. 
3976 Compare Ch. 5, A., IV., 1.and 2., p. 427; Ch. 6, A., IV., 1., p. 536. 
3977 Compare Ch. 4, A., II., III.; Ch. 5, A., IV.; Ch. 6, A., IV.  
3978 See supra Ch. 4, A., II., III., 2.a., p. 313. 
3979 See supra Ch. 4, A., II., III., 2.a. and b., pp. 313 et seq. 
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2006/54/EC applicable to contractual obligations, UK and German Employment 
Law is governed mainly by EU Law with respect to the relationship between 
employers and their employees.3980 Thus, as employees, compliance officers enjoy 
all the statutory protections applicable to them. For example, after a certain 
period of time of continuous employment, the employee is entitled to protection 
under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) or the Protection Against Unfair 
Dismissal Act (KSchG).3981 Therefore, in contrast to the US common law doctrine, 
both the UK and Germany have a statutory protection against unfair dismissal, 
which includes the compliance officer as an employee under the conditions 
defined within the framework of the applicable law.3982 However, specific 
protection against unfair dismissal for the compliance officer has been not 
recognized, despite the broad scope and sensitive nature of his tasks and duties. 
For this reason, the thesis has explored other solutions in response to an 
appropriate protection against unfair dismissal for the corporate compliance 
officer under common law, such as indemnification provisions and 
indemnification clauses.3983 
Thirdly, due to the US’ differing employee protection against unfair 
dismissal from that in the UK and in Germany, various different ways to protect 
employees from termination without cause and notice have developed in the US. 
The vast of majority of US corporate officers are at-will employees without a 
written employment contract and fall under the employment at-will doctrine.3984 
The US Courts can apply exceptions for various categories of cases. In addition, 
US Federal law, such as the Civil Right Acts or the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) encompass e.g. a specific statutory discrimination protection for the 
employees.3985 However, due to the absence of protection against unfair dismissal, 
the US compliance officer should negotiate the inclusion of exact grounds for 
termination, a termination period and indemnification terms in his employment 
agreement.3986 
                                                     
3980 Compare Ch. 5, A., IV.; Ch. 6, A., IV. 
3981 Compare Ch. 5, A., IV.; Ch. 6, A., IV. 
3982 See supra Ch. 5, A., IV. 4. p. 443 ;Ch. 6, A., IV.5. p. 548. 
3983 See supra Ch. 4, A., II., p. 280 ; Ch. 5, A., IV. 4.c., p. 449. 
3984 See supra Ch. 4, A., II., III., 2., p. 308. 
3985 See supra Ch. 4, A., II., III., 1., p. 305. 
3986 See supra Ch. 4, A., II., III., 2., p. 344. 
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Finally, the duties of the compliance officer as an employee under US, UK 
and German Employment Law should be compared. The duties of employees 
vary under US State Employment Law. In most cases, besides the key duty to 
perform the work, the duty of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality in respect of 
the employer have been recognized.3987 In the event that an officer is appointed by 
the board, he furthermore has a duty to inform his principal under the agency 
law.3988 In the event of any breach of these duties, the employer can terminate the 
employment contract for cause, but the breach is not subject to damages. 
Generally, in the event of termination with cause, officers leave the company 
without any severance compensation.3989 Similar to the US, under UK 
Employment law, the implied duties owed by an employee include, inter alia, the 
duty of care, the duty of fidelity, the duty of loyalty and confidentiality to his 
employer.3990 In particular, for the compliance officer, the duty of care relates to 
the performance of his work. As we have seen, in the English financial services 
sector, the duty of reasonable care applies in enhanced form to control functions 
such as the compliance officer.3991 If an employee is in breach of this duty, the 
employer is entitled to terminate the contract of employment and can recover 
damages.3992 Overall, it appears that the duties of the UK employees are more 
extensive and any breach thereof is to a greater degree subject to legal action and 
investigations, particularly in the financial services sector, than is the case in the 
US and in Germany.3993 By comparison with the duties owed by the employee in 
the American and English systems, the German employee has a similar duty of 
loyalty and confidentiality.3994 Just like the US and UK employer, the German 
employer can terminate the employment contract and is entitled to recover 
                                                     
3987 See supra MAYERS V. STONE CASTLE PARTNERS, LLC, NO. 650410/2013 (U.S. N.Y. 2014), 
supra note 2087. 
3988 See supra SMITH V VAN GORKOM, (DEL. 1985), supra note 1859; American Law Institute, 
supra note 2130. 
3989 See supra Ch. 4, A., II., III., 2., p. 308. 
3990 See supra Ch. 5, A., IV., 3., p. 428. 
3991 See supra Ch. 5, A., IV., 3.a., p. 431. 
3992 See supra Ch. 5, A., IV., 4., p. 443. 
3993 See supra Ch. 5, A., IV., 4.a., p. 445. 
3994 See supra Ch. 6, A., IV., 1., p. 536.  
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limited damages from the employee in the event of the employee’s breach of 
duties.3995  
To conclude, the examination of the relevant statutory employment law, 
common law principles and court cases as discussed in chapters four to six has 
demonstrated that the compliance officer is an employee with employment status. 
In the UK and in Germany, this status comprises the statutory protection against 
unfair dismissal that applies to all employees who fall within the scope of the 
Employment Rights Act (ERA) and the Protection against Unfair Dismissal Act 
(KSchG). However, there is no specific statutory protection for the corporate 
compliance officer under US, UK, or German employment law.  
 
Table 21 - The Employment Status of the Compliance Officer compared 
Concerning the CO US Employment Law UK Employment Law German Employment Law 
Relevant statutes  CRA, NLRA, FSLA,  ERA, EA BGB, KSchG 
Employee status + + + 
Written employment 
contract 
- + + 
Statutory protection against 
unfair dismissal 
- + + 
Common law principle Employment at-will - - 
Case law  No exeption of the at will-
doctrine 
- - 
Specific statutory protection  - - - 
Position under employment 
law 
Corporate Officer, but not an 
executive officer 
Company’s Secretary  Corporate Officer, but not an 
executive officer 
Relevant duties Duty of loyalty and 
confidentiality 
Duty of care, loyalty, fidelity 
and confidentiality 
Duty of loyalty and 
confidentiality, in cases 
where the CO is delegated 
with compliance tasks – duty 
of care 
                                                     
3995 See supra Ch. 6, A., IV., 4,. p. 545. 
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Legal Consequences in the 
event of a breach of duties 
Termination  Termination, damages Termination, limited 
damages 
IV. The Impact of Guidelines on Compliance Officers compared 
This thesis has also discussed various approaches to existing corporate 
governance mechanisms by means of Codes or Principles.3996 Corporate 
governance continues to have a great significance in the context of the adoption of 
best practices within the framework of more stringent requirements of investors 
and shareholders vis-à-vis companies following high-profile scandals in the US, 
in the UK and in Germany. Corporate governance code principles and 
recommendations govern companies with a listing of equity shares on the stock 
exchanges and set out best practices, for example regarding the roles of the board 
of directors, the board’s composition and compensation, the responsibility of 
management, and the relationships with shareholders and investors.3997 Here, the 
US Principles of Corporate Governance take a voluntary approach, while the UK 
and German Code employ the comply and explain approach to adhere to the 
principles or recommendations.3998 
Regardless of these different approaches, the principles and 
recommendations of all three aim toward a proactive and focused view of the 
members of the board to achieve the highest standards of management 
responsibility for compliance.3999 In addition to the varying number of legal and 
regulatory requirements as set forth in primary law, good governance practices, 
in the form of secondary or soft law, can be a flexible approach for the board and 
management to ensure corporate adherence with law. The overall goal is to 
establish more efficient corporate governance structures for effective decision 
making by the members of the board, and their proper monitoring of compliance 
and performance of the company.4000 Thus, a company can appropriately respond 
to changing circumstances and the enhanced legal framework in terms of 
                                                     
3996 See generally Ch. 4, A. II., Ch. 5, B.; Ch. 6, B. 
3997 Compare Ch. 4, A., II; Ch. 5, B.; Ch. 6, B. 
3998 See supra in detail Ch. 6, B., IV., p. 563. 
3999 See supra Ch. 4, A.,II, p. 280; Ch. 5, B., p. 452, Ch. 6, B., p. 553. 
4000 See generally Ch. 4, A.,II, p. 280; Ch. 5, B., p. 452; Ch. 6, B., p. 553. 
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required disclosure and transparency, and, in so doing, can provide value for 
shareholders and investors.  
The UK Code, the German Code and the US Principles all provide the 
applicable responsibilities for the members of the board as regards compliance.4001 
The board is required to oversee the corporate compliance program. In addition, 
the board should ensure that the compliance procedure is implemented such that 
the board is informed at an early stage of any compliance issues that may arise. 
Only in this way can it be guaranteed that the compliance program will be 
effective.4002 Beyond that, the German Code 2017 and the amended provision 4.1.3 
refers to management board responsibility for providing a proportionate 
compliance management system and for the requirement of publishing the basic 
features of this system in the annual corporate governance report.4003 Hence, the 
recently amended German Code 2017 even requires the disclosure of the features 
of this system with the annual declaration of conformity pursuant to Section 161 
(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). Thus, this recommendation is 
mandatory for all German corporations to which this Act applies. 
However, neither, the US Principles, the UK Code, nor the German Code 
refer explicitly to any principles, provisions or recommendations with respect to 
the corporate compliance officer and his responsibilities.4004 This provides further 
evidence that the ultimate responsibility lies and remains with the members of the 
board. In essence, the board should take reasonable steps to develop, implement, 
maintain and oversee an effective legal compliance program, but in practice some 
of these tasks can be delegated to subordinates, such as a compliance officer. 
Ultimately, the Principles and Codes support the practical implementation of the 
compliance program within companies. 
Furthermore, the US has established sentencing guidelines, such as the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (FSGO), which create sentencing 
policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system.4005 The FSGO apply 
                                                     
4001 See THE GERMAN CODE 2017, supra note 3875 para 4.13; THE UK CODE 2016, supra note 
3151 para C.2.3; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2012, supra note 1813 at 10. 
4002 See supra Ch. 4, A.,II, p. 280; Ch. 6, B., p. 553 
4003 See supra Ch. 6, B., III, p. 561. 
4004 Compare Ch. 4, A., II.; Ch. 5, B.; Ch. 6, B. 
4005 See supra Ch. 4., A., 3., p. 258. 
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to corporations that have committed a federal crime, e.g. fraudulent misconduct 
pursuant to the SOX. These Guidelines recommend a range of a minimum up to a 
maximum period of imprisonment or levels of fines for offences relating to the 
handling of compliance issues, the size of the corporation, its prior history 
regarding corporate misconduct, and timely reporting to the US authorities. For 
example, corporations can be afforded credit and can reduce criminal penalties if 
they are able to prove that they had established an effective compliance 
procedures.4006  
As a matter of fact, the US Supreme Court has recognized the importance of 
these guidelines in the case United States v. Booker.4007 The overall advantage for 
corporations of these guidelines is that they clearly describe seven minimum 
criteria for an effective compliance program. One important criteria set forth in 
the Guidelines is that “specific individual(s) shall be delegated day-to-day responsibility 
and appropriate authority for the compliance and ethics program.”4008 Therefore, this 
criterion refers to the transfer of the compliance tasks from the members of the 
board to e.g. the compliance officer. In addition, the amended FSGO added an 
eighth criteria concerning the periodic assessment of the compliance procedure. 
This serves to ensure that the compliance program continues to be effective.4009 It 
has been recognized that the FSGO supported the creation of an entirely new job 
description: that of the corporate compliance officer through the assignment of 
compliance responsibilities. The guidelines led to a new focus on compliance 
structure, board oversight, and independent compliance reporting. The 
guidelines help to facilitate and enhance the role of the compliance officer, to 
integrate this function into the strategic corporate business and define his role 
more clearly.4010 In addition, the organizational guidelines also influence 
sentencing practice, government enforcement, and finally corporate compliance 
structures.4011 
                                                     
4006 See supra Ch. 4., A., 3.a, p. 261. 
4007 See supra United States v. Booker, supra note 1695. 
4008 See supra Ch. 4., A., 3.a., p. 261. 
4009 See supra Ch. 4., A., 3.b., p. 262. 
4010 See supra Ch. 4., A., 3.d., p. 271. 
4011 See supra Ch. 4., A., 3.c., p. 265. 
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To conclude, the overall system of guidance, guidelines, rulebooks, 
principles, and recommendations on the applicable law supports the refining and 
structuring of corporate compliance procedures within the framework of primary 
law. This system allows the companies flexibility in the implementation of 
compliance measures that fit the company’s needs and circumstances, while the 
primary law provides requirements, prohibitions and sanctions. By means of the 
guidelines, principles and recommendations, reference was made to a new 
oversight duty of the members of the board with respect to the compliance 
program, which was first held in the Caremark decision in 1996. This duty 
comprises the identification, assessment and management of all compliance risks, 
and ensuring that the company acts within the law. This system further refers to 
the practical handling of the oversight or compliance duty through e.g. the 
delegation of this duty to a specific individual, such as to a compliance officer. 
Due to the recommendation that the board should remain informed about 
compliance issues, the board has to consider appropriate reporting lines. 
Consequently, the system of guidance, guidelines, principles and 
recommendations has contributed to the increasing numbers of compliance 
officers, to the establishment of a standalone compliance function, to the 
determination of reporting lines, and to a new job description.  
B. THE FINDINGS OF THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 
OFFICERS’ MODEL 
Referring back to the major goal of this doctoral thesis, which was to 
establish a modern and dynamic role of the German corporate compliance officer, 
the selected relevant primary and secondary law concerning compliance and the 
corporate compliance officer in the US, the UK and in Germany have been 
examined. In addition, due to the absence of case law with respect to corporate 
compliance officers’ liability, chapters four to six analyzed case law with respect 
to compliance officers’ liability within the financial services sector and its 
findings, as well as case law regarding compliance duties. By examining the legal 
framework and compliance case law together, the findings have provided an 
overall picture of the role of the corporate compliance officer. That is why the 
third hypothesis cannot be confirmed, because both the legal framework and the 
case law were helpful in achieving the goal of this work. 
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H3 It can be assumed that, due to the limited number of judicial decisions on the 
compliance officer’s role in the common law system, it would be useful to analyze the legal 
framework pertaining to the corporate compliance officer.4012 
Despite existing differences between the American and English common 
law, shared characteristics such as the prevalence of case law and common law 
principles is similar. Hence, this thesis has attempted to reflect the strengths of 
both the common law and civil law systems and has attempted to incorporate 
these. For this reason, chapter two presented a brief comparison of the common 
law and civil law systems, and in particular the fundamental differences between 
them, and it has been shown that, despite substantial differences, both legal 
systems have evolved, adapted, and converged over the course of time. The major 
differences can be seen to exist between the common law system in the US and 
Germany. On the basis of the impact of EU law on the English common law, 
English law appears more centralized, structured and consistent, similar to 
German law. Finally, chapter two set out the fundamental cornerstone of the 
analysis of the US, UK and German law with respect to compliance and the 
compliance officer.  
In addition, chapter three outlined the legal roots and background of 
compliance and the compliance officer function to categorize the current situation 
in the US, UK and Germany. Generally, it is assumed that the roots of compliance 
originated in the US at the beginning of the 19(th) century, but it has been noted 
that the first attempt to achieve compliance was to limit the unfair practices of 
brokers and stock-jobbers in the UK in the 17(th) century. Hence, the earliest form 
of compliance and the compliance officer post were found in the financial services 
sector in the UK. It seems that the English concept of compliance comprises a 
narrow definition and takes place in a generally more ordered development than 
the US concept of compliance and its development. However, due to the huge 
increase in the establishment of companies, and in in the growth of fraudulent 
actions by those companies at the beginning of the 19(th) century, the legal 
framework with respect to compliance has expanded significantly. As we have 
seen, American and English companies preferred to tend towards formal rules 
and corporate norms. In contrast to the early development in the UK and US, it 
                                                     
4012 See supra Ch. 2, C., II., p. 112. 
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has been noted that there are no cultural background and legal origins of 
compliance in Germany. Apparently, the emergence of German compliance is 
connected with the global business of German corporations listed on US and UK 
stock exchanges. Thus, the term compliance and the compliance officer’s function 
are relatively new in Germany compared with the UK and US. 
Having compared the two legal systems, the historical classification, and the 
analysis of the legal framework, chapters four to six revealed and illustrated the 
models of the US, UK and German corporate compliance officer. The three 
models introduced the responsibilities, the legal duties, and liabilities incumbent 
upon corporate compliance officers.4013 There followed a description of the role 
such as a high-level control, oversight, multifunctional in the US, a command and 
control function in the UK, and a control and monitoring function at a high 
corporate level in Germany.4014 Hence, the common element of all three models is 
the description as a control function. This indicates that the compliance function 
emerged in the context of the enforcement of the legal environment, because legal 
requirements need controls for the implementation. The enforcement of the 
legislation, the regulatory framework and case law particularly in the areas of 
corporate law, bribery law and criminal law, as well as and the continuous 
increase in the duties of the boards and directors, such as the creation of a new 
oversight duty, have led to the emergence of a standalone established compliance 
officer post through the delegation of compliance tasks by the members of the 
board to the compliance function. Due to the growing number of statutory 
provisions, companies are required to assign compliance tasks to an independent 
standalone compliance function with the authority in order to fulfil the 
responsibilities and duties effectively. Hence, the personal liability of the 
corporate compliance officer has also increased. Additionally, in the US and in the 
UK, the requirements imposed by regulators and prosecutors have shaped a 
formal position of the compliance officer through a cooperative collaboration with 
them in the event of misconduct. Therefore, the findings of these three models 
have confirmed assumptions two, six and seven of this thesis:  
                                                     
4013 See generally Ch. 4, C., p. 345, Ch. 5, C., p. 469, Ch. 6, C., p. 565. 
4014 See generally Ch. 4, C., p. 345, Ch. 5, C., p. 469, Ch. 6, C., p. 565. 
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H2 It can be anticipated that the compliance officer has been emerged with enhanced 
legal requirements because the legal framework could establish a formal position of 
authority for the compliance officer at a high corporate level within companies. 4015 
H6 It can be suggested that due to this multifunctional role, the function of the 
corporate compliance officer is unable to develop an independent standalone position, 
because the responsibilities are not clearly delimited and defined.4016 
H7 It can be assumed that legislative regulation and a regulatory framework will be 
necessary to appoint an independent standalone compliance officer at a high-corporate 
level.4017 
However, it would be necessary to ascertain whether an independent 
function can conduct properly the assessment of business risks. Nevertheless, the 
findings of the thesis have shown and the proposed model of the German 
compliance officer recommended that the compliance officer should have more 
business expertise in addition to his legal expertise by means of incorporating 
him into business units. Thus, the compliance officer can oversee and monitor the 
risks effectively while at the same time acting independently. This suggested 
model may be able to cope with the challenge of the fifth hypothesis:  
H5 It can be assumed that the compliance officer is independent, he or she may not 
be sufficiently familiar with the risks of the business, because he or she is not involved 
enough in day-to-day business.4018 
In conclusion, the reasons for the emergence of the compliance functions are 
the response to a series of high-profile scandals of corporate companies through 
the introduction of a criminal justice framework to deter and penalize 
organizational misconduct. Overall, the enhancement of legal requirements and 
an appropriate degree of protection for consumers and investors, alongside the 
strengthening of shareholders’ rights have influenced and adapted corporate 
structures in all three countries on a delayed basis and in various ways. The 
compliance responsibility has reached the highest levels within corporations and 
will be implemented by corporate officers such as compliance officers. Finally, 
                                                     
4015 See supra Ch. 2, B., II., p.112. 
4016 See supra Ch. 2, B., II., p.112. 
4017 See supra Ch. 2, B., II., p.112. 
4018 See supra Ch. 2, B., II., p.112. 
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due to the differing history and the evolving nature of compliance and as a result 
of different legal approaches, the role of the compliance officer is assessed, 
discussed and formed differently in the US, UK and in Germany. 
I. How are the modern role and legal position of the Compliance Officer 
defined under the common law and in practice? 
The aim of this section is to highlight the key findings of chapters four and 
five with respect to the compliance officer under common law to present a model 
of their role and position. Corporate compliance officers are a group of corporate 
officers who are usually employed by companies under the employment law in 
the UK and under the employment at-will doctrine in the US. Generally, they are 
assigned partial compliance tasks and duties by the board of directors and act on 
behalf of the directors. As explored in chapters four and five, there is no statutory 
provision under corporate, criminal and bribery laws that clearly requires the 
designation of a compliance officer post or which stipulates in detail what the 
duties of the corporate compliance officer are in the private sector. Although their 
responsibilities are not legally defined such as for CEOs and CFOs under US State 
Corporation Law or the SOX in the US or for directors under company law in the 
UK, they must ensure that all corporate levels adhere to the rules, standards and 
the law. The findings in chapters four and five demonstrate that compliance tasks 
are complex and far-reaching, and that they have increased over the course of the 
last thirty years on the basis of the enforcement of the directors’ legal duties. In 
the meantime, the equitable and common law principles applicable to directors’ 
duties, which govern the relationship between the directors and the shareholders, 
are for the most part enshrined into law. The companies’ bylaws and the articles 
of association generally allow the delegation of directors’ duties to senior 
executives. However, the ultimate responsibility remains with the directors.  
In addition, the US and UK courts apply the same directors’ duties, such as 
the duty of care and loyalty, to corporate officers. For this reason, the corporate 
compliance officer under common law takes up a difficult position between 
business and regulation. On the one hand, they have to understand the nature of 
the company’s business, to identify, analyze and assess the business risk, and on 
the other hand, they sometimes have to restrict the business to ensure adherence 
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the to law. Therefore, in the US, it has been recognized that a succinct explanation 
of their roles could be a the ‘dual-hatted’ position of the compliance officer.4019 As 
delegation is allowed, another specific feature of the compliance officers under 
common law is that the compliance duties and responsibilities were spread over 
several corporate positions. The titles varied from CEO to General Counsel in the 
US and from director to company secretary in the UK. Thus, the compliance 
officer position is also referred to as a ’multifunctional role’. Another definition 
which describes the specific position within corporations could be as an 
‘intermediary’ or a ‘gatekeeper’ role, first between the employees in the business 
units and the board of directors and second, between the corporation and the 
regulators or prosecutors.4020 Hence, it is key that they act independently of the 
different parties.  
In the UK, the title of ‘compliance officer’ is transferred from other regulated 
industries, such as the financial services sector. As discussed in chapter five, this 
sector applies the control function regime. Consequently, in the UK, the corporate 
compliance officer’s position is emphasized as a ‘command and control model’ with 
a procedural approach.4021 This model reflects that compliance and its function 
within companies is more self-determined and self-controlled. Compliance 
officers shape their business control of risks by means of guidance by the 
regulators and prosecutors.4022 Hence, the compliance position is considered to 
improve the risk coordination and quality of risk documents. The difference is 
that the UK compliance officer more often has to deal with regulators and 
prosecutors, rulebooks and guidance even before an investigation is opened while 
the US compliance officer has to deal with regulators in the event of an 
investigation. In this regulatory and risk-focused environment, the compliance 
officer needs a diverse set of skills, e.g. a combination of communication and 
reporting skills, as well as business acumen in order to focus on specific risk areas 
of business. In particular, compliance personnel have to deal with various 
reporting lines inside and outside the company to keep the board of directors, the 
relevant committees, the business units affected by that risk area and the 
                                                     
4019 See supra Ch. 4, C., p. 345. 
4020 See supra Ch. 4, A., I., 2.d, p. 247. 
4021 See supra Ch. 5, C., p. 469. 
4022 See supra Ch. 5, C., p. 469. 
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regulators duly informed. Due to the complex nature of compliance tasks, the 
traditional general counsel, company secretary or staff with legal expertise 
performing compliance tasks will gradually be replaced with standalone 
compliance experts, who have personal experience with regulatory compliance 
and business background. The key task of compliance officers is the 
implementation of the requirements of legislators and regulators within 
companies. The compliance officer post is therefore categorized as a control 
function. As such, looking to the fourth hypothesis of this thesis, the first 
assumption is confirmed: 
H4 It can be assumed that the compliance officers’ post is categorized as a control function 
in order to implement legal requirements. For this reason, this function is viewed as “corporate 
cop”or “watchdog” and does not obtain effective and relevant information of the business, because 
employees are wary of them.4023 
In practice, compliance officers should be integrated within the business 
units in order to identify business risks on-the-spot and periodically check by 
means of unannounced surveys, audits and investigations to identify early risks 
and assess staff readiness. By understanding the business risks, they can identify 
where corrective actions are needed. Therefore, compliance officers should 
independently monitor and review business processes without specifically 
interfering with employees’ work. In the event that they are authorized to do so 
and have access to relevant meetings and documents, they can obtain the effective 
and relevant information needed. Thus, the second assumption of the fourth 
hypothesis could not be confirmed. 
By summarizing all of the results above, the model of the modern role and 
the legal position of the compliance officer in the US and UK can be illustrated as 
follows:4024 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4023 See supra Ch. 2, B., II., p.112. 
4024 See supra  
Figure 17, p. 603. 
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officer under common law 
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in the implementation of effective compliance structures. Finally, it can be argued 
that the model of the modern US and UK compliance officer’s role as a standalone 
independent control and a gatekeeper is a well-integrated function, which is 
responsible for implementing and monitoring the compliance measures in an 
effective manner, and on the other hand, for handling the coordination of 
compliance audit activities and communication of reporting results to all relevant 
parties.  
II. Which aspects are transferable to the German Compliance Officer?  
Having presented the model of the modern role and position of the 
corporate compliance officer under common law, this section will discuss which 
aspects could be adopted from this model to the German Compliance Officer. 
Although the differences between the common law and civil law show 
contrasting corporate board structures, contrasting handling of law by means of 
case law and the application to further cases versus the systematic codification of 
law, and the powers of regulators and prosecutors under common law, the 
German compliance officer’s role and position appears not to be very different 
than the US and UK compliance officers role within companies. The analysis of 
the legal framework in the US and UK has revealed that in the course of the last 
few years, extensive criminal and bribery statutes have developed where common 
law principles have been enshrined in statute. The US and UK Courts have also 
applied these statutory provisions to e.g. corporate liability. Additionally, 
chapters four and five established that the common law principles and doctrines 
are applicable even under a non-regulated framework. On the other hand, in the 
civil law systems such as in Germany, the case- law also plays a considerable role 
when interpreting and filling certain statutory provisions or gaps in the law. In 
addition, EU law has further influenced the convergence regarding the UK 
common law and the German civil law system. However, as previously 
examined, significant differences remain.4025 
For this reason, it was useful to comprehensively examine the relevant hard 
and soft law in the US and the UK, as compliance and the compliance officer 
function originated from these countries. This thesis went beyond the text of the 
                                                     
4025 See supra Ch. 2, A., II., p. 54. 
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relevant statutes and cases by using information from principles and guidance, 
legal scholars and practitioners, studies, available data and the actual practice of 
compliance officers in these countries. The findings were presented in figure 18, in 
the section above.4026 This allows for a consideration of which features could be 
applicable to the German compliance officer. In Germany, the legal scholars’ 
attention was focused on the corporate compliance officer when the BGH issued 
its widely discussed obiter dictum.4027 Since then, this function has come to the fore 
and a large-scale debate on the compliance officer’s liability has begun. However, 
after examining the US and UK statutes and the case law, it has been revealed that 
this discussion appears more and more excessive. Under common law, the courts 
apply the same duties to a corporate officer as to the directors, but the business 
judgement rule does not apply to an officer. Nevertheless, US State Corporation 
Law refers to possible indemnification, which implies reimbursement for the costs 
of litigation for directors and officers in the event they are held personally liable. 
Chapter six examined the situation that under German criminal law, the liability 
of the compliance officer can be limited, for example in accordance with his 
delegated area of responsibility. Additionally, the German compliance officer is 
protected under the Unfair Dismissal Act. In the US, the compliance officer 
seldom receives a written employment contract. In the majority of cases, he works 
under the employment at-will doctrine. In view of these findings, it is doubtful 
whether the enforcement of the legal duties of directors and officers under 
common law should be applied in the same way to the German compliance 
officer. This approach cannot be accepted because it has been recognized that the 
ultimate responsibility remains with the members of the board. However, due to 
the absence thus far of any case law holding a corporate compliance officer 
personally liable in the US, UK and Germany, it is difficult to argue which 
approach is better or worse.  
Therefore, the other features of the corporate compliance officer under 
common law should be considered. When taking into account two aspects of the 
modern role and position of the US and UK compliance officer, such as the 
development as a standalone and independent compliance function with business 
expertise, and the integration within business units, it can be noted that in 
                                                     
4026 See supra Figure 17, p. 604. 
4027 See supra Ch. 6, A., III., 4.a., p. 516. 
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practice, the German compliance officer embodies several of these features as we 
have seen in figure 15.4028 The reason for this could be the late emergence of the 
German compliance officer compared to its US and UK counterparts. Thus, in 
practice, the Anglo-American approach to this function has already served in part 
as a model for German companies. These and further aspects of the compliance 
officers’ model under common law will be examined with indications as to their 
effectiveness which could be adopted from the common law model. 
Firstly, both models of the compliance officer under common law and 
under civil law have shown that this post is integrated at the high corporate level 
in order to effectively deal with compliance issues.4029 Many companies in the US, 
UK and Germany, in the initial period, employed an officer with legal expertise 
and the authority to ensure compliance. These functions were referred to as ‘dual-
hatted’ role. Over recent years, based on the enforcement of compliance duties, the 
increasing scope of the responsibilities, and the growing focus on business risk 
manangement, the compliance officers’ function has been established as an 
independent standalone corporate function in order to perform the job effectively.  
Secondly, under civil law, compliance is defined as “organized legal 
conformity”, which, as under common law, also means adherence to the law. 
Under common law, compliance is viewed as “a system of policies and controls” or 
as a form of internal control. Additionally, the line of Delaware cases has 
developed a new duty of oversight under common law. Hence, the compliance 
officer is clearly defined as a control and oversight function. Although it has been 
illustrated that the German compliance officer is also assigned certain control and 
monitoring tasks by the members of the board, this aspect could be emphasized 
and enhanced in practice. On the other hand, the continual expansion of the 
responsibility could lead to an increase of the degree of liability of the compliance 
officer. These should be carefully weighed against one another. 
Thirdly, another aspect which should be considered is that the US and the 
UK understood original compliance and its background as an issue is carried out 
by a company not for a company. Hence, compliance is performed by the 
company itself by means of ‘self-regulation’ and has traditionally not been 
                                                     
4028 See supra Ch. 6, C., II., Figure 14, p. 574. 
4029 Compare Ch. 6, C., II., Figure 14, p. 574; Ch. 7, B., II., Figure 17, p. 603. 
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provided by an external source. However, over the last forty years, the legal 
framework in terms of compliance has increased significantly, but the self-
regulated thinking and handling of compliance issues and concerning the 
compliance function have remained. Thus, the compliance officer under common 
law plays a more proactive role in the implementation of corporate compliance 
structures. Recently, in the US and UK, it has been required that the compliance 
function should actively participate in the setting of corporate strategy to identify 
and manage compliance risks. Simultaneous compliance officers should be 
integrated within business units to better understand and to identify the business 
risks.4030 Hence, the ideal model of the compliance officer under common law 
encompasses a proactive, well-integrated role within corporations. This aspect of 
the model can be transferred to the dynamic German compliance officers model. 
In Germany, the mindset is oriented more towards guidelines from outside. 
However, due to the absence of compliance guidance by the legislator or a 
regulator within the private sector, corporations and compliance officers should 
more actively shape compliance issues.  
Fourthly, the next aspect refers to clearly required reporting lines. Under 
agency law, the employee as an agent has the duty to provide information to the 
principal on relevant facts, for example compliance issues. In addition, the legal 
framework, in the form for instance of the SOX, the FSGO, the US Principles, the 
DoJ and their DPAs, the UK Code 2015 and the enforcement of disclosure to 
investors and shareholders require an effective and periodic corporate reporting 
mechanism in respect of the compliance program. Reports must be submitted to 
the board and to regulators, because the board has to review, report, and confirm 
aspects such as compliance controls in their annual report. For example, the FSGO 
has set standards for reporting by the high-level personnel. They should have 
direct access to the board. As PWC studies have shown, US and UK companies 
have enhanced their compliance risk reporting within the company based on legal 
requirements and risk assessment results in practice.4031 Nevertheless, the 
corporation must also ensure an effective reporting line is in place outside the 
company with investigators or regulators. In the US, for example, the Yates Memo 
sets out the new approach that the company must completely disclose to the DoJ 
                                                     
4030 See supra Ch. 4, A., I., 3. d, p. 271; Ch. 5, C., I., p. 469. 
4031 See PwC-Study 2014 , supra note 8; PwC-Study 2015 , supra note 1799. 
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all relevant facts about individual misconduct if they hope to be given credit in 
the event of investigation under the FSGO.4032 Furthermore, in the context of its 
DPAs, the DoJ in some cases requires in the DPAs Attachment the establishment 
of a periodic reporting system to the agency by the compliance officer concerning 
e.g. suspected criminal conduct. The reporting requirements also include 
communications with regulators, which the English compliance officers usually 
carry out prior to the occurrence of corporate criminal conduct and before an 
investigation has been opened. Therefore, the compliance officer under common 
law plays a ‘gatekeeper’ role inside and outside the company. This ‘gatekeeper’ role 
of the corporate compliance officer is absent in Germany. The question of whether 
and how the company will inform the German Public Prosecutor's Office in the 
event of internal investigations or in the event of the filing of a criminal complaint 
against the company depends on the individual case. However, it is not a 
frequent practice and a matter of some controversy for the German company or 
the compliance officer to cooperate fully with the prosecutor before, at the 
beginning of and during the course of an investigation. There is no incentive such 
as The US mitigating system. Nevertheless, the ‘gatekeeper’ role could serve as a 
role model for the German compliance officer. In Germany, the extent and the 
recipient of the compliance officers reporting and documentation duties are 
regulated by his contract of employment.4033 As we have seen, the compliance 
officer is viewed as interface or switching point within companies. However, it is 
suggested that additional incentives be provided to companies in Germany just 
like in the US and the UK, to enhance disclosure and cooperation with regulators 
or prosecutors in the event of corporate misconduct. 
Therefore, fifth, another aspect comes to light, namely the absence of 
guidance from the German legislator with respect to the interpretation of the 
statutory regulation. It will be helpful for companies of all legal forms and sizes to 
obtain guidance and information by means of manuals, guidelines or rulebooks 
on the legal issues involved, e.g. including who and what is covered by the 
relevant statutes, the definitions of relevant legal terms, what is encompassed in 
certain terms and how preventative measures such as the compliance officers 
                                                     
4032 See supra Ch. 4, A., I., 1.d., p. 225, See supra Memorandum for Assistant Attorney 
General Yates and DOJ, supra note 1325 at 3. 
4033 See supra Ch. 6, A., IV., 6., p.551. 
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function should be designed. Hence, manuals, guidelines or rulebooks can 
provide valuable support in the implementation of corporate preventative 
measures and assist the German compliance officer’s work. 
Finally, the last aspect that will be highlighted is indemnification under 
common law. US State Corporation Law has adopted provisions on when the 
company has power or may indemnify its officers and directors “against expenses 
including attorneys' fees, judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement” to 
absorb the losses if they acted in good faith.4034 In addition, under common law, 
there is a possibility for the compliance officer to negotiate an indemnity clause in 
their employment contracts to the effect that one contractual party agrees to 
“indemnify” the other.4035 These provisions and contract terms aim to protect the 
indemnified party against third-party claims. German law does not provide for 
any such statutory “indemnification”. In practice, it is not customary to include 
such indemnification clauses in employment contracts. This aspect seems to be 
appropriate to adopt into the German model of the compliance officer and into 
German law. Nevertheless, it should apply only to the members of board and to 
high-level control functions, such as the chief compliance officer, who has overall 
responsibility for compliance in the event that he acted without willful intent or 
gross negligence.  
In conclusion, despite the considerable similarities presented by the model 
of the compliance officer under both common law and civil law, there are several 
aspects that could also be fitted to the German compliance officer model. This 
section has examined six aspects with respect to the compliance officers’ role 
within companies: (1) the development into an independent standalone function 
with business expertise, (2) the enhancement as a control and oversight function, 
(3) the shaping of a proactive role embedded in strategic thinking, (4) the 
development into a function with a ‘gatekeeper’ role, (5) the development of 
guidance from the German legislator, which supports the compliance officer’s 
work and (6) the adoption of statutory indemnification provisions and 
indemnification clauses to protect the chief compliance officer in particular 
against high damages payments. The adoption of aspects of these is 
                                                     
4034 See supra Ch. 4, A. II., p. 280. 
4035 See supra Ch. 5, A., IV. 4.c., p. 449. 
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recommendable, but the second aspect should be carefully considered in practice. 
The findings of this section will be shown below in the final presentation of the 
modern and dynamic role of the corporate compliance officer in Germany.  
C. THE MODERN AND DYNAMIC MODEL OF THE GERMAN CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE OFFICER. 
This thesis has identified the modern and dynamic role of the establishment 
of a compliance function within American, British, and German private sector 
companies. The work can contribute to a better understanding and strengthening 
of the German compliance officer’s position within companies by examining the 
compliance officer’s role under common law. In the course of this thesis, the legal 
framework, the case law, rules, principles, guidance relating to the law, the legal 
literature, views of legal scholars, available data from regulators and prosecutors, 
as well as bylaws were examined in order to present a modern and dynamic role 
of the German compliance officer with aspects derived from both the civil and the 
common law. The US and UK common law model has served as a role model 
because compliance and the compliance officers function originated from the UK 
and the US. However, despite the historical development, legal roots and 
background under common law, it cannot be verified that the corporate 
compliance officer function is better defined and standardized in the common law 
than in the civil law system due to the absence of any legal definition within the 
private sector. As we have seen, under common law, there are more guidelines on 
the establishment of this function. As such, the findings of this thesis have not 
confirmed the first hypothesis: 
H1 Due to the legal framework the function of the compliance officer is better 
defined and standardized in the common law than in the civil law system on account of 
the specific historical and legal development.4036 
However, the thesis has recognized that through the enforcement of the 
legal framework with respect to compliance, the corporate compliance officer’s 
position and his duties have more clearly shaped his role in practice and this is 
taken into consideration in the development of the modern and dynamic model 
                                                     
4036 See supra Ch. 2, C., II., p. 112. 
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proposed. The modern and dynamic model of the corporate compliance officer 
provides suggestions on his role to be included in the risk business process, but 
the company is also permitted to develop its own model of this function to reflect 
the specific nature of the business, its size and its legal form.  
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Diplomatic reporting 
          Reporting in the event of escalation 
 
Figure 18 - The Modern and Dynamic Model of the German Compliance Officer 
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In the first instance, this flexible model could apply to the two-tier system 
for German listed companies, which fall within the scope of the German Stock 
Corporation Act (AktG), such as the joint-stock company (AG) and the 
partnerships limited by shares (KGaA). Besides these two legal forms, this model 
may also be suited to companies with limited liability (GmbH) pursuant to the 
Limited Liability Companies Act (GmbHG) and to small-medium sized 
companies, which operate without a supervisory board, a management board and 
a compliance committee. For this purpose, therefore, it is suggested that the 
management board could be replaced by the managing director or the owner of 
the company. Based on the fact that in smaller companies the high corporate level 
can be absent, the senior executive level may be deleted in the model. By contrast, 
the aspects of the corporate compliance officer’s post described may be suited to 
all sizes and legal forms of companies. This model, therefore, could be 
incorporated into all types of companies. 
Finally, a key consideration in relation to the suggested model would be the 
development of the definition applicable to the German compliance officer’s post. 
Having examined and analysized the findings in chapters four to six and having 
summarizing the key aspects that could be adopted from the common law model 
to the German Compliance Officer, it can be concluded that the essential aspects 
of the compliance officers post identified should be taken into account when 
defining of the corporate compliance officer. The aspects to be included in the 
definition are: the embedding of this function within companies; the linkage 
between the compliance tasks, the position and the status of the compliance 
officer; as well as corporate requirements for the compliance officer. Based on the 
knowledge that the key aspects of the definition of compliance officer in chapter 
three4037 were expanded to include aspects of the common law model and the 
modern and dynamic model of the German Compliance Officer, presented in 
figure 19 above,4038 the general definition of the German Compliance Officer can be 
outlined as follows: 
The independent standalone German Corporate Compliance Officer is an 
employee at a high corporate level, who is delegated with certain compliance tasks with a 
                                                     
4037 See supra The definition of the compliance officer in Ch. 3, B., p. 176. 
4038 See supra Figure 18, p. 613. 
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status of a guarantor, plays a proactive and gatekeeping role, is embedded in business 
units, is designated as a control and oversight function with business expertise with direct 
access and periodic reporting duties to the management board or the managing director.  
In view of the modern and dynamic model of the German corporate 
compliance officer and the general definition of this post as developed in this 
thesis, and based on the knowledge derived from these, there follow some 
recommendations for future research. As the regulatory requirements of 
compliance processes continue to be enforced, it would be worthwhile to examine 
the links between access by regulators and prosecutors to corporate data and 
individuals via the corporate compliance officer, his role within corporate 
investigations in the event of corporate misconduct by employees and the 
embedding of the compliance function and procedures into day-to-day business. 
This would provide a clearer and sharper picture of the compliance officer. It 
remains to be seen how this corporate function will be developed: either into an 
‘extended arm’ of the legislation or into an truly indepentend corporate function. 
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